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ABSTRACT 
 
ERIC CONRAD STEINHART: Creating Killers: The Nazification of the Black Sea Germans 
and the Holocaust in Southern Ukraine, 1941-1944 
(Under the direction of Christopher R. Browning) 
 
Transnistria, a multiethnic region along southern Ukraine‘s Black Sea coast that 
Germany ceded to Romania, was an epicenter of the Holocaust in the conquered Soviet 
Union.  This dissertation explores the role of the area‘s ethnically German or Volksdeutsche 
minority in the Holocaust.  The region‘s ethnic Germans, the so-called Black Sea Germans, 
were the largest Germanophone population to come under Nazi control in the conquered 
Soviet Union.  To secure local German-speakers as the demographic foundation for the 
future German domination of southern Ukraine, the SS (Schutzstaffel) deployed a special unit 
to administer the area‘s ethnic Germans.  Almost immediately, the region‘s ethnic 
multiplicity hampered the SS‘s efforts to identify suitable ethnic Germans to mobilize for the 
Nazi cause.  German officials responded to this ethnic ambiguity by establishing a mercurial 
occupation regime that undercut Romanian authority by rewarding cooperative local 
residents with comparatively lavish material rewards and brutalizing allegedly recalcitrant 
area denizens.  In the midst of the SS‘s Nazification project in the region, Romanian 
deportation of Jews into rural Transnistria threatened to spread epidemic disease to the 
region‘s ethnic Germans.  Local SS commanders deployed the region‘s ethnic German 
militia forces, the only personnel at their disposal, to murder the Jewish deportees in one of 
the Holocaust‘s most intense episodes.  Despite having had historically good relations with 
their Jewish neighbors, local ethnic Germans responded to situational pressures that Nazi rule 
iv 
 
created—not least of which was the opportunity to clarify their ethnic status in SS eyes by 
taking part in the Holocaust—and murdered Jews with enthusiasm. 
 This dissertation analyzes the constellation of motivations that moved a group of 
murderers to participate in some of the Holocaust‘s most brutal crimes.  Based heavily on the 
example of German killers, scholars have long rejected postwar apologist claims of coercion 
and highlighted individual agency to explain why perpetrators participate in genocide.  While 
this insight remains key to understanding perpetrator behavior, my research demonstrates 
that, within the context of war and a violent occupation, the Nazi regime could bring forceful 
situational pressures to bear on prospective killers that provided it with powerful leverage to 
encourage them to murder. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 During the Second World War, German authorities and their local helpers killed some 
two and a half million Jews in the occupied Soviet Union.1  The large swath of Soviet 
territory that Germany and its allies occupied from the Baltic to Black Sea was not simply the 
crucible of the Holocaust, but it was also a region of singular importance to Nazi ambitions.  
Guided by the belief that territorial expansion in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union was 
the only way to provide the agricultural base needed to secure the Third Reich‘s global 
dominance, the Nazi regime attempted to remove supposedly racially undesirable Jews and 
Slavs and to gain permanent control of the region by settling it with Germans.  Wartime 
German authorities regarded Soviet Jewry as the most inferior of the region‘s numerous 
allegedly inferior peoples and as the Soviet state‘s puppeteers.  They were therefore the first 
group that the Nazis targeted.  Future German designs, however, were far more expansive.  
After winning the war against the Soviet Union, Nazi planners envisioned settling their new 
empire‘s breadbasket with Germans, whose militarized, agricultural settlements would dot 
the countryside and cement lasting economic autarky.  In this brave new National Socialist 
world, local Slavs would remain as laborers until German industry could supplant them with 
agricultural machinery.  Then, they too would share the grim fate of their Jewish neighbors.  
For the Nazi regime, the destruction of Soviet Jewry was the opening gambit in a broader 
                                                 
1 This figure reflects the number of victims in the pre-1939 borders of the Soviet Union and territories 
that it annexed between 1939 and 1941.  Yitzhak Arad, The Holocaust in the Soviet Union (Lincoln: University 
of Nebraska Press, 2009), 525. 
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planned genocidal demographic revolution in conquered Soviet territory.2 
  Over the course of the Second World War, Nazi authorities had to content themselves 
with a more modest pilot program of demographic engineering.  Absent the excess 
population in the Reich or the resources to begin settling Germans in the conquered Soviet 
Union—particularly after the conflict expanded into a global war against the United States in 
December 1941—the Nazi regime sought to develop a German population bulwark in the 
area to secure lasting claims to Soviet territory.  In lieu of more grandiose plans, the Third 
Reich decided to marshal the territory‘s ethnic Germans or Volksdeutschen (hereafter 
Volksdeutsche) as the demographic basis for permanent control of the region.  The largest 
population of Soviet ethnic Germans to come under the control of the Third Reich was the 
so-called Black Sea Germans (Schwartzmeerdeutschen), 130,000 Volksdeutsche in southern 
Ukraine‘s Odessa oblast‘ (region). 3  Between the arrival of German forces in fall 1941 and 
the German evacuation of all Volksdeutsche from the region in early 1944, this group became 
the focus of Nazi efforts to marshal Volksdeutsche as a demographic toehold on conquered 
Soviet territory.  Although limited by the scarce resources available for non-military missions 
in the occupied Soviet Union, local German administrators launched an intensive and brutal 
Nazification program to mobilize area Volksdeutsche for the National Socialist cause.  When 
unanticipated situational factors moved area German authorities to enlist the help of local 
Volksdeutsche in the mass shooting of Jews, the region‘s ethnic Germans responded by 
fielding some of the most heavily implicated Holocaust perpetrators.  This dissertation 
                                                 
2 Gerhard L. Weinberg, Visions of Victory: The Hopes of Eight World War II Leaders (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), 32-33. 
3 German Police Decodes Nr 2 Traffic: 19.2.43, March 1, 1943, British National Archives [Hereafter 
BNA], HW 16, Piece 37, Part 1, 5.  Stabbefehl Nr. 101, April 10, 1943, Bundesarchiv Berlin [Hereafter BB], R 
59/67, 105.   
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explores Nazi Volksdeutsche policy in southern Ukraine and analyzes the participation of 
area ethnic Germans in the Holocaust. 
 Nazi planners were by no means the first to conceive of German-speaking minorities 
as the demographic foundation for German territorial expansion in the area.  Prior to the First 
World War, Pan-German thinkers—many of them members of German-speaking 
minorities—regarded the Volksdeutsche of Eastern Europe and the Russian Empire as a 
potential aid to Germany‘s land grab in the East.4  At the twilight of the First World War, 
temporary German military hegemony in the occupied territories of the former Russian 
Empire permitted area German commanders to advance German influence there by 
undergirding local Volksdeutsche.5  Germany‘s defeat in 1918 increased the importance of 
German-speaking minorities in East Central and Eastern Europe as a vehicle for projecting 
German power in the region.  With the postwar reallocation of the German Empire‘s eastern 
periphery to Poland and the disintegration of Austro-Hungary, German-speakers, formerly 
dominant members of Germanophone empires, became minority populations in newly 
formed states.  Succoring ethnic German minorities abroad was no longer a matter of 
supporting future territorial expansion deep into the Russian steppe, but of maintaining a 
demographic claim to land that many Germans regarded as part of the German state‘s 
historical borders.  To this end, the Weimar Republic underpinned these minorities financially 
and flexed its diplomatic muscle to secure their linguistic and cultural autonomy.6 
                                                 
4 Ingeborg Fleischhauer, Die Deutschen im Zarenreich: Zwei Jahrhunderte deutsche-russische 
Kulturgemeinschaft (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1986), 393. 
5 Ibid., 583-585. 
6 John Hidden, ―The Weimar Republic and the Problem of Auslandsdeutsche,‖ Journal of 
Contemporary History, 12, no. 2 (1977), 273-289. 
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  State support for ethnic German minorities continued after the Nazi seizure of power 
in 1933.  As in the Weimar Republic, the new Nazi regime sought to employ Volksdeutsche 
communities as a demographic basis upon which to reverse Germany‘s territorial losses after 
the First World War.  In contrast to efforts during the Weimar Republic, however, the Nazi 
regime centralized ethnic German affairs under the aegis of the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle 
(Ethnic German Liaison Office) or VoMi, a Nazi party organ that later functioned as part of 
the German state.  This move not only coordinated the cacophony of state and private actors 
working on behalf of Volksdeutsche during the Weimar Republic, but it also communicated a 
unified National Socialist message to German minorities abroad.  During the mid-1930s, 
Heinrich Himmler‘s SS (Schutzstaffel, Protection Squadron) populated the VoMi, making it 
effectively an SS agency by the eve of the Second World War.7  Adolf Hitler‘s appointment 
of Himmler as Reichskommissar für die Festigung deutschen Volkstums (Reich Commissar 
for the Strengthening of Germandom) in October 1939 cemented Volksdeutsche affairs 
squarely within the SS‘s domain.8 
 During the late 1930s and early 1940s, the Third Reich used ethnic German 
minorities abroad as a tool for Hitler‘s foreign policy.  In 1938, Hitler employed trumped up 
accusations of assaults against ethnic Germans as a pretext for annexing the Sudetenland and 
ultimately occupying the rest of Czechoslovakia.  The following September, alleged 
mistreatment of ethnic Germans in Poland constituted a key Nazi justification for invading 
                                                 
7 Valdis O. Lumans, Himmler’s Auxiliaries: The Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle and the German National 
Minorities of Europe, 1933-1945 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1993), 64-66. 
8 On the Reichskommissar für die Festigung deutschen Volkstums see Robert L. Koehl, RKFDV: 
German Resettlement and Population Policy, 1939-1945: A History of the Reich Commission for the 
Strengthening of Germandom (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957).  Markus Leniger, 
Nationalsozialistische “Volkstumsarbeit” und Umsiedlungspolitik 1933-1945: von der Minderheitenbetreuung 
zur Siedlerauslese (Berlin: Frank & Timme, 2006). 
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that country.  While the presence of Volksdeutsche minorities in Czechoslovakia and Poland 
facilitated Hitler‘s foreign policy aims, ethnic German populations elsewhere in Eastern 
Europe presented a diplomatic stumbling block, particularly in areas that the 1939 Molotov-
Ribbentrop Pact had designed as part of the Soviet Union‘s sphere of influence.  Hitler 
ordered Himmler and the VoMi to relocate Volksdeutsche from the Baltic, Volhynia, 
Bessarabia, and northern Bukovina to German-occupied Poland.  There, rather than impeding 
the Third Reich‘s immediate foreign policy aims, Eastern European Volksdeutsche could 
contribute what the Nazis regarded as valuable biological material to secure the German 
domination of Eastern Europe.9 
 With the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, the Nazi regime 
reversed its short-lived policy of relocating Volksdeutsche from the Soviet sphere of 
influence.  Now at war with the Soviet Union, and at least initially confident of a speedy 
victory over the Red Army, the VoMi took charge of the country‘s remaining Volksdeutsche, 
whom Soviet authorities had not permitted to relocate to German-controlled territory prior to 
the invasion.  Himmler dispatched Sonderkommando R (Special Command R[ussia]), a 
special VoMi unit to succor and mobilize ethnic Germans in conquered Soviet territory as the 
demographic seeds of the region‘s future Germanization.  Removed from the VoMi‘s normal 
chain of command at its genesis and subordinated directly to the Office of Reichsführer SS, 
Sonderkommando R functioned as Himmler‘s back pocket Volksdeutsche affairs unit in the 
occupied Soviet Union.  Its orders were to operate in both the German-occupied Soviet 
Union and, perhaps more importantly, in territory along the Black Sea that the Third Reich 
had granted to its Romanian allies.  To secure Romanian participation in the invasion of the 
                                                 
9 Lumans, Himmler’s Auxiliaries, 157-179. 
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Soviet Union, Hitler promised his counterpart, Ion Antonescu, a Romanian occupation zone 
between the Dniester and Bug Rivers in southwestern Ukraine—so-called Transnistria.  
While this territory proved an irresistible prize for Antonescu, whose country went to war 
alongside the Germans, it also placed the largest population of Volksdeutsche in the occupied 
Soviet Union under the control of a foreign power.  Like other hardcore Nazi ideologues, 
Himmler feared that the Black Sea Germans would languish under Romanian rule, and 
directed Sonderkommando R to deploy to the region. 
 In Romanian-occupied Transnistria, the SS had unique latitude to begin the long-term 
Germanization of conquered Soviet territory.  Unlike in the German-occupied Soviet Union, 
where Himmler‘s subordinates confronted powerful German organizations, such as the 
military and Civil Administration, whose representatives often did not cooperate with the SS, 
in Transnistria Sonderkommando R had to contend with the Third Reich‘s Romanian allies.  
Owing to high-level agreements between the SS and their Romanian counterparts, which 
ceded responsibility for ethnic German affairs in the region to Sonderkommando R, and the 
willingness of area SS officers to run roughshod over local Romanian occupation officials, 
the SS carved out unique autonomy in Transnistria.  Nowhere else in German-dominated 
Europe did the SS have such unfettered freedom to mobilize local German-speakers as a 
vanguard of future German settlement.  Examining Sonderkommando R‘s Volksdeutsche 
project in Transnistria provides an exceptional window into embryonic Nazi plans for the 
German-occupied Soviet Union. 
 Spread thinly across Romanian-occupied southern Ukraine, Sonderkommando R‘s 
personnel undertook the daunting task of molding a group of German-speakers with limited 
historical interactions with Germany into a Nazi demographic bulwark in conquered Soviet 
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territory.  In anticipation of the agricultural Germanophone settlements that were to become 
the basis for Nazi rule in the East, the SS sought to establish a dominant economic position 
for local Volksdeutsche communities by securing their privileged access to the region‘s 
agricultural resources and providing them with property stolen from murdered Jews.  To 
cement their adherence to the National Socialist cause, Sonderkommando R unfurled an 
impressive propaganda enterprise that emphasized winning ―the hearts and minds‖ of 
Transnistria‘s Volksdeutsche youth. 
 Without establishing the boundaries of ―Germanness‖ in the region, however, these 
heady designs were for naught.  Creating what the Nazi regime hoped would become the 
bastions of Germandom in the conquered Soviet Union required Sonderkommando R‘s 
personnel to identify which local residents belonged to the Volksgemeinschaft, the Nazi racial 
community.  This component of the SS‘s mission in Transnistria proved particularly 
problematic.  Despite extensive institutional experience identifying and relocating ethnic 
Germans across Eastern Europe prior to 1941, the VoMi had been unable to operationalize a 
definition for a category as ambiguous as ethnic identity.  Local circumstances exacerbated 
this handicap.  As a German-speaking population with circumscribed historical contacts to 
Germany and few opportunities to demonstrate an affinity for the National Socialist agenda 
prior to the war—a metric that the VoMi had employed earlier in Eastern Europe to gauge 
―Germanness‖—the Black Sea Germans defied even the SS‘s haphazard ethnic 
categorization measures.  The Black Sea Germans‘ interwar history made them, in SS eyes, 
particularly problematic.  The VoMi feared that decades of ―Judeo-Bolshevik‖ rule had 
corroded the racial purity and political reliability of would-be local ethnic Germans.  This left 
Sonderkommando R‘s personnel ruling a population that they regarded as simultaneously 
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particularly suspicious and difficult to classify.  Local ethnic Germans profited from their 
ambiguous status by manipulating the amorphous category‘s boundaries to their own 
advantage and often to secure the protection and material privileges that Volksdeutsche 
standing granted to their Ukrainian and sometimes Jewish friends and relatives.  When 
Sonderkommando R‘s personnel discovered that their efforts to identify local ethnic Germans 
had failed, they launched a violent campaign against area residents whose racial 
backgrounds, political orientations, or behavior the SS regarded as unworthy of the planned 
Nazi racial community in the conquered Soviet Union. 
 In the midst of the SS‘s efforts to mobilize the Black Sea Germans as the foundations 
for Nazi rule in occupied Soviet territory, unanticipated situational factors moved local VoMi 
commanders to enlist Volksdeutsche assistance in the mass murder of Jews in Transnistria.  
During fall 1941, the Antonescu regime deported Jews from territories that it had acquired 
during the course of Operation Barbarossa to a series of camps and ghettos near Odessa and 
along the Bug River‘s right bank.  Cognizant that the appalling sanitary conditions in which 
Romanian authorities housed their Jewish captives threatened to precipitate a typhus 
epidemic that could spread to local Volksdeutsche communities, Sonderkommando R 
acceded to Romanian requests to assist in murdering Jewish prisoners near the Bug River in 
mid-December 1941.  Without other personnel in the region, the SS deployed its ethnic 
German militia (Volksdeutsche Selbstschutz) units—formations that German authorities had 
conceived to defend against Romanian banditry—to carry out mass shooting operations in 
which tens of thousands of Jews perished.  Initially, Sonderkommando R regarded its foray 
into mass murder as a temporary detour from its central mission to underpin local 
Volksdeutsche.  Romanian authorities, however, recognized that, if pressed, 
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Sonderkommando R and its ethnic German militiamen could lend invaluable assistance to 
solving their Jewish ―problem.‖  When occupation officials in German-occupied Ukraine 
refused to permit their Romanian counterparts to deport Jews across the Bug River and into 
German-controlled territory, the Romanian government resolved to send its Jewish prisoners 
to villages at the heart of Sonderkommando R‘s Volksdeutsche population project in 
northeastern Transnistria.  Confronted with the renewed threat of racial ―contamination‖ and 
epidemic disease, Sonderkommando R fielded its ethnic German militiamen in a series of 
mass shooting operations that lasted until spring 1942, when German diplomatic pressure and 
the increasing scarcity of victims ended the unit‘s major participation in the Holocaust.  
Exploring the involvement of Sonderkommando R‘s militia in the mass murder of Jews 
permits this study to recover an understudied episode of the Holocaust and to examine the 
motivations of the most significant group of ethnic German perpetrators in the occupied 
Soviet Union. 
Historiography 
 This dissertation makes two primary contributions to the history of the Second World 
War and the Holocaust.  First, it sheds light on a previously overlooked aspect of Nazi rule in 
the occupied Soviet Union.  The German conquest of the Soviet Union has been the subject 
of considerable historical research since the 1950s.  The Cold War left an indelible imprint on 
this early wave of scholarship.  In preparation for a potential conventional war against the 
Soviet Union, during the late 1940s and early 1950s the American military took an interest in 
the behavior of Soviet residents under foreign rule and commissioned substantial research on 
the topic.10  In the early 1950s, Alexander Dallin, then a young émigré scholar, prepared a 
                                                 
10 Alexander Dallin, Reactions to the German Occupation of Soviet Russia (Maxwell Air Force Base, 
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RAND corporation report on the Romanian occupation zone in southern Ukraine, which 
remains the standard English-language work on the topic.11  Using captured German records, 
published Soviet sources, and interviews with former Soviet citizens that he conducted on 
behalf of Harvard University, in 1957 Dallin published his detailed survey of the German 
occupation of the Soviet Union, German Rule in Russia, 1941-1945: A Study of Occupation 
Policy.12  Three years later, Gerald Reitlinger‘s The House Built on Sand revisited the topic 
and underscored how the Third Reich‘s iron fist alienated a local population that stood ready 
to oppose Soviet power.13  Reitlinger and particularly Dallin‘s virtually encyclopedic 
overviews set the standard for a field of historical inquiry that, due to archival restrictions in 
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, employed wartime German records captured by Allied 
forces in 1945.14 
 Beginning in the early 1990s, research on the German occupation of the Soviet Union 
underwent two paradigm shifts.  The first was archival.  Following the collapse of Soviet-
backed communist regimes in Eastern Europe during 1989 and the disintegration of the 
Soviet Union in 1991, scholars gained access to new documentation related to the German 
occupation of the Soviet Union during the Second World War.  This material included not 
                                                                                                                                                       
AL: Air University, Human Resources Research Institute, 1952). 
11 Alexander Dallin, Odessa, 1941-1944: A Case Study of Soviet Territory under Foreign Rule 2nd 
edition, (Iaşi: Center for Romanian Studies, 1998).  Using Romanian and former Soviet archival records, 
Vladimir Solonari is currently preparing a monograph on Romanian occupation policy in Transnistria. 
12 Alexander Dallin, German Rule in the Occupied Soviet Union, 1941-1945: A Study of Occupation 
Policies (London: Macmillan, 1957). 
13 Gerald Reitlinger, The House Built on Sand: The Conflicts of German Policy in Russia, 1939-1945 
(London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1960). 
14 For an example of research on the German occupation of the Soviet Union using captured German 
records see Timothy Patrick Mulligan, The Politics of Illusion and Empire: German Occupation Policy in the 
Soviet Union, 1942-1943 (New York: Praeger, 1988). 
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only wartime German documents that the Red Army had captured on its march to Berlin, but 
also records related to often extensive postwar Soviet investigations of wartime events in the 
country‘s western borderlands.  These newly accessible documents have permitted 
researchers to study this period in previously unfathomable detail.  Second, using these 
records historians raised and answered new questions about the German occupation and the 
Holocaust in the Soviet Union.  Early scholarship on the history of the Holocaust in the 
Soviet Union employed records that the Einsatzgruppen produced.15  These self-serving 
reports did little to flesh out the role of other German units or the local population in the mass 
murder of Jews.  Access to local German records that Soviet forces captured at the war‘s end 
and postwar testimonies that German and Soviet investigators gathered increased scholarly 
awareness of German and non-German participation in the Holocaust.16  Furthermore, new 
attention to Nazi demographic and economic planning related to conquered Soviet territory 
has placed the history of the Holocaust in the region in a broader context.17  Thanks to these 
developments historians approaching the war in the East and the German occupation there 
have begun to integrate more systematically the mass murder of Jews and Nazi policy toward 
Slavs into their narratives.18 
                                                 
15 See, for example, Yitzhak Arad et al., eds, The Einsatzgruppen Reports: Selections from the 
Dispatches of the Nazi Death Squads’ Campaign against the Jews, July 1941-January 1943 (New York: 
Holocaust Library, 1989). 
16 Philip Friedman‘s early work on Ukrainian participation in the Holocaust is a notable exception.  
Philip Friedman, ―Ukrainian-Jewish Relations during the Nazi Occupation,‖ YIVO Annual of Jewish Social 
Science, 12 (1958), 259-296. 
17 See, for example, Götz Aly and Susanne Heim, Vordenker der Vernichtung: Auschwitz und die 
deutschen Pläne für eine neue europäische Ordnung (Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 1991). 
18 Military historians of the Second World War in the Soviet Union have become increasingly sensitive 
to the Holocaust in the region.  See, for example, Geoffrey P. Megargee, War of Annihilation: Combat and 
Genocide on the Eastern Front, 1941 (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006).   
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 In keeping with these twin developments, the past generation of research has yielded 
a rich, if still somewhat geographically spotty treatment of German-occupied territory within 
the Soviet Union‘s pre-1939 boundaries.19  Exquisitely researched monographs by historians, 
such as Bernhard Chiari, Christian Gerlach, and Babette Quinkert, have sketched the 
contours of the German occupation of Belarus and highlighted topics including everyday life 
under German rule, the Third Reich‘s efforts at economic exploitation, and the role of 
German propaganda.20  Similarly, excellent scholarship on German-occupied Ukraine by 
historians such as Omer Bartov, Karel Berkhoff, Kate Brown, John-Paul Himka, Dieter Pohl, 
Alexander Prusin, and Thomas Sandkühler has provided a much more detailed portrait of 
everyday life under the occupation and the Holocaust.21  The German occupation of territory 
that is today located in the Russian Federation has been the subject of significantly less 
                                                 
19 See the recent translation and republication of the Unknown Black Book.  Joshua Rubenstein and Ilya 
Altman, eds., The Unknown Black Book: The Holocaust in the German-Occupied Soviet Territories 
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2008).  
20 Berhard Chiari, Alltag hinter der Front: Besatzung, Kollaboration und Widerstand in Weissrussland 
1941-1944 (Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1998); Christian Gerlach, Kalkulierte Morde: Die deutsche Wirtschafts- 
und Vernichtungspolitik in Weißrußland 1941 bis 1944 (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 1999); Babette Quinkert, 
Propaganda und Terror in Weissrussland 1941-1944: die deutsche “geistige” Kriegführung gegen 
Zivilbevölkerung und Partisanen (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2009). 
21 Omer Bartov is preparing a monographical study of the East Galician town of Buczacz prior to, 
during, and after the Holocaust.  For a preliminary essay on the topic see Omer Bartov, ―Interethnic Relations in 
the Holocaust as Seen Through Postwar Testimonies: Buczacz, East Galacia, 1941-1944,‖ in Lessons and 
Legacies XIII: From Generation to Generation, ed Doris L. Bergen, (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University 
Press, 2008), 101-124; Karel Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair: Life and Death in Ukraine under Nazi Rule 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004); Kate Brown, A Biography of No Place: From Ethnic 
Borderland to Soviet Heartland (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004).  John-Paul Himka is 
currently working on a study of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army in western Ukraine.  For his preliminary work on 
the topic, see John-Paul Himka, ―The Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) and the Holocaust,‖ (presented at the 
American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies Annual Convention, Boston, M.A., 2009).  Dieter 
Pohl, Nationalsozialistische Judenverfolgung in Ostgalizien 1941-1944: Organisation und Durchführung eines 
staatlichen Massenverbrechens (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1996); Alexander V. Prusin, ― A Community of Violence: 
The Sipo/SD and its Role in the Nazi Terror System in Generalbezirk Kiew,‖ Holocaust and Genocide Studies, 
21, no. 1, (2007), 1-30.  Thomas Sandkühler, “Endlösung” in Galizien: der Judenmord in Ostpolen und die 
Rettungsinitiativen von Berthold Beitz, 1941-1944 (Bonn: Dietz, 1996).  Also see Ray Brandon and Wendy 
Lower, eds., The Shoah in Ukraine: History, Testimony, Memorialization (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University 
Press, 2008). 
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academic research.  Owing to the continuing inaccessibility of German and Soviet records 
related to the war—many of which remain closed in the repositories of the current state 
security apparatus—Russian scholars have produced the bulk of recent scholarly research on 
the topic.22  Despite the fact that much detailed work remains to be done, scholars have 
attempted to provide synthetic overviews that address the German occupation of the Soviet 
Union, either as one episode in the region‘s longue durée or very narrowly focused on the 
Holocaust.23  Within the past decade, scholarship on the German occupation and the 
Holocaust in the Soviet Union has developed into a mature, yet dynamic field. 
 This study dialogues most closely with Wendy Lower‘s pathblazing research on the 
German occupation and the Holocaust in Ukraine.24  Empirically focused on central 
Ukraine‘s Zhytomyr region, Lower explores how local German administrators implemented 
the Nazi regime‘s expansionist and genocidal aims in the occupied Soviet Union.  Casting the 
German occupation of Ukraine as a ―colonial‖ enterprise, Lower probes the Third Reich‘s 
multifaceted efforts to create the demographic foundations for Lebensraum.25  She examines 
both the mass murder of the region‘s Jews by German forces and their local gentile helpers 
and German efforts to create Hegewald, a Volksdeutsche settlement that anticipated Nazi 
                                                 
22 A handful of Russian scholars have received access to the archives of the Federal Security Service of 
the Russian Federation.  See, for example, B.N. Kovalev, Natsistskaia okkupatsiia i kollaboratsionizm v Rossii 
1941-1944 (Moscow: Tranzitkniga, 2004). 
23
 Timothy Snyder‘s research has attempted to contextualize the Holocaust within the region‘s broader 
history of interethnic violence.  Timothy Snyder, The Reconstruction of Nations: Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, 
Belarus, 1569-1999 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003); Timothy Snyder, Bloodlands: Europe 
Between Hitler and Stalin (New York: Basic Books, 2010).  Yitzhak Arad‘s recent synthesis work seeks to 
provide an overview of the Holocaust in the Soviet Union.  Arad, The Holocaust in the Soviet Union. 
24 Wendy Lower, Nazi Empire-Building and the Holocaust in Ukraine (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 2005). 
25 David Furber and Wendy Lower, ―Colonialism and Genocide in Nazi-Occupied Poland and 
Ukraine,‖ in Empire, Colony, Genocide: Conquest, Occupation, and Subaltern Resistance in World History, ed. 
Dirk Moses, (New York: Berghahn Books, 2008), 372-400. 
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plans for the region.  Lower argues convincingly that whereas German administrators 
cooperated to murder Jews, the multiplicity of competing area military, civil and SS 
authorities hamstrung Nazi attempts to underpin local Volksdeutsche. 
 Despite the fact that Transnistria‘s large ethnic German population was an epicenter 
for Nazi Volksdeutsche projects and a primary killing field for Jews in the occupied Soviet 
Union, historians have only touched on Sonderkommando R‘s activities in the region.  
Historians focused on Transnistria‘s occupation and the Holocaust there have understandably 
concentrated on Romanian authorities and to a lesser extent local Ukrainians in the region.26  
Most specialized scholarship on the area has either implicitly or explicitly glossed over 
Sonderkommando R‘s Volksdeutsche project and its involvement in the Holocaust in 
southern Ukraine because the topic appeared peripheral to the region‘s wartime history.  
Insofar as scholars have probed the institutional history of the Ethnic German Liaison Office 
and of southern Ukraine‘s Volksdeutsche communities, Sonderkommando R‘s wartime 
activities remain understudied.27  Although frequently of high quality, much of this research 
dates from the 1970s and early 1980s, when key German and Soviet records about the unit 
remained inaccessible to scholars.  With the exception of pioneering preliminary recent 
research on Sonderkommando R by Andrej Angrick and Frank Görlich, the unit‘s activities in 
                                                 
26 Radu Ioanid, The Holocaust in Romania: The Destruction of Jews and Gypsies Under the Antonescu 
Regime, 1940-44 (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2000); Jean Ancel, Transnistria, 1941-42: The Romanian Mass 
Murder Campaigns Trans. Karen Gold, 3 vol., (Tel Aviv: The Goldstein-Goren Diaspora Research Center, 
2003); Dennis Deletant, ―The Ghetto Experience in Golta, Transnistria, 1942-1944,‖ Holocaust and Genocide 
Studies 18, no. 1 (2004), 1-26; Dennis Deletant, ―Transnistria and the Romanian Solution to the ‗Jewish 
Problem,‘‖ in The Shoah in Ukraine: History, Testimony, Memorialization, eds. Ray Brandon and Wendy 
Lower, (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2008), 156-189. 
27 Meir Buchsweiler, Volksdeutsche in der Ukraine am Vorabend und Beginn des Zweiten Weltkriegs--
ein Fall doppelter Loyalität?  trans. Ruth Achlama (Tel-Aviv: Schriftenreihe des Instituts für Deutsche 
Geschichte, Universität Tel-Aviv, 1984); Ingeborg Fleischhauer, Das Dritte Reich und die Deutschen in der 
Sowjetunion, (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1983); Lumans, Himmler’s Auxiliaries.  Lumans‘s 
monograph was based on his 1979 dissertation. 
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Transnistria and its involvement in the Holocaust are poorly understood.28  By examining 
Sonderkommando R‘s mission in Romanian-occupied territory, this study recovers a little 
explored dimension to the German occupation and Holocaust in the Soviet Union. 
 Second, drawing on recent research on Volksdeutsche in the Third Reich, this 
dissertation seeks to advance research on Holocaust perpetrators.  Since the end of the 
Second World War, scholars have grappled with the question of what motivated Nazi 
Germany‘s killers.  Originally the bailiwick of social scientific research, this vein of 
scholarship has developed progressively more nuanced explanations for perpetrator behavior.  
Whereas in the late 1940s researchers grappled with the issue of whether or not the Third 
Reich‘s murderers were clinically insane or at least psychologically abnormal,29 by the 1960s 
and 1970s scholars developed more nuanced explanations involving universal interpersonal 
dynamics, such as the pressure to obey authority and role adaptation.30  Within the past 
                                                 
28 Andrej Angrick, Besatzungspolitik und Massenmord: Die Einsatzgruppe D in der südlichen 
Sowjetunion 1941-1943 (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2003), 254-294; Frank Görlich, ―Volkstumspropaganda 
und Antisemitismus in der Wochenzeitung ‗Der Deutsche in Transnistrien‘ 1942-1944,‖ in Holocaust an der 
Peripherie: Judenpolitik und Judenmord in Rumänien und Transnistrien 1940-1944, eds. Wolfgang Benz and 
Brigitte Mihok, (Berlin: Metropol Verlag, 2009), 95-110. 
29 Initial examinations of German perpetrators began with psychiatric and psychological examinations 
of the defendants at the International Military Tribunal at Nürnberg in 1945.  Douglas McGlashan Kelley, 22 
Cells in Nuremberg: A Psychiatrist Examines the Nazi Criminals (New York: Greenberg, 1947).  G.M. Gilbert, 
Nuremberg Diary (New York: Farrar, Straus, 1947); G.M. Gilbert, The Psychology of Dictatorship: Based on an 
Examination of the Leaders of Nazi Germany (New York: Ronald Press Co., 1950).  Also see Theodor W. 
Adorno, et. al., The Authoritarian Personality (New York: Harper, 1950). 
30
 During the 1960s, social scientific research, led by Raul Hilberg and Hannah Arendt, suggested that 
broader social structures, rather than individual clinical abnormality, motivated Holocaust perpetrators.  Raul 
Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews, 3rd edition, 3 vols., (New Haven: CT: Yale University Press, 
2003); Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (New York: Viking University 
Press, 1963).  This pioneering research prompted experimental social psychologists to probe the issue.  Stanley 
Milgram and Philip Zimbardo led early research in this avenue.  Stanley Milgram, Obedience to Authority: An 
Experimental View (New York: Harper & Row, 1974);  Craig Haney, Curtis Banks, and Philip Zimbardo. 
―Interpersonal Dynamics in a Simulated Prison.‖ International Journal of Criminology and Penology 1 (1973): 
69-97; Zimbardo has recently published a book-length treatment of his now-famous Stanford Prison 
experiment.  Philip Zimbardo, The Lucifer Effect: Understanding How Good People Turn Evil (New York: 
Random House Trade Paperbacks, 2008).  Social scientists have now synthesized much of this earlier research.  
See Fred E. Katz. Ordinary People and Extraordinary Evil: A Report on the Beguilings of Evil (Albany, NY: 
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generation, much of the significant work on German Holocaust perpetrators has been based 
on historical research on specific military,31 police,32 and SS units33 that the Nazi regime 
charged with implementing genocide.  Following Christopher R. Browning‘s seminal study 
of Reserve Order Police Battalion 101‘s involvement in the Holocaust, this body of research 
has developed a variegated constellation of ideological, cultural, situational, and dispositional 
factors that moved perpetrators to carry out the Holocaust.34 
 Despite the noteworthy contributions of this avenue of inquiry, it has focused almost 
                                                                                                                                                       
State University of New York Press, 1993); Leonard S. Newman and Ralph Erber, eds., Understanding 
Genocide: The Social Psychology of the Holocaust (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); James Waller, 
Becoming Evil: How Ordinary People Commit Genocide and Mass Killing (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2002).   
31 Omer Bartov, The Eastern Front, 1941-45: German Troops and the Barbarisation of Warfare (New 
York: St. Martin‘s Press, 1986); Omer Bartov, Hitler’s Army: Soldiers, Nazis, and War in the Third Reich 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991); Thomas Kühne, Kameradschaft: die Soldaten des 
nationalsozialistischen Krieges und das 20. Jahrhundert (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2006); Waitman 
Beorn, ―Negotiating Murder: A Panzer Signal Company and the Destruction of the Jews of Peregruznoe, 1942,‖ 
Holocaust and Genocide Studies 23, no. 2 (Fall 2009): 185-213. 
32 On the Gestapo see Robert Gellately, The Gestapo and German Society: Enforcing Racial Policy 
1935-1945 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990); Eric A. Johnson, Nazi Terror: The Gestapo, Jews, and Ordinary 
Germans (New York: Basic Books, 2000).  On the Order Police, see Christopher R. Browning, Ordinary Men: 
Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland, 2nd edition (New York: HarperPerennial, 1998); 
Daniel J. Goldhagen, Hitler’s Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust (New York: Alfred 
A. Knopf, 1996); Edward Westerman, Hitler’s Police Battalions: Enforcing Racial War in the East (Lawrence, 
KS: University Press of Kansas, 2005).  Harold Welzer draws many of his examples from Order Police 
Battalion 45.  Harold Welzer, Täter: Wie aus ganz normalen Menschen Massenmörder werden (Frankfurt: S. 
Fischer Verlag, 2005). 
33
 On the Einsatzgruppen see Andrej Angrick, Besatzungspolitik und Massenmord; Helmut Krausnik, 
Hitlers Einsatzgruppen: die Truppe des Weltanschauungskrieges 1938-1942 (Stuttgart: Deutscher Verlags-
Anstalt, 1985); Ralf Ogorreck, Die Einsatzgruppen und die “Genesis der Endlösung” (Berlin: Metropol, 1996); 
Hans-Heinrich Wilhelm, Die Einsatzgruppe A der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD 1941/42 (Frankfurt: P. Lang, 
1996).  On the Reichssicherheitshauptamt (Reich Security Main Office) see Yaacov Lozowick, Hitler’s 
Bureaucrats: The Nazi Security Police and the Banality of Evil, Trans. Haim Watzman, (London: Continuum, 
2002); Hans Safrian, Die Eichmann-Männer (Vienna: Europaverlag, 1993); Michael Wildt. Generation des 
Unbedingten: das Führungskorps des Reichssicherheitshauptamtes (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2002).  On 
concentration camp guards see Tom Segev, Soldiers of Evil: The Commandants of the Nazi Concentration 
Camps (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1987); Karin Orth, Die Konzentrationslager-SS: sozialstrukturelle Analysen 
und biographische Studien, (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2000). 
34 Christopher R. Browning, ―Ideology, Culture, Situation, and Disposition.  Holocaust Perpetrators 
and the Group Dynamics of Mass Killing,‖ in NS-Gewaltherrschaft: Beiträge zur historischen Forschung und 
jurischen Aufarbeitung, eds. Alfred Gottwaldt, et al., (Berlin: Edition Heinrich, 2005), 66-76. 
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exclusively on German perpetrators.  The expansion of research on the Holocaust in Eastern 
Europe and the Soviet Union, however, has underscored the extent to which non-Germans 
provided crucial manpower for the Third Reich‘s campaign against the area‘s Jews.35  Not 
only did non-German perpetrators perform different (and usually subordinate) roles in the 
killing process, but, as is becoming increasingly apparent from emerging research, many of 
the models that scholars have offered to explain the behavior of German perpetrators are 
poorly calibrated to understand the participation of their non-German counterparts.  Prewar 
anti-Semitism, for example, functioned very differently in Ukraine than in Germany.  While 
recent research on the Holocaust in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union has identified new 
perpetrator groups, it has yet to revise explanations for their participation in the Holocaust.  
Insofar as scholars have ventured into this area, they have focused on Eastern Europe and the 
Soviet Union‘s historically high level of anti-Semitism and robbery as important motivational 
factors for local participation in the Holocaust.36  Instead, this branch of research has focused 
                                                 
35 Christoph Dieckmann, Kooperation und Verbrechen: Formen der “Kollaboration” im östlichen 
Europa 1939-1945, vol. 19, Beiträge zur Geschichte des Nationalsozialismus (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2003).  
Focusing on the complicity of the predominantly Slavic local police in Belarus and Ukraine, for example, 
Bernhard Chiari, Martin Dean, and Dieter Pohl have examined the crucial contribution of non-German 
Holocaust perpetrators in the Soviet Union.  Chiari, Alltag hinter der Front; Martin Dean, Collaboration in the 
Holocaust: Crimes of the Local Police in Belorussia and Ukraine, 1941-44 (New York: St. Martin‘s Press, 
2000); Dieter Pohl, ―Ukrainische Hilfskräfte beim Mord an den Juden,‖ in Die Täter der Shoah: fanatische 
Nationalsozialisten oder ganz normale Deutsche?, ed Gerhard Paul, (Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2002), 205-
24.  Likewise, Wendy Lower‘s work on the Ukrainian province of Zhytomyr, which focuses on German 
occupation officials, acknowledges the important role that non-Germans played in bringing about the Holocaust 
in the Soviet Union.  Lower, Nazi Empire-Building, 75.  On Russia, see Kovalev, Natsistskaia okkupatsiia i 
kollaboratsionizm v Rossii. 
36 In examining Eastern European Holocaust perpetrators, historians have sketched two preliminary 
explanations for the involvement of Eastern Europeans.  First, as Karel Berkhoff and Amir Weiner note, the 
region‘s indigenous anti-Semitism was a crucial engine for driving the Holocaust at the grassroots level.  
Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair; Amir Weiner, Making Sense of War: The Second World War and the Fate of the 
Bolshevik Revolution (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001).  Similarly, in his case study of the 
Holocaust in Jedwabne, Poland, Jan Gross points to the primary importance of local anti-Semitism in the 
decisions of Poles to murder their Jewish neighbors.  Jan T. Gross, Neighbors: The Destruction of the Jewish 
Community in Jedwabne, Poland (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001).  Second, as historians, such 
as Chiari, Dean, Diekmann, and Ioanid argue, Eastern Europeans perpetrated Holocaust crimes as a result of 
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on reconstructing the history of previously little studied episodes of genocide.  This is 
especially true of the growing, but still modest research on Volksdeutsche perpetrators in the 
German-occupied Soviet Union.37 
 This study both explores the role of Transnistria‘s Volksdeutsche in the mass murder 
of Jews and examines their motivations for perpetrating some of the Holocaust‘s most brutal 
crimes.  Such an undertaking has two dimensions.  On the one hand, it necessitates adapting 
universal explanations that scholars have developed to understand the behavior of other 
groups of Holocaust perpetrators to the local circumstances in which area Volksdeutsche took 
part in the mass murder of Jews.  On the other hand, it requires exploring the exceptional 
status of Volksdeutsche in the Nazi worldview and its relationship to ethnic German 
participation in the Holocaust.  Doris Bergen‘s scholarship on ethnic Germans in the Third 
Reich provides an invaluable point of departure.  Bergen‘s ongoing research highlights not 
only the importance of Volksdeutsche to the Third Reich‘s immediate foreign policy needs 
and future territorial fantasies, but also it emphasizes the degree to which the Nazi regime 
constructed and then continuously adapted the boundaries of ―Germanness.‖38  As Bergen 
                                                                                                                                                       
self-interest, either by simply robbing their victims, or by attempting to curry favor with German occupation 
officials.  Chiari, Alltag Hinter der Front; Dean, Collaboration in the Holocaust; Dieckmann, Kooperation und 
Verbrechen; Ioanid, The Holocaust in Romania. 
37 Martin Dean, ―Soviet Ethnic Germans and the Holocaust in the Reich Commissariat Ukraine, 1941-
1944,‖ in The Shoah in Ukraine: History, Testimony, Memorialization, eds. Ray Brandon and Wendy Lower 
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2008), 248-271; Wendy Lower, ―Hitler‘s ―Garden of Eden‖ in 
Ukraine: Nazi Colonialism, Volksdeutsche, and the Holocaust, 1941-44,‖ in Gray Zones: Ambiguity and 
Compromise in the Holocaust and Its Aftermath, ed Jonathan Petropoulos and John K. Roth, (New York: 
Berghahn Books, 2005), 185-204. 
38 Doris L. Bergen, ―The Nazi Concept of ‗Volksdeutsche‘ and the Exacerbation of antisemitism in 
Eastern Europe, 1939-45,‖ Journal of Contemporary History 29, no. 4 (1994): 569-582; Doris L. Bergen, ―The 
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Yearbook of European Studies 13 (1999): 70-93; Doris L. Bergen, ―The Volksdeutsche of Eastern Europe and 
the Collapse of the Nazi Empire, 1944-1945,‖ in The Impact of Nazism: New Perspectives on the Third Reich 
and Its Legacy, eds. Alan E. Steinweis and Daniel E. Rogers, (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2003), 
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notes, the Third Reich was unable to develop a litmus test for a category as amorphous as 
ethnic identity and ultimately relied on the Gestalt of local German officials to determine 
whether or not an individual deserved membership in the Nazi racial community.  In this 
highly fluid environment, prospective ethnic Germans could clarify their membership in the 
Volksgemeinschaft and secure its material privileges through their own actions.  This 
dissertation argues that the capacity for Transnistria‘s local residents to use their participation 
in the Holocaust to demonstrate their ―Germanness‖ to Sonderkommando R‘s staff 
constituted a key way in which the Nazi regime secured local assistance in the mass murder 
of Jews. 
Sources 
 Despite the scale of Sonderkommando R‘s operations in Transnistria and the 
significance of the unit‘s efforts to marshal local Volksdeutsche to murder Jews, previous 
scholarship on these topics has largely overlooked this episode of the German occupation and 
the Holocaust in the Soviet Union because key documents related to the subject were 
inaccessible.  Wartime German records captured by Allied forces in 1945 contained only 
skeletal references to Sonderkommando R‘s activities in Transnistria and virtually no 
indication that it had led area ethnic Germans in mass shooting campaigns against Jews in the 
area.  This sanitized documentary record was not accidental.  Prior to withdrawing from 
Transnistria in March 1944, Sonderkommando R‘s personnel burned their unit‘s most 
incriminating sources.  Allied air raids and advancing Soviet forces destroyed what little 
documentation Sonderkommando R had been able to evacuate to Germany and German-
occupied Poland during the war‘s final months.39  Any historian who approached the topic 
                                                 
39 Aussage von V. S., April 14, 1965, BAL, B162/2305.  Aussage von G. B., December 13, 1966, BAL, 
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prior to the early 1990s would have confronted a body of historical material that consisted of 
little more than SS personnel files and Volksdeutsche immigration documents prepared by 
the Einwandererzentrale (EWZ or Immigration Main Office) and copies of staff orders that 
Sonderkommando R‘s command post in Transnistria circulated to the VoMi‘s headquarters in 
Berlin. 
 This study has profited enormously from access to archives that have opened to 
researchers during the past decade.  These newly available collections include both 
documents that Transnistria‘s Romanian and German occupiers created during the war and 
the records of massive investigations into Sonderkommando R‘s crimes that Soviet and later 
West German authorities pursued from 1944 until 1999.  Two newly accessible sources 
provide valuable caches of wartime documents related to Sonderkommando R‘s activities in 
Transnistria.  First, the recently declassified records of the British Radio Code and Cypher 
School contain decrypted wartime German police radio traffic that British signals intelligence 
gathered during the Second World War.40  These intercepts include the text of more than 
1,000 messages that Sonderkommando R sent or received while on station in Transnistria.  
Second, records from the Odessa oblast‘ archive, which are available on microfilm at the 
United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, contain a large quantity of often fragmentary 
wartime German and Romanian records.  This collection preserves a significant amount of 
correspondence between Sonderkommando R and Transnistria‘s Romanian civil and military 
administrators and details their bilateral wartime relations. 
 Most importantly, Sonderkommando R‘s activities were the focus of intense 
                                                                                                                                                       
B162/2307, 332. 
40 On wartime British signals intelligence and the Holocaust, see Richard Breitman, Official Secrets: 
What the Nazis Planned, What the British and Americans Knew (New York: Hill and Wang, 1998). 
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investigation by Soviet and West German authorities.  Soviet probes into Sonderkommando 
R‘s crimes began immediately after the German and Romanian withdrawal from southern 
Ukraine.  In mid-1944, the Soviet Extraordinary State Commission for Ascertaining and 
Investigating Crimes Perpetrated by the German-Fascist Invaders and their Accomplices 
(Chrezvychainaia gosudarstvennaia komissiia po ustanovleniiu i rassledovaniiu zlodeianii 
nemetsko-fashistskikh zakhvatchikov i ikh soobshchnikov) interviewed local residents about 
Sonderkommando R and its involvement in mass murder in the region.  Later that year, 
Soviet counterintelligence or SMERSH (Smert’ Shpionam, Death to Spies) interrogated 
captured SS officers, who had served in Sonderkommando R.  By 1945, Soviet authorities 
had a clear, if still general understanding of the crimes that Sonderkommando R and its local 
Volksdeutsche helpers had committed in occupied southern Ukraine.  Information garnered 
from these inquiries served as the foundation for a series of secret NKVD (Narodnyi 
Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del, People‘s Commissariat for Internal Affairs) trials of former 
area residents, many of whom the Red Army had captured as members of the German 
military at the war‘s end and transported to penal camps in Central Asia.  Although some 
convicted ethnic Germans faced immediate execution, after 1956 Soviet authorities generally 
released suspected local perpetrators to live in special settlements, such as those around 
Karaganda in the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic. 
 In the early 1960s, shortly after the creation of the Central Office of the State Justice 
Administration for the Investigation of National Socialist Crimes (Zentrale Stelle der 
Landesjustizverwaltungen zur Aufklärung nationalsozialistischer Verbrechen) in 
Ludwigsburg, the Federal Republic of Germany‘s primary investigative office for Nazi-era 
crimes, West German prosecutors launched an investigation into Sonderkommando R‘s 
22 
 
wartime deployment to Transnistria.41  The West German investigation, which quickly spun 
off into a number of smaller cases, suffered from many of the documentary limitations that 
confronted historians until very recently.  Absent virtually any reference to Sonderkommando 
R‘s activities in the region in German-held archival records and initially ignorant of earlier 
Soviet inquiries, West German prosecutors and police investigators gathered testimony from 
Sonderkommando R‘s surviving German personnel and from former Volksdeutsche, who had 
relocated to West Germany after the war.  Over the course of these investigations, police in 
the Federal Republic of Germany conducted 224 interviews with surviving members of 
Sonderkommando R and their immediate family members and 490 interviews with former 
local residents.  Initially focused on SS violence against local ethnic Germans in Transnistria, 
West German authorities began preparing a case against Sonderkommando R for 
spearheading the Holocaust in the region. 
 During the mid-1960s, shortly after West German authorities began their 
investigation, the Soviet KGB (Komitet gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti or Committee for 
State Security) reopened an inquiry into Sonderkommando R‘s crimes.  Why the KGB opted 
to revisit proceedings that Soviet authorities had concluded a decade earlier is unclear.  
Definitive answers to this question may be found in the KGB‘s internal records, which are 
housed in the archives of its successor organizations, the Federal Security Service of the 
Russian Federation (FSB or Federal’naia sluzhba bezopasnosti Rossiiskoi Federatsii) and 
Security Service of Ukraine (SBU or Sluzhba Bezpeky Ukrainy).  As these repositories are 
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inaccessible to American researchers, it is possible only to speculate about what motivated 
this renewed Soviet interest in Sonderkommando R‘s crimes.  The fact, however, that this 
second round of postwar Soviet investigations into Sonderkommando R coincided so closely 
with parallel West German probes suggests that Soviet intelligence caught wind of new West 
German interest and responded by reopening a long-dead case.  Perhaps anticipating that the 
results of their inquiries would be used to embarrass or prod West Germany into a more 
thorough investigation in the midst of the Cold War, Soviet authorities pursued detailed 
probes into the crimes of local residents who had taken part in Sonderkommando R‘s mass 
shooting campaigns.  In contrast to cases that their predecessors concluded fifteen year 
earlier, during the mid-1960s the KGB gathered exhaustive testimony from witnesses and 
suspected perpetrators and exhumed mass graves for forensic analysis.  At the conclusion of 
their investigation, which resulted in a number of convictions and executions, Soviet 
authorities telegraphed their results to West German investigators by publishing newspaper 
articles about the trials in the Russian and German-language Soviet press.42 
 By the time that West German prosecutors discovered parallel Soviet inquiries into 
Sonderkommando R and its local helpers, Willy Brandt‘s Ostpolitik had thawed bilateral 
relations to the point where limited collaboration in this inquiry became conceivable.  West 
German investigators contacted Soviet authorities to gain access to the records of these 
investigations.43  In a tortuous bout of diplomatic gymnastics, West German prosecutors 
obtained some key Soviet investigative documentation and at least vague promises of further 
                                                 
42 ―Izmenniki rodiny rasstreliany,‖ Krasnaia zvezda, August 28, 1966, 6.  E. Petrus, ―Massenmörder 
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43 Leiter der Zentralstelle im Lande Nordrhein-Westfalen für die Bearbeitung von 
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assistance.44  This exceptional opportunity for cooperation became moot when, on the eve of 
issuing an indictment against Sonderkommando R‘s surviving senior leaders, West German 
courts declared the suspects physically unfit for trial.  The local prosecutor‘s office 
(Staatsanwaltschaft) in Dortmund, which had inherited the case from Ludwigsburg, deemed 
further investigation fruitless and ended more than a decade of inquiry into 
Sonderkommando R‘s crimes.45  It is unclear if the decision to close the case was done on 
purely practical grounds or if the rumored past Nazi affiliations and continued sympathies of 
senior prosecutors in the office influenced their decision to end the probe. 
 Perhaps reflecting a generational shift in the Dortmund prosecutor‘s office, German 
state attorneys resurrected their investigation into Sonderkommando R in 1994, following an 
informational request from the Canadian Department of Justice.46  In the case‘s reincarnation, 
German investigators focused their inquiry on Transnistria‘s local residents, whom 
Sonderkommando R deployed to murder Jews.  German prosecutors traveled to Ukraine, 
where they duplicated large quantities of Soviet investigative records, and conducted 
interviews with surviving erstwhile ethnic Germans living in the Federal Republic.47  While 
this second wave of postwar German investigations yielded new details about 
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Sonderkommando R and its local collaborators‘ involvement in the Holocaust in southern 
Ukraine, prosecutors were unable to uncover evidence that met the lofty legal burdens of 
convicting an aging group of suspects of first-degree murder (Mord) in German courts.  In 
1999, prosecutors in Dortmund ended the investigation of Sonderkommando R‘s local 
helpers and with it a nearly forty-year criminal investigation in the Federal Republic.48 
 While this study draws on a large and diverse collection of wartime records, the 
testimony that Soviet and West German authorities recorded from suspected perpetrators, 
their neighbors, and a handful of survivors constitutes the most significant source of 
information about Sonderkommando R‘s mission in Transnistria.  Employing these 
testimonies as historical evidence presents two methodological challenges—one related to 
the use of testimony in general and the second posed by the nature of Soviet investigative 
practice.  First, using testimony taken years and sometimes decades after an event conflicts 
with orthodox historical methodology, which suggests that the closer a record was created to 
an event, the more faithfully it recorded the reality of what occurred.  Using captured 
wartime German records as their primary source, scholars of the Holocaust initially followed 
this approach.49  More recently, however, historians have begun to employ postwar testimony 
to reconstruct wartime events.  The reasons for this trend are twofold.  On the one hand, new 
sources have become available.  Beginning in the 1970s, scholars began obtaining access to 
West German investigative records and the rich collection of interview transcripts that they 
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contained.  In the past couple of decades, a mammoth collection of interviews with Holocaust 
survivors conducted by institutions, such as the Shoah Foundation Visual History Archive, 
the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, Yad Vashem, and Yale University, have 
become accessible to researchers.  On the other hand, scholars have grown increasingly 
sensitive to the fact that records produced by the Nazi security apparatus were not as 
objective as they had first appeared.  Records that German perpetrators created often 
refracted complex events through the Nazi racial worldview‘s narrow lenses.  German 
documents, moreover, only partially recorded the experiences of non-Germans in the 
Holocaust.  Postwar testimony, despite the methodological difficulties involved in using it, 
often provides the only source of information to address an array of topics that historians 
have started to raise about the Holocaust.  
 Although a number of historians have used postwar testimony to reconstruct wartime 
events related to the Holocaust, perhaps no scholar has employed them as systematically in 
historical research on this period as Christopher R. Browning.  His recent study 
Remembering Survival: Inside a Nazi Slave-Labor Camp turns some conventional historical 
wisdom about testimony on its head and offers a methodology for using it as a historical 
source.50  Browning argues convincingly that in some instances the quality of historical 
information in postwar testimony benefits from the passage of time.  He demonstrates that 
survivor testimony given in the decades after the war frequently either wittingly or 
unwittingly omitted memories that were either too painful or socially uncomfortable to 
discuss, such as sexual violence and revenge killings among prisoners.  Browning contends 
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that it was only beginning in the 1990s that survivor testimony broached these previously 
taboo subjects.  His findings challenge the methodological principle that chronological 
proximity to an event increases the accuracy of the historical information contained in the 
testimony.  
 While Browning acknowledges the potential difficulties in employing postwar 
testimony as a source for reconstructing wartime events, he presents a simple, yet compelling 
methodological approach to using this material.  As he did in his study Ordinary Men, in his 
most recent research Browning assembled a ―critical mass of testimonies that can be tested 
against one another.‖51  Using this ―critical mass of testimony,‖ Browning submits that ―some 
reasonable judgments about plausibility can be made about various individual memories 
based on the overall credibility of the survivor‘s testimony, the vividness and detail of the 
particular events being recalled, the absence of contradiction with other plausible narratives, 
and  . . .  the highly subjective intuition of the individual historian that gradually develops 
from prolonged immersion in the materials.‖52  Put simply, Browning submits that access to a 
large cache of testimonies permits the historian to distinguish between historically valuable 
information and accounts that, either intentionally or unintentionally, do not reflect the 
historical reality accurately.  Drawing on a mass of postwar testimony that investigators 
assembled about Sonderkommando R and the Holocaust in Transnistria, this dissertation 
applies Browning‘s general methodological approach. 
  Using testimony that Soviet authorities gathered constitutes a second and perhaps 
more severe methodological challenge to this study.  The Soviet Union (and its satellite 
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states) had a long history of staging politically motivated show trials in which coerced (and 
often tortured) defendants testified to having committed imaginary crimes.  The Great Purges 
of the late 1930s, fictionalized by Arthur Koestler‘s novel Darkness at Noon, cast a shadow 
on any testimony that Soviet security forces recorded.53  Scholars are therefore right to treat 
the factual material that these testimonies contain with the utmost caution and to raise 
questions about the extent to which Soviet political interests and the mindset and habits of 
the individual investigators shaped the information contained in these records. 
 Aware of the methodological challenges that Soviet investigative material presents, a 
handful of scholars have begun to use these records to analyze previously understudied 
dimensions of the Holocaust in the Soviet Union.54  As this type of inquiry remains in its 
infancy, historians who use these materials have focused on studying Soviet judicial 
proceedings, rather than reflecting on how these records can be used to study wartime 
events.55  Jan Gross‘s study Neighbors provides the most germane methodological discussion 
for using these types of sources.  Gross bases his study largely on testimony that Polish 
security forces gathered in the late 1940s, the height of Stalinist rule in the country.  
Acknowledging the potential pitfalls of using the material as an historical source to 
reconstruct what happened during the war, not least of which was the fact that investigating 
officials tortured many of the witnesses and defendants to obtain statements, Gross contends 
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that the specific circumstances of the investigation make the historical information contained 
in its records reliable.  Gross submits that because ―the matter was handled as a routine case,‖ 
authorities did not manipulate the evidence to serve an ulterior political motive.56  Gross 
concludes that ―for the very reason that this was by no means a political trial, materials 
produced during the investigation can serve us well in our reconstruction of what actually 
took place.‖57 
 Gross‘s assertion that discerning the aims of investigators is key to determining the 
quality of historical information contained in the records is a useful starting point for 
evaluating how to treat testimony that Soviet authorities gathered.  As interview transcripts 
are the only accessible sources related to the inquiries, ascertaining whether or not Soviet 
investigators manipulated or fabricated statements to serve the Soviet regime‘s political 
agenda depends on inferring their intent from the testimony that they recorded.  To be sure, 
each of the major groupings of Soviet testimony reflect, to varying degrees, the Soviet 
regime‘s desire both to probe German activities in occupied territory and to identify local 
residents who cooperated with the invaders.  To this end, strong circumstantial evidence 
suggests that Soviet authorities subjected interviewees to sleep deprivation and physical 
abuse to obtain information from uncooperative suspects.  While these interrogation 
techniques are unlikely to meet the burdens of most judicial systems, there is no evidence 
that Soviet authorities manipulated evidence for political gain. 
 It is important to distinguish between the testimony that Soviet investigators recorded 
about Sonderkommando R and its crimes during the 1940s and 1960s.  Wartime materials, 
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which SMERSH or the Extraordinary State Commission produced, remained secret because 
they had counterintelligence applications and threatened to expose the degree to which local 
residents had collaborated with occupying forces.  Similarly, the special cases that the NKVD 
tried in clandestine courts in late 1940s remained sealed because public evidence of massive 
local complicity in German-led crimes was embarrassing.  During the 1960s, when strong 
circumstantial evidence suggests that the KGB responded to an ongoing West German 
inquiry by reopening an old case, a different dynamic appears to have been at play.  Perhaps 
cognizant that their findings would be shared with West German authorities and that, to 
remain convincing, interview records would need to maintain the appearance of due process, 
Soviet investigators went to great lengths to gather meticulously accurate evidence.  The 
inquiry was a massive undertaking.  Over the course of a months-long investigation, the 
KGB transported witnesses from Central Asia to southern Ukraine, interviewed key suspects 
dozens of times, recorded thousands of pages of testimony and conducted onsite pathological 
analysis.  Investigators also recorded absurdly implausible claims of ignorance about wartime 
events that many defendants made.  Had the KGB simply wanted a signed confession to 
make quick political hay, then there would have been no reason to concoct such an elaborate 
investigation.  A careful analysis of available Soviet testimony strongly suggests that the 
Soviet security apparatus recorded evidence that it judged to capture historical reality.  While, 
like all sources, Soviet investigative records concerning the crimes of Sonderkommando R 
and its local helpers should be read critically for information that, given the preponderance of 
the evidence, appears inaccurate, it would be an error simply to disqualify these sources from 
consideration. 
 The scale and diversity of sources available to reconstruct Sonderkommando R‘s 
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mission to Transnistria and area Volksdeutsche complicity in the Holocaust present a unique 
methodological opportunity to assess the quality of historical information in Soviet 
testimony.  Not only is there a large, if fragmentary body of wartime records that can be used 
to corroborate postwar statements, but the West German investigation into Sonderkommando 
R and later its indigenous assistants constitutes an exceptional parallel set of records.  In few 
if any other instances did German investigators possess the language skills or unfettered 
access to former local residents to conduct a detailed investigation into the Holocaust in the 
occupied Soviet Union at the grassroots level.  Postwar investigations into this subject 
constitute a rare instance in which two very different states probed the same microhistorical 
events and one in which historians can compare the content of each record group.  That 
interview transcripts recorded decades and thousands of kilometers apart provide remarkably 
consistent historical information speaks to the empirical weight of these testimonies. 
Place and Personal Names 
 For scholars writing about historical events in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, 
assigning place names is a perpetually problematic undertaking.  Given the region‘s ethnic 
and linguistic multiplicity, most places have an array of names.  Choosing one designation 
over another inevitably threatens to insert researchers into partisan struggles over which 
ethnic group is entitled to a particular piece of territory.  With the exception of places, such as 
Odessa, which have common English spellings, all places names are given using the names 
that local German-speakers and later the SS assigned to them.  This is done to recreate and 
convey the historical landscape as it existed at that time.  During the war, the violent 
population schemas that German officials enacted remade much of the region‘s demographic 
landscape.  The SS‘s removal of local Volksdeutsche and the Soviet regime‘s refusal to 
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permit German-speakers to return to southern Ukraine after the war meant that many of these 
Germanized settlements existed for only a brief historical moment.  Using wartime names 
reflects this historical reality.  For the reader‘s convenience and geographical precision, if 
possible the contemporary Ukrainian-language place name is given in the first instance. 
 This study renders all personal names as they appeared during the war.  The one 
notable exception is names that appear exclusively in archival collections accessed in the 
Federal Republic of Germany.  According to the conditions of access that German law 
imposes on scholarly users, the personal details, including names of living private 
individuals, may not be published.  In accordance with established practice in this field, 
personal names that do not appear elsewhere in the public record are anonymized. 
Chapter organization 
 This study is organized into eight thematic chapters that are arranged in rough 
chronological sequence.  Chapter 1 reconstructs the historical trajectory of southern 
Ukraine‘s Black Sea German communities from their establishment during the early 
nineteenth century to Sonderkommando R‘s arrival in the fall of 1941.  A once privileged 
minority, the Black Sea Germans experienced decades of decline under Soviet rule before the 
summer of 1941, when the retreating Red Army attempted to deport ethnic German men and 
advancing German and Romanian forces targeted the region‘s Volksdeutsche communities 
for harsh but selective violence.  This experience illustrated to local ethnic Germans that life 
as they had known it in the Soviet Union had come to an end and that while German rule 
provided new possibilities, area Volksdeutsche would need to learn to navigate the Nazi 
regime‘s new expectations or face potentially lethal consequences. 
 Chapter 2 analyzes the men and women who staffed Sonderkommando R and set 
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Volksdeutsche policy in the region.  A highly eclectic unit, it drew its personnel from an array 
of sources, including professional völkisch activists, recently resettled Volksdeutsche, Nazi 
party ―old fighters,‖ members the National Socialist Motor Corps (Nationalsozialistische 
Kraftfahrkorps), and German Red Cross nurses.  Despite its myriad cleavages, 
Sonderkommando R functioned because many of its personnel had forged bonds by 
participating together in earlier Volksdeutsche ―resettlement‖ campaigns in Eastern Europe 
and because the high proportion of women assigned to the unit provided an opportunity to 
pursue romantic relationships and build group cohesion in the field. 
 Chapters 3 through 5 explore Sonderkommando R‘s attempts to mobilize 
Transnistria‘s Volksdeutsche as the demographic vanguard of Nazi plans for the occupied 
Soviet Union.  The third chapter probes Sonderkommando R‘s efforts to ferret out real and 
largely imagined enemies of National Socialism in the region‘s ethnic German communities.  
The unit‘s discovery that earlier German sweeps through the area had failed to kill a handful 
of local Jews and members of ―mixed race‖ families led its personnel to question the 
reliability of local Volksdeutsche, who had hidden these individuals from the SS.  
Sonderkommando R responded by ratcheting up violence against suspected Volksdeutsche 
―communists‖ and eventually local residents, whom the SS deemed to be unfit for the Nazi 
racial community on behavior grounds. 
 Chapter 4 analyzes VoMi attempts to pry local Volksdeutsche, historically a deeply 
religious people, from their attachment to Christianity.  Conscious of the fact that the Church 
offered area ethnic Germans an alternative to National Socialism, the unit squelched the 
religious freedom that many local residents had hoped for by suppressing the Catholic 
Church and providing them with heavily Nazified Protestant clergy. 
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 The fifth chapter reconstructs Sonderkommando R‘s projects to organize 
Transnistria‘s Volksdeutsche in anticipation of the militarized agricultural German 
settlements that the Third Reich planned to establish in the conquered Soviet Union.  This 
undertaking entailed carving out an autonomous sphere of influence in Romanian-occupied 
territory by launching a low-level armed conflict with local Romanian forces and pursuing a 
brutal policy of ethnic cleansing to create homogenous Volksdeutsche communities, where 
none had existed previously.  The VoMi succored these Volksdeutsche settlements by 
providing them with privileged access to the region‘s scare economic assets and to massive 
quantities of stolen Jewish property imported from Poland.  Sonderkommando R 
complemented this economic policy with a concerted, if ultimately incomplete propaganda 
and education campaign to secure local Volksdeutsche adherence to the National Socialist 
cause. 
 Chapter 6 turns its attention away from rural Transnistria and to Odessa, the region‘s 
cosmopolitan entrepôt.  There, Sonderkommando R‘s personnel confronted the exceptional 
challenge of identifying and mobilizing Volksdeutsche in one of the Soviet Union‘s most 
ethnically diverse cities.  Confounded by this local reality, the unit‘s staff ceded control of the 
ethnic classification process to their indigenous female subordinates.  When these local 
women sabotaged the SS‘s efforts to find area Volksdeutsche, the unit‘s personnel responded 
by murdering suspected ethnic German ―imposters.‖  This chapter underscores the 
tenuousness of the category of ―Germanness‖ in southern Ukraine and the degree to which 
the SS was prepared to use violence to clarify this reality. 
 The study‘s final chapters analyze Volksdeutsche involvement in the Holocaust in 
Transnistria.  Chapter 7 reconstructs the specific circumstances in which Sonderkommando R 
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and its local Volksdeutsche helpers participated in the Holocaust in southern Ukraine during 
the winter of 1941-42.  The chapter explores how, in the midst of a long-term shoving match 
between Romanian and German authorities over which power was responsible for murdering 
the region‘s Jews, Transnistria‘s Romanian administrators used the SS‘s fear of epidemic 
disease to enlist Sonderkommando R‘s assistance in mass shooting operations.  It also 
discusses how Sonderkommando R deployed local Volksdeutsche militiamen in killings that 
not only expanded in scale and complexity, but also anticipated techniques later employed at 
extermination centers in occupied Poland. 
 The dissertation‘s final chapter examines why area Volksdeutsche participated in 
mass murder.  It begins with an institutional history of Transnistria‘s ethnic German militia, 
the organization from which Sonderkommando R drew its killers.  Using a prosopography of 
militiamen from the most heavily involved ethnic German militia unit, it then constructs a 
collective biography of the region‘s most prominent Volksdeutsche perpetrators.  Finally, 
using as a case study one militia unit‘s initial killing deployment, it analyzes the specific 
situational dynamics at play while these perpetrators carried out the Holocaust.  It concludes 
that, more so than other factors, situational pressures created by Sonderkommando R‘s rule in 
Transnistria moved local Volksdeutsche to participate in genocide. 
  
  
 
CHAPTER I: FROM PRIVILEDGED TO PERSECUTED: THE BLACK SEA 
GERMANS, 1800-1941 
 
 At the outset of the West German criminal investigation into Sonderkommando R in 
1961, the lead investigator in Ludwigsburg, State Attorney (Staatsanwalt) Schuster, wrote to 
the Bavarian State Office of Criminal Investigation (Bayrische Landeskriminalamt) to 
request its assistance in interviewing witnesses and potential suspects.  Schuster warned his 
colleagues that ―I have been told that, because of their difficult fate, the Russian Germans are 
very distrustful and close-lipped.  It will therefore perhaps require some effort to get them to 
speak.‖58  As perceptive investigators like Schuster realized, the complex century and a half 
history of the Black Sea Germans and their historical interactions with Germany shaped their 
responses not only to postwar investigators, but also to National Socialist rule.  This chapter 
unpacks this historical baggage by tracing the development of the Black Sea Germans from 
the establishment of their communities during the nineteenth century to Sonderkommando 
R‘s arrival in Transnistria during the fall of 1941. 
 Through territorial expansion and concerted efforts to recruit settlers from central 
Europe, during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the House of Romanov acquired a 
substantial number of German-speaking subjects.  Invited by the tsarist regime during and 
after the Napoleonic Wars to settle territory that it had acquired recently from the Ottoman 
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Empire, the Black Sea Germans were the final major group of Germanophone subjects to 
arrive in the Empire.  During much of the nineteenth century, they prospered in agriculture 
and maintained comparatively circumscribed connections to their ancestors‘ erstwhile 
homeland.  Beginning at the end of the nineteenth century, however, their privileged socio-
economic position began to erode in the wake of domestic political unrest in the Russian 
Empire.  While the region‘s German-speakers initially weathered these obstacles relatively 
unscathed, repressive tsarist measures at the beginning of the First World War marked the 
beginning of a multi-generational decline.  The 1917 Russian Revolution, the Russian Civil 
War, and Soviet rule constituted an unmitigated disaster for the Black Sea Germans that 
culminated in widespread expropriation, famine, arrest, and deportation.  Targeted by Soviet 
authorities first as class enemies and then as an ethnically suspect minority, the Black Sea 
Germans suffered mightily in the years leading up to 1941. 
The opening months of the Second World War in southern Ukraine—a portion of the 
conflict that has received comparatively little scholarly attention—constituted the most 
violent period of the Black Sea Germans‘ unarguably violent recent history.  During the 
summer of 1941, both retreating Soviet and advancing German forces targeted local 
Volksdeutsche communities.  The lessons that local Volksdeutsche drew from these brutal 
encounters, however, were very different.  Soviet violence, which the Red Army and NKVD 
directed against virtually all ethnic Germans, underscored to area Volksdeutsche that their 
prospects under Soviet rule were increasingly grim.  By the fall of 1941, the Black Sea 
Germans realized that a return of Soviet power would mean their wholesale deportation to 
the Soviet interior and the destruction of their communities.  German violence, by contrast, 
was far more selective and focused on local Jews, the members of ―mixed race‖ families, and 
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area residents whom other locals had denounced as ―communists.‖  While the public nature 
of this violence shocked area Volksdeutsche, it highlighted to local ethnic Germans that their 
prospects under German rule were more positive, provided that they could navigate their new 
overlords‘ expectations. 
Prosperity and Change: German-Speakers in the Russian Empire, 1721-1905 
 The Russian Empire was home to two primary groups of German-speakers.  The first 
was the Baltic Germans (Baltendeutsche), who inhabited the provinces of Estland, Kurland, 
and Livland in what is present-day Estonia and Latvia.59  The 1721 Treaty of Nystadt, with 
which Peter I ended the Great Northern War against Sweden, not only incorporated the three 
provinces into the Russian Empire, but also established the local Germanophone nobility, 
which descended from the Teutonic Knights who had conquered the region in the thirteenth 
century, as his feudal vassals.  In exchange for their fealty, Peter I granted the local 
aristocracy extensive cultural privileges, including confessional freedom and a German 
Lutheran university in Dorpat (Tartu), as well as internal political autonomy.60  Peter I‘s 
decision to ennoble all foreign officers in imperial service was a tremendous catalyst for 
securing Baltic German participation and advancement in the Russian state service until the 
regime‘s demise in 1917.  Throughout much of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the 
Baltic German nobility and urban bourgeoisie used their intimate relationship with the tsarist 
autocracy to secure an economically privileged position vis-à-vis local Balts, who constituted 
the majority of the region‘s population.  This ethnic and socio-economic differentiation 
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precipitated the emergence of Baltic nationalism during the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries.  During the 1905 Russian Revolution, the increasingly antagonistic 
relationship between Baltic Germans and Balts fueled interethnic and class violence.  
Following the disillusion of the Russian Empire in the wake of the 1917 Russian Revolution, 
the nascent states of Latvia and Estonia eliminated the political and much of the economic 
power of their countries‘ ethnically German minorities. 
 State-sponsored settlers, who arrived in the Russian interior in three waves, 
constituted the second and historically distinctly more parvenu group of ethnic Germans in 
the Russian Empire.  The first of these new arrivals were ethnic Germans, who settled along 
the Volga River primarily near Saratov.  In keeping with Habsburg enlightened absolutists, 
who recruited Germans to settle the Banat and the Bačka regions of what is now Serbia, 
Catherine II enlisted German-speakers to populate the vast Russian steppe.61  Catherine II‘s 
December 1762 and July 1763 Manifestos solicited Germans, who wanted either to escape 
the poverty of German-speaking central Europe after the end of the Seven Years War or to 
avoid compulsory military service in the Prussian army.62  The generous offer that the tsarist 
autocracy circulated throughout central Europe included a thirty-year freedom from taxation, 
local self-government, a perpetual military service exemption, and thirty desiatina 
(approximately 108 acres) of free land.63  Using local recruitment agents and Catherine II‘s 
home state of Anhalt-Zerbst as a staging area, the autocracy established 102 German 
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settlements along the Volga between 1765 and 1770.64  By 1788 the Volga Germans 
(Wolgadeutsche) numbered some 31,000, a figure that increased tenfold by the 1897 tsarist 
census.65 
 The Russian Empire‘s territorial expansion at the end of the eighteenth century 
provided the tsarist regime with new opportunities to recruit German-speaking settlers.  
Following the Peace of Jassy, which ended the Second Russo-Turkish War in 1791, the 
Russian Empire acquired previously Ottoman territory near the Black Sea, so-called New 
Russia.  To settle the Empire‘s newly-acquired borderlands between the Dniester and Bug 
Rivers, Catherine II launched a second and more ambitious bid to attract Germans to the 
Russian Empire.  The autocracy set aside more than 555,000 desiatina (approximately two 
million acres) of land open for settlement in the new provinces of Ekaterinoslav and Cherson 
as well as on the Crimea.  Catherine II‘s new immigration policy coincided with Frederick 
Wilhelm II‘s 1786 accession to the Prussian throne, and a subsequent decrease in official 
tolerance for religious minorities in that country.66  The result was that Mennonite religious 
refugees comprised a disproportionate number of the German-speaking settlers who arrived 
in the region at the end of the eighteenth century. 
 At the beginning of the nineteenth century, Catherine II‘s grandson, Alexander I, 
launched the tsarist regime‘s third and final attempt to recruit German settlers to the Russian 
Empire.  He took a personal interest in the Empire‘s internal development and passed no less 
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than 123 edicts concerning immigration.67 Alexander I‘s February 1804 Edict, in particular, 
encouraged German settlement by permitting potential immigrants significant latitude in 
choosing their destinations within Russia.68  Building on Catherine II‘s efforts, Alexander I 
increased the geographic area slated for German settlement to include parts of Bessarabia.  
Despite the fact that tsarist officials recruited a variety of settlers from central and 
southeastern Europe, Alexander I and his officials favored Germans for their agricultural 
skills.69  After the end of the Napoleonic Wars, for example, the ancien régime offered twice 
as much land to German settlers as it did to their Balkan counterparts.70  As a result of 
increasing state incentives and the turbulence of central Europe during the Napoleonic 
period, the demographic pattern of German settlers changed.  Because of crop failures in 
southern Germany, a large number of Catholics, primarily from Württemberg, relocated to 
New Russia.  Similarly, a second major group of largely Lutheran settlers emigrated from 
West Prussia, Brandenburg, Mecklenburg and Pomerania.71  During the first decades of the 
nineteenth century, the fluid central European political situation and solicitous tsarist 
immigration policy created a uniquely diverse German settler community.72 
 The so-called Black Sea Germans were among the largest of these groups.  Living in 
noncontiguous settlements that dotted the region outside of Odessa, they inhabited largely 
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ethnically homogeneous Germanophone villages throughout the nineteenth century.73  These 
settlements were typically segregated by confession, with Protestant and Catholic settlers 
residing in separate communities.  New Russia‘s German settlers prospered in agriculture.  In 
contrast to the Volga Germans, who had relocated to the Russian interior several decades 
earlier, and largely adopted Russian farming practices, the Black Sea Germans introduced 
central European agricultural techniques to the Russian Empire‘s southwestern frontier.  Not 
only did the Black Sea Germans farm individual homesteads, but they also employed 
technological innovations, such as crop rotation and steel plows, which were previously 
unknown in the region.74  The result was that the Black Sea Germans economically 
outperformed their non-German neighbors.  On the eve of the 1917 Russian Revolution, 
Ukraine‘s German-speakers owned and farmed between 40,000 and 45,000 square 
kilometers—an area approximately one and a half times the size of the state of Maryland.75  
In the countryside surrounding Odessa ethnic Germans, who comprised seven percent of 
property owners at the beginning of the twentieth century, owned approximately 60 percent 
of the land.76  Prior to the Russian Revolution, the Black Sea Germans were Ukraine‘s 
prosperous peasants par excellence. 
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 The comparative economic success of New Russia‘s German-speakers during the 
nineteenth century had important implications for their historical interactions with area Jews.  
Although ironic, given their descendants‘ involvement in the Holocaust, during the 
nineteenth century the Black Sea Germans were among the primary agents of the Russian 
Empire‘s experimental efforts to establish Jews as subsistence farmers in the Pale of 
Settlement.  In 1808, Alexander I established the Aid Committee for Foreigners in Odessa, 
which was charged with overseeing New Russia‘s non-Russian inhabitants.77  The Aid 
Committee was not only responsible for local Germans, but also authorized to supervise the 
sizable local Jewish population that the autocracy acquired through its westward territorial 
expansion into what became the southern-most tip of the Pale of Settlement.78  Tsarist 
administrators on the Aid Committee were so impressed with the Black Sea Germans‘ 
apparent agricultural acumen that they decided to employ area ethnic Germans as ―model 
farmers‖ for local Jews beginning in 1847.  Over the next five years, the Aid Committee‘s 
incentives encouraged dozens of German farmers and their families to relocate to New 
Russia‘s two dozen Jewish experimental settlements.  By 1858, an imperial survey of twenty 
predominately Jewish villages revealed that the local population also included 450 ethnic 
Germans. 79  In contrast to the participation of local ethnic Germans in the Holocaust during 
the Second World War, during the first half of the nineteenth century Russian authorities had 
identified their ancestors as a population that was uniquely suited to assist Jews. 
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 Despite the comparatively intimate relations between southern Ukraine‘s ethnic 
Germans and Jews, contact between area German-speakers and Ukrainians were far less 
positive.80  Whereas Black Sea Germans interacted and intermarried with Jews both in the 
countryside and in Odessa, the region‘s cosmopolitan center, there was comparatively little 
intermarriage between local Volksdeutsche and Ukrainians.81  In fact, many Ukrainians often 
conflated Jews and ethnic Germans.  Because of state privileges for German-speakers and 
Jews‘ legal monopoly on alcohol sales, Ukrainians regarded both groups as economic 
exploiters.  These tensions periodically came to a head during Ukrainian-led anti-Jewish 
pogroms, in which the assailants also menaced area Germans.82  New Russia‘s German-
speakers existed in a periodically tense interethnic milieu in which ethnic and economic 
antagonisms reinforced one another. 
 Following the Russian Empire‘s ignoble defeat during the Crimea War in 1855, the 
Russian autocracy pursued an aggressive program of social and economic reforms designed 
to modernize and rehabilitate the Empire.  Prior to his assassination in 1881, Alexander II 
enacted an array of reforms that abolished serfdom, established institutions for local self-
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government, and codified the Empire‘s legal and administrative structure.83  Two of these 
reforms had important implications for the special legal status of German-speakers in 
southern Ukraine.  First, in 1871, imperial authorities eliminated the special administrative 
structure under which they had governed ethnic German settlements and rescinded their 
taxation exemptions.  As area German-speakers legally became part of the peasantry, Russian 
administrators invited them to participate in local government by joining recently formed 
zemstva (a representative form of local government).  Second, as part of the autocracy‘s 
military reforms, in 1874 Alexander II ordered universal male conscription.84  Alexander II‘s 
policies in the latter half of the nineteenth century rescinded many of the privileges that had 
attracted German-speakers to southern Ukraine several generations earlier. 
 The impact of these reforms on local ethnic Germans was mixed.  On the one hand, 
obligatory military service contradicted an important religious tenet for the region‘s sizable 
Mennonite population.  Although some Mennonites, who had the financial means to emigrate 
again, relocated primarily to North America, the majority of their co-religionists were able to 
reach an accommodation with the autocracy, whereby conscientious objectors could fulfill 
their obligation by serving as non-combatants.85  For local Protestants and Catholics, these 
new service requirements proved less problematic.  On the other hand, participation in local 
zemstva permitted New Russia‘s Germans to engage with their Slavic neighbors in local 
                                                 
83 On these reforms see W. Bruce Lincoln, The Great Reforms: Autocracy, Bureaucracy and the 
Politics of Change in Imperial Russia (DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 1990). 
84 Fleischhauer, ―The Nationalities Policy of the Tsars Reconsidered--the Case of the Russian 
Germans,‖ D1087; Schmidt, Die Deutschen aus Bessarabien, 49-50.  Bourret, Les Allemands de la Volga, 62. 
85 Michael Schippan and Sonja Striegnitz, Wolgadeutsche: Geschichte und Gegenwart (Berlin: Dietz 
Verlag, 1992), 104.  
46 
 
government in a way in which they had not done previously.86  Because a landowner‘s 
authority within the zemstva depended on the size of his landholdings, the wealthy 
maintained an unequal say in area affairs.  By dint of the fact that German colonists were 
historically more prosperous than their non-German neighbors, they typically exerted 
disproportionate influence in local politics.87  While New Russia‘s Germans lost many of 
their de jure privileges vis-à-vis the autocracy, the new structure of local government ensured 
that many of their de facto privileges remained until the early twentieth century. 
 Throughout much of the nineteenth century, the Black Sea Germans differed from 
many other ethnic German communities in Romanov or Habsburg lands, such as the 
Transylvanian Saxons (Siebenbürger Sachsen) and the Baltic Germans, in that they 
maintained relatively circumscribed connections to German-speaking central Europe.  The 
reasons for this were both geographical and cultural.  The comparative remoteness of the 
Black Sea Germans meant that outside of the city of Odessa there were few opportunities to 
trade directly with central Europe.  Owing to the Black Sea Germans‘ relatively low level of 
educational development, they had little need to engage with the broader Germanophone 
cultural world.  The notable exceptions were southern Ukraine‘s Protestant and Catholic 
clergy and ethnic German instructors.  While some clergymen and teachers received training 
at German institutions, many of them pursued their studies at German-speaking institutions 
within the Russian Empire, either in the Baltic or on the Volga.88  During the nineteenth 
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century, the Black Sea Germans were thus among the most historically divorced groups of 
ethnic Germans from Germany—a feature of their historical development that would have 
important implications for the contours of German occupation policy during the Second 
World War. 
 Notwithstanding an evolving relationship between local German-speakers and 
imperial power and continued latent interethnic conflict with area non-Germans, the latter 
half of the nineteenth century marked the Black Sea Germans‘ historical high watermark.  
Within the course of less than one hundred years, the region‘s German-speakers had 
established a dominant economic position in the countryside surrounding Odessa and had 
secured precisely the religious freedoms that their ancestors sought in the tsarist empire.  
Despite the fact that the Russian autocracy‘s efforts at modernization had eroded some of 
their historical privileges, the Black Sea Germans remained a socio-economically privileged 
population that had little opportunity or reason to maintain any but the most basic 
connections with their ancestors‘ former homeland. 
The Black Sea Germans in an Era of Revolutions and Civil War, 1905-1922 
 At the beginning of the twentieth century, the Russian Empire‘s domestic problems 
appeared to be of little concern to area Volksdeutsche.  In comparison to the acute interethnic 
and class violence that the 1905 Revolution spawned in the Baltic, the Black Sea Germans 
were little affected by the upheaval.  As the autocracy‘s apparent inability to police the 
countryside became apparent to local residents, however, the area‘s German settlers, like 
their Baltic German counterparts, established Selbstschutz (or self-defense) units to guard 
their communities against possible theft and interethnic violence.  Perhaps one of the 
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Revolution‘s strangest episodes exemplifies the degree to which the Black Sea Germans 
sought to maintain the status quo in the midst of upheaval.  In an effort to bolster their 
fledgling militia forces, a group of Baltic German leaders traveled by rail to the Black Sea 
German settlements and suggested that the two groups combine self-defense units for a joint 
assault on revolutionaries in the Baltic.  Black Sea German leaders declined on the grounds 
that they could not see any advantage to defending Baltic German privilege.89 
 The Black Sea Germans underscored their support for the status quo following 
Nicholas II‘s October Manifesto by returning Octobrist representatives to the First Duma, 
who accepted the tsar‘s manifesto as sufficient reform.  When P.A. Stolypin‘s government 
dissolved the Second Duma and issued new election laws that favored propertied interests, 
the political power of southern Ukraine‘s ethnic Germans increased further.90  Given that 
New Russia‘s German settlers escaped most of the Revolution‘s violence, their Duma 
electoral results highlighted their continued fealty to the tsarist autocracy, whose favor 
remained instrumental in maintaining their privileged socio-economic position. 
 As the Black Sea Germans owed their dominate socio-economic position to historical 
privileges that the tsarist regime had granted them, it is ironic that the first major twentieth-
century state challenge to their settlements came from the ancien régime.  In 1915, tsarist 
authorities became increasingly uneasy about the presence of German-speakers—both ethnic 
Germans and Yiddish-speaking Jews—along the Empire‘s western periphery.  Fearing the 
Jews and ethnic Germans could become a fifth column for the armies of the advancing 
Central Powers, tsarist officials pursued repressive policies against its Germanophone 
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subjects in the Empire‘s western borderlands.91  Although ethnic Germans and Jews, who 
were closest to the front in areas like Volhynia, faced the brunt of these policies, such as 
expropriation and deportation, the Black Sea Germans saw much of their linguistic, 
educational, and religious autonomy evaporate.92  For the Black Sea Germans, these 
measures signaled the state‘s departure from its historical role as the protector of area ethnic 
Germans and its emergence as one of their primary opponents. 
 In the midst of their progressively deteriorating position during the last years of the 
tsarist regime, the Black Sea Germans greeted the February 1917 Revolution with guarded 
optimism.  The Provisional Government‘s initial policies suggested that the Revolution 
would benefit southern Ukraine‘s ethnic Germans.  In March 1917, the Provisional 
Governmental declared the equality of all citizens and rolled back many of the repressive 
tsarist measures that had targeted the Empire‘s ethnic Germans.93  The October 1917 
Revolution, however, immediately threatened to undo these advances.  While, during the last 
years of the tsarist regime, the Black Sea Germans had suffered from increasingly repressive 
policies, as wealthy farmers they stood to lose significantly more from a radically new socio-
economic order.  Over the next three years, they launched a quixotic effort to maintain the 
status quo antebellum. 
 The local Selbstschutz, which first defended local ethnic German communities from 
theft and ultimately joined counter-revolutionary forces, spearheaded the Black Sea German 
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response to the October Revolution.  As they had in 1905, during the 1917 Revolution 
southern Ukraine‘s ethnic Germans raised indigenous self-defense forces to protect their 
communities.94  When the German army occupied southern Ukraine in 1918, local German 
commanders implemented measures that favored area Volksdeutsche.  The German military 
trained and armed local Selbstschutz units as a bulwark against area non-Germans and 
suspected revolutionaries.95  The Black Sea Germans reciprocated this privileged treatment 
by purchasing German war bonds valued at 60 million Goldmarks.96  Assistance from area 
German forces, however, ended almost as quickly as it had begun.  Following the November 
1918 revolution in Germany, the German military withdrew from the region.  In the power 
vacuum left in the wake of retreating German forces, the Red Army, the anarchist 
Revolutionary Insurrectionary Army of Ukraine (or Black Army), and the anti-revolutionary 
White Army vied for control of southern Ukraine.97  Anticipating that victory for the 
Bolsheviks would threaten their dominant socio-economic position in the area and besieged 
by Ukrainian anarchist forces under the command of Nestor Makhno, the Black Sea Germans 
sided with the Whites.98  During the spring and summer of 1919, Black Sea German 
militiamen fought alongside White forces led by A.I. Denikin and P.N. Wrangel, which 
resupplied the Selbstschutz with arms brought from the White-controlled port of 
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Sevastopol.99  When Black and later Red forces routed the Whites during 1920, thousands of 
Black Sea Germans fled southern Ukraine, primarily for Germany and North America.100  
The remaining Black Sea Germans were left to live under a Soviet regime whose creation 
they had just taken up arms to oppose. 
The Black Sea Germans under Soviet Rule, 1922-1941 
Following the Russian Civil War, the Black Sea Germans were an embattled 
population on two fronts.  First, particularly in southern Ukraine, the war‘s devastation was 
immense.  As in much of the rural Soviet Union, years of warfare had decimated the 
countryside.  The conscription of young men and draft animals by warring armies robbed 
southern Ukraine of these valuable resources and hamstrung subsistence agriculture.  The 
destruction of ethnic German settlements and agricultural equipment disrupted agricultural 
production and precipitated widespread hunger and disease.101  Second, during the preceding 
years, the Black Sea Germans had made themselves the archenemies of the new Soviet 
regime.  As onetime staunch supporters of the tsarist autocracy, recipients of wartime 
German military assistance, and finally as allies of the White Army, the Black Sea Germans 
had, at every opportunity, thrown their lot in with Bolsheviks‘ avowed opponents.  Soviet 
authorities routinely labeled local ethnic Germans, and particularly ethnic German men, as 
counter-revolutionaries and ordered their arrest, deportation, and often execution.  This move 
exacerbated the deficit of Volksdeutsche men in the area and intensified economic hardship 
in the region‘s ethnic German communities. 
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 Despite their inauspicious early encounters with Soviet rule, the Black Sea Germans 
benefited from certain policies that the Soviet government pursued during the 1920s.  In 
contrast to War Communism and its ruinous grain requisitions, the New Economic Policy 
(NEP), begun in 1921, permitted local German-speakers limited space for independent 
agricultural production.  More importantly, Soviet nationalities policies during the 1920s, 
typified by korenizatsiia (nativization), endowed the Black Sea Germans with significant 
cultural freedom.102  Like the Volga Germans, whom the Soviet regime granted an 
Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic in 1924, the Black Sea Germans received substantial 
administrative and linguistic independence in southern Ukraine—privileges that the tsarist 
regime had denied the group during the First World War.103  Local Volksdeutsche response to 
these measures was tepid at best.  Not only were their economic opportunities under NEP 
more limited than they had been under the tsarist regime, but cultural autonomy in the face of 
anti-religious measures that the Soviet regime later implemented had little appeal to most 
area ethnic Germans.104 
 For the Black Sea Germans, mass expropriation, famine, and arrest punctuated the 
1930s.  Beginning in the winter of 1929-30, the Soviet regime, with Josef Stalin now 
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squarely at the helm, pursued an intense policy of dekulakization and collectivization.  While 
local Soviet authorities had implemented these measures haphazardly, they now intensified.  
Alleged wealthy farmers, whom Soviet officials identified as ―kulaks,‖ faced property 
confiscation, arrest, and deportation.105  While the Soviet regime did not target German-
speakers as an ethnic minority, dekulakization fell particularly hard on Ukraine‘s historically 
economically productive Volksdeutsche.   Despite accounting for only two percent of the 
region‘s population, ethnic Germans constituted 15 percent of all ―kulaks.‖106  This figure is 
particularly striking, given that Soviet statisticians had estimated that only three percent of 
the country‘s peasant households merited categorization as kulaks.107  Like many of their 
non-German neighbors, those Black Sea Germans who survived dekulakization found 
themselves compelled to surrender their property and join collective farms.  An immediate 
consequence of dekulakization and collectivization was famine.  Decreased agricultural 
output coupled with increased state grain requisition precipitated a famine across large 
portions of Ukraine during 1932 and 1933, claiming the lives of some 10 percent of the 
region‘s population.108  While the famine was particularly severe in eastern Ukraine, southern 
Ukraine‘s Odessa oblast‘, where most Black Sea Germans lived, was also hard hit.109  In 
response to perceived rural recalcitrance and agricultural ―sabotage,‖ the Soviet regime 
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intensified repressive measures in the countryside.110  Although, during the early 1930s, 
Soviet authorities did not target the Black Sea Germans as an ethnic minority and maintained 
much of the group‘s cultural and administrative independence, southern Ukraine‘s 
Volksdeutsche, like area non-Germans, felt the full brunt of Soviet agricultural policy. 
 In the latter half of the 1930s, the Soviet regime targeted southern Ukraine‘s 
Volksdeutsche as a suspect ethnic minority.  The shift reflected a broader change in Soviet 
nationalities policy.  Despite earlier efforts to spread the Soviet model by granting ethnic 
minorities extensive cultural and linguistic independence, beginning in 1935, the Soviet 
regime became concerned about the potential for diaspora populations to project foreign, 
capitalist influence within the Soviet Union.  While the Soviet state remained suspicious of 
other minority groups, such as Finns, Poles, and Koreans, ethnic Germans constituted a 
particular problem for Soviet authorities.  In late 1929, in the midst of increasingly repressive 
Soviet agricultural policies, thousands of Volksdeutsche descended on the German Embassy 
in Moscow and demanded assistance in obtaining exit visas.  Public outrage in Germany at 
the condition of German-speakers in the Soviet Union precipitated intensive diplomatic 
engagement with the issue and the formation of a charity, Brüder in Not (Brothers in Need), 
to aid the country‘s Volksdeutsche.111  Soviet fears that these initiatives were an effort to 
insert German influence into internal Soviet affairs intensified in 1933, when the vociferously 
anti-communist Nazi party assumed power in Germany. 
 Beginning in 1935, the Soviet regime began to pursue measures against ethnic 
minorities along Ukraine‘s western borderlands.  It expanded the border region and deported 
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the area‘s ethnically Polish and German residents to Kazakhstan, where they became ―special 
settlers‖ alongside kulaks, whom Soviet authorities had sent to the region a few years 
earlier.112  By 1936, Soviet authorities had deported roughly half of the territory‘s 
Volksdeutsche to Central Asia.113  As the Black Sea Germans fell outside of the designated 
border zone, they weathered this initial wave of ethnically based deportation.  Nevertheless, 
Soviet officials curtailed Germanophone administrative bodies and cultural institutions, 
eventually ending German-language education by the eve of the Second World War.114  
Soviet authorities ramped up anti-German measures during the Great Terror of 1936-38.  
Inspired by the infamous NKVD decree 00447, in early 1938 the Politburo ordered the 
Soviet security apparatus to take repressive measures against a host of diaspora minorities, 
including German-speakers.115  At roughly the same time, local communist party officials in 
Odessa oblast‘ ordered the deportation of some 5,000 ethnic German households for 
suspected anti-Soviet activities.116  By the summer of 1941, a return to ethnic-based 
discrimination that the Black Sea Germans had first tasted under tsarist regime during the 
First World War underscored to local Volksdeutsche their increasingly endangered position 
under Soviet rule. 
A Changing of the Guard: The Violent Summer of 1941 
 The beginning of Operation Barbarossa has been the topic of tremendous scholarly 
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inquiry.117  Many researchers have rightly focused on the brutality of the German advance 
into Soviet territory and the role of German military and police forces in the murder of local 
residents, and especially Jews, during the campaign‘s opening months.118  Until very recently, 
however, scholars have rarely examined the extent to which the local population suffered at 
the hands of both retreating Soviet and advancing German forces.119  Examining violence 
that both Soviet and German authorities unleashed in tandem is not meant to relativize or 
minimize the unique intentionality with which the German invaders targeted civilians, and 
particularly Jews, for murder.  Rather, examining the violent summer of 1941 is necessary to 
reconstruct the experiences of local residents, and specifically ethnic Germans, in the months 
leading up to Sonderkommando R‘s arrival in September 1941. 
 The German invasion of the Soviet Union caught the Soviet government and military 
completely off balance.  During the first months of the invasion, the German Blitzkrieg was 
highly effective against often poorly organized Soviet resistance.  The German and 
Romanian sweep through southern Ukraine was no exception.  Although Antonescu‘s 
determination to capture Odessa without German assistance prevented the invaders from 
taking the city until the end of October 1941, the campaign in what would become 
Transnistria lasted a matter of weeks.  While slowed by periods of intense fighting, German 
and Romanian forces wrested control of much of the region west of the Bug River from 
                                                 
117 See, for example, Geoffrey Megargee‘s work on the opening months of the campaign.  Megargee, 
War of Annihilation.   
118 See, for example, Dieter Pohl, ―The Murder of Ukraine‘s Jews und German Military Administration 
and in the Reich Commissariat Ukraine,‖ in The Shoah in Ukraine: History, Testimony, Memorialization, eds. 
Ray Brandon and Wendy Lower, (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2008), 23-76. 
119 As Karel Berkhoff has observed, the Red Army and Soviet security apparatus behaved like a 
retreating army as it withdrew from much of Ukraine during the summer of 1941.  Berkhoff, Harvest of 
Despair, 33-34. 
57 
 
Soviet control by the end of August 1941. 
 Between the outbreak of hostilities and the Red Army‘s retreat in late July and early 
August 1941, Soviet authorities sought first to prepare defenses against the German and 
Romanian onslaught and then to evacuate matériel, agricultural equipment, and local 
residents to the country‘s interior.  Like their tsarist predecessors a generation earlier, the Red 
Army and NKVD suspected that area Volksdeutsche would likely become a German fifth 
column and ramped up repressive measures against local German-speakers.120  Beginning 
shortly after the start of the German offensive, Soviet authorities impressed area ethnic 
German men into forced labor squads and assigned them to dig trenches and construct other 
fortifications.121  When it became apparent to Soviet commanders that they would be unable 
to stop the German and Romanian thrust into southern Ukraine, Soviet military and security 
forces started stripping the countryside of livestock and agricultural equipment.122  Soviet 
authorities placed special emphasis on removing tractors and other agricultural machinery 
from the Machine Tractor Stations that peppered southern Ukraine‘s countryside.123  This 
scorched earth policy appears to have been aided by a growing number of Slavs and Jews, 
who correctly anticipated their dire fate under occupation and scrambled to flee to the Soviet 
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interior.124  To transport livestock, agricultural machinery, and local residents across the Bug 
River, Soviet authorities turned to local Volksdeutsche men.  Using area Volksdeutsche to 
shuttle animals, equipment, and refugees away from advancing German and Romanian forces 
accomplished two tasks simultaneously.  It not only denied the invaders access to these 
important resources, but it also promised to remove a group that historically had 
demonstrated a willingness to collaborate with invading German forces. 
 Shortly before enemy forces reached the area, Soviet commanders ordered all ethnic 
German men from the ages of sixteen to sixty to assemble in their localities to staff the 
evacuation transports.125  Some area Volksdeutsche anticipated that their departure would 
mean permanent relocation to the Soviet interior and hid in their homes or the surrounding 
countryside to await the German invaders. 126  Most ethnic German men, however, feared 
Soviet reprisals and mustered for transport duty.  The forced evacuation transports departed 
southern Ukraine for the Bug River shortly before the area became a combat zone.  As far as 
can be reconstructed from postwar statements, the evacuation was an amateurish enterprise.  
While Soviet authorities ordered ethnic Germans to use their wagons to transport civilian 
refugees across the Bug, there was no rail or truck transport available to relocate their 
livestock or agricultural equipment.  Many area Volksdeutsche were left herding cattle and 
driving their tractors and threshing machines in a futile and undoubtedly halfhearted effort to 
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outrun German and Romanian forces.127 
 The evacuation was predictably only partially successful.  Owing to their greater 
speed, horse-drawn civilian evacuation transports tended to reach the Soviet interior.  The 
relocation of livestock and agricultural equipment, which proceeded at a comparatively 
glacial pace, was far less successful.  Advancing German military unit overran many of these 
transports and freed their impressed drivers from their Soviet guards, who either fled or were 
taken prisoner.128  After liberation, German soldiers ordered the Volksdeutsche transport 
drivers to return home with their livestock and agricultural equipment—a trek that took up to 
several weeks.129  Although the rapidity of the German advance spared many Volksdeutsche 
from deportation to the Soviet interior, Soviet authorities managed to transfer a sizable 
portion of the region‘s population and economic infrastructure as well as no less than 6,000 
area ethnic German men behind the lines.130  This final deportation of Volksdeutsche men fell 
particularly heavily on Black Sea German communities that had already lost many of their 
adult males to earlier Soviet arrests and deportations.  It also underscored to local German-
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speakers that their days under Soviet rule were numbered.  Notwithstanding earlier hardships, 
southern Ukraine‘s Volksdeutsche had never faced the prospect of wholesale deportation 
from the region.  Their experiences during the final weeks and days before the occupation 
highlighted to the Black Sea Germans the grim fate that awaited them should they again fall 
into Soviet hands.  For local ethnic Germans, whose parents had fought against the 
Bolsheviks during the Russian Civil War and for whom Soviet rule had precipitated a 
multigenerational decline, this final, brutal period of Soviet power in southern Ukraine left 
them with little alternative but to welcome the arrival of German forces. 
 Early encounters between the Wehrmacht and local ethnic Germans appear to have 
been relatively benign.  Not only had the German army liberated many local Volksdeutsche 
men, who otherwise might have become permanent residents of Central Asia, but it also 
provided the first line of defense against Romanian troops who had begun raiding 
Volksdeutsche settlements.  The German army temporarily assumed responsibility for the 
safety of ethnic German communities by erecting placards to ward off their Romanian allies 
and stationing reserve units in the area to prevent further Romanian incursions.131 
 While the German Eleventh Army, which was deployed to southern Ukraine during 
the late summer of 1941, protected area ethnic German residents from Romanian banditry, its 
soldiers also tapped into the virulent animosity that many local Volksdeutsche felt toward the 
Soviet regime.  During the 1920s and 1930s, Soviet authorities had arrested, deported, and 
sometimes executed suspected political opponents on the basis of denunciations from other 
local residents.132  Now, with German forces in control of the region, the shoe was on the 
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other foot.  Local Volksdeutsche, whose relatives area residents had denounced to Soviet 
officials prior to the war, took their revenge by denouncing the informants to German forces 
as communist agents.133  From the existing records, it is unclear to what extent the German 
army had orders to pursue suspected communists within area Volksdeutsche settlements.  It 
appears, however, that initially individual Wehrmacht units responded to this groundswell of 
denunciations by carrying out summary executions.  In the town of Speyer, some 45 
kilometers northwest of Nikolaev (Mykolaiv), for example, an ethnic German woman merely 
flagged down a passing German tank and denounced the administrator of the local collective 
farm as a communist responsible for the Soviet-era deportations of local residents.  A 
member of the tank‘s crew dismounted and shot the man before his unit continued 
eastward.134  Perhaps to systematize what had been an ad hoc response to local Volksdeutsche 
denunciations, the Wehrmacht‘s Geheime Feldpolizei (Secret Field Police) launched 
investigations into the complicity of individual ethnic Germans in the Soviet regime‘s 
brutality, and particularly into the deportation of Volksdeutsche men immediately prior to the 
arrival of German forces.135  Throughout Transnistria‘s Volksdeutsche settlements the 
Wehrmacht became a conduit for local ethnic German frustration with the Soviet regime by 
carrying out dozens of executions of suspected local Soviet collaborators.136 
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 The Wehrmacht‘s efforts were merely the initial salvo in the Nazi regime‘s efforts to 
purge southern Ukraine‘s Volksdeutsche settlements of political opponents and racial 
enemies—a project that would consume the attention of German officials in the area for 
years to come.  As German military forces pushed deeper into the Soviet Union, 
Einsatzgruppe D assumed responsibility for the security of local Volksdeutsche settlements.  
Whereas the Wehrmacht responded to local denunciations by executing Volksdeutsche 
communists, Einsatzgruppe D‘s primary function was to purge the German military‘s rear 
areas of suspected communists and Jews.  During mid-August 1941, Einsatzgruppe D‘s 
Einsatzkommandos swept through southern Ukraine‘s Black Sea German communities in 
search of local Soviet collaborators and Jews.137  As earlier Wehrmacht units had discovered, 
area Volksdeutsche were eager to identify their perceived Soviet-era tormentors—both Jews 
and gentiles—to German authorities.  Nevertheless, in deciding whether or not to denounce 
local residents to German forces area Volksdeutsche made nuanced assessments about 
individual complicity in the Soviet regime‘s violence.  Einsatzgruppe D‘s personnel, 
however, were uninterested in determining the gradations of local involvement in the Soviet 
regime for area ethnic Germans, let alone for Jews, whose murder was a central part of their 
mission.  Whereas local Volksdeutsche would have been content for German forces to kill 
area residents who were complicit in prewar Soviet terror, Einsatzgruppe D slated most 
former Soviet administrators and all local Jews for murder.  As the unit‘s aims became 
apparent to area ethnic Germans—many of whom Einsatzgruppe D required to assist it in 
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disposing of its victims‘ bodies—some local residents attempted to retard the process that 
they had helped to set in motion.  Prior to shooting operations, local ethnic Germans 
periodically interceded on behalf of those former Soviet administrators, whom they regarded 
as innocent of wrongdoing under Soviet rule.138  Likewise, when it became apparent to local 
ethnic Germans that Einsatzgruppe D had resolved to murder not only individual Jews and 
Jewish families, but also the Jewish spouses, Volksdeutsche partners, and children of ―mixed 
race‖ families, many ethnic German communities resolved to hide handfuls of more 
thoroughly integrated local Jews from the SS.  The decision to shield selected Jews from 
Einsatzgruppe D would have lethal consequences when German authorities discovered this 
subterfuge the following year.  While local residents supported and even encouraged the 
initial German drive to root out the enemies of National Socialism, as its proportions became 
evident, many local Volksdeutsche attempted often unsuccessfully to limit Einsatzgruppe D‘s 
murder campaign.139 
 Einsatzgruppe D targeted not only a far more extensive group of residents than that 
with which most Volksdeutsche appeared comfortable, but also reintroduced a form of public 
violence into the region that had not been seen there since the upheaval of the Russian Civil 
War a generation earlier.  With the exception of the Red Army‘s brutal retreat through the 
region during the preceding weeks, Soviet violence had been bureaucratized and, although an 
open secret, typically obscured from plain sight.  Einsatzgruppe D‘s murderous sweep 
through the area during the summer of 1941 was precisely the opposite.  Upon arriving in a 
Volksdeutsche settlement, the members of Einsatzgruppe D‘s Einsatzkommandos typically 
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established a temporary local command post and solicited information from local residents 
about the identifies of Soviet agents and Jews, often using public meetings to encourage 
denunciations.140  Upon identifying their targets, Einsatzgruppe D‘s personnel arrested 
alleged Jews and communists and detained them at their command post while local residents 
received orders to dig trenches at the edge of town.  The Einsatzkommandos then shot their 
victims before advancing eastward.  As Anton T., an ethnic German from the town of Landau 
(Shyrokolanivka), some 50 kilometers northwest of Nikolaev, later described one of 
Einsatzkommando 12‘s killing operations: 
An SD unit of approximately 25 men arrived in Landau at the end of August 1941 and 
remained there at most 10 days.  . . .  These SD personnel shot 8 Jews in Landau, 
including an elderly local Jewish woman and seven other Jews, who all lived in the 
Landau‘s retirement home.  The shooting took place at a sand pit 500 meters to the 
southwest of Landau.  . . .  Mayor F. ordered Willibald S., Michael W., and Johann L., 
and I to dig a pit the size of a double grave.  Then the SD personnel arrived.  After a 
time we heard the shots fired.  Before that [however] Raphael S. the coachman from 
the retirement home had arrived.  We found out from him that he had to drive the old 
Jews from the retirement home on a horse-drawn wagon to the pit.  About 10 minutes 
after the shots were fired the SD personnel—it was four of them—came to us and 
ordered us to cover the grave.141 
 
In a pattern that repeated itself through southern Ukraine, Einsatzgruppe D‘s personnel 
gunned down area residents whom they had identified as the enemies of National Socialism 
within plain sight of the local population.  In some instances, Einsatzgruppe D‘s staff even 
posted signs announcing which inhabitants they had murdered.142  The opening of weeks of 
German rule in southern Ukraine left area Volksdeutsche with few illusions about the Nazi 
regime‘s desire to hunt down and murder Jews and suspected communists. 
                                                 
140 Aussage von J. H., April 1, 1964, BAL, B162/2304, 29.  Aussage von O. W., November 19, 1964, 
BAL, B162/2303, 170.  Aussage von R. M., May 29, 1964, BAL, B162/2304, 95-96. 
141 Aussage von A. T., October 22, 1964, BAL, B162/2303, 81. 
142 Aussage von A. M., October 15, 1962, BAL, B162/2300, 117. 
65 
 
Conclusion 
 Einsatzgruppe D‘s peripatetic mass murder campaign constituted the historical nadir 
of a minority whose position in the region had deteriorated dramatically since the turn of the 
twentieth century.  As the beneficiaries of the structural privileges that the tsarist regime had 
established at the beginning of the nineteenth century to attract settlers from central Europe 
to New Russia, the Black Sea Germans had maintained a dominant socio-economic position 
in southern Ukraine and a large measure of cultural and linguistic autonomy until the 
beginning of the First World War.  Fearing the unreliability of this German-speaking minority 
along the Empire‘s periphery, tsarist officials took increasingly repressive measures against 
area Volksdeutsche during the first years of the conflict.  While the establishment of the 
Provisional Government and the German army‘s brief occupation of southern Ukraine 
provided temporary relief, the October 1917 Russian Revolution and subsequent Russian 
Civil War brought new challenges.  Having sided with the Whites during the Civil War, the 
Black Sea Germans were left to reap the whirlwind of a generation of Soviet rule in which 
local authorities targeted them first as political and class opponents and then as a potentially 
disloyal ethnic minority.  Stripped of their property and, by the eve of the Second World War, 
of the remnants of their historical linguistic and cultural independence, the Black Sea 
Germans constituted a beleaguered minority prior to 1941.  Between the end of June and the 
beginning of September 1941, both retreating Soviet and advancing German forces exposed 
the Black Sea Germans to a level of violence that was unprecedented even for a population 
that had, during the past thirty years, experienced world war, revolution, civil war, 
collectivization, famine, and the full brunt of the Soviet security apparatus.  When 
Sonderkommando R arrived on the heels of Einsatzgruppe D‘s withdrawal in early 
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September 1941, it faced Germanophone enclaves whose economies were wrecked, whose 
men had been deported, whose livestock and agricultural equipment had been largely stolen, 
and whose Jews and former local leaders had been brutally and publicly murdered.   
 Although the legacy of Soviet interwar policies and the destruction wrought by 
Operation Barbarossa‘s opening months was not the ideal foundation for the Third Reich to 
launch its völkisch project, this history prepared area Volksdeutsche for Nazi rule in two 
ways.  First, most local ethnic Germans grasped that, one way or another, they would never 
be able to return to their prewar Soviet existence.  An increasingly persecuted minority under 
Stalin, in the final weeks of Soviet power in the region local Volksdeutsche caught a glimpse 
of what they could anticipate if they were again to come under Soviet control.  In contrast to 
their experiences during the 1920s and 1930s, area ethnic Germans faced not random arrests 
and expropriation, but the wholesale deportation of their communities to the Soviet interior 
and the destruction of their way of life.  Second, their contact with the Wehrmacht and 
Einsatzgruppe D had taught them two valuable lessons about their new German masters.  On 
the one hand, in contrast to their generally positive experiences with the German army a 
generation earlier, initial encounters with German forces illustrated to area Volksdeutsche the 
intensity of the Nazi campaign to eliminate the Third Reich‘s racial and political opponents 
from local ethnic German communities.  Within the context of mutual denunciations, area 
Volksdeutsche realized how easily they could become targets of Nazi violence.  On the other 
hand, preliminary Nazi moves against Jews and accused Soviet collaborators highlighted the 
degree to which local residents could help shape the specific contours of Nazi violence.  
While the events of the preceding months left area ethnic Germans little choice but to 
embrace their German occupiers as the only viable alternative to Soviet rule, they realized 
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that their status in the new order would depend to a large extent on the inclinations of their 
recently arrived German overlords. 
 
  
 
CHAPTER II:  ORDINARY NAZIS AND ORDINARY MEN: HIMMLER’S AGENTS 
OF GERMANIZATION AND GENOCIDE IN TRANSNISTRIA 
 In February 1962, West German police interviewed Alexander Fetsch, a former mayor 
of the Volksdeutsche settlement Lichtenfeld.  Regarding the town‘s commander, SS-
Hauptsturmführer Nobert Pachschwöll, Fetsch explained: ―in the Bereichkommando 
P[achschwöll] was a little God.‖143  While Fetsch‘s quip reflected Volksdeutsche discontent 
with the VoMi‘s heavy hand during the occupation, it also underscored the importance of 
Sonderkommando R‘s personnel in shaping ethnic German policy and ultimately 
spearheading the Holocaust in the region.  With few other German units permanently 
stationed in Transnistria, Hoffmeyer‘s underlings enjoyed an unparalleled opportunity to 
conceive and implement the Third Reich‘s plans for area Volksdeutsche.  To understand the 
contours of the VoMi‘s Volksdeutsche policy in Transnistria, it is necessary to analyze the 
Germans whom Himmler charged with making ―on the spot‖ decisions in the region.   Were 
they ―ordinary men‖ with little attachment to the Nazi regime or were they National Socialist 
―berserkers‖ (Berserker) for whom participation in the Third Reich‘s projects of racial 
revolution reflected deep-seeded attachment to the Nazi worldview?144 
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 This chapter aims to understand the men and women who dictated Volksdeutsche 
policy in Transnistria and ultimately catalyzed ethnic German involvement in the Holocaust, 
thereby creating a prosopography of Sonderkommando R.  Without a wartime roster of the 
200 to 300 German men and women whom the VoMi deployed to Transnistria, it is 
impossible to reconstruct an exhaustive collective biography of Hoffmeyer‘s subordinates.  
Nevertheless, a mass of identifiable wartime SS personnel files, Rasse- und 
Siedlungshauptamt (Race and Settlement Main Office or RuSHA) marriage applications, 
individual ethnic German naturalization records, and the protocols of extensive statements 
that former members of the unit and their families gave to the West German police during the 
1960s and 1970s permit a detailed collective biography of the unit.  These records paint the 
portrait of an exceptionally if not uniquely diverse group of men and women, whose early 
life experiences, educational backgrounds, political orientations, organizational affiliations, 
and levels of anti-Semitism varied dramatically. 
 Notwithstanding these differences, two clear patterns emerge.  First, on average the 
unit‘s leadership corps and professional staff demonstrated a deeper ideological attachment to 
National Socialism than did Sonderkommando R‘s rank-and-file personnel.  Although the 
VoMi drew its managerial and professional staff from an array of sources, which ranged from 
Volksdeutsche ―experts,‖ to ethnic German ―resettlers‖ from Eastern Europe, to 
undistinguished Nazi party ―old fighters,‖ to female medical professionals and career Nazi 
party organizers, a commitment to the National Socialist movement bound this diverse group 
together.  By contrast, Sonderkommando R filled its ranks with National Socialist Motor 
Corps (Nationalsozialistische Kraftfahrkorps or NSKK) personnel, who typically did not 
exhibit a strong ideological commitment to Nazism.  Second, despite its diversity, 
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Sonderkommando R maintained a surprising degree of cohesion that permitted it to function 
in the field.  Although institutional rivalries between the unit‘s SS-dominated leadership 
corps and its subordinate organizations created friction within Sonderkommando R, 
particularly in its regional headquarters in Landau, a pair of factors mollified these tensions 
in rural areas, where most of its personnel operated.  On the one hand, much of the unit‘s SS 
and NSKK personnel had participated together in the VoMi‘s earlier population 
―resettlements‖ in Eastern Europe.  This established a common frame of reference that 
facilitated interactions between members of both groups.  On the other hand, the abnormally 
high proportion of German women in the unit permitted Sonderkommando R‘s mid-level SS 
leaders to pursue romantic relationships in the field.  Incestuous relations within the unit 
created what one scholar has described recently as a ―clan society‖ (Sippengemeinschaft), 
which blunted inter-institutional tensions and strengthened interpersonal bonds within 
Sonderkommando R.145  It was thus accident, rather than design, that permitted 
Sonderkommando R, a unit fraught by manifold cleavages, to function. 
 Scholars of the Holocaust have long probed the biographies of the Germans—and to a 
much lesser extent non-Germans—charged with implementing the Third Reich‘s murderous 
policies to understand their behavior.146  Autobiographies, penned by heavily implicated 
Germans like Dr. Hans Frank and Rudolf Höss, are among the earliest accounts of 
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perpetrators.147  Pioneering research by Hannah Arendt and Gitta Sereny employed 
biographical analysis of mass murderers to explain their motivations.148  Although somewhat 
sidelined by social histories of the Third Reich and institutional studies of German agencies 
involved in the Final Solution during the 1970s and 1980s, biographical research on 
Holocaust perpetrators has enjoyed a renaissance in the past two decades.149  Recent research 
has produced impressive collective biographies of the men who staffed the Third Reich‘s 
machinery of persecution and destruction.150 
 This vein of research has yielded several important findings.  First, it has underscored 
the importance of biographical variables in explaining perpetrator behavior.  Michael Mann‘s 
quantitative analysis of Holocaust perpetrators, for example, suggests that the Third Reich‘s 
murderers originated disproportionately from border regions plagued by interethnic conflict 
prior to the Second World War.151  Similarly, Michael Wildt‘s study of the Reich Security 
Main Office‘s (Reichssicherheitshauptamt, RSHA) midlevel leaders points to biographical 
factors, such as a high level of participation in interwar radical student politics, in explaining 
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perpetrator behavior.152  Second, in light of this research, scholars have begun to sketch a 
more nuanced continuum of Holocaust perpetrators that ranges from killers, who maintained 
little particular affinity for the Third Reich‘s murderous agenda and whose participation in 
the Final Solution is best explained by specific situational factors, to perpetrators whose 
crimes reflected a Weltanschauung that preceded and often survived the war.153 
Recent collective biographies of Holocaust perpetrators have focused on the Third 
Reich‘s professional génocidaires rather than on case studies of military, police, and auxiliary 
units tasked with carrying out the Holocaust.  This line of inquiry has shed much light on the 
heart of the Nazi ―machinery of destruction,‖ but it perhaps unwittingly presents a picture of 
fairly homogenous groups of thoroughly Nazified perpetrators.  To capture the biographical 
diversity of Holocaust perpetrators, several recent edited volumes have highlighted the lives 
and careers of perpetrators who operated beyond the confines of the central Nazi security 
apparatus.154  While this recent trend has provided a more variegated portrait of Hitler‘s 
executioners, recent scholarship has devoted less attention to sketching the collective 
biographies of German police and military units involved in the Holocaust and dissecting 
how biographical factors influenced unit dynamics.155  This collective biography of 
Sonderkommando R‘s personnel in Transnistria aims to provide precisely such a 
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contribution. 
Sonderkommando R 
 Prior to reconstructing Sonderkommando R‘s collective biography, the unit‘s unique 
composition must be understood within the context of both its original purpose and its 
organizational antecedents.  The Sonderkommando R‘s personnel were abnormally diverse 
because the SS created the unit for a unique purpose.  Tasked with governing Volksdeutsche 
in the German-occupied Soviet Union, Sonderkommando R differed from the majority of 
German units involved in the Holocaust because it was part of neither the military nor the 
police.  This special mission had two primary implications for the individuals that the VoMi 
wanted and could assign to the unit.  First, despite the prominence of former soldiers and 
members of the Nazi security apparatus in Sonderkommando R, the VoMi placed a premium 
on personnel who could succor area ethnic Germans with material aid and provide them with 
appropriate National Socialist ideological instruction.  The VoMi assigned specialized 
personnel with practical and theoretical experience in Volksdeutsche affairs, including 
teachers, doctors, Red Cross nurses, and dozens of professional Nazi party organizers.  
Second, the unit‘s specialized purpose limited the personnel that the Third Reich could 
devote to the enterprise.  Sonderkommando R had no military application and, at the unit‘s 
genesis, there was little reason to suspect that its personnel would assist in the murder of the 
Soviet Union‘s Jews.  When Himmler ordered Sonderkommando R‘s creation in spring 1941, 
Germany had not yet decided to murder Soviet Jewry.  What more limited plans for the mass 
murder of the Soviet Union‘s Jews existed in late spring 1941 were the bailiwick of other 
German authorities and, in Transnistria, the responsibility of the Romanians.156  At roughly 
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the time at which the Third Reich began deploying middle-aged reservists and dragooning 
enemy prisoners of war to murder Jews—a project to which the Nazi regime devoted 
infinitely greater resources and assigned infinitely greater priority—the VoMi had slim 
pickings for Sonderkommando R.157  Himmler, put simply, ran Sonderkommando R out of 
his back pocket. 
 While the VoMi cobbled Sonderkommando R together out of whatever manpower it 
could scrape together, it drew on its earlier Volksdeutsche ―resettlement‖ campaigns in 
Eastern Europe for both inspiration and personnel.  After the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, 
Hitler charged Himmler, in his capacity as Reich Commissar for Strengthening of 
Germandom, with the task of relocating Volksdeutsche living on the western periphery of the 
newly defined Soviet sphere of influence to the ―incorporated territories‖ of German-
occupied Poland.  As noted in the introduction, this policy constituted a marked departure 
from the German state‘s post-1918 policies, which sought to maintain large German minority 
communities in Eastern Europe to secure influence there.  Hitler, however, regarded their 
removal as necessary both to avoid conflict with the Soviet Union while Germany waged war 
against Great Britain and France and to preserve what the Nazis regarded as the biological 
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building blocks needed to Germanize annexed Polish territories.158  Between fall 1939 and 
fall 1940, Himmler charged the VoMi with relocating hundreds of thousands of 
Volksdeutsche from the Baltic, Volhynia and Podolia, and Bessarabia and northern Bukovina 
to the Greater German Reich and especially to West Prussia and the Warthegau.  These VoMi 
―resettlement‖ units, which by 1940 numbered more than 1,000 members, shaped how 
Sonderkommando R filled its personnel needs in two ways.  First, these Eastern European 
Volksdeutsche ―resettlement‖ actions provided the VoMi with the organizational concept that 
it later applied to Sonderkommando R—namely large mixed units of motorized SS and non-
SS personnel deployed to the East to take charge of local ethnic Germans.  Second, the 
deployments, which Himmler regarded as highly successful, staffed the VoMi with a cadre of 
expert personnel.  Sonderkommando R was thus the descendant and manpower beneficiary 
of earlier SS-orchestrated population transfers from Eastern Europe. 
Sonderkommando R’s SS Leaders 
 An examination of Sonderkommando R‘s leadership corps underscores both its 
personnel continuities with earlier VoMi operations in Eastern Europe and the cohort‘s 
ideological commitment to the Nazi cause.  Horst Hoffmeyer, the man to whom Himmler 
entrusted Sonderkommando R, remains one of the unit‘s most enigmatic officers.  Owing to 
the fact that Hoffmeyer committed suicide shortly after being captured by Soviet forces in 
Romania in August 1944, he was one of the few ranking Sonderkommando R officers not to 
have been questioned by German or Soviet officials.  Surviving documentation about 
Hoffmeyer, however, paints the portrait of a meteoric advance through the SS‘s ranks.  Born 
in Posen (Poznań) in 1903, Hoffmeyer‘s youth precluded service in the First World War but 
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not association with the interwar radical right.159  At sixteen, Hoffmeyer enlisted in Freikorps 
Grenzschutz Ost (Free Corps Border Patrol East) and served with the unit for six months in 
1919.  The following year, upon leaving the Freikorps, Hoffmeyer joined Stahlhelm (Steel 
Helmet) and remained a member of that organization until 1923.160 
 Hoffmeyer‘s activities during the late 1920s and early 1930s can be only partially 
reconstructed due to the fragmentary documentary record.  According to his SS personnel 
file, Hoffmeyer joined the SA (Sturmabteilung, Stormtroopers) in March 1927.161  
Hoffmeyer‘s wife later testified that when they married in Königsberg seven years later, he 
was working as a manager for Dr. Theodor Oberländer‘s Bund Deutscher Osten (League of 
the German East).162  The incorporation of this interwar völkisch organization under the 
VoMi‘s aegis during the mid-1930s presented Hoffmeyer with an entrée into the SS, which he 
embraced.  To advertise his National Socialist credentials and to launch his SS career, 
Hoffmeyer likely embellished a detailed personal narrative of active, albeit secret, Nazi party 
membership dating back to 1927.  According to a June 1935 letter that his former SA 
commander submitted to Erich Koch, East Prussia‘s Gauleiter (local Nazi party leader), 
Hoffmeyer‘s alleged but unspecified ―special service‖ (Sonderdienst) required that his party 
membership remain off the books so that Hoffmeyer would not have to perjure himself if 
asked to testify in court.163  Whether or not Koch found Hoffmeyer‘s story compelling is 
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unclear.  Hoffmeyer‘s personnel file indicates, however, that he did not officially join the 
Nazi party until May 1937 and did not receive a commission in the SS until March 1939.164  
Based on VoMi chief SS-Obergruppenführer Werner Lorenz‘s March 3, 1939, 
recommendation, which indicates that Hoffmeyer‘s service with the VoMi prompted his 
request to transfer to the SS, it appears that Hoffmeyer‘s induction into the SS had more to do 
with the flow of career Volksdeutsche organizers into the SS than it did with any clandestine 
Nazi party activities a decade earlier.165 
 Once in the SS, Hoffmeyer‘s superiors promoted him at an astonishing rate.  Between 
March 1939 and October 1941—a mere two and half years—Hoffmeyer advanced six grades 
from the rank of SS-Untersturmführer to that of SS-Oberführer.166  Hoffmeyer owed his 
success to two primary factors.  First, Hoffmeyer distinguished himself through impressive 
wartime service in both the VoMi and in the Waffen-SS.  In October 1939, Lorenz tapped 
Hoffmeyer to oversee the resettlement of Latvia‘s Baltic Germans in Riga.  Following the 
completion of that operation the following month, Lorenz recommended Hoffmeyer for a 
promotion, complimenting his ―outstanding character traits and his excellent service 
performance.‖167  Later that year, Hoffmeyer‘s superiors granted him sole command of 
arduous Volksdeutsche ―resettlement‖ operations in Volhynia and Podolia, which relocated 
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some 135,000 Volksdeutsche during the bitter winter of 1939-1940.168  In the summer of 
1940, Hoffmeyer spearheaded the ―resettlement‖ of a roughly equal number of ethnic 
Germans from Bessarabia and northern Bukovina.169  The VoMi delighted in Hoffmeyer‘s 
performance during this final operation and published a glossy photo album in 1942 to extol 
its success.170  After completing his duties for the VoMi in southeastern Europe, Hoffmeyer 
transferred to the Waffen-SS and took part in combat operations in Yugoslavia and Greece.171  
Although Hoffmeyer had served as a reserve non-commissioned officer in the interwar 
German army, his combat experience undoubtedly beefed up his National Socialist vita and 
helped to overshadow his late entry into the Nazi party.172 
 Second, for an officer of relatively low rank, there is evidence that Hoffmeyer came 
to Himmler‘s attention.  As Lumans notes, Himmler personally decorated Hoffmeyer in 
Przemyśl following the conclusion of VoMi operations in Volhynia and Polodia.173  When 
interviewed by the West German police shortly before his death in 1974, the elderly Lorenz 
explained that Himmler had always been ―very interested‖ in Hoffmeyer.174  Under 
investigation by West German authorities for his involvement in Sonderkommando R‘s 
crimes and eager to conceal his own close relationship with Hoffmeyer, Lorenz likely 
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exaggerated the Himmler-Hoffmeyer connection to mask his own role in Transnistria.175  
Hoffmeyer‘s relationship with Himmler appears to have operated on a professional, rather 
than on a personal level.  Surviving wartime records of meetings between Himmler and 
Hoffmeyer support this conclusion.  Himmler‘s day planner, for example, lists six meetings 
between the two men between August and December 1942.176  With the exception of the 
year‘s final meeting on New Year‘s Eve, at which Lorenz and Hoffmeyer lunched with 
Himmler at his Hochwald compound in East Prussia, the other five meetings all occurred 
during Himmler‘s trips to Ukraine.177  According to a 1942 British intercept of German 
police radio traffic, it took Hoffmeyer four months to schedule his first recorded appointment 
with Himmler in 1942.178  Although he never entered Himmler‘s circle of intimate 
acquaintances, Hoffmeyer had, within the course of five years, parlayed a lackluster career as 
a Volksdeutsche organizer into that of a battle-hardened SS officer and Himmler‘s point man 
for ethnic German affairs. 
 SS-Obersturmführer Dr. Klaus Siebert, Hoffmeyer‘s subordinate during these earlier 
Volksdeutsche ―resettlement‖ operations and later Sonderkommando R‘s first executive 
officer in Transnistria, had a more typical, if less spectacular SS career.  Born near Dessau to 
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a chemist and his wife in 1904, Siebert was a committed völkisch activist and an enthusiastic, 
early adherent to National Socialism.179  Like Hoffmeyer, while Siebert‘s youth prevented 
him from serving in the First World War, he demonstrated a commitment to rightwing 
politics.  Attaching himself to a local German army unit in late 1919, the sixteen-year-old 
Siebert took part in the abortive Kapp Putsch the following year.180  Returning home after his 
unit‘s dissolution in March 1920, Siebert concluded his Gymnasium studies and passed the 
Abitur in 1922.  After completing apprenticeships in business and farming, Siebert undertook 
an agricultural science course in 1925, studying at the universities of Königsberg and 
Breslau.181  Following his initial studies in 1928, Siebert and three of his friends sought some 
practical agricultural experience and set off on a month-long hike through the Baltic States in 
search of ―German agriculture.‖182  Upon his return to Königsberg, Siebert completed his 
doctoral degree in agricultural science in 1930.183 
 Unlike Hoffmeyer‘s murky initial commitment to National Socialism, Siebert was an 
early Nazi activist and a career SD officer.  Shortly after completing his doctoral studies, 
Siebert, as he later described in his personnel file‘s autobiography, ―followed the call of the 
Carinthian Heimatbund in Klagenfurt‖ to help repopulate the region as a demographic 
bulwark against growing encroachments by neighboring Slavs.184  Purchasing a 60-hectare 
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farm north of Klagenfurt, the newly-wed Siebert divided his time between raising a family 
and organizing Austria‘s clandestine Nazi party.185  In March 1932, Siebert joined the 
Klagenfurt‘s SA and, after offering his farm as a meeting place for local Nazis, rose to the 
rank of SA-Sturmführer.186  Siebert‘s participation in a second failed putsch—this one in 
1934 against the Austrian government—forced him to slip across the Yugoslavian frontier 
and return to Germany.187 
 His livelihood martyred for the National Socialist cause, Siebert, much like Adolf 
Eichmann a year earlier, sought employment with the Nazi party.188  Assigned to the SD 
Main Office (Hauptamt) in Berlin‘s Wilhelmstrasse in January 1935, Siebert quickly secured 
a commission as an SS-Untersturmführer and sent for his wife and two young daughters, who 
had remained laboring on their Carinthian farm.189  Siebert‘s initial responsibilities entailed 
the surveillance of other Nazi party organizations.190  Over the next three and a half years 
Siebert advanced steadily, reaching the rank of SS-Sturmbannführer and securing a post in 
the RSHA‘s Department (Abteilung) III, specializing in internal intelligence.191  In November 
1939, Siebert‘s superiors seconded him to aid the VoMi in its Volksdeutsche population 
transfers.192  As Hoffmeyer‘s second in command, Siebert took part in all of the VoMi‘s 
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Eastern European ethnic German ―resettlement‖ campaigns, including Hoffmeyer‘s much-
fêted Bessarabian operation.193  Although in his postwar statements to the West German 
police Siebert claimed that his transfer to the VoMi occurred in late 1939, his SS personnel 
file indicates that he remained an active SD officer temporarily attached to the VoMi until his 
permanent transfer to Sonderkommando R in June 1941.194  Excluding his personal völkisch 
farming enterprise in Austria, Siebert, unlike Hoffmeyer, had no experience in Volksdeutsche 
matters prior to 1939.  While the VoMi‘s wartime manpower needs likely contributed to 
Siebert‘s assignments to the organization in 1939 and 1940, it is also conceivable that his 
established National Socialist track record assured Hoffmeyer‘s superiors that the VoMi‘s 
population transfers and its then untested commander remained in good hands. 
 Beyond providing a test bed for Sonderkommando R‘s senior leaders, the VoMi‘s 
earlier ―resettlement‖ operations became a school for Eastern European Volksdeutsche 
specialists, who ultimately formed the unit‘s mid-level leadership core as 
Bereichkommandoführer (Regional Commanders).  SS-Untersturmführer Franz Liebl, 
Bereichkommandoführer of Lichtenfeld‘s Bereichkommando XX, typified the SS officers 
who cut their teeth under Hoffmeyer‘s command elsewhere in Eastern Europe in 1939 and 
1940.  Born at the turn of the century in Mannheim, Liebl spent his childhood in Riga.  
Interned by Russian authorities at the beginning of the First World War as a German national, 
Liebl returned to Germany after Riga‘s occupation by German forces more than three years 
later.  He served in the German Army from August 1918 until Germany‘s capitulation in 
November of that year.  After the end of the First World War, Liebl drifted in and out of 
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paramilitary organizations and the military, serving for five months in both the Freikorps and 
the German army.  Upon exiting the German army in February 1920, Liebl married and 
settled into a relatively stable existence as a civil servant.195 
 Liebl‘s brief experience with Germany‘s postwar right-wing paramilitary units 
apparently whetted his appetite for radical politics.  Liebl joined the Nazi party in February 
1932, more than a year before party membership became an occupational norm for 
government employees.196  From 1932 until 1939 Liebl served as a Nazi party 
Ortsgruppenleiter (Local Group Leader).197  Exactly how and when Liebl joined the VoMi is 
unclear.  A July 1944 notation in his personnel file indicates that he was a member of the 
VoMi ―since the beginning of the resettlements.‖198  Owing to the fact that he had lived in the 
Baltic as a youth and spoke both Latvian and Russian, it seems highly likely that the VoMi 
tapped Liebl to accompany Hoffmeyer to Riga in October 1939.199  Liebl‘s role in the VoMi‘s 
subsequent resettlement operations is more evident.  In late 1939 and early 1940, Liebl ran a 
reception camp in Germany for Volksdeutsche ―resettlers‖ from Volhynia and Podolia.  Later 
in 1940, Liebl accompanied Hoffmeyer and Siebert to Bessarabia and assisted in relocating 
ethnic Germans from those territories.  After a brief deployment with the VoMi to Lithuania 
later that year, Liebl received a discharge from the organization.200  When the VoMi began 
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forming Sonderkommando R little more than a year later, the SS reactivated Liebl for service 
and deployed him to southern Ukraine.201  While, like many of his fellow 
Bereichkommandoführer, Liebl had previous experience with Eastern Europe and had 
demonstrated an affinity for the Nazi cause, it was his participation in the VoMi‘s earlier 
Volksdeutsche ―resettlement‖ actions that had prepared him for a midlevel leadership 
position in Sonderkommando R.202 
 Earlier VoMi resettlement campaigns also permitted Nazi academic specialists on 
ethnic Germans to gain practical experience that they would later apply to Transnistria.  Dr. 
Gerhard Wolfrum, Sonderkommando R‘s resident intellectual, knew both Hoffmeyer and 
Siebert before 1939.  All three men enjoyed a strong connection to both Theodor Oberländer 
and the University of Königsberg, where Oberländer held a university chair during the mid-
1930s.  Wolfrum in particular maintained an intimate relationship with Oberländer prior to 
and then especially after the Second World War, when he served as Oberländer‘s personal 
advisor during the latter‘s tenure as Bundesminister für Vertriebene (Minister of Expellee 
Affairs) during the mid-1950s.  A child of a university professor, Wolfrum was born in 
Leipzig in 1911.203  Although neither his SS officer file nor his disingenuous 1965 statement 
to the West German police offer much insight into his youth, his political orientation during 
the 1930s is evident.  At the age of twenty-two, Wolfrum joined the SA months after the Nazi 
seizure of power and, like Hoffmeyer, assumed a leadership role in the Bund Deutscher 
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Osten in East Prussia a few years later.204  After completing his doctoral degree in history at 
the University of Königsberg, Wolfrum published his first book through the organization 
entitled Die polnischen territorialen Forderungen gegen Deutschland in ihrer 
geschichtlichen Entwicklung (Polish Territorial Claims against Germany and their Historical 
Development) in 1936.205  Wolfrum joined the Nazi party in May 1937.206  Mobilized for the 
German army in August 1939, Wolfrum participated in the invasion of Poland.  Attached to 
an artillery unit, Wolfrum sustained injuries in an accident behind the front two days after the 
start of the German offensive and spent the remainder of his Wehrmacht service convalescing 
in a Königsberg military hospital.207 
 Following his recovery, Wolfrum joined the VoMi.  Selected by Hoffmeyer personally 
for his expertise in Volksdeutsche matters, Wolfrum took part in the VoMi‘s 1940 relocation 
of the Bessarabian and Bukovinian Germans.  Awarded an SS commission commensurate 
with his role as VoMi Abteilungsleiter (Departmental Director), Wolfrum wrote the mission‘s 
operational history, which Volk und Reich Verlag published in 1942 as a glossy photo album 
complete with Lorenz‘s foreword.208  Wolfrum‘s offhanded comments about Slavs and Jews 
in Der Zug der Volksdeutschen aus Bessarabien und dem Nord-Buchenland  (The Migration 
of Ethnic Germans from Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina) suggests that he had 
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internalized Nazi stereotypes of both groups.209  Recounting the unit‘s entry into the Soviet 
Union, Wolfrum described incompetent and brutish Soviet border guards who ―rifled through 
every article of clothing with [their] dirty fingers.‖210  Wolfrum explained how the VoMi 
doctor‘s apparently exotic medical instruments mystified Soviet border guards and quipped 
that the physician bore the brunt of the inspection.211  These inconveniences, however, were 
nothing compared the roadblocks thrown up by their Soviet counterpart, ―the Jew Dobkin,‖ 
who attempted to sabotage the VoMi‘s operation at every turn.212  Although no evidence links 
Wolfrum to a 1942 VoMi request on his behalf that a ―Jewish apartment‖ be placed at his 
disposal to facilitate his family‘s relocation to Berlin, given his apparent distain for Slavic 
Untermenschen and ―Jew-Bolsheviks,‖ it appears doubtful that he would have objected.213 
 Ethnic Germans, whom the VoMi had relocated to Germany in earlier population 
transfers from Eastern Europe, constituted a disproportionate number of Sonderkommando 
R‘s officers.  The reasons for this were two-fold.  First, as non-German citizens, 
Volksdeutsche could not be conscripted for Wehrmacht service and were a group that SS 
recruiters earmarked to fill their bottomless manpower needs.  Given that ethnic Germans 
received SS commissions commensurate with their participation in right-wing völkisch 
organizations abroad during the interwar period, they constituted a particularly ideologically 
committed group of SS officers.  Second, the SS appears to have selected Eastern European 
Volksdeutsche with esoteric language skills for Sonderkommando R.  Although the absence 
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of VoMi records on the subject frustrates efforts to draw conclusions about its plans to staff 
Sonderkommando R, the substantial number of Russian and Romanian-speaking ethnic 
Germans that it deployed to Transnistria as officers suggests that the VoMi anticipated the 
unit‘s polyglot needs and assigned what ethnic German SS officers that it had at its disposal. 
 The composition of Sonderkommando R‘s Volksdeutsche SS officers reflected the 
ethnic German populations that the VoMi had relocated prior to the onset of Operation 
Barbarossa.  The VoMi assigned a large number of recent Baltic German émigrés to 
Sonderkommando R.  Freiherr Erich Edgar Alexander von Sievers exemplified this trend.  
Born in 1896 on his family‘s centuries-old ancestral estate Gotthardsberg in what was then 
the Livland province of the Russian Empire, von Sievers was a prototypical anti-Bolshevik 
and völkisch activist.214  Educated by private tutors until the age of eleven, when he pursued 
secondary education at the German Gymnasium in Reval (Tallinn), von Sievers was a 
member of the area‘s Baltic German aristocracy.  Mustered for service in the Russian army in 
1917, von Sievers fled overland to Finland in the hopes of traveling to Germany via neutral 
Sweden and enlisting in the German military.  Tsarist officials apprehended him before 
reaching the Swedish frontier and von Sievers spent the remaining months of the ancien 
régime as a prisoner in Krasnoyarsk.215  Returning to the Baltic after the Russian Revolution 
in an abortive attempt to take up his studies at the University of Dorpat (Tartu), von Sievers 
quickly secured a commission in the Baltische Landwehr (Baltic Militia).216  Wounded in 
Kurland in January 1919, von Sievers retained his commission until the Baltische 
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Landwehr‘s dissolution the following year.217 
 Unable to prevent the genesis of an independent Latvian state, von Sievers relocated 
to Germany, where he began his studies anew at the University of Berlin.218  After receiving a 
scholarship to continue his education at the University of Jena, von Sievers relocated to the 
city and began courting Freifrau Erika von Richter, a fellow Baltic German aristocratic 
refugee.  The two married in 1923.219  Returning to Latvia without concluding his studies, 
von Sievers and his new wife began administering the 70 hectares that remained of his 
ancestral holdings after the Latvian Republic‘s postwar agricultural reforms.220  Diminished 
in wealth, but not völkisch fervor, von Sievers established himself as the leader of the Baltic 
German farmers‘ organization during the interwar period.221 
 While von Sievers had returned to Latvia after a brief self-imposed exile during the 
early 1920s, perhaps anticipating the growing Soviet threat, he and the rest of his extensive 
clan immigrated to German-occupied Poland as part of Hoffmeyer‘s 1939 ―resettlement 
operation.‖222  Von Sievers began working for the SS on November 21, 1939, and received 
German citizenship two days later.223  Although von Sievers‘s SS intake officers maintained 
reservations about his only son Gert, whose apparently underdeveloped ―physical and mental 
condition‖ perturbed them, they nevertheless praised von Sievers‘s ―exemplary leadership 
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qualities in the struggle for the German race.‖. 224  After only six months of working for the 
SS and even less time as a German citizen, von Sievers‘s superiors awarded him a 
commission as an SS-Sturmbannführer, permitting him to jump three grades automatically.225  
Both von Sievers‘s activities in interwar Latvia and his brief service for the Reich impressed 
the SS, which sought to secure a suitable estate in German-occupied Poland to reward his 
loyalty and compensate him for his family‘s partial expropriation in interwar Latvia.  On July 
1, 1941, shortly before the SS seconded him to Sonderkommando R, Himmler personally 
awarded von Sievers the 508-hectare Buchwalden estate near present-day Września, 
Poland.226  Pegged for advancement in the SS even before he received German citizenship, 
von Sievers‘s language skills and interwar völkisch activism added both practical and 
ideological contributions to Sonderkommando R. 
 Although Baltic Germans received unique opportunities to advance in the VoMi, 
Volksdeutsche from southeastern Europe also constituted a smaller and less well-
documented, but nevertheless significant group of SS officers in Sonderkommando R.  Like 
von Sievers and the unit‘s other Baltic Germans, Theophil Weingärtner had an ideological 
adherence to the SS‘s völkisch project and obscure language skills.  Sparse naturalization and 
SS personnel records combined with Weingärtner‘s probable suicide at the war‘s end, which 
denied postwar investigators the opportunity to question him, create obstacles in 
reconstructing Weingärtner‘s biography and VoMi career path.227  Nevertheless, a 
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fragmentary portrait emerges.  Born near Teplitz (Teplitza) in Bessarabia in 1909, 
Weingärtner divided his formative years between Romania and Germany, where he studied 
theology at the Universities of Königsberg and Berlin apparently without completing a 
degree.228  A member of the crypto-fascist Erneuerungsbewegung (Renewal Movement) in 
Romania since 1933, he demonstrated an early affinity for National Socialism.229  Despite the 
fact that Weingärtner had served in the interwar Romanian army, whatever attachment he felt 
to that country did not prevent him from relocating to Germany in 1940 as part of 
Hoffmeyer‘s ―resettlement‖ of the Bessarabian Germans.230 
 Weingärtner‘s established political credentials smoothed his entry into the Waffen-SS 
a full three months before he applied for German citizenship.231  Trumpeted as a ―flawless 
ethnic German‖ by his SS evaluator, Weingärtner was assigned first to the staff of Danzig‘s 
Höhere SS und Polizeiführer (Higher SS and Police Leader) and then to the Reich 
Commissar for the Strengthening of Germandom, where he worked from February through 
August 1941.232  Recruited by Hoffmeyer personally for service in Transnistria, Weingärtner 
impressed his new colleagues.  Writing in support of Weingärtner‘s efforts to obtain an estate 
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in German-occupied Poland in November 1942, SS-Sturmbannführer Karl Götz, a fellow 
Sonderkommando R officer, praised him as ―one of the most diligent men in our ranks‖ 
whom he valued ―equally highly as a person, SS man and comrade.‖233  Notwithstanding 
Götz‘s kind words, Weingärtner‘s seemingly interminable struggles to obtain an estate a 
paltry fifth the size of the one that von Sievers had secured suggests that, while in the SS‘s 
eyes all Volksdeutsche were better than non-Germans, not all Volksdeutsche were equal.234 
 Although most of Sonderkommando R‘s senior and midlevel leaders had participated 
in earlier VoMi missions in Eastern Europe either as members of Hoffmeyer‘s staff or as 
ethnic German ―resettlers,‖ Nazi party ―old fighters,‖ who lacked experience with ethnic 
German affairs, also constituted a portion of Sonderkommando R‘s leadership corps.  
Frequently too aged for military service and too incompetent for assignments that the SS 
considered more critical, their primary qualification was deep seeded ideological 
commitment to the Nazi cause.  Transferring these third-rate troops to the VoMi satisfied two 
SS concerns simultaneously.  On the one hand, these comparatively elderly officers were one 
of the only available manpower pools that remained at the SS‘s disposal.  On the other hand, 
VoMi postings were a way for the regime to reward long-time National Socialists who had 
proven their loyalty to the movement and yet failed to receive a plum position. 
 For Paul Mattern, Groß-Liebenthal‘s Bereichkommandoführer, an assignment to 
Sonderkommando R constituted a modest and much-delayed reward for years of party 
service.235  Born in Mohrungen, East Prussia, in 1895, Mattern was a textbook Nazi party 
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―old fighter.‖236 After his elementary education, Mattern completed an apprenticeship as a 
gardener prior to 1914.237  At the First World War‘s outbreak, the nineteen-year-old Mattern 
enlisted in the German army.  Defending his native East Prussia from advancing Russian 
troops, Mattern‘s father perished during the war‘s opening campaigns.238  Stationed initially 
on the Eastern Front, Mattern redeployed to France to take part in the 1916 Verdun offensive.  
Decorated with the Iron Cross Second Class and promoted to the rank of Unteroffizier (non-
commissioned officer), Mattern ended the war as a machine gun instructor.239  Following his 
demobilization, he returned to his home in East Prussia, purchased a floral shop, and 
married.240 
 Life as an unsuccessful florist failed to satisfy the former machine gunner and by the 
end of the 1920s Mattern‘s restlessness gave way to rightwing political agitation.  He joined 
the Stahlhelm in 1927 and both the SA and the Nazi party in 1932.241  By the eve of the Nazi 
seizure of power, Mattern had advanced to the rank of SA-Sturmführer.242  An active local 
Nazi enforcer, he played a key role in establishing the party‘s control in East Prussia.  One 
night in March 1933, Mattern and his SA subordinates took the SPD (Sozialdemokratische 
Partei Deutschlands, Social Democratic Party of Germany) mayor of neighboring Freiwalde, 
Reinhold P., into Schutzhaft (protective custody) on the charge of discharging a firearm 
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illegally.243  Although Mattern would later dispute these accusations during a postwar West 
German investigation into the night‘s events, other witnesses implicated him as the 
orchestrator of P.‘s nocturnal abduction and likely assassination.244  Perhaps as a reward for 
decapitating local SPD resistance in East Prussia, Mattern advanced in the SA.  Marked as a 
future SA leader, Mattern completed an impressive array of leadership training courses 
throughout Germany.  After concluding his training, Mattern advanced to the rank of SA-
Obersturmführer and served as a small arms instructor at the SA academies first, in 
Memmingen and later in Kapfenburg.245  By mid-1934, Mattern‘s star in the SA was rising. 
 Were it not for the June 1934 Röhm Putsch, it is likely that Mattern would have 
enjoyed a reasonably successful SA career.  Like many members of the SA, however, 
Mattern‘s prospects faded with the organization‘s precipitous decline in significance.  
Following the dissolution of the SA-Sportschule (Sports Academy) Kapfenburg the following 
year, Mattern found himself unemployed.  After applying at the local employment office, he 
obtained work as a municipal gardener in Schäbisch-Gmünd.  Dissatisfied with his hefty 
demotion, although apparently undeterred in his enthusiasm for National Socialism, Mattern 
applied for SS membership in 1936.246  Although his application succeeded, Mattern‘s new 
career in the SS paled in comparison to the meteoric one that he had enjoyed in the SA but a 
few years earlier.  Without the educational qualifications that became de rigeur for a SS 
commission and stained by his earlier SA service, Mattern floated listlessly through a series 
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of dead-end postings.247  Despite having served as an SA-Obersturmführer, he initially 
received the rank of a SS non-commissioned officer.248  Even after the SS assigned him to the 
VoMi for deployment with Sonderkommando R in fall 1941, Mattern never advanced beyond 
the rank of SS-Untersturmführer (SS Second Lieutenant).249  While his dim career prospects 
after 1934 did not discourage his faith in National Socialism—an affinity that Mattern 
instilled in his sons, who volunteered for the SS—his SS career would have remained in the 
doldrums had Sonderkommando R‘s manpower needs not precipitated his transfer to 
southern Ukraine.250 
Hoffmeyer’s Female Subordinates 
 The high proportion of German women on Sonderkommando R‘s staff constituted 
one of the unit‘s most exceptional features.  Accounting for perhaps 10 percent of all 
Germans deployed to Transnistria with Sonderkommando R, German women performed 
specialized tasks ranging from providing medical care to organizing local National Socialist 
programs.  Frequently, Hoffmeyer‘s female employees had educational and ideological 
qualifications that surpassed those of their male superiors.  Disproportionate to their 
numbers, German women facilitated Sonderkommando R‘s mission in southern Ukraine. 
 The role of German women in the Third Reich and their participation in Nazi plans to 
Germanize Eastern Europe have been the subject of considerable research over the past two 
and a half decades.  Claudia Koonz‘s pioneering study, Mothers in the Fatherland, concluded 
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that ―Nazi women, no less than men, destroyed ethical vision, debased humane traditions, 
and rendered decent people helpless.‖251  More recent research, by scholars such as Gudrun 
Schwarz, has probed the direct participation of women in the Nazi ―machinery of 
destruction,‖ by exploring their variegated roles, ranging from administrative staff in the 
German bureaucracy to concentration camp guards.252  Elizabeth Harvey‘s scholarship 
underscores the important contribution of German women in implementing Nazi plans for the 
Germanization of occupied Poland.253  Dubbing German women who served as teachers and 
administrators in occupied Poland ―agents of Germanness,‖ Harvey concludes that the 
educational and welfare initiatives that these women oversaw constituted a key avenue for 
transmitting National Socialist ideology to newly ―resettled‖ ethnic Germans.254  Lower‘s 
ongoing research on German women stationed in occupied Ukraine echoes many of Harvey‘s 
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findings and suggests that, in the occupied Soviet Union, German women had far greater 
direct exposure to the murder of Jews and, at times, more expanded opportunities to kill than 
in Poland.255  Examining Hoffmeyer‘s female subordinates has the potential both to inform 
Sonderkommando R‘s collective biography and to further scholarship on the role of German 
women in the Holocaust in Ukraine. 
 When Sonderkommando R arrived in Transnistria in September 1941, it had no 
female members.  As Odessa did not fall for another six weeks, it is likely that the initial 
absence of women reflected the SS‘s desire to shield German women from a potentially 
dangerous security situation.  Once the unit established that Transnistria‘s terrain was 
infertile for Soviet partisans—at least outside of Odessa‘s catacombs—Hoffmeyer‘s female 
subordinates began to arrive in fall 1941.  As most of the information regarding these women 
comes from statements that they made after the war to the West German police, recovering a 
representative portrait of the unit‘s female subordinates is difficult.  Nevertheless, a general 
biographical profile emerges. 
 Most German women attached to Sonderkommando R were part of either the German 
Red Cross (Deutsches Roten Kreuz or DRK) or career Nazi party organizers in the NS-
Frauenwerk (National Socialist Women‘s Organization).  Arriving between October 1941 
and March 1942, DRK members reported to DRK-Bevöllmachtige (plenipotentiary) Ursula 
Kästner, who was posted first in Rowno (Rivne) and later in Landau.  DRK nurses received 
assignments throughout Transnistria.256  There, day-to-day command rested in the dozen or 
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so physicians assigned to rural Transnistria.  Where no doctor was stationed, as was 
frequently the case, DRK nurses reported to local SS commanders.257  Numbering perhaps 50 
by the height of Sonderkommando R‘s deployment, DRK nurses attended to the medical 
needs of the unit‘s personnel and area Volksdeutsche.258 
 From what can be reconstructed of these women‘s biographies, a couple of distinct 
patterns become apparent.  First, some DRK nurses—from among both the oldest and 
youngest assigned to the region—received posting in Transnistria simply because 
Hoffmeyer‘s unit required medical personnel.  Else A., a forty-eight-year-old nurse from 
Freiburg joined the DRK in February 1917 and served during the First World War.  After a 
deployment to Alsace in 1941, and without any apparent affinity for or previous experience 
with Volksdeutsche affairs, she received a transfer to the Hoffmeyer Sonderkommando.259  
Similarly, Irmela K., the twenty-four-year-old daughter of a Protestant minister from Halle, 
had just completed a DRK training course in Dresden when her superiors transferred her to 
Sonderkommando R.260  Like A., the evidence suggests that K. had no previous exposure to 
either the VoMi or to Volksdeutsche. 
 Second, despite the idiosyncratic nature of some DRK assignments to Transnistria, a 
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surprising number of DRK nurses volunteered for wartime service and frequently for 
deployment to occupied Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.  Thirty-four-year-old Ursula 
K., for example, left medical school at the University of Munich to deploy to Ukraine as a 
DRK nurse.  Although K. was silent after the war about her motivations for leaving her 
medical studies for a wartime deployment, the fact that she had served as a Bund Deutscher 
Mädchen (League of German Girls) Obergauführerin (Senior Area Leader) for Bayerischen 
Ostmark casts some light on her political leanings.261  Other women had more personal 
motivations for volunteering for posting in the German-occupied Soviet Union.  Twenty-six-
year-old Franziska W. from Carinthia, for example, joined the DRK and requested a posting 
on the Eastern Front in early 1942 following the death of her fiancée, who was killed fighting 
near Murmansk.262  For some DRK personnel, deployment to Transnistria grew on them.  
Hildegard Schneider, for example, began a three-month practicum with Sonderkommando R 
in mid-September 1942.  Only a month into her apprenticeship, she requested a permanent 
posting to the unit after the scheduled completion of her state exam in December.263  While 
the postwar statements of former DRK nurses frequently only hint at their motivations for 
volunteering for this assignment, the available evidence suggests that many of them had 
significant ideological and personal reasons for seeking their assignments. 
 The second largest cohort of women under Hoffmeyer‘s command engaged in what 
former members of the unit described as ―women‘s work‖ (Frauenarbeit).264  Loosely 
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conceived, women‘s work sought to transform local ethnic German women and children into 
appropriate National Socialist mothers and youths.  This undertaking entailed establishing 
schools, creating a local National Socialist youth organization, and training local young men, 
and particularly local young women, to spread the Nazi gospel. 
 In contrast to the DRK nurses assigned to Hoffmeyer, who varied somewhat in their 
attachment to the Nazi regime and to its Volksdeutsche project in Transnistria, the 
professional female Nazi party activists deployed to southern Ukraine were committed 
National Socialists with a keen interest in transforming local Volksdeutsche women in their 
own image.  The head of Frauenarbeit in Transnistria, Gertrude Braun, had made a career in 
the Third Reich of supervising the National Socialist conversion of ethnic German women.265  
Born in 1906 in Yevpatoria on Crimea, Braun‘s early life experiences left her a committed 
anti-Bolshevik.  After Soviet authorities had executed her father in 1919, she had fled to 
Germany with her mother and two siblings.266  During the late 1920s and early 1930s, Braun 
worked for a number of Protestant women‘s welfare agencies in southwestern Germany.  It is 
likely that Braun‘s decision to join the Reichsarbeitsdienst‘s (Reich Labor Service) 
Weiblicher Arbeitsdienst (Women‘s Labor Service) stemmed from the large-scale 
centralization of Protestant welfare agencies under the Nazi party‘s aegis after 1933.267 
 Once a member of the Women‘s Labor Service, Braun advanced rapidly to the 
position of stellvertretende Bezirksführerin (Deputy Regional Leader) in Stuttgart as a 
protégée of Reichsfrauenführerin (Reich Women‘s Leader) Gertrude Scholtz-Klink.  In 1939, 
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Braun‘s superiors promoted her to the staff of the Reichsleitung des Deutschen Frauenwerks 
(Reich Leadership of the German Women‘s Organization) in Berlin with the title of 
Sachbearbeiterin für das Russlanddeutschtum (Administrator for Russian Germandom).268  
As the organization‘s point woman for ethnic German affairs in the Soviet Union, Braun took 
part in the VoMi ―resettlement‖ of Volhynian and Galician Volksdeutsche by supervising 
programs for ethnic German women in the VoMi‘s resettlement camps in the Warthegau.269  
In her 1966 interview with the West German police, Braun articulated her motivations for 
deploying with Sonderkommando R: ―After the outbreak of hostilities with Russia it was 
always my aspiration to deploy to the East to care for and change my fellow ethnic German 
countrymen and, if possible, to return to my old homeland again.‖270  Braun accomplished 
both goals.  In the summer of 1943, when German forces still controlled Crimea, Braun took 
a six-day vacation to Yevpatoria.271 
 The subordinates whom Braun selected to help her Nazify Transnistria‘s ethnic 
German women were cut from the same cloth.  In some cases, Braun handpicked these 
women.  Former gymnastics teacher Johanna W., for example, had volunteered to assist the 
VoMi in its Volksdeutsche resettlement camps in the Warthegau.  There, Braun recruited her 
for subsequent deployments with the VoMi to the occupied Soviet Union.272  Irene H., a 
twenty-nine-year-old former gymnastics instructor turned professional Nazi party organizer, 
shared a Stuttgart connection with Braun.  A former Bund Deutscher Mädel leader and Nazi 
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party member since 1939, H. worked for the NS-Frauenwerk in Stuttgart when she received 
an offer from Braun to serve in Transnistria.  As H. later recounted, she accepted Braun‘s 
offer because she found the opportunity intriguing.273  H. was not alone among Braun‘s 
former subordinates to express an affinity for her duties.  As Ilse S., then a twenty-year-old 
from Schleswig-Holstein, later recounted: ―I always had a particular interest in the East.  In 
1942, I was asked if I would be interested in a deployment in the Occupied Eastern 
Territories.  I agreed.‖274    Like many DRK members deployed to Transnistria, Braun and 
her female subordinates were as thoroughly Nazified as any German women in the Third 
Reich. 
Sonderkommando R’s Rank-and-File Personnel 
 In contrast to Sonderkommando R‘s leaders or its specialized female employees, the 
unit‘s rank and file generally had a significantly lower commitment to the Nazi cause. As it 
had in the VoMi‘s earlier ―resettlement‖ campaigns, the NSKK contributed a remarkably high 
proportion of Sonderkommando R‘s personnel.  Numbering some 150 members on the eve of 
the unit‘s deployment to Transnistria and growing steadily thereafter, Sonderkommando R‘s 
NSKK complement comprised between one third and one half of the Hoffmeyer 
Sonderkommando‘s staff.275  Although the NSKK was the second largest Nazi party mass 
organization, in which more than half a million Germans claimed membership by July 1941, 
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it remains remarkably understudied.  To date Dorothee Hochstetter‘s monograph, 
Motorisierung und “Volksgemeinschaft”: Das Nationalsozialistische Kraftfahrkorps, NSKK, 
1931-1945, remains the only academic study of the organization.276  Owing to the relative 
paucity of archival material related to the NSKK, Hochstetter‘s study focuses on the 
organization‘s activities in the Third Reich and provides a more skeletal treatment of the its 
deployment in the German-occupied Soviet Union.277  The NSKK‘s relative obscurity 
necessitates a brief recovery of its history. 
 Founded in April 1931, the NSKK styled itself as the Nazi party‘s ―motorized armed 
force.‖278  Originally conceived of as the Nationalsozialistisches Automobil-Korps (National 
Socialist Automobile Corps) in 1929, the NSKK sought to harness the Third Reich‘s motor 
vehicles and drivers for the Nazi party‘s own ends.279  Given the relatively low rate of car 
ownership in Germany at the time, this was a heady endeavor.  In 1939, there was roughly 
one car for every 40 Germans.  In the same year, the ratio of cars to Americans was roughly 1 
to 4.  As Jeffrey Herf has noted recently, Hitler‘s Germany ―was overwhelmingly a nation of 
pedestrians.‖280  While its bread and butter remained the car, the NSKK exerted its authority 
over all vehicles with internal combustion engines, ranging from motorcycles to speedboats.  
Although after the war many of the organization‘s former members, which included a 
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number of public figures in the Federal Republic, such as Axel Springer, defended it as a 
simple automobile club akin to the ADAC (Allgemeiner Deutscher Automobil-Club e.V., 
General German Automobile Club).  The reality was both more complicated and more 
sinister.  As Hochstetter aptly concludes: ―the NSKK was a strictly organized, hierarchical 
National Socialist formation that, along with the SA and SS, formed the Nazi party‘s political 
triumvirate.‖281 
 As an umbrella organization that sought to synchronize the Third Reich‘s motorized 
activities, the NSKK was remarkably diverse.  NSKK membership was voluntary and, except 
for a brief 1934 ban on new members, all driver license holders were eligible to join.282  
From July 1933 until November 1937, NSKK membership tripled from 100,000 to 300,000, 
reaching more than 500,000 shortly after the beginning of Operation Barbarossa.283  The 
NSKK drew its membership predominately from the urban petty bourgeoisie.  The 
occupational breakdown of the NSKK‘s 262,000 members in 1938, for example, indicates 
that workers and farmers were underrepresented in the organization relative to their 
proportion of the German population.284  The NSKK also maintained a curious mix of young 
and middle-aged members.  Based on membership data from 1937, veterans of the First 
World War constituted nearly a quarter of the NSKK‘s members.  Nevertheless, the majority 
of NSKK, who were between the ages of twenty and thirty five, were too young to have seen 
combat.285  Notwithstanding impressive growth during the 1930s, the majority of NSKK 
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members did not own vehicles, and the majority of the Third Reich‘s vehicle owners were 
not NSKK members.286 
 Ascertaining why NSKK members volunteered for the organization is a difficult task.  
Memoirs and statements that former members gave during denazification proceedings 
invariably downplayed any ideological attraction to the Nazi movement or its anti-Semitic 
agenda.  Nevertheless, using these sources Hochstetter articulates three motivations for why 
Germans joined the NSKK: political, sporting, and professional.287  The political appeal of 
the organization to many NSKK members is evident.  By 1935, nearly one-third (31.5 
percent) of the NSKK‘s members shared membership in the Nazi party.288  During the Nazi 
party‘s 1933 to 1937 ban on new members this statistic is ambiguous.  On the one hand, that 
nearly of one third of the NSKK‘s 1935 members had joined the Nazi party prior to the ban 
suggests that many early NSKK members had an affinity for the Nazi agenda.  Although not 
as high as that of the SS, which stood at 48.9 percent, the proportion of dual memberships in 
the NSKK remained significantly higher than that of the SA, which stood at a comparatively 
modest 23.2 percent.289  As Hochstetter aptly suggests, NSKK membership provided an 
alternate type of party affiliation for Germans who felt that association with the Nazi party 
was advantageous, yet were unable to join after 1933.290  On the other hand, Hochstetter 
hypothesizes that for some Germans, and particularly for some university students, NSKK 
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membership proved attractive because it offered a concrete, albeit more tepid connection to 
the Nazi movement and permitted them to avoid formal party membership.291  For some 
Germans who joined the NSKK during the 1930s, membership in the organization was the 
next best thing to joining the Nazi party.  For other NSKK members, it provided an avenue to 
avoid precisely the formal party membership that some of their compatriots coveted. 
 In their postwar explanations for joining the NSKK, former members stated that they 
joined the organization because it provided a venue for pursuing their interests in competitive 
motor sports and automobile technology.  At first glance, these claims reflect a certain reality 
about the post-Gleichschaltung (party synchronization) Nazi order.  With Nazi efforts to 
place all motorized activity under the NSKK‘s supervision, it would have been difficult for 
automobile enthusiasts to pursue their avocation independently of the organization.  
Nevertheless, the postwar propensity of former NSKK members to divorce their enthusiasm 
for motor sports from its specific ideological content in the Third Reich appears to be too 
convenient an alibi.  As Hochstetter convincingly observes: ―during the 1930s no political 
movement identified itself so closely with the project of national motorization and with the 
symbol of the motor as the NSDAP.‖292  Although admittedly speculative, it appears likely 
that the sporting interests that many German articulated for joining the NSKK were part of an 
affinity for the Nazi regime‘s broader agenda. 
 Many NSKK members joined the organization because doing so became a 
professional necessity in the Third Reich.  After 1933, German men whose livelihoods 
revolved around manufacturing, selling, maintaining, or operating motor vehicles felt 
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pressure to join the NSKK.  The NSKK explicitly targeted automobile mechanics and 
technicians for recruitment.  NSKK membership provided admission to a party-sanctioned 
automobile network that afforded privileged access to related goods and services.293  Put 
simply, for many Germans, membership in the organization became ―an occupational norm‖ 
and even a necessity in the Third Reich.294 
 Prior to and during the Second World War the NSKK maintained close connections to 
the Wehrmacht and police.  Before 1939, the NSKK lent the German military its expertise by 
training motorized and mechanized units.295  Following the onset of hostilities, the NSKK 
extended logistical support for the German military, the SS, and the Order Police.  After 
November 1939, all NSKK units assisting German military and police units became 
subordinate to the head of the Order Police and operated under German military law.296  By 
1940, 60 percent of NSKK members were deployed in this capacity.  Three years later this 
proportion had increased to 80 percent.297 
 As a manpower pool of last resort, NSKK personnel were ordered to participate in the 
Holocaust in the Soviet Union.  In May 1941, Himmler ordered the creation of NSKK 
Transportation Companies (NSKK-Verkehrskompanien) for deployment to the Soviet Union.  
With the status of special policemen, NSKK personnel deployed with the Einsatzgruppen and 
the Order Police during Operation Barbarossa.298  In the field the NSKK lent logistical 
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support to and participated in the mass murder of Jews.  Owing to the absence of postwar 
criminal investigations focused on the NSKK‘s crimes, relatively little is known about these 
missions.  Nevertheless, Hochstetter notes that there is no evidence of widespread resistance 
within the NSKK to participating in the Holocaust.299 
 When the VoMi formed Sonderkommando R in the summer of 1941, Hoffmeyer drew 
on extensive experience commanding NSKK personnel.  Although scholarship on the VoMi 
during the first two years of the war has largely overlooked the prominence of the NSKK 
during its Volksdeutsche ―resettlement‖ campaigns, NSKK members played a critical role in 
these deployments.  In late 1939 and early 1940, more than 120 NSKK members helped 
relocate Volksdeutsche from Volhynia and Galicia.  During the Volksdeutsche ―resettlement‖ 
from Bessarabia and northern Bukovina later in 1940, Hoffmeyer‘s command had some 500 
NSKK men.300  NSKK members not only provided valuable manpower, but many of them 
placed their personal vehicles at the VoMi‘s disposal.301  The NSKK also staffed more than 
50 of the VoMi‘s Umsiedlungslagern (Resettlement Camps).302  When Hoffmeyer selected 
personnel for Sonderkommando R, he had an extensive list of NSKK members to choose 
from for his new command. 
 Obtaining a profile of the NSKK members who deployed to Transnistria as part of 
Sonderkommando R is handicapped by the same documentary limitations that Hochstetter 
encountered in researching her monograph about the organization.  Without wartime rosters 
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for NSKK personnel deployed to Transnistria or personnel files, it is virtually impossible to 
obtain a representative portrait of the contingent.  What remains are perhaps a dozen detailed 
interview protocols of former NSKK members stationed in the region that the West German 
police recorded during the 1960s.  Based on this admittedly limited source base, it appears 
that the majority of NSKK personnel deployed to Transnistria were men who had little 
particular affinity for the Nazi regime or its anti-Semitism.  Except for their previous shared 
experience ―resettling‖ Volksdeutsche from Eastern Europe, most of Hoffmeyer‘s NSKK 
subordinates represented a cohort of ―ordinary men.‖ 
 Anecdotally, the NSKK personnel deployed to Transnistria fit a common four point 
profile.  First, the majority of NSKK men assigned to Sonderkommando R joined the 
organization because membership facilitated their occupational goals.  Second, most NSKK 
members had entered the organization prior to the outbreak of the Second World War.  The 
remaining personnel all did so before the onset of Operation Barbarossa in 1941.  Third, 
virtually all of the NSKK men in Sonderkommando R had served with Hoffmeyer in earlier 
Volksdeutsche ―resettlement‖ campaigns.  And lastly, most of the NSKK men under 
Hoffmeyer‘s command were not Nazi party members.  Even by the organization‘s standards, 
Sonderkommando R‘s NSKK personnel appear to have been among the least Nazified. 
 A couple of brief biographical sketches exemplify this trend.  Thirty-seven-year-old 
Otto Hotz, a professional test driver for Porsche, had joined the NSKK during the 1930s for 
occupational reasons.303  In 1940, the NSKK assigned him to assist the VoMi in its 
Volksdeutsche ―resettlement‖ operations in Volhynia and Galicia.  As required, Hotz drove 
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his personal vehicle from Stuttgart to take part in the mission.304  Following its successful 
completion, Hotz‘s superiors ordered him to northern Serbia to assist the VoMi in the 
Banat.305  With the conclusion of that deployment, Hotz received orders to accompany 
Sonderkommando R to southern Ukraine.306  Ernst R.‘s journey to Transnistria as part of the 
NSKK was even more circuitous.  The Berlin automobile mechanic joined the ADAC in 
1933 and, at the request of his employer, joined the NSKK a few years later.307  R.‘s superior 
in Berlin, and future NSKK chief in Transnistria, Ernst Gutsche, tapped him to participate in 
ethnic German ―resettlement‖ operations in Bessarabia and the Baltic.308  Returning to 
Berlin, R. began work servicing the VoMi motor pool.  By dint of ―personal difficulties‖ at 
his new post, he requested help from Gutsche, who arranged for his transfer to Hoffmeyer‘s 
unit in Transnistria during the summer of 1942.309  Rather than Nazi ideologues or 
Volksdeutsche ―experts,‖ most of Hoffmeyer‘s NSKK men received orders to deploy to 
Transnistria because their affinity for motoring put them in a category of readily draftable 
men. 
 Circumstantially, there is evidence to suggest that Hoffmeyer selected NSKK 
personnel with specialized skills beyond those of operating and maintaining vehicles 
necessary for the unit‘s operations.  Hoffmeyer drew both medical professionals and 
Russophone Volksdeutsche from the NSKK‘s ranks.  Dr. Otto Franke, Sonderkommando R‘s 
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chief physician, came to the unit via the NSKK.  A member of the NSKK since 1933, Franke 
took part in the VoMi‘s Volksdeutsche ―resettlements‖ from Volhynia and Galicia.  After a 
brief stint as a German Army surgeon, Franke requested that Hoffmeyer transfer him back to 
the VoMi perhaps because a posting behind the lines appeared safer to him.  Hoffmeyer 
requested his transfer to Sonderkommando R, and Franke deployed to southern Ukraine with 
the unit.310 
 Like the SS, the NSKK fielded a number of Volksdeutsche from the Soviet Union that 
the VoMi had relocated prior to the beginning of Operation Barbarossa.  Thirty-three-year-
old Otto T. typified this trend.  An ethnic German originally from Volhynia, T. settled in the 
Warthegau in early 1940.  Perhaps lacking the educational or National Socialist credentials 
that smoothed the admission of many Volksdeutsche from the Baltic or Bessarabia into the 
SS, T. volunteered for the NSKK shortly after arriving in occupied Poland.  Despite the fact 
that T. primarily served as a truck driver, he was one of a handful of Russian-speaking NSKK 
men—a skill that was undoubtedly not lost on his superiors.311  As with SS personnel 
deployed to Transnistria, the VoMi selected NSKK members who frequently possessed 
unique skills for Sonderkommando R. 
 The VoMi‘s appetite for manpower was so ravenous that in selecting personnel it 
frequently remained blind to National Socialist or even professional qualifications.  In the 
case of NSKK personnel, this often resulted unintentionally in deploying highly skilled 
personnel to perform menial jobs.  Zahntechniker (dental technician) turned truck driver 
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Erwin Niessner exemplified these sometimes preposterous assignments.  Born in the 
Sudetenland in 1912, the bilingual Niessner spent his formative years in Germany, where he 
joined the Hitler Jugend (Hitler Youth) and later the Nazi party.312  Although absent more 
comprehensive wartime documentation it is difficult to pinpoint why Niessner joined the 
Nazi party, it is a distinct possibility that he did so merely because of the professional 
advantages that party membership afforded.  Despite established SS conventions, even in 
April 1944, when Niessner received an SS commission as an SS-Untersturmführer, his 
personnel file noted that he remained a practicing Catholic.313  Regardless of why Niessner 
joined the NSDAP, his deployment to Transnistria owed more to his membership in the 
NSKK than it did to any personal political loyalties.  Seconded to the VoMi in Berlin August 
1940, Niessner served as a chauffeur for the organization until his superiors attached him to 
Sonderkommando R for service in southern Ukraine.314  Although he was originally assigned 
merely to drive a mobile dispensary, it was not until he reached Odessa in late October 1941 
that his SS superiors realized that he might be more valuable to the unit as a dentist than as a 
truck driver.315  In its haste to fill Sonderkommando R‘s ranks, the VoMi often displayed a 
startling inability to assign effectively even the limited manpower that it had at its disposal. 
Group Cohesion in Sonderkommando R 
 How did Sonderkommando R‘s diversity affect its cohesion as a unit?  The answer is 
decidedly mixed.  The unit‘s SS-dominated leadership corps distrusted its subordinate 
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organizations, the NSKK, the DRK, and the NS-Frauenwerk, which collectively contributed 
the majority of the unit‘s personnel, and fought internal power struggles with them.  This 
institutional strife prompted the SS to issue periodically bizarre orders aimed at punishing 
Sonderkommando R‘s non-SS members.  At the unit‘s headquarters in Landau, this 
atmosphere poisoned relations between its leaders and the members of the NSKK, the DRK, 
and the NS-Frauenwerk.  In rural Transnistria, however, these conflicts appear to have had 
little impact on relations among Sonderkommando R‘s variegated staff.  There, two different 
covalent bonds permitted the unit‘s diverse members to function with apparently minimal 
friction.  Isolated from other Germans in an alien environment, SS and NSKK personnel 
drew on a shared reservoir of experiences that many of them acquired in their previous VoMi 
deployments to Eastern Europe in 1939 and 1940.  In rural Transnistria, Sonderkommando 
R‘s leaders enjoyed far more intimate relations with their DRK and NS-Frauenwerk 
subordinates.  Romantic liaisons lubricated interpersonal interactions between 
Sonderkommando R‘s SS midlevel leaders and their female subordinates. 
 The unit‘s institutional rivalries were not simply byproducts of the SS‘s hubris, but, as 
with so many of Sonderkommando R‘s features, originated in the VoMi‘s Eastern European 
population transfers.  The VoMi‘s initial plan for its fall 1939 ―resettlement‖ operations in the 
Baltic envisioned substantial support from local Nazi party administrators in West Prussia 
and the Warthegau, who were to care for the Baltic Germans once they arrived in the Reich.  
To the VoMi‘s chagrin, it discovered that local Nazi party administrators were acutely 
unenthusiastic about the Baltic German ―resettlers‖ and had failed to make adequate 
preparations.  Himmler‘s epiphany that few Nazis outside of the SS shared his zeal for ethnic 
German resettlement projects prompted him to order the creation of a VoMi-run resettlement 
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center in Posen.  This experience merely sharpened the SS‘s already pronounced desire to 
centralize all Volksdeutsche affairs under its authority.  Subsequent VoMi ―resettlement‖ 
operations in Volhynia and Polodia, and Bessarabia and northern Bukovina remained under 
exclusive SS control from start to finish.316  This autarkic mindset had significant 
consequences for the SS‘s cooperation (or lack thereof) with its institutional partners in 
Sonderkommando R. 
 Landau was the epicenter of the SS‘s protracted power struggle with the NSKK.  
NSKK-Truppenführer Gutsche‘s autonomous staff in Landau was a perennial thorn in the 
SS‘s side.  Unlike in rural Transnistria, where area NSKK leaders made infrequent inspection 
visits and where the organization‘s personnel were subordinated to Sonderkommando R‘s SS 
officers, in Landau a robust NSKK staff presented a viable competitive chain of command.317  
The SS found this challenge to its authority unacceptable and, beginning in 1942, Hoffmeyer 
attempted repeatedly to have Gutsche recalled to Berlin and to subordinate his staff directly 
to the SS.  Hoffmeyer succeeded in doing precisely this in mid-1943.318  Without available 
wartime records on the subject, it is difficult to determine the precise contours of this contest.  
That Gutsche‘s removal and the large-scale transfer of NSKK personnel to the SS coincided 
with the withdrawal of NSKK units elsewhere in the German-occupied Soviet Union 
suggests that broader institutional factors, rather than local circumstances, may have 
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precipitated an end to the NSKK‘s nominal independence in Transnistria. 
 Presumably taking their cues from Hoffmeyer‘s running feud with Gutsche, SS 
personnel in Landau launched a petty campaign against their NSKK colleagues.  Siebert went 
out of his way to sharpen the distinction between the SS and the NSKK in Landau.  From the 
beginning of the occupation, he billeted members of both organizations separately, 
establishing the SS‘s barracks in a former government building and NSKK‘s quarters in an 
erstwhile school on the other side of Landau‘s church.319  The SS‘s hostility toward the 
NSKK had a trickle-down effect on Sonderkommando R‘s rank-and-file personnel in 
Landau.  Herman J., a former policeman and NSKK member, whose deployment to 
Transnistria with Sonderkommando R marked his second VoMi operation in the East, 
recounted bitterly that ―the SS repeated to us that we were only ‗drinkers‘ and not 
‗fighters.‘‖320  Abuse levied by SS personnel against NSKK members was not merely verbal.  
NSKK member Ernst R. later described having been threatened physically by an SS member 
during a squabble.321  Care should be taken not to overstate the discord between SS and 
NSKK personnel in Landau.  In their postwar statements to the West German police, NSKK 
members likely exaggerated this inter-institutional strife to distance themselves from the SS 
and to deflect suspicion.  Nevertheless, the evidence suggests that the SS and NSKK‘s 
marriage of convenience was an unhappy one in Landau. 
 Sonderkommando R‘s SS leaders fought similar institutional turf wars with the 
organizations to which the unit‘s female members belonged.  Hoffmeyer and his deputies 
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began grousing about both the DRK and the NS-Frauenwerk a few months after both 
organizations reached their full complements in mid-1942.  The SS‘s primary objection was 
that both organizations fell only loosely under its command.  Despite the fact that the SS was 
supposed to authorize the DRK and NS-Frauenwerk‘s personnel transfers, this chain of 
command appears to have worked better in theory than in practice.  An April 10, 1943, staff 
order, for example, chastised both the DRK and the NS-Frauenwerk for moving personnel 
about without the SS‘s approval.322  Hoffmeyer‘s frustration with his apparent inability to 
exert his desired control over these subordinate organizations was such that he risked a 
confrontation with Himmler.  According to British signals intelligence, Himmler ordered the 
NS-Frauenwerk to dispatch a further 40 members of its staff to Transnistria to beef up its 
Nazification program.  Hoffmeyer resisted the order, claiming that the region was already 
―overflowing‖ with representatives of the DRK and the NS-Frauenwerk.323  To make matters 
worse, Hoffmeyer lamented that although these organizations continued ―working under the 
direction of Vomi [sic]‖ they ―remain under the command of their own stations.‖324  Owing 
to a gap in the documentary record, it is unclear whether or not Hoffmeyer‘s rearguard action 
was successful.  Anecdotally, there appears to have been a decline in the number of new 
DRK and NS-Frauenwerk personnel assigned to Transnistria after April 1943.  Given the 
increasingly precarious German military position in the Soviet Union at this time, a 
slackening of additional transfers of German women to Transnistria is more likely to have 
been a reflection of the overall military situation than a result of Hoffmeyer‘s protestations. 
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 While Hoffmeyer may have been less successful in bridling the DRK and NS-
Frauenwerk than the NSKK in Transnistria, Sonderkomanndo R‘s SS leaders in Landau 
followed Hoffmeyer‘s example by ratcheting up pressure on the members of both the DRK 
and the NS-Frauenwerk.  In May 1943, Sonderkommando R banned German women from 
riding horses and ordered them henceforth to ride bicycles, which the unit hoped to obtain for 
them.325  The consequences of this punitive order were predictable.  Four months later, 
Hoffmeyer‘s command had to eat crow.  In August 1943, Sonderkommando R ordered its SS 
and NSKK personnel to cooperate more closely with their female counterparts and 
admonished them that their continued complaints about these women were unfounded.326  At 
the unit‘s Landau headquarters, the SS‘s poor institutional relations with the NSKK, the 
DRK, and the NS-Frauenwerk catalyzed increasing interpersonal tensions within the unit. 
 Outside of Landau, the unit‘s primary institutional battleground, relations between SS 
and NSKK personnel were significantly better.  Complaints by former NSKK personnel 
about antagonistic behavior by their SS counterparts were limited overwhelmingly to NSKK 
members who had been stationed in Landau.  Away from Landau, former Sonderkommando 
R members described a relaxed atmosphere in which SS officers socialized freely with their 
NSKK subordinates.327  Some command posts dispensed with formal ranks and coworkers 
used the informal du to address colleagues during their day-to-day operations.328  As became 
apparent during the early years of the lengthy West German police investigation into 
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Sonderkommando R‘s crimes, many of the unit‘s former members maintained close 
connections with one another decades after the war, organizing annual reunions that included 
both former SS and NSKK members.329  Notwithstanding the fact that inter-institutional 
tensions precipitated friction between the unit‘s rank-and-file SS and NSKK members in 
Landau, interpersonal relations within Sonderkommando R in rural Transnistria were far 
better. 
 An array of factors, including a more clearly defined chain of command, encouraged 
better SS-NSKK relations in Sonderkommando R‘s rural Bereichkommandos than in Landau.  
The comparative remoteness of the unit‘s rural command posts from Landau, the epicenter of 
the unit‘s inter-institutional strife, largely quarantined the antagonistic relationship between 
Sonderkommando R‘s SS and NSKK leaders in the unit‘s regional headquarters.  There, 
many SS and NSKK personnel drew on shared experiences because of their participation in 
the VoMi‘s earlier Volksdeutsche population transfers.  This provided a common frame of 
reference for a staff that frequently had little else in common.  Absent the intense inter-
institutional strife that characterized Sonderkommando R‘s operations in Landau, in rural 
Transnistria this shared operational history smoothed interpersonal relations between the 
unit‘s heavily Nazified SS leadership and relatively un-Nazified NSKK rank-and-file. 
 In contrast to the SS‘s relations with their NSKK subordinates in Sonderkommando 
R‘s rural Bereichkommandos (regional command posts), inherent ideological affinity 
catalyzed far more intimate relations between the SS and their female subordinates.  
Particularly in rural Transnistria, scores of Sonderkommando R‘s personnel initiated 
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romantic relationships with DRK nurses and NS-Frauenwerk workers.  With the exception of 
Odessa and Landau, where larger populations of Reichsdeutsche women offered greater 
possibilities for female companionship, there were few eligible German women in rural 
Transnistria.  As many of the women attested to after the war, the isolation of 
Sonderkommando R‘s rural Bereichkommandos meant that the unit‘s male and female 
personnel worked and socialized together for months at a time, routinely dining together 
daily.330  Beyond the exceptional proximity that Sonderkommando R‘s German men and 
women enjoyed, many German women deployed to Transnistria had a passion for their work.  
As a self-selected cohort of professional Nazi Volksdeutsche activists, many of 
Sonderkommando R‘s German women were suitable romantic and political partners for the 
unit‘s men.  Sequestered in the Ukrainian countryside with a group of disproportionately 
Nazified German women, who frequently expressed an affinity for ethnic German affairs, 
many of Hoffmeyer‘s male subordinates were struck—somewhat not surprisingly—by 
Cupid‘s arrow. 
 Admittedly, the records available to reconstruct liaisons between German men and 
women in southern Ukraine—RuSHA files and postwar testimony—imperfectly capture the 
range of relationships.  Both sources heavily overrepresent the number of long-term 
relationships and likely underrepresent more ephemeral liaisons.  RuSHA files, by their very 
nature, only recorded applications for authorization to marry.  Postwar testimony taken by the 
West German police is virtually silent about casual encounters between German men and 
women in Transnistria either because discussing these relationships violated 1960s German 
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sensibilities or because these relationships appeared irrelevant to investigators.  
Notwithstanding these documentary limitations, the available information paints the portrait 
of a highly incestuous unit in which work and pleasure overlapped. 
 Anecdotally, three notable patterns to these relationships emerge.  First, in contrast to 
the frequently temporary liaisons between SS and NSKK members and local Volksdeutsche 
women, a significant number of relationships between German men and women in 
Transnistria ended in long-term unions.  When the West German police interviewed these 
women during the 1960s, many of them were still married to former members of the unit, 
whom they had met during their deployment to southern Ukraine.  Friederike C. is a case in 
point.  Originally from the Sudetenland, she joined the German Red Cross as a nurse‘s 
assistant in 1935.  In May 1942, C.‘s superiors mobilized her for service in Ukraine and she 
deployed to Transnistria via Breslau and Rowno.  At 38 years old, C. was well past the 
marriage age for most German women.331  Nevertheless, during her deployment she initiated 
a relationship with Rosenfeld‘s Bereichkommandoführer, SS-Obersturmführer Heinz Born, a 
forty-nine-year-old fellow Sudeten German.332  Married for over two decades when the West 
German police interviewed her in 1968, she attempted to shield her husband from 
prosecution by concocting a farfetched story about their efforts to save Jews by smuggling 
them into Odessa.333 
 Second, German women assigned to Sonderkommando R were more likely to have 
long-term relationships with the unit‘s higher ranking members and especially its officers.  In 
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many cases, these unions constituted a marked social advancement for the women.  Anna 
R.‘s romance with and subsequent marriage to Erich von Fircks typified this trend.  An 
Austrian by birth, R. volunteered for the German Red Cross following the 1938 Anschluss.  
In 1940, R.‘s superiors assigned her to a VoMi resettlement camp for Bukovinian 
Volksdeutsche in Herberstein in Steiermark.  After a brief deployment with the Luftwaffe, the 
German Red Cross dispatched R. to Transnistria as part of Sonderkommando R.  Assigned to 
Bereichkommando XI in Rastatt (Porech‘e), R. began a relationship with the commander of 
neighboring Bereichkommando XIV in Worms (Vinogradnoe), SS-Untersturmführer Erich 
von Fircks, a Baltic German nobleman, who had joined the SS after relocating from Latvia to 
German-occupied Poland in 1940.334  Shortly after meeting at a Sonderkommando R social 
gathering, von Fircks orchestrated R.‘s transfer from Rastatt to his command in Worms.  
When R. departed Transnistria in May 1943, she was carrying von Firck‘s child.  The couple 
married the following month in her native Steiermark.335 
 Lastly, DRK nurses and doctors under Hoffmeyer‘s command had an exceptionally 
high rate of intermarriage.  Given that DRK nurses reported to the unit‘s physicians scattered 
throughout Transnistria‘s countryside, it is little surprise that this intimacy and isolation led to 
romance.  Even based on the fragmentary documentary record available, it is evident that at 
least a quarter of the physicians subordinated to Hoffmeyer met their spouses during their 
service in Transnistria.336  SS-Untersturmführer Dr. Herbert Lützendorf, Sonderkommando 
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R‘s head doctor, met his future wife during his deployment to Transnistria.  An SA member 
during his medical studies at the Universities of Munich and Halle during the 1930s, 
Lützendorf enjoyed a reasonably successful career as a VoMi physician, having participated 
in the ―resettlement‖ campaigns that Hoffmeyer led in Volhynia and Podolia, the Baltic, and 
Bessarabia.  After working as a doctor for the Einwandererzentrale and a six-month posting 
at the Universitätsklinik (University Clinic) in Berlin, Lützkendorf‘s superiors transferred 
him to Landau as Hoffmeyer‘s chief physician in April 1942.337  The following month, 
Lützkendorf met his future bride, Hildegard Stefan, when the DRK assigned her to Landau as 
kindergarten teacher.338  A nurse‘s assistant, who had volunteered for the DRK in 1938 and 
then sought duty at the front following the start of hostilities the following year, Stefan was 
Lützkendorf‘s romantic and likely ideological match.339  After a six-month romance, 
Lützkendorf proposed in early October 1942 and the couple married in June 1943.340  
Perhaps as a testament to her devotion to Lützkendorf, Stefan was still using her married 
name when the West German police interviewed her in 1964, despite the fact that her 
husband had been missing in action since March 1945.341 
 Scholars have long pointed to the part that German women played in supporting the 
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Third Reich and its murderous policies from their often circumscribed domestic roles.342  In 
her examination of the family lives of concentration camp staff, Schwarz argues that these 
incestuous relationships created a ―clan society‖ (Sippengemeinschaft) in which German 
women oiled the machinery of destruction.343  Schwarz‘s concept of a Sippengemeinschaft 
aptly captures the interpersonal dynamics that these romances created within 
Sonderkommando R.  In a heterogeneous group fraught with inter-institutional strife, these 
liaisons stabilized an otherwise fragmented unit by blunting much of the institutional 
criticism that the unit‘s leaders levied at both organizations.  Within the context of myriad 
liaisons between the unit‘s midlevel leadership and their female subordinates, institutional 
sniping held little truck on the local level. 
Conclusion 
 In his recent case study of the Nazi security apparatus in Kiev, Alexander Prusin 
describes the Sipo-SD (Sicherheitspolizei und Sicherheitsdienst, Security Police and Security 
Service) as a ―community of violence.‖344  He argues: ―regardless of rank and personal 
disposition to violence—which varied from enjoyment to distaste—or whether one‘s violent 
proclivities were awakened or acquired, SiPo/SD functionaries perceived themselves as a 
single community designed or fated to maintain order by violence in the Generalbezirk 
Kiew.‖345  Prusin‘s findings about Sipo-SD personnel assigned to the Generbezirk Kiew 
provide a fruitful comparison to Sonderkommando R‘s staff in Transnistria.  In both cases, 
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comparatively diverse groups of Germans cooperated to implement the Third Reich‘s 
genocidal plans in the occupied Soviet Union.  The discontinuities between both groups of 
German perpetrators highlight the very exceptional nature of Sonderkommando R‘s 
personnel in Transnistria.  In contrast to Sipo-SD officials stationed in Kiev, Himmler never 
conceived of Sonderkommando R as a manpower pool that might be called upon to murder 
Jews.  The unit‘s limited portfolio of mobilizing the region‘s ethnic Germans necessitated 
specialized personnel, such as DRK nurses and NS-Frauenwerk organizers, who were absent 
from other groups of heavily implicated killers.  Moreover, given that the unit had no military 
application, the SS assigned whatever personnel it could gather together with little thought as 
to how this eclectic cast of characters might function in the field.  The unit‘s diversity was 
thus a product of the wartime manpower pressures that the VoMi faced. 
 This same diversity also nearly sabotaged the unit in the field.  Although 
subordinating a conglomeration of non-SS staff that reported to an array of organizations was 
an unavoidable necessity for the VoMi, it violated the organization‘s engrained autarkic 
mindset that sought to secure all Volksdeutsche operations in the SS‘s hands.  This inherent 
contradiction moved Sonderkommando R‘s SS leaders to seek to expand their authority at the 
expense of the NSKK, the DRK, and the NS-Frauenwerk, which asserted at least nominal 
control over the majority of the unit‘s personnel.  Particularly in Sonderkommando R‘s 
regional headquarters in Landau, this infighting poisoned interpersonal relations between the 
SS and members of the NSKK, DRK, and NS-Frauenwerk.  In rural Transnistria, where 
Sonderkommando R deployed the majority of its personnel, two unanticipated factors largely 
inoculated the unit‘s staff to this infighting.  First, the unit‘s SS Bereichkommandoführer and 
their NSKK subordinates drew on a common frame of reference that they shared by dint of 
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their participation in earlier VoMi Volksdeutsche ―resettlement‖ operations in Eastern 
Europe.  Second, many of Sonderkommando R‘s SS mid-leaders had liaisons with their 
female subordinates, which strengthened interpersonal bonds between members of the SS, 
the DRK, and the NS-Frauenwerk, despite clear institutional tensions between the 
organizations.  Wartime manpower shortages prompted the VoMi to staff Sonderkommando 
R with a hodgepodge of personnel, whose very diversity threatened to hamstring the unit‘s 
operations in Ukraine.  Sonderkommando R became a ―community of violence‖ that 
functioned in spite of itself. 
 
  
 
CHAPTER III: HARVEST OF VIOLENCE: SONDERKOMMANDO R’S 
CAMPAIGN AGAINST INTERNAL ENEMIES IN RURAL TRANSNISTRIA 
 In the Transnistrian countryside, Sonderkommando R‘s personnel encountered a local 
population embittered by its loss of privileged status and traumatized by the war‘s opening 
months, when Soviet and German forces both targeted local ethnic Germans.  As discussed in 
chapter one, prior to withdrawing in August 1941, the Red Army and NKVD attempted to 
remove or destroy the region‘s military, economic, and transportation infrastructure.  Paying 
particular attention to German-speakers, whom Soviet authorities correctly suspected might 
become a fifth column, Soviet security forces tried to evacuate all ethnic German men of 
military age as well as the area‘s agricultural equipment and livestock across the Bug River.  
Although advancing Wehrmacht forces overtook many of these transports before they 
reached the Soviet interior, thousands of displaced Volksdeutsche refugees roamed the 
countryside for weeks in their trek home. 346  Profiting from the temporary absence of most 
male Volksdeutsche, Romanian soldiers plundered the region‘s already partially denuded 
Germanophone settlements.347  The German Eleventh Army stationed in Transnistria 
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responded by assigning sentries to guard against further Romanian raids and threatened harsh 
punishment for any thieves that it caught.  As German combat forces withdrew from the area, 
Einsatzgruppe D assumed the Wehrmacht‘s guard duties.  Beyond simply protecting local 
Volksdeutsche from further Romanian banditry and assisting in their economic recovery, 
Einsatzgruppe D prepared the communities for Nazi rule by murdering members of ―mixed 
race‖ Jewish-Volksdeutsche families and suspected Communist Party functionaries.348  How 
did Hoffmeyer‘s ragtag subordinates begin to mobilize this brutalized population for the 
National Socialist cause?  Their solution was to launch yet another violent campaign to 
eradicate perceived internal enemies within Transnistria‘s Volksdeutsche settlements—an 
initiative that began with murdering surviving Jews and quickly snowballed to include 
suspected Volksdeutsche opponents as well. 
 This chapter recovers Sonderkommando R‘s increasingly violent attempts to identify 
and eliminate real and largely imagined adversaries of National Socialism in southern 
Ukraine.  Despite their collective inexperience in the region, Sonderkommando R‘s staff 
suspected correctly that the earlier German effort to murder local Jews had been only 
partially successful.  Succoring the Volksgemeinschaft in Transnistria without first 
establishing its racial and political foundations threatened, from the SS‘s perspective, to rot 
the entire enterprise from its very core.  At first, Sonderkommando R‘s personnel in rural 
Transnistria emulated Einsatzgruppe D‘s previous murderous anti-Jewish campaign.  As 
permanent German authorities in the region, Sonderkommando R‘s staff launched a 
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comprehensive ―mopping up‖ operation to kill Jews and members of ―mixed race‖ families 
who had escaped the initial German dragnet.  This preliminary campaign not only provided 
Hoffmeyer‘s subordinates with scores of victims, but it also revealed that local 
Volksdeutsche, some of whom the Germans had often placed in positions of authority, had 
conspired to hide these individuals.  In hiding some Jews, Transnistria‘s Volksdeutsche had 
behaved no differently than the Nazi leadership had suspected that Germans would have 
acted had the regime targeted such thoroughly integrated Jews in the Reich.  Most 
Volksdeutsche did not conceive of hiding their Jewish or part Jewish neighbors and relatives 
as an act of broader resistance to the Third Reich‘s murderous anti-Semitic agenda.  
Nevertheless, within the context of Sonderkommando R‘s deep-seeded concerns about the 
viability of the Black Sea Germans as a Volksgruppe, the epiphany that some local residents 
had undermined the SS‘s murder campaign fed the unit‘s perception that area ethnic Germans 
constituted a politically unreliable population.  In this atmosphere of suspicion, 
Sonderkommando R began to construe any ethnic German behavior that its personnel 
deemed to be undesirable as a form of opposition to the unit‘s broader agenda.  Hoffmeyer‘s 
subordinates read Volksdeutsche efforts to shield a highly selective group of local Jews from 
the SS as the tip of the iceberg to a concerted Volksdeutsche resistance to the VoMi project in 
Transnistria that never actually existed.349 
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 In early 1942, this increasing frustration boiled over as Sonderkommando R‘s 
midlevel leaders used their autonomy to expand earlier attempts to kill local Volksdeutsche 
―communists‖ into an uneven, yet brutal effort aimed at stamping out real and often imagined 
Volksdeutsche resistance to the unit‘s mission in Transnistria.  What began as an effort to 
punish fugitive Volksdeutsche ―communists‖ evolved rapidly into a system of routinized 
punishments and assaults that brutalized any ethnic German who demonstrated inadequate 
enthusiasm for the Nazi cause or whose moral conduct the SS regarded as unbecoming of a 
prospective member of the Volksgemeinschaft.  Absent effective oversight from 
Sonderkommando R‘s senior leadership, the unit‘s more sadistic members used these ad hoc 
initiatives as a pretext for abusing Volksdeutsche without restraint.  By early 1943, this 
brutality had reached such proportions that Hoffmeyer was forced to intervene.  He relieved 
his deputy responsible for Transnistria and brought in new leadership, which attempted to 
tamp down these abuses by ordering a halt to senseless brutality and channeling this violence 
into a concentration camp for the region‘s Volksdeutsche. 
Germans and Volksdeutsche 
  Scholars have struggled to capture the ambiguous relationship between ethnic 
Germans and Nazi violence in Eastern Europe.  Historically, it is a complex subject.  The 
proximity of many Volksdeutsche to the Holocaust in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union 
permitted them to participate disproportionately as both the perpetrators and the immediate 
material beneficiaries of genocide.  However, as Bergen has noted, ―the rewards for 
Germanness  . . .  were only for those Volksdeutschen who proved loyal, active partners in 
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the Nazi project.‖350  After the war, the victimization narrative that many ethnic Germans in 
the Federal Republic developed to cloak their complicity in the Nazi regime‘s crimes merely 
amplified this ambiguity.351  As a necessary corrective to this distorted narrative, typically 
historians have underscored Volksdeutsche participation in the Holocaust, particularly in the 
Soviet Union, without paying corresponding attention to what Bergen has aptly termed the 
violent ―ripple effects‖ of the Nazi worldview that many ethnic Germans experienced.352  
Scholarship on the German occupation of Ukraine has, however, grown increasingly 
sensitive to violent encounters between German authorities and area Volksdeutsche.  
Angrick‘s excellent examination of Einsatzgruppe D, for example, highlights the unit‘s 
parallel efforts to murder both local Jews and Volksdeutsche ―communists‖ in southern 
Ukraine.353  Similarly, Lower‘s lucid case study of Zhytomyr under Nazi rule underscores the 
fact that ―ethnic Germans changed sides during the war, often blurring the categorical 
distinctions of victim, perpetrator, and bystander.‖354  The radicalization of Sonderkommando 
R‘s efforts from hunting surviving Jews and Volksdeutsche ―communists‖ to using violence 
to root out imagined Volksdeutsche resistance to National Socialism demonstrates that, even 
among a group of Volksdeutsche as heavily implicated in the Holocaust as the Black Sea 
Germans, the threat of German brutality remained an omnipresent feature of life under Nazi 
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rule. 
 The same postwar ethnic German victimization narrative that has made historians 
rightly leery of Volksdeutsche claims that they were brutalized by the Nazi regime presents 
acute methodological challenges in recovering Sonderkommando R‘s violence against ethnic 
Germans in Transnistria.  As local commanders, rather than Sonderkommando R‘s senior 
leadership, shaped the unit‘s policies toward area Volksdeutsche during 1942, contemporary 
records about this brutality were kept at the unit‘s lowest levels.  As surviving documentation 
from Sonderkommando R‘s subunits is extraordinarily rare and as former members of the 
unit were generally reticent to discuss their mistreatment of local ethnic Germans after the 
war, statements that former Volksdeutsche gave to the West German police often contain the 
only references to this violence.  As many ethnic Germans assumed correctly that they might 
become suspects in criminal investigations, they had every reason to exaggerate their 
victimization at the hands of Hoffmeyer‘s subordinates to distract investigators‘ attention 
from their own crimes.  Nevertheless, both the number of corroborating statements, often 
given by ethnic German women who grasped that they were not under suspicion, and 
fragmentary surviving German and Soviet wartime records provide a sufficiently diverse 
source base to help distinguish hyperbole from reality. 
Sonderkommando R in Transnistria 
 Prior to discussing the increasingly violent campaign that Sonderkommando R‘s staff 
launched during 1942, it is useful first to examine briefly the unit‘s administrative structure, 
communications network, and leadership—all of which played a role in granting the unit‘s 
midlevel commanders tremendous latitude to shape the VoMi‘s Volksdeutsche policy in 
southern Ukraine.  Sonderkommando R‘s commanders had to design the unit‘s organizational 
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structure to compensate for an acute manpower shortage.  In Transnistria, Sonderkommando 
R‘s roughly 120 to 150 initial members were responsible for shaping policy for the region‘s 
130,000 Volksdeutsche inhabitants, who were scattered through Odessa, a major metropolitan 
area, and in towns and hamlets in a large surrounding countryside.  Put somewhat differently, 
Sonderkommando R initially fielded one staff member for every 130 Volksdeutsche and, to 
cover the entire region, that just one staff member was responsible for all ethnic German 
affairs in an area approximately as large as the city of Atlanta.  
 From the beginning of Sonderkommando R‘s deployment, the unit‘s leaders 
attempted to cover the maximum possible territory with the fewest possible staff members.  
When Sonderkommando R departed its Stahnsdorf headquarters in mid-August 1941, the 
unit‘s caravan numbered some one hundred vehicles that ranged from sedans, to trucks, to 
specialized vans equipped with radio receivers, field kitchens, and even a dark room for the 
unit‘s professional photographer.355  Traveling via Łódź, Sonderkommando R reached 
Zhytomyr, where Hoffmeyer divided the 200-man unit roughly equally.  Approximately half 
of the unit remained in Zhytomyr for later deployment to other ethnic German population 
centers in the recently created Reichskommissariat Ukraine.356   Under Siebert‘s command 
the other half of Sonderkommando R proceeded into Romanian-occupied Transnistria, 
where, by early September, fighting was limited largely to Odessa.  Siebert selected Landau 
as the location for Sonderkommando R‘s headquarters (Hauptstab) in Transnistria because of 
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both its equidistance from other area Volksdeutsche settlements and its available buildings to 
house Sonderkommando R‘s administrative offices.357  Siebert then divided the bulk of his 
staff into eighteen four- to five-man Bereichkommandos.  Commanded by a midlevel SS 
officer, the Bereichkommandoführer, these subunits mixed SS and NSKK personnel, the 
latter of which were responsible for driving and maintaining the handful of vehicles assigned 
to each Bereichkommando.358  On Siebert‘s orders, these Bereichkommandos established 
outposts throughout Transnistria in the predominately ethnic German towns of 
Alexanderfeld, Anam, Bischofsfeld, Groß Liebenthal, Halberstadt, Hoffnungsthal, Janovski, 
Johannisfeld, Lichtenfeld, Mannheim, Marianburg, Neudorf, Rastatt, Rosenfeld, Selz, 
Speyer, and Worms as well as in the city of Odessa.359  Given the relative absence of other 
German units in Transnistria, Hoffmeyer‘s subordinates in the region could count themselves 
among the most isolated German administrators in the occupied Soviet Union. 
 Siebert faced immense difficulties in trying to communicate with his subordinates in 
the field.  Like other parts of the rural Soviet Union, road conditions made motor vehicle 
traffic extraordinary difficult, particularly in inclement weather.  In good weather, Landau 
was two days of hard driving from Kiev.  In bad weather, washed out roads made this trip 
impossible.360  Winter further complicated ground travel.  In late December 1941, for 
example, Sonderkommando R‘s subunit assigned to Nikopol in the Reichskommissariat 
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Ukraine could not reach its destination due to poor road conditions.361  Because streets were 
frequently impassible for wheeled vehicles, Sonderkommando R often used horses to courier 
weekly mail deliveries and written staff orders to individual Bereichkommandos—a 
distribution method that took days.362  Sonderkommando R depended on its own version of 
the Pony Express to transport even cipher books and other decoding materials from Nikolaev 
for its radio transponder in Landau.363  Although VoMi offices in Landau and eventually 
Odessa had police band radio transmitters with which Sonderkommando R‘s staff remained 
in touch with their superiors in Kiev and Berlin, individual Bereichkommandos had no radio 
equipment.364  To catch Wehrmacht news broadcasts, Hoffmeyer instructed his subordinates 
to tune in using their car radios.365  Periodically, and perhaps as infrequently as every three 
months, Hoffmeyer or Siebert chaired conferences for Transnistria‘s 
Bereichkommandoführer.  These meetings, held initially in Landau and then in Odessa, 
provided an opportunity for the unit‘s leadership to set policy and troubleshoot problems as 
well as for Bereichkommandoführer to socialize and provision themselves with German 
sundries that were hard to obtain in their remote outposts.366  Aside from occasional written 
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orders dispatched by mounted riders and even less frequent face-to-face meetings, 
Sonderkommando R‘s senior leaders had few opportunities to supervise their subordinates 
spread throughout the Ukrainian countryside. 
 That Sonderkommando R‘s senior leaders demonstrated painfully little interest in 
supervising the unit‘s daily operations merely compounded the de facto independence that 
many Bereichkommandoführer enjoyed.  Hoffmeyer‘s casual attitude toward managing the 
unit exemplifies this lack of oversight.  A man of action and tremendous ambition, 
Hoffmeyer emulated his SS superiors‘ Wanderlust and attempted to manage his disparate 
personnel while constantly on the move.  Johann P., one of his chauffeurs, recounts ferrying 
Hoffmeyer back and forth from Berlin to various destinations in German and Romanian-
occupied Ukraine innumerable times.367  Hoffmeyer aped senior Nazi leaders by traveling in 
a style well above his pay grade of SS-Oberführer (Brigadier General).  He maintained an 
entourage of ten to fifteen, including driver and mechanics, who kept both hard-topped and 
convertible limousines at the ready, depending on the weather and Hoffmeyer‘s preference.368  
Hoffmeyer also maintained a host of accommodations, conveniently located en route from 
Berlin to Ukraine, including two in Łódź and Kiev.369  Rumor had it that the VoMi-run Łódź 
way station was a particular favorite for the married Hoffmeyer because of the charms of its 
female proprietor, conveniently the mother of one of his young protégées.370  Occasionally, 
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Hoffmeyer would visit Landau, Odessa, or the odd rural Bereichkommando on inspection 
tours with much pomp and circumstance.371  During one visit to Rastatt, for example, 
Hoffmeyer‘s arrival necessitated an honor guard from the local ethnic German militia unit, 
complete with white dress uniforms conceived especially for the occasion.372  Invariably, the 
unit‘s photographer, SS-Untersturmführer Georg Bauer, was on hand to capture the photo 
op.373  On important matters, such as Sonderkommando R‘s participation in the murder of 
Jewish deportees during the winter of 1941-42, Hoffmeyer conferred with his staff in situ.374  
Hoffmeyer, however, left all but the most crucial issues to the discretion of his subordinates 
who, if they were lucky, could reach him by radio.375  Hoffmeyer was, put simply, the 
epitome of a ―seagull manager.‖ 
 Sonderkommando R‘s Bereichkommandoführer in Transnistria exercised surprising 
independence in shaping Volksdeutsche policy in their Bereichkommandos.  Only some of 
this autonomy was by design.  Frequently the only German officials within a day or two of 
travel, the unit‘s midlevel leaders had substantial authority to implement VoMi policy 
independently.  Nevertheless, Sonderkommando R‘s woefully inadequate communications 
infrastructure, which more often than not depended on written dispatches couriered by riders, 
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ensured that speedy intervention from the unit‘s senior leader would have been virtually 
impossible even had Hoffmeyer and his immediate subordinates been so inclined.  Important 
decisions about an array of subjects, including the unit‘s campaign against internal enemies 
in Transnistria‘s Volksdeutsche communities, fell almost exclusively to local commanders 
during the first year and a half of the occupation.  In Transnistria, the ―‗on the spot‘ decision-
making‖ that Lower has aptly identified as part of the organizational culture of German 
administrators in the occupied Soviet Union, was not simply an institutional ethos, but also a 
necessity.376 
The Murder of Local Jews and “Mixed Race” Families in Transnistria’s Volksdeutsche 
Settlements 
 In Transnistria‘s Volksdeutsche settlements, the Nazi regime pursued an anti-Jewish 
policy that was far more radical than the one that it felt able to implement in Germany.  The 
major distinction was whether or not the Jewish spouses of ―Aryans‖ and their part Jewish 
children were to be considered as Jews for the purposes of the Final Solution.  In Germany, 
the Nazi party met repeated stiff opposition from the German civil service when it proposed 
that both groups should be regarded as Jews.  Both following the 1935 Nürnberg Laws and at 
the Wannsee Conference in early 1942, German civil servants cautioned that moves against 
Jewish spouses of Germans were inadvisable because of potential popular backlash against 
the regime.377  Heeding these warning, Nazi authorities reluctantly resolved not to pursue the 
members of these ―privileged marriages‖ and their partially Jewish offspring in the Reich.  In 
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Transnistria, by contrast, concerns about local opinion failed to moderate Nazi racial policy.  
There, Einsatzgruppe D and later Sonderkommando R murdered both area Jews and local 
residents, who were members of ―mixed race‖ families.  In some instances, German forces 
murdered not only the Jewish spouses of Volksdeutsche and local Mischlinge, but also these 
unions‘ ―Aryan‖ partners.378  When Transnistria‘s ethnic Germans hid their Jewish or part 
Jewish neighbors and family members from the SS, they behaved precisely as German civil 
administrators had predicted that many Reich Germans would have done had the Nazi regime 
implemented similarly radical anti-Jewish policies in Germany.  Sonderkommando R appears 
not to have grasped that the SS had pursued these measures in Transnistria precisely because 
the suspect nature of local Volksdeutsche made it indifferent to local reactions to these 
killings.  Hoffmeyer‘s subordinates interpreted area ethnic German efforts to save a highly 
selective group of Jews and Mischlinge from the SS not as a predictable response to a 
murderous policy that the Nazi regime had deemed potentially too unpopular to implement in 
Germany, but rather as evidence of Volksdeutsche resistance and unreliability. 
 Upon its arrival in Transnistria, Sonderkommando R inherited Einsatzgruppe D‘s 
responsibilities for making the region‘s Volksdeutsche settlements judenrein (free of Jews).  
None of the unit‘s surviving records reveal evidence of written orders from 
Sonderkommando R‘s commanders to their staff to begin murdering surviving local Jews.  
However, the fact that members of the unit pursued the same genocidal policy in isolated 
Bereichkommandos suggests that at least the unit‘s officers received oral orders to do so 
either before separating in Landau or, more likely, before the unit departed Stahnsdorf.  
Despite the similarities with Einsatzgruppe D‘s efforts to murder local Jews living in 
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Transnistria‘s ethnic Germans towns and hamlets, Sonderkommando R‘s task was 
significantly more challenging.  In its initial sweep through the region during the summer of 
1941, Einsatzgruppe D had shot only those Jews whom the unit could identify with or 
without the help of local ethnic Germans.  The handful of Jews who remained in the region‘s 
Volksdeutsche settlements were either Jews whose ethnic German neighbors had hidden them 
from the SS or Jews who had returned to local Volksdeutsche communities after 
Einsatzgruppe D‘s departure.  In either case, unlike Einsatzgruppe D‘s victims, 
Sonderkommando R‘s Jewish targets typically had much deeper roots in Transnistria‘s 
Volksdeutsche settlements.  By dint of the fact that these surviving Jews were difficult to spot 
and, almost invariably, were being assisted by local ethnic Germans, Sonderkommando R‘s 
attempt to murder area Jews was a lengthy process that continued well into 1942. 
 Initially, Sonderkommando R‘s involvement in the murder of local Jews in 
Transnistria constituted a second sweep that often retraced Einsatzgruppe D‘s route weeks or 
months earlier.  Killings in the regional center of Hoffnungsthal, a predominantly ethnically 
German town of between 2,500 and 3,000 residents some 90 kilometers north of the city of 
Odessa, exemplifies Sonderkommando R‘s initial ―mopping up‖ efforts.379  Shortly after 
Romanian and German troops occupied the town in August 1941, a 20 to 30 strong 
detachment from Einsatzgruppe D entered Hoffnungsthal and announced its intention to 
solve the local ―Jewish question.‖380  With the aid of local informants, Einsatzgruppe D 
detained a handful of local Volksdeutsche ―communists‖ as well as between 50 and 60 Jews, 
whom ethnic German witnesses later identified alternatively as local Jews and Jewish 
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expellees from Bessarabia, and shot their prisoners a kilometer from the edge of the town.  
As was its established practice in Transnistria, Einsatzgruppe D ordered local Volksdeutsche 
men to bury the bodies in a mass grave.381 
 Despite implausible postwar remonstrations from Sonderkommando R‘s former 
personnel,382 the ―Jewish question‖ was far from solved when SS-Hauptsturmführer 
Weingärtner383 and his subordinates, SS-Obersturmführer Konrad Hoffmann,384 SS-
Oberscharführer Alexander Lerche,385 NSKK chauffeur Hermann J.,386 established their 
Bereichkommando in Hoffnungsthal the following month.  When Weingärtner and his staff 
arrived in Hoffnungsthal, the town appears to have had an unusually high number of 
surviving Jews for two reasons.  First, it appears likely that Einsatzgruppe D‘s earlier sweep 
had focused on Freiburg, a predominantly Jewish village of roughly 100 residents some three 
kilometers away, and thus overlooked many of Hoffnungstal‘s Jewish residents.387  Second, 
postwar evidence suggests that Einsatzgruppe D‘s initial killings shocked area Volksdeutsche, 
who had hidden surviving local Jews from the SS.  August F., a local resident whom 
Einsatzgruppe D ordered to serve in the burial detail, recounted being ―full of fear‖ at the 
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sight of the corpses and having been unable to eat for days after the shootings.388  Adolf W., 
another denizen of Hoffnungsthal, recounted how the community was ―not in agreement‖ 
with the killings.389  Both popular and private disdain for the murders moved Hoffnungsthal‘s 
newly appointed mayor, Gottlieb B., to shelter the town‘s remaining Jews from the SS.  
When Weingärtner discovered B.‘s efforts on behalf of his Jewish neighbors, he sacked B. in 
favor to another local resident, who was seemingly more sympathetic to the Nazi agenda.390  
B.‘s advanced age apparently spared him from a harsher punishment.391  The Jews whom he 
attempted to help, however, were not so lucky.  Witness accounts describe how Weingärtner‘s 
subordinates rounded up the surviving members of the town‘s ten to fifteen Jewish families 
and executed them on Hoffnungstal‘s environs.392  Many local ethnic Germans appear to 
have reacted equally negatively to this subsequent round of killing.  As Heinrich F., aged 
fourteen in 1941, later recounted: ―as a boy I was really shocked [by the shootings], because 
the Jewish children, with whom we had been together, suddenly were no longer among us.393    
In a pattern that replicated itself in many of Transnistria‘s Volksdeutsche settlements, 
Sonderkommando R‘s initial responsibilities involved murdering local Jews who, often with 
the assistance of area ethnic Germans, had eluded Einsatzgruppe D.394  
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 Like those of Einsatzgruppe D, Sonderkommando R‘s efforts to expunge Jews from 
Transnistria‘s ethnic German communities also entailed the murder of members of ―mixed 
race‖ Volksdeutsche-Jewish families.  This initiative created even greater problems for 
Sonderkommando R.  Members of ―mixed race‖ marriages and their children, who had 
survived Einsatzgruppe D‘s murder campaign, had done so by avoiding detection.  While 
luck sometimes played a role, more often than not survival depended on both the concrete 
assistance of ―Aryan‖ relatives and at least a tacit agreement among local residents not to 
paint them as targets for Sonderkommando R.  Finding local informants to finger members of 
―mixed race‖ marriages and their offspring may have proven particularly difficult because 
any would-be denouncer would have known that providing the information to 
Sonderkommando R would have contributed to the murder of local children with surviving 
local relatives.  It was thus not until the better part of a year into the VoMi‘s administration of 
Transnistria‘s Volksdeutsche settlements that local residents denounced these surviving Jews 
and Mischlinge to Sonderkommando R. 
 Perhaps as a reflection of the unease that these killings created among local residents, 
witnesses focused disproportionately on these crimes in postwar statements to both West 
German and Soviet authorities.  The murder of members of ―mixed race‖ families was an 
initial catalyst for the West German criminal probe into Sonderkommando R‘s wartime 
activities.  In November 1961, after reading an article about the work of German prosecutors 
in a local newspaper in British Columbia, an ethnic German émigré from Transnistria penned 
a letter about these crimes to the German consulate in Vancouver, which the German Foreign 
                                                                                                                                                       
Katharinental, see Aussage von A. D., October 30, 1962, BAL, B162/2299, 290. 
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Office forwarded to Ludwigsburg.395  Before grasping the scope of Sonderkommando R‘s 
involvement in the mass murder of Jews during the winter of 1941-42, West German 
investigators focused their inquiry on the unit‘s role in murdering the members and children 
of ―mixed race‖ marriages in Transnistria‘s Volksdeutsche communities.  These types of 
killings also left their mark on local non-Germans, which is reflected in the fact that these 
crimes constitute one the rare instances in which the Soviet Extraordinary Commission 
investigated Sonderkommando R‘s crimes against local residents (as opposed to Jewish 
deportees).396  This rich source base provides a unique opportunity to reconstruct how 
Hoffmeyer‘s subordinates prosecuted this final campaign to make Transnistria‘s 
Volksdeutsche settlements judenrein. 
 Sonderkommando R‘s efforts to eliminate the last vestiges of Jewish ―contamination‖ 
from Selz, a town of some 3,000 Volksdeutsche some 50 kilometers northwest of Odessa, 
exemplifies the difficulties that Hoffmeyer‘s subordinates faced in carrying out this aspect of 
their mission.  As in Hoffnungsthal, Einsatzgruppe D had operated in the town, executing a 
sizable number of local Jews and Volksdeutsche ―communists‖ and recruiting a handful of 
ethnic German men to serve as interpreters, some of whom accompanied the unit as far as 
Crimea.397  Like their colleagues in Hoffnungsthal, the head of Bereichkommando XXIII, 
SS-Obersturmführer Norbert Pachschwöll,398 and his deputy, SS-Untersturmführer Johannes 
                                                 
395 Brief an das Consulate of the Federal Republic of Germany, Vancouver, Canada von Herrn E. G., 
November 28, 1961, BAL, B162/2290, 80-82. 
396 Akt No. 37, October 17, 1944, USHMM, RG-22.002M, Reel 6, Fond 7021, Opis 69, Delo 75.  Akt 
No. 40, October 17, 1944, USHMM, RG-22.002M, Reel 6, Fond 7021, Opis 69, Delo 75.   
397 Aussage von L. S., October 3, 1962, BAL, B162/2300, 146.  On the recruitment of Volksdeutsche 
interpreters, including Hans Volk, see Aussage von L. D., August 7, 1967, Staatsarchiv Münster, Nr. 2698, 39. 
398 SS Offizier Akte Norbert Pachschwöll, NARA, RG 242, A3343 SSO-360A, 1041. 
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F.,399 inherited responsibility for a Volksdeutsche town that, unbeknownst to them, was only 
partially purged of ―Jewish‖ influences. 
 Prior to the war, Selz had been home to a number of Jews, many of whom had 
anticipated correctly the Nazi threat and had evacuated eastward with retreating Soviet forces 
during the summer of 1941.400  For local Jews who had intermarried with the town‘s ethnic 
Germans, however, Selz appeared to provide a refuge amid the chaos of the German and 
Romanian offensive.  Apparently judging that his Volksdeutsche wife Martha and their four 
young children afforded him protection from German aggression, Kasper Thielman, a 
collective farm worker known locally as ―Kasper the Jew,‖401 (Judenkasper) opted to remain 
in Selz.402  Area ethnic Germans, who were married to Jews, likewise regarded Selz as a safe 
haven.  Georg Deibert was a case in point.  During the mid-1930s, Deibert, a professional 
musician and choral director, had moved to Odessa, where he married a Jew and fathered two 
children.403  When Romanian occupation authorities arrested his wife, Deibert returned to his 
parents‘ home in Selz with their two children because his hometown appeared to offer them a 
better chance for survival than Odessa, which, during the fall of 1941, was the epicenter of 
Romanian anti-Jewish violence.404  Surprisingly, both Thielman and Deibert‘s assumptions 
                                                 
399 Aussage von J. F., July 19, 1962, Staatsarchiv Münster, Nr. 2671, 71. 
400 Aussage von A. F., August 6, 1962, BAL, B162/2302, 70. 
401 Zeugenschaftliche Vernehmung J. S., December 12, 1961, BAL, B162/2290, 142.  Aussage von H. 
L., December 21, 1961, BAL, B162/2291.  Aussage von L. W., n.d., BAL, B162/2291, 31.  Aussage von F. J., 
December 21, 1961, BAL, B162/2291, 24.  Aussage von E. K., December 21, 1961, BAL, B162/2291, 25. 
402 Quoted in Aussage von J. D., November 26, 1962, BAL, B162/2291, 26.  Zeugenschaftliche 
Vernehmung von D. R., n.d., BAL, B162/2290, 136. 
403 Ibid., 134. 
404 Ibid.  Aussage von J. H., August 6, 1962, BAL, B162/2302, 115.  Aussage von F. J., December 21, 
1961, BAL, B162/2291, 24.   
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about their ability to submerge themselves in Selz were correct, albeit tragically temporarily. 
 Reconstructing precisely how Pachschwöll and his subordinates discovered these 
families in Selz is particularly difficult not because of the absence of postwar testimony, but 
rather because of the ubiquity of likely exculpatory statements that suspected perpetrators 
gave to the West German police.  Pachschwöll,405 F.,406 and Alexander Fetsch,407 the SS-
appointed ethnic German mayor of Selz, all provided differing accounts that ranged from 
absurd denials of any wrongdoing, to blaming anonymous and perhaps phantom SS officers, 
to fingering one another.  With the aid of an October 1944 report prepared for the Soviet 
Extraordinary State Commission and postwar statements given by other local residents, 
however, a partial picture emerges.408  During the winter of 1941-42, both families succeeded 
in hiding among the local ethnic German population.  Deibert, whom some former residents 
remembered fondly as a featured performer at dances held in the town, apparently hid his 
children in plain sight.409  Although other residents were aware that both the Thielman and 
Deibert families had members with Jewish ancestry, no one in Selz denounced them to 
Pachschwöll or his subordinates, despite the fact that, by January 1942, no one in Transnistria 
                                                 
405 An Austrian citizen, and apparently unconcerned with appearances, Pachschwöll hid from West 
German authorities first in Austria and then in North Africa.  Although never interviewed by West German 
investigators about the killing of these two families, in October 1971, Pachschwöll sent a letter to the German 
Embassy in Morocco.  In it, he objected that the investigation was portraying the SS in an unfairly negative 
light.  Brief von N. P. an die Deutschen Botschaft in Marokko / Betr.: Meine Tätigkeit während des Krieges in 
den Gebieten Ost- und Südost-Europas, October 29, 1971, Staatsarchiv Münster, Nr. 2787, 61. 
406 F. provided a detailed and likely phony description of handing the ―mixed race‖ children over to 
two anonymous SS officers, thereby conveniently distancing himself from their murder.  Aussage von J. F., July 
19, 1962, Staatsarchiv Münster, Nr. 2671, 81-82. 
407 Fetsch also gave descriptions of the families‘ murders to the West German police and equally 
conveniently pointed responsibility directly at Pachschwöll and Fischer.  Aussage von A. F., February 23, 1962, 
BAL, B162/2291, 66-67.  Aussage von A. F., August 6, 1962, BAL, B162/2302, 70-71. 
408 Akt No. 40, October 17, 1944, RG-22.002M, Reel 6, Fond 7021, Opis 69, Delo 75, 62. 
409 Aussage von D. P., April 26, 1967, BAL, B162/2307, 524. 
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could have remained ignorant of the SS‘s complicity in the murder of Jewish deportees.  This 
conspiracy of silence ended abruptly in April 1942, not because of an end to the community‘s 
tacit agreement to shelter the families, but rather because Deibert‘s wife escaped from her 
Romanian captors—whose brutal conditions she had endured for more than six months—and 
returned to her family in Selz.410  In a town of 3,000 residents, Bereichkommando XXIII‘s 
staff, some of whom had just arrived from Germany, might not have detected Mrs. Deibert‘s 
return were it not for the fact that recently Sonderkommando R had begun issuing permanent 
ethnic German identification cards (Volkstumsausweise) to area Volksdeutsche.411  A few 
months earlier, both the large-scale treks of ethnic German refugees back to their home 
villages from captured Soviet deportation transports and Sonderkommando R‘s mass murder 
campaign would have obscured a newcomer‘s arrival in the community.  By early April 
1942, however, the absence of the appropriate SS-issued identification invited close scrutiny 
from Sonderkommando R‘s personnel.  After determining Mrs. Deibert to be a Jew, 
Pachschwöll and F. arrested her at the family home a short distance from their command 
post, drove her a kilometer outside of the village, and shot her.412  Perhaps because Mrs. 
Deibert‘s appearance had increased the vigilance of Bereichkommando XXIII‘s staff, or 
                                                 
410 Zeugenschaftliche Vernehmung von D. R., n.d., BAL, B162/2290, 136.  Aussage von J. H., August 
6, 1962, BAL, B162/2302, 115. 
411 Establishing when Sonderkommando R distributed Volkstumsausweise is a difficult proposition, as 
it likely varied according to local circumstances.  A late December 1941 staff order from Hoffmeyer directed his 
subordinates to distribute identification cards by February 25, 1942.  Rundanweisung Nr. 11 / Betrifrt [sic] 
namentliche Erfassung und Reigstrierung aller Volksdeutschen in Transnistrien, December 28, 1941, BB, 
R59/66, 132.  Evidence from Bereichkommando XI in Rastatt, however, suggests that members of its 
Selbstschutz received Volkstumsausweise only at the beginning of April 1942.  See, for example, 
Einbürgerungsantrag Peter Heck, September 12, 1944, NARA, A3342-EWZ50-C57, 574. 
412 F. provided the most vivid account of the arrest, at the conclusion of which he conveniently and 
implausibly claimed that he handed her over to another SS officer.  Aussage von J. F., July 19, 1962, 
Staatsarchiv Münster, Nr. 2671, 81-82.  Fetsch stated simply after the war that Mrs. Deibert disappeared.  
Aussage von A. F., August 6, 1962, BAL, B162/2302, 70.  Other residents confirm her disappearance.  See 
Aussage von H. L., December 21, 1961, BAL, B162/2291, 26.   
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perhaps because her brutal murder convinced a local informant that keeping the town‘s secret 
might now prove equally fatal, in short order Pachschwöll and his subordinates identified 
Kasper Thielman as a Jew and shot him as well.413 
 While Pachschwöll and F. killed both Jews immediately after their discovery, the two 
SS officers waited for more than a week before they murdered the families‘ ―mixed race‖ 
children.414  It seems that by mid-1942 Sonderkommando R‘s standing order instructed its 
staff to permit VoMi experts from Landau to inspect ―mixed race‖ children for their 
biological suitability to be included in the Volksgemeinschaft.  The experience of Wilhelm S., 
a local ethnic German truck driver employed by Sonderkommando R in Helenental, supports 
this theory.  After witnessing the murder of local Jews by Einsatzgruppe D and by 
Sonderkommando R, S. began to fear for the safety of his two, half-Jewish grandchildren.  
He presented the situation to a sympathetic member of the local Bereichkommando, who 
requested direction from his superiors.  The responsible Bereichkommandoführer and two SS 
officers from Landau appeared to evaluate the children and, as S. later described, ―because of 
my duties at the Bereichkommando in Helenental and the fact that my grandchildren did not 
have a Jewish appearance, nothing happened to them.‖415  Although speculative, it is possible 
that the two mid-ranking SS officers, whom F. referenced in his postwar testimony and 
blamed for Mrs. Deibert‘s disappearance, appeared in Selz to perform precisely the same 
                                                 
413 Zeugenschaftliche Vernehmung von D. R., n.d., BAL, B162/2290, 137.  Other witnesses confirm 
T.‘s disappearance.  See Zeugenschaftliche Vernehmung von J. S., December 12, 1961, BAL, B162/2290, 142. 
414 According to F., the SS rounded up Deibert‘s children 8 to 10 days after Mrs. Deibert‘s arrest.  
Aussage von J. F., July 19, 1962, Staatsarchiv Münster, Nr. 2671, 81. 
415 Aussage von W. S., September 15, 1964, BAL, B162/2304, 304. 
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function that S. described in Helenental.416 
 Regardless of whether the children were in fact subjected to racial examination, a 
little more than a week after the murder of the parents Bereichkommando XXIII‘s staff 
moved against the youngsters.  Early one April morning, with the assistance of Mayor Fetsch 
and two local ethnic Germans, Franz Wald and Rafael Wilhelm, Pachschwöll and F. collected 
the children in their staff car.417  Under the alleged pretext of taking the children to an 
orphanage, the SS requested that Deibert hand over his son and daughter.418  Apparently 
without protest, Deibert dutifully bundled his children, eight-year-old Rafael and seven-year-
old Lena, against the morning cold and permitted the SS officers and their helpers to load the 
youths into the staff car.419  When the party arrived at the Thielman residence with the same 
request, Martha Thielman insisted on accompanying her children.420  The SS obliged her and 
packed the woman and her children, Peter, Rosa, Wendelin, and Maria, into their vehicle.421  
Josef S., a fellow Selz resident, later described the scene: ―the mother of the children did not 
                                                 
416 Aussage von J. F., July 19, 1962, Staatsarchiv Münster, Nr. 2671, 81. 
417 Akt No. 40, October 17, 1944, RG-22.002M, Reel 6, Fond 7021, Opis 69, Delo 75, 62. 
418 Fetsch‘s testimony suggests that an SS request to place the children in an orphanage was the 
subterfuge that the SS used to convince Deibert to separate from his children.  Aussage von A. F., February 23, 
1962, BAL, B162/2291, 66.  Aussage von A. F., August 6, 1962, BAL, B162/2302, 71. 
419 Akt No. 40, October 17, 1944, RG-22.002M, Reel 6, Fond 7021, Opis 69, Delo 75, 62.  A former 
local resident confirmed the approximate ages of Deibert‘s children.  Zeugenschaftliche Vernehmung von D. R., 
n.d., BAL, B162/2290, 134. 
420 It is impossible to establish with certainty that the murder of both families‘ children occurred at the 
same time.  Local residents of Selz merely stated after the war that both families‘ children disappeared at 
roughly the same time in 1942.  Zeugenschaftliche Vernehmung von D. R., n.d. BAL, B162/2290, 137.  
Particularly if representatives from Landau examined both sets of children simultaneously, it seems likely that 
the Deibert children and the surviving members of the Thielman family were arrested during the same 
operation.  Evidence from the Soviet Extraordinary State Commission supports the conclusion that all of the 
victims were murdered on the same day.  Akt No. 40, October 17, 1944, RG-22.002M, Reel 6, Fond 7021, Opis 
69, Delo 75, 62. 
421 Ibid. 
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want to live without them.  I saw at a distance of several hundred meters how the children 
and the women were brought forward.  The woman was holding a little one in her arms.‖422  
As the SS drove them out of town, Fetsch calmed the children by handing out candy.423  
Upon arriving at the sand dunes between Selz and the neighboring town of Strasburg, the SS, 
perhaps aided by their local helpers, gunned down the entire party.424  Upon returning to 
town, Pachschwöll banned local residents from burying the bodies in the local cemetery.425  
Remarkably, sometime later, Pachschwöll requested that Deibert reprise his role as the town 
choral director and he once again entertained the community with his music.426 
 Both Einsatzgruppe D and Sonderkommando R‘s attempts to murder Jews and 
Mischlinge in Transnistria‘s Volksdeutsche communities underscore the important role that 
local ethnic Germans played in both lubricating and sabotaging the ―machinery of 
destruction‖ at the local level.  Without the unqualified support of the local community, the 
Nazi regime‘s efforts to murder every last Jew remained a difficult, if not impossible task.  
When asked to identify their Jewish neighbors, area Volksdeutsche initially kept the identities 
of at least some local residents of Jewish ancestry hidden from both units.  During the 
summer of 1941, local ethnic Germans had fingered most area Jews to Einsatzgruppe D 
during its sweep through the region.  Nevertheless, these same Volksdeutsche informers 
failed to denounce a handful of them to the SS.  Why local ethnic Germans decided to expose 
                                                 
422 Zeugenschaftliche Vernehmung von J. S., December 12, 1961, BAL, B162/2290, 142. 
423 Akt No. 40, October 17, 1944, RG-22.002M, Reel 6, Fond 7021, Opis 69, Delo 75, 62. 
424 Zeugenschaftliche Vernehmung von D. R., n.d., BAL, B162/2290, 137.  Curiously, while the 
Extraordinary State Commission supports this postwar testimony, it does not list Martha Thielman as one of the 
victims.  Akt No. 40, October 17, 1944, RG-22.002M, Reel 6, Fond 7021, Opis 69, Delo 75, 62. 
425 Zeugenschaftliche Vernehmung von J. S., December 12, 1961, BAL, B162/2290, 137. 
426 Aussage von J. H., August 6, 1962, BAL, B162/2302, 115. 
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some Jews and Mischlinge to the SS and sheltered others is largely speculative.  Anecdotally, 
however, ethnic Germans aided Jews and members of ―mixed race‖ families, whom they 
regarded as integrated members of the local community.  In doing so, Transnistria‘s 
Volksdeutsche behaved no differently than Reich Germans would have had the Nazi regime 
attempted to deport and murder Jewish spouses and offspring of ―mixed marriages.‖  
Although Transnistria‘s Volksdeutsche were ready partners in German efforts to murder 
many of their Jewish and ―mixed race‖ neighbors, they remained reluctant to assist German 
authorities in hunting down the Nazi regime‘s final racial enemies within their midst.   
 Despite ongoing local Volksdeutsche support for a small fraction of their Jewish and 
―mixed race‖ neighbors during the first nine months of the occupation, Einsatzgruppe D and 
Sonderkommando R perceived ethnic German enthusiasm for murdering Jews very 
differently.  Area ethnic Germans had responded to Einsatzgruppe D‘s entreaties for 
assistance with scores of denunciations, satisfying the unit‘s members that many local 
Volksdeutsche were willing partners in the Nazi project—so much so that they recruited local 
interpreters from the region‘s ethnic German communities.  For Sonderkommando R, 
however, the repeated discovery of hidden local Jews and members of ―mixed race‖ families 
cast serious doubt as to the willingness of local ethnic Germans to participate in the Nazi 
project.  The unit‘s staff realized that the continued survival of these targeted minorities 
would have been impossible without the concrete assistance of a few and a tacit support of 
virtually all local Volksdeutsche.  Moreover, Sonderkommando R‘s winter 1941-42 mass 
shooting operation (to be discussed in chapters seven and eight) had illustrated to local 
Volksdeutsche that the SS expected them to murder Jews if called upon to do so.  That 
Sonderkommando R‘s staff in rural Transnistria continued to find Jews and members of 
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―mixed race‖ families well into 1942 suggested to the unit‘s midlevel leaders that many local 
ethnic Germans remained opposed—however selective in reality—to at least this key 
component of the National Socialist agenda. 
 Sonderkommando R‘s discovery that some residents of Jewish ancestry had survived 
in Transnistria‘s Volksdeutsche communities with local ethnic German assistance merely 
contributed to existing concerns within the unit about the viability of the VoMi‘s efforts in 
Transnistria.  From the unit‘s first deployment to southern Ukraine, it was apparent to at least 
the veterans of earlier Volksdeutsche resettlement campaigns in Eastern Europe that ethnic 
Germans in the pre-1939 boundaries of the Soviet Union compared unfavorably to the 
Germanophone minorities that they had encountered earlier in their service.  Even the unit‘s 
senior leadership acknowledged repeatedly that the level of economic development in rural 
Ukraine and the comparatively weak linguistic, cultural, and political ties that the Black Sea 
Germans had maintained with the Reich historically would present unique obstacles to the 
unit‘s mission.427  While it is virtually certain that Sonderkommando R‘s rank and file on 
average thought even less of local Volksdeutsche, it is difficult to gauge this perception.  As 
the ―agents of Germanization‖ in Transnistria, Sonderkommando R‘s staff rarely if ever 
articulated their low regard for the local residents, whom it was their job to succor, in official 
records.428 Likewise, in their postwar statements to the West German police, 
Sonderkommando R‘s former personnel did not articulate these sentiments, as they would 
                                                 
427 See, for example, Rundanweisung Nr. 11 / Betrifrt [sic] namentliche Erfassung und Registrierung 
aller Volksdeutschen in Transnistrien, December 28, 1941, BB, R 59/66, 132. 
428 For Sonderkommando R‘s staff to have articulated their dissatisfaction with the quality of the Black 
Sea Germans as a Volksgruppe risked divulging these reservations to other elements within the Nazi regime, 
which, in contrast to the SS, opposed the VoMi‘s efforts in Ukraine.  Schmaltz and Sinner, ―The Nazi 
Ethnographic Research of Georg Leibbrandt and Karl Stumpp in Ukraine, and Its North American Legacy,‖ 47. 
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have been out of step with the portrayal of their task in the context of West German judicial 
investigations during the 1960s and 1970s as an aid or rescue mission.429  If, however, in its 
attempt to put a positive spin on the unit‘s mission, Sonderkommando R‘s leadership had to 
acknowledge the potential unsuitability of local Volksdeutsche, then it seems implausible that 
their subordinates would have thought much better of area ethnic Germans.  An already 
suspect group of Volksdeutsche in the eyes of their new German masters, the Black Sea 
Germans demonstrated what the SS regarded as an alarming lack of devotion to National 
Socialism.  For Sonderkommando R‘s staff, racial and political reservations about the 
region‘s Volksdeutsche became mutually reinforcing. 
 The realization that local Volksdeutsche had hamstrung repeated German efforts to 
kill a handful of Jews as well as the offspring of mixed marriages in the region‘s ethnic 
German settlements, however, did not simply reinforce Sonderkommando R‘s negative 
perceptions of the Black Sea Germans—it suggested that the unit had a real problem on its 
hands.  If, even after Sonderkommando R had called upon area Volksdeutsche to assist in the 
mass murder of Jews, many local ethnic Germans continued to aid their Jewish and ―mixed 
race‖ neighbors, then what else might they be hiding?  In this atmosphere of growing 
suspicion, Sonderkommando R‘s staff began to regard any ethnic German recalcitrance or 
misbehavior as a possible concerted opposition to the Nazi project.  Their solution was to nip 
this perceived (and likely imaged) Volksdeutsche resistance in the bud with brutal and 
immediate consequences. 
                                                 
429  A  number of the unit‘s former officers depicted it as a type of aid mission.  See, for example, 
Aussage von K. S., October 30, 1963, Staatsarchiv Münster, Nr. 2690, 75. 
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Policing Transnistria’s Volksdeutsche 
 Initially, like its anti-Jewish measures, Sonderkommando R‘s efforts to purge 
Transnistria‘s Volksdeutsche communities of alleged ethnic German political opponents were 
simply a continuation of earlier German operations in the region.  Sonderkommando R‘s role 
in rooting out local Volksdeutsche ―communists‖ was, in fact, numerically comparatively 
insignificant.  Discontent with Soviet rule was sufficiently widespread that, during the 
summer of 1941, both the Wehrmacht and later Einsatzgruppe D had no difficulty finding 
local informants, who frequently sought out German authorities.  On the basis of these initial 
denunciations, the German military and Einsatzgruppe D had already shot many of the worst 
Volksdeutsche ―offenders‖ before Sonderkommando R arrived on station in Transnistria.  
Sonderkommando R‘s preliminary role was thus again to complete earlier German sweeps of 
the region. 
 What began as a simple ―mopping up‖ operation to kill suspected local Volksdeutsche 
―communists,‖ whose presence earlier German forces had not detected, escalated rapidly into 
an effort to locate, detain, and execute ethnic Germans ―communist‖ fugitives, whose 
neighbors implicated them in prewar Soviet repression.430  Sonderkommando R‘s efforts to 
arrest Friedrich M., the former chairman of the village soviet in Neudorf, a Volksdeutsche 
settlement of roughly 2,400 residents some 60 kilometers northwest of Odessa, underscores 
the unit‘s rapidly evolving role.431  Local Volksdeutsche held M. accountable for 
expropriating his neighbors, whom Soviet authorities had identified as ―kulaks.‖432  
                                                 
430 See, for example, Sonderkommando R‘s arrest of Volksdeutsche ―communists‖ in Hoffnungsthal.  
Aussage von H. A., November 22, 1962, BAL, B162/2301, 160-161. 
431 Vernehmungsniederschrift von J. K., July 17, 1962, BAL, B162/2296, 55. 
432 Aussage von A. S., April 23, 1965, BAL, B162/2305, 71.   
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According to some sources, during the course of collectivization, M. routinely raped the 
wives of farmers whose property he had confiscated.  For the latter crime, Soviet authorities 
allegedly had sentenced M. to seven years in prison. 433  After his release shortly before the 
war‘s beginning, M. relocated to Pervomaisk, either because Soviet authorities had not 
permitted him to return to Neudorf due to his criminal record or because he feared local 
retribution.434  In Pervomaisk, however, Karolina H., one of M. former victims who had also 
since moved to the city, recognized him.  Upon returning to Neudorf, H. denounced M. to the 
town‘s Bereichkommandoführer, SS-Untersturmführer Matthäus Köhli. 435  At Köhli‘s 
request, German authorities in Pervomaisk arrested M. and returned him to 
Bereichkommando XXIV in Neudorf, where he was made to face his accusers.436  During his 
lengthy incarceration in the Bereichkommando‘s office, Köhli ordered M. to perform hard 
labor under the guard of the local militia.  Köhli also permitted M.‘s detractors to beat him 
savagely, leaving him with seven broken ribs.437  After the pummeling, on Köhli‘s orders, 
members of the area‘s Selbstschutz drove M. to a vegetable garden a half kilometer from 
Neudorf, forced him to dig his own grave, and shot him.  Köhli refused M.‘s wife‘s request 
                                                 
433 It is difficult to determine whether or not the charge of rape has any merit.  Although it is 
conceivable, it may also have been a postwar fabrication designed to justify M.‘s execution.  Aussage von J. R., 
May 24, 1965, BAL, B162/2305, 152.  Interestingly, after the war, Anna D. made similar accusations against the 
Soviet-era mayor of Worms, Georg W.  Aussage von A. D., August 13, 1964, BAL, B162/2304, 218. 
434 M.‘s nephew, August S., confirmed that he had moved to Pervomaisk prior to the war.  Aussage von 
A. S., April 23, 1965, BAL, B162/2305, 71.   
435 Aussage von J. R., May 24, 1965, BAL, B162/2305, 152. 
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Pervomaisk.  Aussage von A. S., April 23, 1965, BAL, B162/2305, 71.  Aussage von J. R., May 24, 1965, BAL, 
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that she be permitted to move her husband‘s body to Neudorf‘s cemetery.438 
 Sonderkommando R‘s efforts to pursue Volksdeutsche ―communist‖ fugitives, such as 
M., constituted an entree for local SS commanders to launch increasingly repressive 
measures against area ethnic Germans, whose recently uncovered efforts to shelter some 
local Jews raised new questions about their political reliability.  Absent wartime 
documentation, it is difficult to reconstruct these initial measures in their entirety.  Based 
largely on postwar statements that former ethnic German residents from Transnistria gave to 
West German investigators, however, three major features of Sonderkommando R‘s efforts to 
police the region‘s Volksdeutsche population become apparent.  First, the unit‘s preliminary 
efforts at policing area ethnic Germans were fly-by-night initiatives.  Even if authorization 
for these measures came from Sonderkommando R‘s commanders—a possibility that 
surviving fragmentary records do not support—Hoffmeyer and Siebert had little opportunity 
to shape them in the remote corners of Transnistria, where they had posted their subordinates.  
As the SS officers responsible for Volksdeutsche affairs in the area, Bereichkommandoführer 
were the ultimate arbiters of objectionable Volksdeutsche behavior and meted out 
punishments.  For more minor Volksdeutsche offenses, Bereichkommandoführer delegated 
disciplinary responsibilities to their German subordinates and, in some instances, to local SS-
appointed Volksdeutsche officials.439  The low number of Sonderkommando R personnel and 
their local helpers relative to Transnistria‘s ethnic German population exacerbated the 
capriciousness and idiosyncrasy of SS power, which apparently had no statutory basis to 
begin with.  The towns in which Sonderkommando R had based its Bereichkommandos bore 
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the brunt of the unit‘s policing efforts because they were among the few locales where 
German authorities maintained a permanent presence.  In the region‘s more remote 
Volksdeutsche villages and hamlets, which Sonderkommando R‘s German staff typically 
visited on periodic inspection tours, Bereichkommandoführer and their subordinates often 
decided to punish Volksdeutsche ―on the spot,‖ typically with little understanding of local 
realities.440  Even in a penal system defined by the whims of local SS officers, enforcement 
was uneven. 
 Second, although decisions about what constituted a Volksdeutsche crime were 
initially the purview of individual Bereichkommandoführer, whose internal records generally 
did not survive the war, it is apparent that Sonderkommando R‘s midlevel officers cracked 
down on a wide variety of alleged ethnic German offences.  Preeminent among these 
transgressions was a reluctance to embrace visibly the new Nazi order.  In Selz, for example, 
Pachschwöll was notorious for punishing local ethnic Germans who failed to greet the SS‘s 
arrival with a stiff-armed Hitler salute (Hitlergruß).441  Similarly, ethnic Germans from 
Landau later complained about being beaten when they failed to address their SS superiors 
with their appropriate rank.442  In other instances, the SS punished ethnic Germans for failing 
to meet its labor requisitions for Sonderkommando R‘s infrastructure improvement projects.  
When Sedor S., an ethnic German wagon driver from Rastatt, arrived at a road construction 
site later than expected, Rudolf Hartung, the local Bereichkommandoführer, ordered his 
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subordinates to beat him.443  Sonderkommando R also policed social mores within their 
Volksdeutsche bailiwicks.  In spring 1942, for example, SS-Untersturmführer Bernhard 
Streit, the local Bereichkommandoführer based in Worms, punished a married ethnic German 
woman and her lover for adultery by ordering the pair to perform the grisly task of collecting 
the corpses of victims from the previous winter‘s mass shooting campaign that the melting 
snow had revealed.444  Given the dubious level of commitment of many of Sonderkommando 
R‘s rank-and-file personnel to the Nazi regime and the unit‘s disturbing level of promiscuity 
in the field, it is ironic that Hoffmeyer‘s subordinates disciplined Transnistria‘s 
Volksdeutsche for failings that the unit‘s staff had in spades. 
 The final feature of Sonderkommando R‘s early efforts to police Transnistria‘s 
Volksdeutsche was its brutality.  As a number of the examples above illustrate, beatings were 
a favorite form of SS punishment for Volksdeutsche infractions.  Both the ubiquity and 
violence of these attacks shocked even ideologically committed Germans.  Anna R., a DRK 
nurse who ultimately married her commanding officer, SS-Untersturmführer von Fircks, later 
recounted treating an ethnic German woman in Worms, whom the SS accused of having 
stolen from the collective farm.  The woman had been virtually ―lynched‖ (gelyncht) by the 
SS and its local helpers and her backside was so bloodied that she was unable to sit down.445  
Beatings, even severe ones, were, however, not the only punishments that the SS handed out.  
For offenses that local SS officers considered more serious, Sonderkommando R‘s staff 
detained ethnic German offenders in Bereichkommando offices in hastily constructed 
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holding cells in doubtlessly appalling conditions.446  What constituted a major crime versus a 
minor infraction depended almost exclusively on the whims of local 
Bereichkommandoführer.  Whereas many SS officers corporally punished Volksdeutsche 
whom they suspected of theft, in other cases local Bereichkommandoführer ordered the 
offenders‘ execution.447  In rural Transnistria, local SS officers had ethnic Germans shot for 
extraordinarily petty offenses.  The fall 1942 execution of Linus W., an ethnic German from 
the twenty-one-farm hamlet of Hörnersfeld near Lichtenfeld, exemplifies this brutality.448  
W., a fur trader and an apparent alcoholic, had a long history of bartering his products for 
moonshine with his predominantly ethnically Russian clientele.  One day, when W. had 
insufficient pelts to trade for vodka, he offered his Volkstumsausweis as collateral for the 
alcohol.  While the thriving black market trade in ethnic German identity papers in 
Transnistria initially made this an attractive proposition for the Russian distiller, the seller 
soon found document dealing to be more hazardous than bootlegging and turned W.‘s 
Volkstumsausweis over to Liebl, Lichtenfeld‘s Bereichkommandoführer.  As this was the 
latest in a long line of complaints about W.‘s behavior, Liebl judged him to have ―disgraced 
Germandom‖ (das Deutschtum blamiert).  On Liebl‘s orders, his local ethnic German 
subordinates shot W. next to Lichtenfeld‘s cemetery the following day.449  Concerned that 
local village youngsters might pick on W.‘s seven children for their father‘s foolishness, 
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Liebl asked a neighbor to prevent unnecessary bullying.450  As W.‘s execution demonstrates, 
for Transnistria‘s Volksdeutsche, drunkenness and stupidity could prove deadly. 
The Escalation of Sonderkommando R’s Violence in Transnistria 
 Lack of oversight from the unit‘s headquarters in Landau combined with the 
mounting disdain that many of Sonderkommando R‘s staff felt toward local ethnic Germans 
created a perfect environment in which the unit‘s members could vent their frustrations on 
local residents.  In contrast to the litany of staff orders that Hoffmeyer and his deputies issued 
in early 1943, which emphasized more benign treatment for Volksdeutsche prisoners, 
Sonderkommando R‘s surviving staff orders remained silent on the issue throughout the 
entirety of 1942.  Many Bereichkommandoführer likely interpreted the lack of criticism as 
tacit authorization from their superiors to ramp up violence against whichever ethnic German 
ran afoul of Sonderkommando R‘s personnel.  As Christine F., a former resident of 
Güldendorf, summed up the situation: the town‘s Bereichkommandoführer ―was very 
unpopular because he never hesitated to beat us ethnic Germans when things did not go as he 
wanted.‖451 
 During 1942, punishing Volksdeutsche offenders became a pretext for members of 
Hoffmeyer‘s command to brutalize local ethnic Germans.  Frequently, mere and perhaps 
fabricated suspicion was sufficient to merit a sadistic assault.  The severe beating and 
attempted rape of Rebecca B., a domestic servant for Sonderkommando R in Worms, by a 
local SS NCO named B. illustrates the level of violence to which these attacks rose.452  
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Rebecca B.‘s SS employer accused her of having stolen five Reichmarks from his quarters 
and, on his orders, members of the Worms Selbstschutz arrested the cleaning woman.  At B.‘s 
behest, the Selbstschutz paraded Rebecca B. through the town on a rope and forced her to 
admit her guilt publicly.  B. then incarcerated Rebecca B. in a cell in the basement of the 
town‘s former hospice care facility, which contained three other women—all suspected Jews 
whom B. and his colleagues had recently arrested.453  The next morning, B. returned to the 
cell, ordered the women to strip naked, and paraded them in a circle through the town‘s main 
square.  B. then pulled Rebecca B. into a nearby ditch, with the apparent aim of sexually 
assaulting her.  When Rebecca B. attempted to fight off her attacker, B. pulled her out of the 
ditch by the hair and beat her ―black and blue‖ with a rubber truncheon.454  Only the 
intervention of Rebecca B.‘s aunt and other local residents, who heard her screams, saved the 
woman from further injury.455  For local residents, this attack rekindled unpleasant memories 
of prewar violence at the hands of Soviet authorities.456 
 While B.‘s brutality precipitated a speedy reply from his superiors in Landau, who 
sacked him, this assault was by no means isolated.457  Sonderkommando R‘s personnel 
frequently attacked area ethnic Germans, when they objected too vociferously to the unit‘s 
policies concerning personal property.  For example, when Peter B., an ethnic German 
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married to area Ukrainian woman, hesitated to surrender his horse to the local mayor, an SS 
enlisted man pistol whipped him so severely that he was bedridden for a month in the Landau 
hospital.  His facial scars from the beating were still visible more than twenty years later to 
the West German policemen who interviewed him.458  Similarly, in Rastatt, Hartung 
repeatedly imprisoned and ultimately ordered one of his subordinates to rough up Franz K., 
who had appealed to Hartung‘s superiors, when the latter had refused to remove squatters 
from K.‘s house.459  Excessive alcohol consumption by Sonderkommando R‘s staff members 
fueled many of these beatings.  SS-Hauptsturmführer Paul Eisenreich based in Mannheim, 
for example, had a nasty habit of beating Volksdeutsche indiscriminately while intoxicated.460  
The reasons for other beatings were frequently even more idiosyncratic.  Adam R., an ethnic 
German from Rastatt, later noted that Hartung beat him for doing a sloppy job of grooming 
his horse.461  Johann D., a resident of Speyer, perhaps best captured how many area 
Volksdeutsche reacted to Sonderkommando R‘s unrestrained brutality during 1942: ―we 
suffered almost more than during Soviet times because we were never beaten by the 
Russians.‖462  
Sonderkommando R’s Efforts to Rein in Local SS Violence 
 Although silent through much of 1942, beginning in early 1943, Sonderkommando 
R‘s leaders energetically began to crack down on the abuse of local Volksdeutsche by the 
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unit‘s personnel.  This change in policy coincided with the dismissal of Hoffmeyer‘s deputy 
in Transnistria and a reduction of Bereichkommandos in the region.  Siebert, Hoffmeyer‘s 
subordinate and Sonderkommando R‘s de facto commanding officer in Transnistria, began 
his deployment in Ukraine as one of the VoMi‘s most able field officers.  He had served as 
Hoffmeyer‘s deputy in all of the VoMi‘s ethnic German ―resettlement‖ operations in Eastern 
Europe during 1939 and 1940.  As an SD member, his participation in these missions likely 
assuaged the VoMi‘s leadership that Hoffmeyer, a then untested commander with less than 
sterling Nazi credentials, had solid surveillance.  While Siebert‘s experience and service 
history under Hoffmeyer was undoubtedly why Hoffmeyer selected him to command 
Sonderkommando R‘s personnel in Transnistria, his performance in southern Ukraine was 
apparently less than stellar.  That he had done little to protect local ethnic Germans from the 
brutality of his Bereichkommandoführer was symptomatic of his detached leadership style, 
which merely exacerbated the effects of Hoffmeyer‘s itinerant aloofness.  Siebert‘s passion 
for hunting apparently distracted him from his duties and made him a lackadaisical 
supervisor.463  Siebert‘s laissez-faire managerial ethos endeared him to his subordinates, one 
of whom described him as ―a very calm and matter-of-fact man.‖464  In Landau, Siebert 
interacted casually with his command‘s SS and non-SS members.  As Thorwald R., the 
number two NSKK man assigned to Sonderkommando R in Transnistria, later recounted: 
―Siebert was actually one of the very few [SS officers], who did not fit in with the other 
higher SS leaders.  He was not as exclusive as the others, who regarded themselves as a 
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special master race.‖465  None of these attributes, however, made for effective leadership.  In 
March 1943, Hoffmeyer reassigned Siebert to command Sonderkommando R‘s 
Einsatzgruppe Shitomir.466  For old time‘s sake, Hoffmeyer wrote Siebert an overly generous 
evaluation two months later, complementing him most disingenuously as ―a particularly 
active SS leader.‖467  
 Following Siebert‘s departure, as one of Sonderkommando R‘s former radio operators 
described, ―a very different wind blew in Landau.‖468  SS-Sturmbannführer Erwin Müller, the 
forty-year-old former bicycle shop owner whom Hoffmeyer selected to replace Siebert, 
brought a far more engaged and aggressive leadership style to Sonderkommando R in 
Transnistria.469  In contrast to Siebert, whose staff liked his easy going manner, Müller‘s 
subordinates described him as ―an outspoken, vulgar character‖ (ein ausgesprochener 
Landsknechtstyp).470  Müller‘s background was eerily similar to Siebert‘s.  Like Siebert, 
Müller had received a SS commission in the early 1930s and served as an SD officer before 
his supervisors seconded him to the VoMi in 1939.471  As a member of Hoffmeyer‘s staff, 
Müller had also participated in all of the organization‘s major Eastern European 
Volksdeutsche ―resettlement‖ operations during 1939 and 1940.472  With more than a year of 
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previous service in the Reichkommissariat Ukraine as the Bereichkommandoführer of 
Nikopol, Müller provided Sonderkommando R in Transnistria with much-needed fresh 
leadership. 
 Müller began his tenure as Sonderkommando R‘s chief in Transnistria by cleaning 
house after a year and half of Siebert‘s apparent mismanagement.  Müller lambasted his 
subordinates for becoming complacent in their assignments.  Within weeks of taking up his 
new post, Müller warned his new subordinates that, within the context of total war, it was 
possible that up to two-thirds of the unit‘s staff would be removed from their cushy roles as 
occupation administrators and sent to the front.473  Müller denounced the evils of personal 
enrichment while stationed in Ukraine: ―the longer that one is tied to a particular locale, the 
more one acquires.  To speak about private property is in most cases nonsense (Quatsch).  It 
is comradely to live ‗luxuriously,‘ while a recently transferred comrade has only the bare 
necessities.‖474  Müller likewise signaled to his subordinates that he was aware that 
Sonderkommando R personnel had embezzled some of the unit‘s funds and threatened to 
punish the culprits.475  Financial improprieties were not Müller‘s only concerns.  He further 
ordered all Sonderkommando R members to report instances of venereal disease to him in 
Landau.476 
 Müller also launched a dramatic reorganization of Transnistria‘s Bereichkommandos.  
In June 1943, Müller cut the number of Bereichkommandos in Transnistria from eighteen to 
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twelve.477  This measure eliminated Bereichkommandos in Bischofsfeld, Halberstadt, 
Janovski, Lichtenfeld, Mannheim, and Marianburg, and expanded the geographical 
boundaries of the remaining subunits to compensate.  In part, this move made good Müller‘s 
earlier warnings that the demands of total war would necessitate freeing up personnel for 
combat service.478  It also appears to have been a convenient opportunity for Müller to sack 
corrupt, inefficient, and incompetent mid-level leaders.  Although the evidence is 
circumstantial, it appears that Müller sent problem Bereichkommandoführer packing at 
precisely the time that he eliminated their Bereichkommandos from Sonderkommando R‘s 
rolls.  Eisenreich‘s unceremonious dismissal, for example, coincided with Müller‘s decision 
to close down the Bereichkommando in Mannheim.479  Eisenreich, originally an SS non-
commissioned officer assigned to Sonderkommando R, had received both his command and 
his commission as an SS-Hauptsturmführer only on March 1, 1943, a few days shy of his 
fiftieth birthday.480  Eisenreich‘s perpetual intoxication, incompetence, and indiscrete 
extramarital liaison with a DRK nurse were sufficiently spectacular, even by 
Sonderkommando R‘s unarguably low standards, that his own staff requested his removal 
after only six weeks.481  When Müller summoned him to a scheduled 
Bereichkommandoführer conference in Odessa to account for himself, Eisenreich 
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inexplicably appeared a day late.482  Müller relieved Eisenreich in April 1943, and transferred 
him back to Stahnsdorf.483  Eisenreich‘s command disappeared a few weeks later.  Back in 
Germany, Eisenreich‘s superiors bounced him from one dead-end posting to another until 
March 1944, when the Reichskriminalpolizeiamt (Reich Criminal Police Office) in 
Auschwitz arrested him for accepting bribes and for theft of state property.  The SS stripped 
Eisenreich of his commission the following month.484  Müller was, no doubt, happy to use 
the reshuffling of Bereichkommandos as an excuse to rid himself of such troublesome 
subordinates. 
 A primary goal of these shake ups was to stem Sonderkommando R‘s rampant 
brutality against local Volksdeutsche.  Müller took two unimaginative, yet effective steps.  
First, he did something that his predecessor apparently never attempted—he simply ordered 
his subordinates to stop abusing area Volksdeutsche.  On March 21, 1943, Müller circulated a 
stern warning to Sonderkommando R in Transnistria, admonishing his staff that area 
Volksdeutsche were not be mistreated.  Müller emphasized that ―the education and 
maintenance of the ethnic Germans is a duty that necessitates the fullest attention of the 
responsible SS officers and NCOs.‖485  Müller reminded his men that ―we will have won no 
man over to us or the ideas of our Führer with poor and comradely treatment.‖486 He 
underscored his order the following August by promising dire consequences for any members 
of his command who continued to mistreat local ethnic Germans: ―starting today every 
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beating that comes to Oberführer [Hoffmeyer‘s] attention will be punished harshly.‖487 
Müller threatened that the responsible staff member would have to travel to Kiev to face 
Hoffmeyer‘s wrath personally.488 
  Second, recognizing that the unrestrained authority of his subordinates contributed to 
the wanton brutalization of the region‘s Volksdeutsche, Müller created an ethnic German 
concentration camp under his control to centralize responsibility for disciplining 
Volksdeutsche offenders.  This initiative grew out of earlier efforts by Sonderkommando R‘s 
leaders to halt its Bereichkommandoführer from summarily executing Volksdeutsche in rural 
Transnistria.489  Within less than a month of taking up his command in Landau, Müller 
eroded the authority of the unit‘s mid and low-ranking members still further.  On April 3, 
1943, Müller ordered SS-Untersturmführer Walter Nadolny, the local 
Bereichkommandoführer based in Johannisfeld, to create a concentration camp capable of 
housing 100 Volksdeutsche inmates.490  Nadolny revamped a large, 80 by seven meter 
building, which prior to the war had served as a communal dormitory for local residents.491  
Volksdeutsche laborers constructed between eight and ten cells, each designed to house up to 
ten ethnic German prisoners.  The facility also contained a common kitchen and mess hall.492  
According to German Sonderkommando R personnel and local ethnic Germans, the unit 
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recycled construction materials to remodel the dormitory from the warehouse complex in 
Dalnik, where the Romanian military had burned tens of thousands of Jews to death a year 
and a half earlier.493  Nadolny completed this so-called Straferziehungslager (Penal 
Reeducation Camp) in a mere three weeks.494 The facility opened in late April 1943, when 
Müller ordered the transfer to Johannisfeld of all ethnic German prisoners held locally at 
Bereichkommandos throughout Transnistria.495  There, under the guard of the local 
Selbstschutz unit, Volksdeutsche inmates worked as agricultural laborers on the town‘s 
remaining collective farm until they had served out the sentences that Müller and his staff in 
Landau now handed down.496 
 Müller‘s efforts to rein in his subordinates and to standardize punishments for area 
ethnic Germans in mid-1943 merely centralized his staff‘s brutality.  Anecdotally, Müller‘s 
initiatives did reduce some of the indiscriminate violence to which Sonderkommando R‘s 
staff subjected area ethnic Germans.  That Müller had to reemphasize his earlier ban on 
beating local Volksdeutsche in August 1943 suggests that this form of brutality continued, but 
a precipitous decline in references to these assaults after mid-1943 in the postwar statements 
of former residents suggests that his policies had appreciable impact.  Beginning in 1943, 
however, both the severity of punishments that the unit meted out to Volksdeutsche and the 
prisoner population of the Johannisfeld concentration camp mushroomed.  Both phenomena 
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were directly or indirectly tied to German defeat at Stalingrad.  As German victory appeared 
increasingly doubtful, some local Volksdeutsche began to question the entire Nazi enterprise.  
Ethnic Germans, who unwisely did so publicly or whose neighbors denounced their private 
reservations about the Nazi regime to Sonderkommando R, found themselves imprisoned in 
Johannisfeld.497  Germany‘s declining military fortunes, moreover, appear to have led 
Sonderkommando R‘s staff to imbue perceived ethnic German recalcitrance with still greater 
political connotations and to ratchet up punishments accordingly.  During 1942, local 
authorities addressed common Volksdeutsche crimes, such as unauthorized butchering of 
livestock, illegal burning of garbage, or black marketeering.  Beginning in mid-1943, 
however, Sonderkommando R‘s staff began sentencing these comparatively petty ethnic 
German offenders to lengthy prison sentences in Johannisfeld.498  Ironically, while the 
Johannisfeld concentration camp helped to standardize punishments for ethnic German 
offenders, within the context of the Nazi regime‘s worsening military fortunes, it provided 
Sonderkommando R with an ideal way to ratchet up violence against an ethnic German 
population that was growing increasingly doubtful of the Third Reich‘s long-term prospects. 
 The creation of the Johannisfeld concentration camp also provided a key installation 
for Sonderkommando R to house the Red Army prisoners of war, upon whom the unit began 
to depend on for forced labor.  During the first six months of the occupation, 
Sonderkommando R had little apparent inclination to employ Red Army POWs as forced 
laborers.  In February 1942, for example, Bereichkommando XIV in Worms requested that 
                                                 
497 Aussage von A. F., November 27, 1964, BAL, B162/2303, 197.  Aussage von H. J., May 19, 1965, 
BAL, B162/2304, 63. 
498 Aussage von H. B., January 14, 1965, BAL, B162/2303, 298.  Aussage von A. F., May 22, 1965, 
BAL, B162/2305, 132. 
169 
 
the Romanian Prefect for Berezovka county arrange to collect a half dozen Red Army POWs, 
whom the Bereichkommando‘s staff had captured.499  By 1943, both demographic realities 
and the SS‘s insatiable appetite for manpower had changed this situation.  A series of Waffen-
SS conscription campaigns during 1942 and early 1943 had exacerbated the acute shortage of 
local ethnic German men, many of whom Soviet authorities had deported prior to the war.  
Both wartime and postwar documentation on Sonderkommando R‘s deployment of Red 
Army POWs as forced laborers is limited.  It is, however, evident that the unit expanded this 
program by housing these workers at the Johannisfeld concentration camp, where they 
worked side by side with ethnic Germans on the collective farm.500  Despite their differing 
status as prisoners, both Volksdeutsche ―convicts‖ and Red Army POWs shared the final 
episode of Sonderkommando R‘s brutality.  In March 1944, on the eve of the German 
evacuation from Transnistria, Sonderkommando R closed the Johannisfeld concentration 
camp.  The unit released minor ethnic German ―criminals‖ and permitted them to join 
evacuation transports bound for the Warthegau.  Ethnic Germans, whom the unit regarded as 
having committed more serious offenses, and the few surviving suspected Volksdeutsche 
―communists‖ remained in Johannisfeld along with Sonderkommando R‘s forced laborers.  
After the main evacuation transport departed the area, members of the local Selbstschutz 
unit, who had previously guarded the camp, gunned down the remaining inmates on SS 
orders.501  Müller‘s reforms, it seems, could channel, but not eliminate the unit‘s tendency to 
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use violence as a panacea to deal with allegedly problematic Volksdeutsche. 
Conclusion 
 Sonderkommando R‘s violent efforts to hunt down its racial and political enemies 
within rural Volksdeutsche communities constituted a fundamental tenet of the unit‘s 
Nazification program in Transnistria.  Initially, and undoubtedly ordered by the unit‘s senior 
leadership, Sonderkommando R continued Einsatzgruppe D‘s earlier campaign by targeting 
both Jews and members of ―mixed race‖ families.  The discovery that a number of Jews and 
Mischlinge had survived with the help or at least silent acquiescence of local ethnic Germans 
well into 1942 merely intensified the suspicion with which many of Sonderkommando R‘s 
midlevel leaders regarded local Volksdeutsche.  In an atmosphere of mounting SS distrust of 
area ethnic Germans, Sonderkommando R‘s midlevel leaders expanded ongoing attempts to 
capture and execute Volksdeutsche ―communists‖ into a brutal effort to stamp out all forms 
of perceived ethnic German misbehavior.  Whether or not the unit‘s senior leadership 
authorized these measures is unclear.  Nevertheless, the remoteness of Transnistria‘s rural 
Bereichkommandos combined with distinctly unenergetic oversight from the unit‘s 
commanders ensured that Sonderkommando R‘s midlevel leaders pursued these punitive 
measures with autonomy.  This latitude permitted some of Sonderkommando R‘s more 
sadistic members to brutalize area ethnic Germans indiscriminately and at least initially with 
impunity.  Belatedly Hoffmeyer responded to this senseless violence by bringing in fresh 
leadership to take charge of the situation.  To put an end to this brutality, Sonderkommando 
R‘s new leaders in Transnistria reined in ineffective Bereichkommandoführer and centralized 
responsibility for punishing ethnic Germans by forming a rudimentary concentration camp. 
 Sonderkommando R‘s efforts to root out its racial and often perceived political 
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enemies exceeded attempts that the Nazi regime pursued in Germany in proximity, visibility, 
and unfettered scope.  In the Reich, Nazi authorities labored to remove communists and other 
political opponents from daily life as well as to eradicate all traces of the country‘s Jews.  An 
elaborate, but far from omnipresent or omnipotent security apparatus continued to search for 
internal enemies long after the Nazi regime had deported German Jews to be murdered in 
Eastern Europe and incarcerated obvious political adversaries.  While these precedents no 
doubt inspired Sonderkommando R‘s staff, the transparency of the Nazi regime‘s brutality 
was far greater for Transnistria‘s Volksdeutsche than it was for Reich Germans.  With the 
exception of the 1938 Reichskristallnacht pogrom, whose naked violence shocked many 
Germans, in Germany, Nazi authorities generally avoided targeting their enemies in plain 
sight.  In Transnistria‘s Volksdeutsche communities, by contrast, this brutality was not 
masked by the fig leaf of arrests, imprisonment, and at least theoretically secret killing 
programs, but rather played out before area ethnic Germans, with, at least initially, little 
concern for their reaction.  Local Volksdeutsche knew that the Nazi regime‘s brutality was 
directed not solely against Jews and non-Germans, but understood that they too could feel the 
―ripple effects‖ of this violence.  Alltag in Transnistria proved to be a hazardous one for 
many area ethnic Germans. 
 
  
 
CHAPTER IV: CHRISTIANS INTO NAZIS: SONDERKOMMANDO R’S 
KULTURKAMPF IN TRANSNISTRIA 
 When Theodor W., a former resident of Bischofsfeld in Transnistria, described the 
town‘s former Bereichkommandoführer, Harold Krause, to the West German police in 1962, 
he lodged a number of complaints against his former SS leader.502  W. specifically objected to 
the fact that Krause ―had let no one enter the Church, which as Catholics, was very painful.‖ 
Krause was, in W.‘s estimation, ―a brute with a bad reputation.‖503    Krause‘s refusal to open 
Bischofsfeld‘s Catholic Church was not the result of an SS officer‘s autonomous and 
overzealous actions, but reflected an important aspect of Sonderkommando R‘s religious 
policy in Transnistria‘s Volksdeutsche settlements.  This chapter reconstructs 
Sonderkommando R‘s Kulturkampf in Transnistria and situates it within the Nazi regime‘s 
ambivalent relationship with the Church. 
 The Third Reich remained schizophrenic about where the Church featured in the Nazi 
new order.  Certain radical elements within the Nazi regime (most notably Alfred Rosenberg 
and Martin Bormann) regarded organized Christianity as inimical to National Socialism and 
courted its destruction.  Other Nazi leaders responded to movements within the Church, 
which sought to incorporate and accommodate National Socialism, as a possible ally of the 
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regime.  At varying times, the Third Reich thus pursued policies in Germany that both 
supported and undercut elements within the Church.  Insofar as Nazi Germany maintained a 
unified Church policy, it was one of caution, partial accommodation, and procrastination.  At 
Hitler‘s insistence, the Nazi regime remained cautious of pursuing religious measures that the 
Catholic and Protestant faithful might regard as an affront to their religious sensibilities.  
After the beginning of the Second World War, this impetus to maintain social tranquility 
merely intensified.  Regardless of what policies the Nazi regime sought to pursue vis-à-vis 
the Church in Germany, Hitler made it clear that none of them should upset wartime German 
popular opinion.  
 As committed SS officers, Sonderkommando R‘s leaders regarded efforts to 
reestablish the Church in southern Ukraine‘s Volksdeutsche communities with the utmost 
suspicion.  Sonderkommando R perceived that the Church‘s reintroduction in Transnistria 
would pose particularly acute problems for its Nazification project for two primary reasons.  
First, in the absence of significant historical contact between Germany and the Black Sea 
Germans and after decades of Soviet rule, Sonderkommando R‘s Nazification project stood 
on particularly wobbly foundations.  Any competition, not least from an alternative ideology 
as powerful as Christianity, threatened to undermine its efforts in the region.  Second, the 
Black Sea Germans had, on average, a far greater affinity for the Church than did Germans 
living in the Reich.  An historically deeply religious people, the Black Sea Germans 
understood confession as a key ethnic marker that distinguished the region‘s predominantly 
Catholic and Lutheran ethnic Germans from the overwhelming Orthodox majority of the 
region‘s population.  Moreover, the Soviet regime‘s ever-expanding anti-religious measures 
before the war galvanized religious observance as a form of anti-Soviet expression for area 
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Volksdeutsche.  Sonderkommando R‘s mission thus required it to carry out its Nazification 
project not simply among an exceptionally isolated group of ethnic Germans, but rather 
among a Volksdeutsche population that had maintained an exceptional affinity for the 
Church. 
 Free from the concerns over German public opinion that moderated Church policy in 
Germany, Sonderkommando R responded to this perceived threat to its Nazification project 
by launching an unprecedented Kulturkampf against the Church‘s reintroduction in the 
region‘s Volksdeutsche settlements.  For fear of competition from the Church for the ―hearts 
and minds‖ of Transnistria‘s Volksdeutsche, initially the SS had no plans to reintroduce 
Christianity to the area‘s ethnic German communities.  When activist priests from the 
German Catholic Church in Romania did precisely that, the SS responded by attempting to 
suppress Catholicism in Transnistria.  Although only partially successful because of the 
intervention of the Romanian civil administration, which allied itself with the Catholic 
Church to antagonize the SS, Sonderkommando R‘s anti-Catholic campaign constituted a 
dramatic departure from earlier German efforts to support the Catholic Church in southern 
Ukraine.  Drawing on the experience of its stillborn attempt to prevent the reintroduction of 
Catholicism to Transnistria, Sonderkommando R labored to shape the Protestant renaissance 
in the region by partnering with the German Christian Movement (Glaubensbewegung 
“Deutsche Christen”).  Ironically, postwar evidence from Catholic and Protestant clergy who 
operated in the region suggests that the Church not only constituted little threat to 
Sonderkommando R‘s project, but also participated actively in the conspiracy of silence after 
the war that obfuscated the unit‘s crimes. 
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The Church in the Third Reich and the German-Occupied Soviet Union 
 Before recovering Sonderkommando R‘s religious policies in southern Ukraine, it is 
useful to explore briefly the orientations of both the Protestant and Catholic Churches to the 
Nazi regime in Germany and the Third Reich‘s stance on organized Christianity.  Relations 
between the Church and the Third Reich have been the subject of significant historical 
research since the 1960s.  Saul Friedländer, Ian Kershaw, and Michael Phayer, among other 
scholars, have probed the Vatican‘s diplomatic relations with Hitler‘s Germany and dissected 
the Catholic Church‘s response to the Nazi regime.504  Other historians, led by Doris Bergen, 
Robert Ericksen, and Susannah Heschel, have explored the Protestant Church‘s frequently 
ambivalent orientation toward the Third Reich and specifically its anti-Jewish policies.505  
Although this area of inquiry remains an innovative field of research, thanks to this 
pioneering scholarship, it is possible to provide an overview of the topic. 
 Given the differing responses of the Catholic and Protestant Churches to the Nazi 
regime, it is useful to treat both denominations separately.  During the Third Reich, the 
Protestant Church split, not in opposition to the Nazis, but rather in opposition to itself.  
Created in 1932, the German Christian Movement sought to wed Protestant theology with 
Nazi racial thinking.  Although the German Christian Movement‘s 600,000 lay and clergy 
members accounted for a tiny fraction of Germany‘s 40 million Protestants, they wielded 
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disproportionate influence, owing to their overrepresentation in the Church‘s hierarchy and in 
theological circles.  To create a Volkskirche (People‘s Church) for the Nazi racial community, 
German Christian theologians jettisoned baptism as a path to salvation and instead advanced 
the notion that ―non-Aryans‖ could never join the fold.506  This new theological construct 
precipitated a vigorous reply from a minority of Protestant clergy, who declared the German 
Christian Movement‘s reinterpretation of baptism heretical and formed the Confessing 
Church (Bekennende Kirche) in 1934.  While some members of the Confessing Church, and 
notably Dietrich Bonhoeffer, resisted the Nazi regime on religious grounds, few Protestants, 
either within or outside of the Confessing Church, condemned the Third Reich‘s genocidal 
policies.  Despite overtures from the German Christian Movement for closer cooperation 
with the Nazi regime, in Germany the Third Reich‘s leaders remained tepid toward the 
organization.  Nevertheless, the existence of the German Christian Movement signaled to the 
Nazis that willing Protestant collaborators remained at the Third Reich‘s disposal.  It was 
precisely this overture that, when pressed, Hoffmeyer accepted. 
 Like the Protestant Church, the Catholic Church enjoyed ambivalent relations with 
Nazi Germany.  The 1933 Reichskonkordat (Reich Concordat) provided the basis for the 
Catholic Church and the Nazi regime to coexist in Germany. The agreement guaranteed the 
inviolability of the Catholic Church‘s institutional structure and spiritual mission in Germany 
at the expense of the end to formal Catholic involvement in German politics.  This accord cut 
both ways.  On the one hand, it protected an autonomous, Catholic milieu that provided the 
faithful with a potent alternative to National Socialism and thus put a chink in the Nazi 
regime‘s totalitarian armor.  The continued integrity of Catholicism in the Third Reich is a 
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likely explanation for the fact that organized Catholic efforts to embrace National Socialism 
remained insignificant in comparison to those of the Protestant German Christian 
Movement.507  On the other hand, the Reichskonkordat set the precedent for Catholic 
acquiescence to the Nazi regime provided that the Third Reich did not infringe on its 
institutions or persecute its faithful.  In the rare instances in which Catholic leaders protested 
Nazi policies, such as Clemens August Graf von Galen‘s August 1941 denunciation of the T-
4 ―Euthanasia‖ Program or resistance to Adolf Wagner‘s ham-handed efforts to remove 
crucifixes from Bavarian schools, the points of contention were not the Nazi regime‘s 
policies per se, but rather specific affronts to Catholic doctrine and practice.508  This 
orientation also applied to the Catholic response to the Holocaust.  As Phayer‘s masterful 
research demonstrates, Pope Pius XII‘s public stance on the murder of Jews reflected the 
pontiff‘s concern with the Church‘s survival as an institution, rather than with its moral 
responsibilities in the world.509  While the Catholic Church, and particularly its leadership, 
proved unwilling to protest the Nazi regime‘s genocidal policies directly, the perpetuation of 
a licit, autonomous sphere within the Third Reich posed a long-term challenge to the 
National Socialist project.  It was precisely this thorn in the Nazi regime‘s side that 
Hoffmeyer first sought to exclude from Transnistria‘s Volksdeutsche communities. 
 Pragmatic concerns dictated the Nazi regime‘s response to the Church in Germany.  
Despite its periodically countervailing Church policies, Hitler‘s anxiety that any concerted 
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attack on the Church during the war could provoke domestic social unrest moderated the 
Third Reich‘s religious policies in the Reich.  With the beginning of the war in 1939, Hitler 
ordered all anti-religious, and specifically anti-Catholic measures, to cease in the interest of 
preserving national solidarity.510  Hitler reiterated these instructions the following year and, 
during the course of the war, retreated from policies that met with widespread Church 
resistance.511  Following von Galen‘s August 1941 protest against the murder of mentally and 
physically handicapped patients—a program that Hitler had authorized personally two years 
earlier—he backpedaled and ordered the initiative to continue in secret.512  Likewise, Hitler 
called Wagner on the carpet for his independent efforts to curb Catholicism in Bavaria—a 
policy the produced precisely the popular blowback that Hitler had hoped to avoid.513  
Although privately some in the Nazi regime may have planned for Christianity‘s future 
demise after the war, during the conflict the Nazi leadership deescalated its anti-religious 
policies for practical reasons.514 
 German officials in the occupied Soviet Union shared Hitler‘s pragmatism in their 
stance toward organized religion, albeit without his concern for public opinion.  Aware of the 
unpopularity of Soviet anti-religious policy in the Soviet Union‘s borderlands, occupation 
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authorities in German-controlled Ukraine supported the reconstruction of indigenous 
religious institutions, albeit in a circumscribed and controlled fashion.515  Despite German 
claims during the war that Nazi rule promised religious freedom, the Third Reich merely 
used the verisimilitude of free religious expressions to enlist the local population‘s support 
for the Third Reich‘s war against ―Judeo-Bolshevism‖—an enterprise in which most 
Ukrainians stood simply to substitute one foreign overlord for another.  Provided that Sunday 
services made Ukrainians more receptive to the Third Reich‘s agenda in the Soviet Union, 
German occupation officials were, in principle, happy to hold the church door open for them. 
 German authorities in the conquered Soviet Union pursued these pragmatic policies 
not simply against the majority Orthodox population, but also against the territory‘s 
Protestant and Catholic minorities.  As Karel Berkhoff has noted, in the Reichskommissariat 
Ukraine German occupation officials regarded Baptists and evangelicals as innocuous and 
targeted neither group for persecution.  This latitude permitted Protestant missionaries to 
roam about the countryside illicitly and even to distribute illegal literature.516  Berkhoff notes, 
however, that German officials treated local Catholics far more harshly.  Owing to deep Nazi 
suspicion of the Vatican and prejudice against Poles, who constituted the majority of the 
region‘s Catholic population, German authorities in the Reichskommissariat Ukraine ramped 
up pressure against the Catholic hierarchy by closing churches as well as detaining and even 
killing local priests.517  These measures contrasted sharply with German policy in the Reich 
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and even in occupied Poland, where the Catholic Church‘s hierarchy continued to exercise 
significant autonomy. 
 German authorities in the occupied Soviet Union could implement what amounted to 
an independent religious policy, even against Protestants and Catholics, that was more 
restrictive than the one that their colleagues pursued in the Reich because they could do so 
without provoking social unrest in Germany—the Nazi regime‘s overarching concern.  The 
reasons for this were twofold.  First, and most obviously, Nazi authorities were much less 
concerned about maintaining social equilibrium in the occupied Soviet Union than they were 
in Germany.  Second, unlike in the Reich, in the German-occupied Soviet Union German 
authorities could implement their religious policies—particularly with regard to Protestants 
and Catholics—without interference from German clergy, whom the Reichsministerium für 
die besetzten Ostgebiete (Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories) banned from 
operating there as early as September 1941.518  Safe from the prying eyes of independent 
German religious leaders, who could object to Nazi religious policy, in the German-occupied 
Soviet Union, authorities had a free hand to pursue whatever religious policy they felt best 
suited the Third Reich‘s interests.  In Transnistria, where the SS had exceptional latitude to 
shape its own policies, Hoffmeyer further radicalized these measures by attempting to restrict 
the Church from Transnistria‘s Volksdeutsche communities, a move unprecedented in either 
Germany or elsewhere in the occupied Soviet Union. 
The Church and the Black Sea Germans 
 Sonderkommando R pursued these exceptional measures precisely because of the 
historical significance of the Church in the lives of the Black Sea Germans.  Prior to the 1917 
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Russian Revolution, the region‘s ethnic Germans maintained a deep commitment to the 
Church, whose religious ceremonies ordered many aspects of their daily lives, ranging from 
interpersonal relations to the yearly calendar cycle of most communities.  Roughly 60 percent 
of Odessa Oblast‘s Volksdeutsche were Roman Catholic and the remaining 40 percent were 
Protestants, predominately Lutherans with a handful of Mennonites.519  Perhaps because 
Germanophone settlements and their daughter colonies were segregated by confession and 
farming proved lucrative for Catholics and Protestants alike, whatever historical inter-
confessional strife that the region‘s ethnic Germans may have imported dissolved fairly 
quickly.  While Catholics and Protestants rarely intermarried prior to 1917, probably because 
Volksdeutsche communities in rural Odessa oblast‘ were highly incestuous, their faith 
constituted a key ethnic marker that differentiated both groups from their predominately 
Orthodox Ukrainian neighbors.  The role of confession in defining their ethnic identity as a 
minority population merely compounded the Church‘s spiritual importance for local 
Volksdeutsche. 
 Soviet rule precipitated a caesura in the religious life of the region‘s ethnic Germans 
and added an important political significance to the Church for local Volksdeutsche.  
Beginning in the late 1920s, the Soviet regime targeted the Church as part of its anti-religious 
campaign.  As with other confessions in the Soviet Union, state authorities circumscribed 
religious services, arrested and deported clergy, confiscated Church property, and converted 
churches to serve a variety of secular functions, such as stabling livestock and housing 
agricultural products.  Although Soviet efforts to curtail Volksdeutsche religious observance 
were initially part of a campaign against religion in general, local ethnic Germans did not 
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perceive it as such.  While, at least initially, Soviet authorities did not conceive of 
dismantling Catholic and Lutheran religious life as a specific assault on the ethnic identity of 
area German-speakers, local Volksdeutsche correctly understood that the Soviet regime‘s 
policies had precisely that effect because they threatened to eliminate one of the primary 
markers of ethnic identity.520  Within the context of dekulakization and collectivization, 
which targeted local Volksdeutsche disproportionately as class enemies, area ethnic Germans 
interpreted Soviet moves against the Catholic and Protestant Churches in southern Ukraine as 
key components of a broader and ever-intensifying assault on local German-speakers.  The 
origins of Volksdeutsche hopes for a religious renaissance were not simply spiritual in origin, 
but rather reflected a desire to roll back a whole host of policies that Soviet authorities had 
enacted since the end of the Russian Civil War.  For these reasons, the Church appeared to 
pose a formidable alternative to Sonderkommando R‘s National Socialist agenda. 
The Catholic Church in Transnistria’s Volksdeutsche Settlements 
 The VoMi‘s initial religious policy in Transnistria is best described as a ban by 
omission.  Based on surviving documentation from Sonderkommando R and the records of 
extensive postwar interrogations of the unit‘s officers by West German and Soviet 
investigators, Sonderkommando R had no initial plan to reopen the region‘s churches.  
Admittedly, it is impossible to demonstrate the absence of an initial religious policy based on 
incomplete documentation.  However, it seems highly plausible that the unit consciously 
failed to prepare for a religious renaissance in Transnistria‘s Volksdeutsche communities 
because it regarded the Church as an undesirable potential competitor to National Socialism.  
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After all, why should Sonderkommando R labor to reintroduce an institution known to its 
leaders to retard the National Socialist project when decades of Soviet anti-religious policy 
had already done the dirty work of closing churches?  Despite widespread Volksdeutsche 
wishes to the contrary, Sonderkommando R‘s leaders appear to have been content to make 
the Soviet regime‘s anti-religious measures permanent. 
 The reintroduction of the Catholic Church in Transnistria appears to have surprised 
Sonderkommando R‘s leadership.  Given the origins of the Protestant Reformation in 
Germany, it is perhaps ironic that the renaissance of the Catholic Church in Transnistria came 
about in a strikingly similar way—namely by the largely autonomous efforts of a meddling 
Catholic priest.  Returning southern Ukraine‘s Catholic Volksdeutsche to the fold was the 
personal mission of Father Nikolaus Pieger, a forty-one-year-old Franconian priest.  In 
contrast to many of his Protestant counterparts, Pieger had no apparent personal connection 
to this ministry.  Decades after the war, he recalled that an elementary school geography 
lesson on ethnic Germans in the Russian Empire had first kindled his interest in Eastern 
European Volksdeutsche.521  After his 1932 ordination, Pieger became the director of a 
Catholic school in Nürnberg, where his interactions with Volksdeutsche pupils from Eastern 
Europe reawakened his earlier interests in the group.522  In response to this calling, Pieger 
transferred to the German Catholic archdioceses in Bucharest in 1936.  Ever eager to minister 
to ethnic Germans, from Bucharest Pieger cast his gaze further east toward the Soviet Union.  
In 1938, he launched an unsuccessful bid to celebrate mass in the German Embassy in 
                                                 
521Nikolaus Pieger, ―Die religiösen Verhältnisse in der Südukraine (Transnistrien),‖ in Die Kirchen 
und das religiöse Leben der Russlanddeutschen, ed Joseph Schnurr, (Stuttgart: Landsmannschaft der Deutschen 
aus Russland, 1972), 43. 
522Aussage von N. P., November 13, 1961, BAL, B162/2289, 74.  Pieger, ―Die religiösen Verhältnisse 
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Moscow—an effort halted by Soviet authorities, who refused Pieger an entry visa.523 
 As Pieger later recounted, the June 1941 German invasion ―fulfilled my wish to go to 
Russia.‖524  Presented with the opportunity to expand his ministry to the Soviet Union—a 
goal that Pieger had maintained for years—he ―pulled out all of the stops to get to Russia.‖525  
As Pieger noted decades later, this was not an easy task.  In August 1941, he first used his 
connections at the German Embassy in Bucharest to obtain permission to enter what was then 
an operational zone for the German and Romanian armies.  According to Pieger, securing the 
necessary authorizations from his ecclesiastical superiors was an even greater challenge.  
After his bishop denied him permission to travel to the recently occupied Soviet Union, 
Pieger turned to the Papal Nuncio to Romania, Andreas Cassullo.  Despite Cassullo‘s initial 
inclination to seek Vatican authorization for such a journey, Pieger convinced him that the 
dire situation of the faithful in southern Ukraine necessitated an immediate response and the 
Nuncio authorized his exploratory mission to the region.526 
 Absent civilian transportation to southern Ukraine, Pieger convinced Father Josef 
Arnold, a Catholic priest serving with the Wehrmacht as a medic, to smuggle him into the 
military‘s rear area disguised as his authorized passenger.527  Arriving in Transnistria on 
August 20, 1941, Pieger began a three-week itinerant trek to survey the region‘s major 
Volksdeutsche Catholic settlements, including Strasburg, Baden, Kandel, Selz, Landau, 
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Karlsruhe, Rastatt, Speyer, and Sulz.528  Pieger‘s brief travelogue, penned during the 1970s, 
recounts a local Catholic population that yearned to reestablish its communion with the 
Church of Rome.  Perhaps reflecting subsequent tribulations in the region, his description of 
celebrating mass in Strasburg, the first stop on his journey evokes images of the early 
Church: 
Generally, the church was maintained, but the bells were removed and the steeple had 
been taken away.  The interior no longer resembled a house of worship.  All altars, 
pictures and the like had disappeared.  [Soviet] authorities had turned it into a dance 
and theater hall.  When the people heard that Mass was to be held the next morning, 
the whole community worked to clean the church late into the night.  At 8 AM the 
people picked me up from my accommodations and escorted me to the overflowing 
church that they had furnished with makeshift decorations and a temporary alter.  At 
the chancel, where three vessels of water stood, the old church father greeted me as a 
Catholic priest and asked me to bless the water and the desecrated church.  To my 
great surprise, during the service the choir sang the Holy Liturgy completely correctly 
in Latin.  After blessing the church, I heard the Te Deum sung as I had never heard it 
sung before.  Following an address to the congregation, a Requiem was held for the 
murdered and deceased members of the community.  The Requiem and finally the 
Salve Regina, which had last been sung in 1932, were sung in three and five-part 
harmonies.529 
 
Before moving on to Baden the next day, Pieger baptized 300 children in Strasburg and 
reported that another hundred youths would have to wait for the sacrament.530 
 At the conclusion of his sojourn to Transnistria, Pieger returned to Bucharest in early 
October 1941 imbued with missionary zeal.  He dispatched a personal report on the dire 
situation of the region‘s Catholics to the Vatican and lobbied for a Church mission to the 
region.  Perhaps cognizant of the fact that, by obtaining authorization for his trip from the 
Papal Nuncio, he had openly defied his bishop and made himself persona non grata with his 
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immediate superiors, Pieger requested that Dr. Martin Glaser, a former member of the 
diocese of Saratov and current regent of the German Catholic seminary in Iaşi, be named 
head of the mission.  Glaser received his appointment as apostolic visitor ten days later.  
Glaser, Pieger, and their colleague in Bucharest, Father Walter Kampe, departed for 
Transnistria immediately.  Without independent transportation or any apparent authorization 
from the German or Romanian militaries, the party followed Pieger‘s earlier route by 
entering the occupation zone with the aid of another Catholic priest working as Wehrmacht 
ambulance driver.  Arriving in Odessa a few weeks after the city‘s occupation by German and 
Romanian forces, the Church‘s mission to Transnistria located the St. Clemens Cathedral, 
which Soviet authorities had converted into a warehouse, stables, and ordinance depot.  
Tellingly, a gigantic portrait of Stalin had replaced the original alter painting of the 
assumption of Mary.531 
 Initially housed in ―a primitive room‖ in the home of a local Polish family, the three 
priests set about reestablishing the Catholic Church in Odessa and the surrounding 
countryside.532  The mission focused on returning St. Clemens Cathedral as ―the center of 
religious life‖ in the region.533  Under Glaser‘s supervision, local artisans restored both the 
cathedral‘s marble floor and replaced Stalin‘s likeness with the original alter painting that 
Pieger and his colleagues identified on display in a local Museum.  Subsequent negotiations 
with the city‘s Romanian administrators yielded a large building on Risel‘evskaya street near 
the cathedral with sufficient space for the mission to expand its growing administrative 
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offices.534  Although supplying rural Transnistria with sufficient clergy to service the spiritual 
needs of local Volksdeutsche proved to be a perennial problem, Catholic officials reached a 
series of agreements with their Romanian counterparts to satisfy ―the most urgent pastoral 
needs.‖535  Staffed primarily with Volksdeutsche priests from Romania and Bessarabia, by 
early June 1942 the mission‘s staff included some fifteen priests.536  The Catholic Church‘s 
renaissance was so successful that Glaser‘s superiors elevated him to the office of bishop in 
1943.537  Notwithstanding these accomplishments, the Third Reich‘s increasingly precarious 
military situation forced the mission to quit the region little more than a year later.  In 
Pieger‘s conclusion about his ministry, he emphasized: ―This work, however, was not for 
nothing.  Our faithful witnessed that the Church did not leave them in the lurch and are today 
still thankful for that.‖538 
 Sonderkommando R responded to the spontaneous Catholic renaissance in 
Transnistria by launching an intense anti-Catholic campaign that reflected not only the unit‘s 
opposition to the reintroduction of Catholicism into the region‘s Volksdeutsche settlements, 
but also its ongoing power struggle with the area‘s Romanian administrators.  Pieger 
personally became a focal point for the SS‘s wrath.  The SS put a stop to Pieger‘s 
inconvenient visits to rural Transnistria, where it was busy leading local Volksdeutsche on a 
mass murder campaign, by driving him out of the countryside at gunpoint.539  Pieger returned 
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to Odessa, where the SS pursued him.  Tipped off by one of Bereichkommando XXV‘s 
Volksdeutsche employees to planned SS efforts to detain him there, Pieger took refuge with 
the city‘s Romanian occupation authorities.540  A subsequent Sonderkommando R circular 
order issued in early April 1942 instructed its staff that Pieger‘s activities in the region were 
henceforth banned.541 
 While Sonderkommando R was able to quarantine Pieger in Odessa, it was unable to 
remove him or other Catholic priests from the region.  In contrast to German-occupied Soviet 
territory, in which the German civil administration had banned German clergy from 
operating, in Transnistria such decisions were the purview of Romanian authorities.  Not only 
did the region‘s Romanian civil administration fail to institute such a ban, but it defended the 
Catholic Church from Hoffmeyer.  The initial involvement of Transnistria‘s Romanian Civil 
Governor, Professor Gheorghe Alexianu, in this dispute is illustrative.  Perhaps because of 
threats to Pieger‘s safety, Glaser beseeched both the Papal Nuncio in Bucharest and the 
Romanian civil administration for assistance.  Surviving records provide only a partial 
reconstruction of the results of Glaser‘s pleas for help.  From what can be recovered, 
however, Cassullo wrote Hoffmeyer on February 8, 1942, to press the Church‘s rights in 
Transnistria, in general, and to complain that Sonderkommando R had banned area priests 
from celebrating mass during Christmas, in specific.542  Hoffmeyer replied to Cassullo in 
early March 1942 and circulated a copy of his reply to Alexianu, suggesting that Romanian 
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authorities had also raised these issues with Sonderkommando R. 543  Hoffmeyer was 
undoubtedly truthful when he explained to Cassullo that ―I also worry about the development 
of the Catholic ministry in Transnistria and have observed it with much concern,‖ but 
probably for reasons that differed dramatically from those of the Papal Nuncio.  According to 
Hoffmeyer, he had denied Glaser‘s request to hold services the previous Christmas because 
Glaser was unable to produce any documentation to show that his activities in Transnistria 
were sanctioned by his ecclesiastical superiors.544  Furthermore, Hoffmeyer complained that 
―Prelate Dr. Glaser was unable to offer any constructive suggestions for the development of 
an orderly Catholic Church.  Above all, in all of these months he has been unable to name a 
single Catholic priest who would like to take up his responsibilities in Transnistria for the 
long term.‖545  In Hoffmeyer‘s eyes, Pieger apparently lacked adequate sincerity. 
 Despite Hoffmeyer‘s efforts to rationalize his role as the Grinch who stole Christmas, 
he remained acutely aware of the fact that Romanian support for the Catholic Church in 
Transnistria limited his freedom of action.  Romanian patronage was both bureaucratic and 
material.  On the one hand, in contravention of Sonderkommando R‘s pronounced wishes, 
during 1941 and 1942 the Romanian civil administration authorized a steady stream of 
Catholic priests to operate in Transnistria, including the most troublesome Father Pieger.546  
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Moreover, when the Church felt threatened, Alexianu pressed Hoffmeyer on the issue.  On 
the other hand, Romanian authorities furnished the Catholic Church with a building in 
Odessa to house its mission.  Why the overwhelmingly Eastern Orthodox Romanians 
succored the German Catholic Church in Transnistria is unclear.  An admittedly speculative, 
but nevertheless highly plausible explanation is that the Romanians supported Glaser 
precisely because the Catholic mission in Odessa irritated Sonderkommando R and thereby 
furthered the Romanian position in their ongoing struggle with the SS.  The running feud 
between the Romanians and the SS, it seems, made for strange bedfellows. 
 Realizing that his unit had been outmaneuvered by the alliance between the Catholic 
Church and the Romanians, Hoffmeyer backpedaled.  A few weeks after his reply to Cassullo 
and Alexianu, Sonderkommando R issued a staff order that instructed the unit‘s mid-level 
leaders to curtail their most aggressive and public measures against Catholic priests in 
Transnistria.  It informed Sonderkommando R‘s Bereichkommandoführer that ―every form of 
struggle against the Church is to cease.‖547     ―Above all,‖ the unit‘s leadership warned it 
subordinates ―to refrain from all childish harassment and mockery‖ of the Catholic 
Church.548  At least publicly, Sonderkommando R promised to end its anti-Catholic campaign 
in Transnistria. 
 Sonderkommando R‘s orders, however, were not to halt its Kulturkampf, but simply 
to conceal it.  Hoffmeyer‘s somewhat improbable March 1942 assurance to Cassullo that 
Glaser had been ―given freedom to carry out his pastoral duties‖ was simply a bald-faced 
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lie.549  The same staff order that sought to tamp down the unit‘s openly anti-Catholic stance 
simultaneously ramped up covert restrictions on the Catholic Church in Transnistria‘s 
Volksdeutsche communities, where Sonderkommando R enjoyed exclusive authority.  It 
commanded the unit‘s Bereichkommandoführer to pursue a litany of coercive measures 
against the Catholic Church in their Bereichkommandos.  The order stipulated, for example, 
that Catholic school books were not to be distributed and that texts that had already been 
handed out were to be confiscated.  Excluding baptism and funerals, church services were to 
take place only on the weekend, so as not to interfere with necessary agricultural production.  
The unit‘s senior leadership also banned priests from performing baptisms or marriages 
without the SS‘s oversight, presumably because both sacraments threatened to introduce non-
Germans into the local Volksdeutsche population.550  These measures had the added benefit 
of eliminating ―the influence of the Catholic Church on the selection of given names‖ and 
promised to erode the Church‘s influence.551  The orders noted further that while ―the 
distribution of rosaries, confessional schedules, icons, etc., cannot be prohibited, it is 
undesirable.‖552    Sonderkommando R continued its struggle against the Catholic Church 
well into 1943.  In June of that year, Hoffmeyer informed his subordinates that he had 
succeeded in pressuring Glaser to recall the apparently meddlesome Father T., who was now 
no longer permitted to preach.553  While Sonderkommando R bent to pressure from 
Romanian authorities and curbed its most blatant attacks on the Catholic Church, Hoffmeyer 
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diverted the assault to a clandestine and continuing anti-Catholic campaign. 
 Ironically, Sonderkommando R‘s anti-Catholic measures in Transnistria constituted a 
marked departure from the Third Reich‘s earlier efforts to succor the region‘s Catholic 
Church.  Prior to 1941, Soviet authorities had targeted Transnistria‘s Catholic Church during 
their anti-religious campaign.  Evidence from the German Consulate dating from the mid-
1930s suggests that Soviet suspicions of Volksdeutsche Catholic priests as German fifth 
columnists had some merit.  In 1934, for example, both the Auswärtiges Amt (Foreign Office) 
in Berlin and the German Embassy in Moscow took a keen interest in increasingly repressive 
Soviet measures directed against Volksdeutsche priests in southern Ukraine and requested 
status reports from the German Consulate in Odessa.554  The Consulate replied by furnishing 
a list of area ethnic German Catholic priests, whom it was supporting with a 1,000 
Reichsmark fund provided by the Foreign Office.555  The relatively modest sum that German 
diplomats used to underwrite the Catholic Church in southern Ukraine suggests that this 
project was a holdover from existing Weimar-era efforts to succor Volksdeutsche in Eastern 
Europe.  This program is nevertheless interesting precisely because it contrasts with 
Sonderkommando R‘s later efforts to circumscribe the region‘s Catholic Church.  Whereas 
German diplomats at the dawn of the Third Reich regarded a functioning Catholic hierarchy 
as a vehicle for supporting Volksdeutsche in the region, in the midst of an all-out Nazification 
program the SS understood it as inimical to its goals and sought unsuccessfully to subvert it. 
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The Protestant Church in Transnistria’s Volksdeutsche Settlements 
 For the first six months of the occupation, the Protestant Church‘s renaissance in 
Transnistria paralleled that of the Catholic Church.  Like their Catholic counterparts, 
Protestant clergy arrived in Transnistria with the assistance of the German army.  Protestant 
pastors, serving as Wehrmacht chaplains, were among the first Germans to pass through the 
region during the late summer of 1941.  Some pastors, such as Heinrich Römmich, were 
natives of the region for whom, like Pieger, Operation Barbarossa was a chance to establish 
ties with area Volksdeutsche.556  These initial peripatetic forays into Transnistria by 
Wehrmacht chaplains quickly gave way to a more permanent Protestant presence in the 
region.  On Sunday, December 7, 1941, without any apparent authorization from 
Sonderkommando R, Protestant authorities reconsecrated Odessa‘s St. Pauli Church, less 
than two months after Romanian and German authorities had captured the city.557 
 Despite these parallels, Sonderkommando R responded very differently to Protestant 
as opposed to Catholic clergy.  Whereas Pieger‘s ministry in the Transnistrian countryside 
appears to have provoked a speedy reply from Sonderkommando R, there is no evidence that 
Hoffmeyer took any immediate action against the Protestant Church in the region‘s 
Volksdeutsche settlements.  The absence of activity against the Protestant Church amid a 
flurry of anti-Catholic measures suggests that Hoffmeyer and his subordinates regarded the 
former as a lesser threat to its mission in the region.  Based on Sonderkommando R‘s 
surviving records, it appears that Hoffmeyer only turned his attention to the Protestant 
Church after his unsuccessful bid to hamstring the Catholic Church in the region.  That the 
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Catholic Church‘s alliance with the Romanian civil administration blunted his anti-Catholic 
measures appears, moreover, to have shaped his policy toward the Protestant Church.  
Perhaps fearing that Protestant clergy might seal a similar marriage of convenience with 
Romanian authorities, Hoffmeyer decided to authorize a Protestant ministry for Transnistria‘s 
Volksdeutsche.  Rather than providing the Protestant Church with more latitude, this move 
permitted Hoffmeyer to exercise greater control over its theology. 
 To harness the Protestant Church in Transnistria, Hoffmeyer took the exceptional step 
of forging a cooperative agreement with the German Christian Movement.  Ostensibly, as 
Hoffmeyer indicated to Alexianu in a June 1942 letter, Sonderkommando R merely entered 
into an accord with the Transylvanian Protestant Church in Hermannstadt (Sibiu) to obtain 
ministers to shepherd the region‘s Protestants.558  What Hoffmeyer neglected to mention in 
his communiqué to Alexianu was the fact that the Transylvanian Protestant Church proved an 
attractive partner for the SS not merely because of its geographical proximity, but also 
because of its pronounced affinity for the German Christian Movement, in specific, and 
National Socialism, in general. 
 The wartime Transylvanian Protestant Church was a creation of its bishop, Wilhelm 
Staedel, a fervent member of the German Christian Movement and committed National 
Socialist.  Born in 1890, Staedel followed a typical education track for a Transylvanian 
Saxon, studying theology in Jena, Budapest, and Berlin.  After serving as a field curate 
during the First World War, völkisch nationalism and ultimately National Socialism attracted 
Staedel‘s devotion.  A prime mover in the Nazification of the region‘s Volksdeutsche youth 
movement, Staedel was a member of the fascist German Peoples‘ Party in Romania 
                                                 
558 Ancel, Transnistria, vol. 3, 1455. 
195 
 
(Deutsche Volkspartei in Rumänien).  Although Staedel‘s political activities prompted his 
predecessor as bishop to sack him from his pastoral duties, a subsequent groundswell of 
National Socialist sentiment in Transylvania precipitated his reinstatement and facilitated his 
election as bishop in February 1941.  Staedel used his position as bishop to strengthen the 
Transylvanian Protestant Church‘s affiliation with the German Christian Movement.  His 
convictions led him to close collaboration with the movement and ultimately moved Staedel 
to create a branch of the Jena-based Institute for the Study and Eradication of Jewish 
Influence on German Church Life (Institut zur Erforschung und Beseitigung des jüdischen 
Einflusses auf das deutsche kirchliche Leben) in Hermannstadt.559  Under Staedel‘s 
supervision, the German Christian Movement became the new Protestant orthodoxy in 
Transylvania—an ideological position that Staedel maintained well after 1945.560  In Staedel, 
Hoffmeyer found an ideal partner to help guide Transnistria‘s Protestant Church in the 
appropriate National Socialist direction.   
 Not surprisingly, Hoffmeyer regarded his arrangement with Staedel as completely 
satisfactory.  Hoffmeyer‘s initial agreement with Staedel yielded four Transylvanian pastors 
for Volksdeutsche congregations in Odessa, Johannistal, Lichtenfeld, and Helenental.561  
Staedel assigned Waldemar Keintzel, Helmut Hoffman, Hellmut Hochmeister, and Erwin 
Barth to take up these assignments.562  Apparently pleased with the content of their ministry, 
later in 1942 Hoffmeyer authorized Staedel to send a further nineteen pastors to 
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Transnistria.563  In April 1943, Hoffmeyer even floated the idea of introducing the 
Transylvanian Protestant Church‘s liturgical calendar to Transnistria ―as a counterweight to 
the propaganda of the Catholic Church‖ and invited commentary from his staff.564  While 
Hoffmeyer‘s partnership with Staedel was an alliance born out of a failed attempt to exclude 
the Catholic Church from the region‘s Volksdeutsche settlements, it provided 
Sonderkommando R with exceptional control over the religious lives of area Protestants.  If 
Hoffmeyer had to suffer the reintroduction of religion into Transnistria‘s Volksdeutsche 
communities, at least in the case of the Protestant Church, it was of a form of his choosing. 
The Church and the Holocaust in Transnistria 
 Given the lengths to which Hoffmeyer went first to try to exclude the Catholic 
Church and to shape the theological content of the Protestant Church‘s ministry for 
Transnistria‘s Volksdeutsche, the question remains did either denomination represent a 
unique threat to Sonderkommando R‘s Nazification project in the region?  The answer is 
most decidedly no.  If the postwar reticence of Protestant and Catholic clergy to discuss the 
Holocaust in Transnistria is any indication, despite the SS‘s fears to the contrary, the 
Church‘s threat to the Nazi regime‘s enterprise in the area was no greater than in Germany.  
Moreover, a careful analysis of police statements and published accounts of the war from 
Protestant and Catholic clergy reveals that religious leaders from both denominations took an 
active role in the postwar conspiracy of silence surrounding Sonderkommando R‘s crimes. 
 After the war, Protestant clergy who had proselytized in Transnistria remained 
virtually silent about the Holocaust.  Römmich‘s postwar publication, ―Die evangelische 
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Kirche in Russland in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart,‖ (The Protestant Church in Russia in 
the Past and the Present) typifies this trend.  In the chapter he presents a history of the 
Protestant Church in the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union laced with anecdotes from his 
experiences as an ethnic German pastor from southern Ukraine now living in exile in the 
Federal Republic.  In keeping with the postwar expellee narrative, Römmich‘s account 
emphasizes Volksdeutsche suffering at the hands of the Soviets.  Recounting his interwar 
ministry in Bessarabia, for example, Römmich describes giving shelter to fellow clergymen, 
who fled the Soviet anti-religious campaign during the 1930s: ―I was able to offer asylum in 
my house to six Catholic priests, one of whom arrived with a gunshot wound, and a 
Protestant pastor, who fled from the [Soviet] bloodhounds through night and fog across the 
[Dniester] river.  After a few days of rest they returned down the same dangerous road to 
their congregations and were later arrested and convicted.  When I arrived in their 
communities in 1941, I could find none of them.  At a show trial in Odessa, the Protestant 
pastor had been exiled for five years and is missing.‖565  Notwithstanding this brutality, in his 
description of his visit to his hometown of Worms in southern Ukraine, Römmich 
emphasizes the renaissance of Lutheran religious life under German rule: ―When I was able 
to visit my hometown of Worms near Odessa for a few hours on the first Sunday after the 
departure of the Bolshevik troops, August 16, 1941, the first service in five years took place 
in a [recently] cleaned and makeshift church.  After the service, the preacher, a soldier from 
the German Wehrmacht, baptized children and blessed marriages.‖566  As these vignettes 
illustrate, the trajectory of Römmich‘s narrative is one of the triumph of faith in the face of 
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adversity. 
 Römmich‘s history of the Protestant Church in the Russian Empire and the Soviet 
Union is, however, more interesting for the events that it selectively omits.  In his published 
narrative, the author jumps a decade and a half from his homecoming in Worms to Konrad 
Adenauer‘s 1955 state visit to the Soviet Union, which he emphasizes secured a loosening of 
restrictions for German-speakers whom Soviet authorities had deported to Central Asia and 
Siberia during and after the Second World War.  By glossing over the war, Römmich is able 
to fashion a tale of the suffering of innocent Volksdeutsche at the hands of Soviet Union, 
while jettisoning the problematic complicity of ethnic Germans—notably those from his 
hometown of Worms—in the Nazi regime‘s persecution of Jews.  It is possible, though 
unlikely, that during his trip through Transnistria during the summer of 1941 as a Wehrmacht 
chaplain Römmich did not encounter the progressive waves of German violence unleashed 
against both local Jews and Volksdeutsche.  Postwar testimony from Worms suggests that 
some of these events may have transpired after Römmich‘s departure from the town.  While 
possible, this appears to be too convenient of an explanation for his omission of the subject.  
Perhaps tellingly, when the West German police attempted to interview Römmich in 1965 
about wartime events in Worms, he broke off the interview and refused to answer further 
questions.567  Like many of his fellow Lutheran clergymen from the region, Römmich‘s 
postwar aversion to discussing Nazi violence—including crimes against his own 
coreligionists—contributed to a postwar conspiracy of silence about Volksdeutsche 
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involvement in the Holocaust and perhaps indicates an affinity for elements of the National 
Socialist agenda. 
 Although privately more forthcoming about wartime Nazi brutality, Catholic clergy 
also failed to engage publicly with the Holocaust in the region after the war.  That Pieger, 
who had been the target of Nazi violence personally, did not discuss the Holocaust after 1945 
is particularly startling.  Despite having had front row seats to the Third Reich‘s brutal 
policies toward some of the area‘s Volksdeutsche as well as Romanian and German efforts to 
murder Jews in Transnistria, neither subject appears in Pieger‘s account of the Church‘s 
mission to the region, ―Die religiösen Verhältnisse in der Südukraine (Transnistrien),‖ (The 
Religious Circumstances in Southern Ukraine (Transnistria)), which he published alongside 
Römmich‘s chapter.  In his detailed description of his visit to Strasburg, for example, Pieger 
merely references the fact that ―during the fighting various houses in the village were 
destroyed.‖568  Although he mentions ―the murdered and deceased members of the 
community,‖ for whom he held a Requiem, the context implies that the dead were the victims 
of Soviet violence.  Undoubtedly many of the departed were.  Yet, they were not the only 
ones.  By the time of Pieger‘s arrival in Strasburg, German and Romanian forces had killed 
significant numbers of local Jews and ethnic Germans.  Postwar statements that Strasburg‘s 
residents gave to the West German police are replete with references to the SS‘s murder of 
the town‘s communist officials, Johannes M. and Adam G., during summer 1941.569  Local 
villagers apparently denounced the men to Einsatzgruppe D for what one of their former 
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neighbors described as ―allegedly have taken part in purges (Säuberungsaktionen) on behalf 
of the Russians in 1937.‖570 
 According to the postwar testimony that the West German police collected, Strasburg 
was also the site of the mass murder of Jews by Romanian forces during the summer of 
1941.571  As Franz B., a resident of Strasburg later recounted, ―at the end of August 1941 
Romanian Jews were executed in our locale.  Romanian troops drove them toward our town, 
but came no further because it was occupied by [German] soldiers.  The [Romanian] soldiers 
drove the fleeing Jews from the houses and transported them roughly one kilometer in the 
direction of the Kutchnokanka stream.  There, they were presumably driven into the water 
and shot.  I know about this because I had to help recover the bodies.  . . .  The civilian 
population did not discuss the fact that Romanians had pick up and murdered these Jews—it 
was common knowledge.‖572  The brutality of the occupation‘s opening weeks in Strasburg 
was by no means an aberration.  Rather, Pieger‘s August and September 1941 journey led 
him through many of the Volksdeutsche towns and hamlets where Einsatzgruppe D had 
murdered both Jews and ethnic Germans mere weeks if not days earlier.  While the ubiquity 
of German and Romanian violence against both Jews and some ethnic Germans during the 
summer and fall of 1941 is not something that Pieger could have missed easily, if for no other 
reason than the fact that some of his initial pastoral duties were almost certainly to bury the 
dead. 
 While Pieger made no reference to the Holocaust in print, unlike his Protestant 
                                                 
570Aussage von G. M., December 1, 1962, BAL, B162/2301, 46. 
571Ibid., 45.  Vernehmungsniederschrift von L. H., August 7, 1962, BAL, B162/2296, 146. 
572Vernehmungsniederschrift von F. B., July 18, 1962, BAL, B162/2296, 41-42. 
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counterpart Römmich, he did assist the West German police‘s criminal investigation into 
Sonderkommando R.  When asked by West German investigators about his summer 1941 trip 
to rural Transnistria, Pieger explained that in the Volksdeutsche settlement of Katharinental ―I 
discovered from a local resident that a large number of Jews were shot and were buried in a 
grave that he had helped to dig personally.  As I passed through the town, I was almost 
whacked (umgelegt) as a suspected Jew.  I was told that [local Volksdeutsche] had received 
firearms to liquidate Jews who had had leading position during Soviet times and were partly 
responsible for the deportation of many [ethnic] German men.‖573  In contrast to what 
Pieger‘s published travelogue suggests, his police statements indicate a more comprehensive 
private postwar engagement with the Holocaust. 
 The specific episodes of Nazi violence that Pieger presented to the West German 
police, however, underscore not a general concern about Nazi brutality, but rather a more 
narrowly focused interest in Nazi measures against Catholics.  In his 1961 interview, for 
example, Pieger discusses the SS-led mass murder of tens of thousands of Jews in the 
Transnistrian countryside in the abstract, but provides two unrepresentative examples to 
illustrate the SS‘s brutality.  First, Pieger focuses on the murder of the ―mixed race‖ children 
of a Jewish-Volksdeutsche couple.  As Pieger explained ―one day a Jew, who had married an 
[ethnic] German woman, was picked up and shot by the SS.  A short time later the woman 
was ordered to hand over her mixed race children (Mischlingskinder).  When the woman 
refused they threatened to burn down the barn, where the children were allegedly hidden.  
When the children left their hiding place and came to their mother [they] refused to be 
separated and they were all shot together.  Our people explained that the SS under 
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[Bereichkommandoführer] Pachschwöll carried out these shootings.‖574  Second, Pieger 
references traveling to a concentration camp in Transnistria to celebrate Holy Communion 
with a Jewish inmate, who had converted to Catholicism, and recounted attempting to secure 
food and medicine for the camp‘s prisoners.575  In contrast to Pieger‘s published account of 
the Catholic Church‘s activities in Transnistria, his earlier police statements do discuss 
episodes of Nazi violence in the region.  Nevertheless, the way in which he frames his 
discussion of the Holocaust suggests that his response to the SS‘s brutality was shaped less 
by universal humanitarian concerns than by a more narrowly defined anxiety about the Third 
Reich‘s encroachment on the Catholic Church‘s institutional prerogatives and the violence 
that it directed against Catholics.  For all of Pieger‘s activism in establishing the Catholic 
mission in Transnistria, the content of his private reflections on the Holocaust to the West 
German police suggest a troublingly narrow interest in Nazi violence that reflected a 
continuity with the Catholic Church‘s response to the Holocaust during the war. 
 That both Römmich and Pieger opted to publish their wartime experiences in Die 
Kirchen und das religiöse Leben der Russlanddeutschen (The Churches and Religious Life of 
the Russian Germans), a volume produced by the Stuttgart-based Landsmannschaft der 
Deutschen aus Russland (Territorial Association of Germans from Russia), is itself 
illustrative of their lack of engagement with the Nazi past after the war.  The 
Landsmannschaft der Deutschen aus Russland was and remains a political and cultural 
organization for Russian Germans in the Federal Republic, whose purpose it is to represent 
the interests of that particular expellee community.  As became clear during the course of the 
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West German police‘s investigation into the Holocaust in southern Ukraine, during the 1960s 
and 1970s a significant number of suspected ethnic German perpetrators held leading 
positions in the organization.  Although not under investigation for having participated in 
mass shootings, its head, Dr. Karl Stumpp, had been an active participant in the Nazi 
regime‘s völkisch projects in Ukraine.  During the war, Stumpp, a Nazi party member, had 
commanded an SS Sonderkommando, whose primary duties were to conduct Nazi 
ethnographic surveys of conquered Soviet territory.576  His research silently documented the 
demographic consequences of the Third Reich‘s genocidal policies in the Soviet Union.  
Many of the organization‘s low-level leaders, however, were heavily implicated in the 
Holocaust in southern Ukraine.  Pius W., Worms‘s first ethnic German mayor during the 
occupation, later served as chairman of the local chapter (Kreis- und Ortsgruppe) of the 
Landsmannschaft der Deutschen aus Russland in Dingolfing, Bavaria, where he settled after 
the war.577  One of W.‘s fellow Volksdeutsche from Worms described him as ―a big Jew-
hater,‖ (ein großer Judenhasser) and many witnesses fingered him as an enthusiastic local 
participant in the Holocaust.578  Römmich and Pieger were obviously aware that they were 
penning narratives for an organization populated with ethnic Germans, whose wartime 
involvement with the Nazi regime made them at the very least unreceptive to a candid 
                                                 
576In his capacity as the organization‘s chairman, Stumpp provided German investigators with 
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engagement with the past.  The fact that both Protestant and Catholic clergy—one of whom 
had tasted the Nazi regime‘s brutality—cooperated with an organization that was now home 
to many of the Nazi regime‘s ethnic German collaborators speaks to the reluctance of both 
churches to address the Holocaust in the region after the war.  While Catholic clergy were, at 
least privately, more forthcoming about wartime Nazi violence, as evidenced by their 
participation in the postwar conspiracy of silence concerning the Holocaust in Transnistria, 
neither church would have presented a substantive challenge to Hoffmeyer‘s Nazification 
plans in the area. 
Conclusion 
 Sonderkommando R launched its Kulturkampf in Transnistria because of the 
ideological predispositions of the unit‘s senior leadership.  Fearing that Christianity would 
offer local Volksdeutsche an alternative to National Socialism, Hoffmeyer had little incentive 
to reestablish the Church in Transnistria, particularly given that Soviet anti-religious policy 
had already excised the Church from the daily lives of area Volksdeutsche—a measure that 
radical elements of the Nazi regime may have desired but were wont to attempt in the Reich.  
Content with at least this convergence of Soviet and Nazi policies, the unit had no initial 
plans to reopen the region‘s Volksdeutsche churches.  Surprised by unanticipated Catholic 
and Protestant missions to the region and doubtlessly perturbed by the enthusiastic response 
of local ethnic Germans, among whom Sonderkommando R understood its Nazification 
program to be a tenuous enterprise, the unit responded in force.  Particularly fearful of the 
Catholic Church‘s ministry in Transnistria, perhaps because of the propensity of the Catholic 
milieu to immunize against National Socialism in Germany, Hoffmeyer led an ultimately 
partially successful effort to circumscribe the Church‘s activities in the region‘s 
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Volksdeutsche communities.  While the Catholic Church‘s alliance with Romanian civil 
administrators fanned SS disdain for the Catholic mission in the area, Romanian intervention 
prevented German authorities from removing German clergy from Transnistria as they had 
done earlier in the Reichskommissariat Ukraine.  Thwarted from banning the Church outright 
in Transnistria, Hoffmeyer used the unique latitude that his position afforded him in the 
region to pursue two measures that were unprecedented in Germany.  First, Hoffmeyer 
launched a robust, yet clandestine campaign to limit the Catholic Church‘s activities in 
Transnistria that eclipsed Wagner‘s efforts to remove crucifixes from Bavarian schools.  If he 
could not restrict the Catholic Church outright, then he could at least limit its success.  
Second, in contrast to the Nazi regime in Germany, that often kept its distance from the 
German Christians, Hoffmeyer forged a close working relationship with the movement.  
While permitting the Protestant Church to operate in Transnistria constituted a retreat from 
Hoffmeyer‘s earlier position, it permitted him to guide the theological content of the 
Protestant Church‘s teachings in the appropriate National Socialist direction.  Hoffmeyer 
ultimately found this arrangement so conducive to the unit‘s goals that he toyed with the idea 
of using Protestantism as a counterweight to Catholicism.  Much though he might have 
hoped to eliminate Christianity as a competitor to his unit‘s somewhat dicey Nazification 
project, Hoffmeyer made the best out of a bad situation to ensure that, insofar as it was 
possible, the Church supported, rather than undermined the SS‘s plans for the region‘s 
Volksdeutsche. 
 
  
 
CHAPTER V: HOFFMEYER’S BENEFICIARIES: THE ROLE OF VIOLENCE, 
ROBBERY, AND PROPAGANDA IN CREATING TRANSNISTRIA’S 
VOLKSGEMEINSCHAFT 
 During the first year and a half of the occupation, Sonderkommando R purged 
Transnistria‘s Volksdeutsche settlements of remaining racially and politically suspect 
residents and channeled ethnic German religious life into avenues that it regarded as 
compatible with the Nazi regime‘s goals.  Although a primary focus on the unit‘s energies, 
and the source of much of Sonderkommando R‘s violence against local ethnic Germans, 
these efforts were merely preparatory measures to pour the foundation of the National 
Socialist project in the region.  The VoMi‘s plans for Transnistria‘s Volksdeutsche hinged on 
Sonderkommando R‘s ability to persuade local ethnic Germans that they had a stake in the 
Nazi project.  Without ethnic German support for National Socialism, Transnistria‘s 
Volksdeutsche could never become the demographic basis for future German expansion in 
the East.  To mobilize local Volksdeutsche for the Nazi cause, Sonderkommando R needed to 
win the ―hearts and minds‖ of the region‘s ethnic Germans—a task made all the more 
difficult by the unpopularity of the unit‘s murderous drive to eliminate local opponents and to 
reorganize religious life in the area.  How then did Sonderkommando R seek to secure ethnic 
German support for the Nazi regime in Transnistria? 
 By recovering Sonderkommando R‘s security, population, economic, and propaganda 
initiatives within the region‘s Volksdeutsche communities, this chapter seeks to answer 
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precisely this question.  As a result of policies launched by the unit‘s commanders and ad hoc 
measures pursued by local SS officers, Sonderkommando R‘s Nazification project took three 
primary forms.  First, the unit sought to carve out autonomy in Transnistria by limiting 
Romanian influence in the area‘s Volksdeutsche settlements.  Whereas on the global stage 
Romania was Nazi Germany‘s junior partner, in Transnistria this power relationship was 
inverted.  Although theoretically independent, from the occupation‘s beginning Hoffmeyer‘s 
Lilliputian staff had to manage Transnistria‘s ethnic German communities both in 
cooperation and more often in conflict with the region‘s Romanian rulers.  Even before 
Sonderkommando R established its Bereichkommandos in Transnistria, systematic Romanian 
pilfering of ethnic German property exacerbated preexisting enmity between the SS and the 
Romanians.  Hoffmeyer and his subordinates responded to this challenge by arming area 
ethnic Germans and contesting perceived Romanian interference in the region‘s 
Volksdeutsche settlements.  This move not only precipitated periodic skirmishes between 
Romanian forces and Sonderkommando R‘s local auxiliaries, but it also provided Hoffmeyer 
and his staff with the pretext to launch an ethnic cleansing campaign designed to establish 
homogenous Volksdeutsche communities in Transnistria.  These strategic hamlets not only 
created a demographic barrier against subsequent Romanian attempts to undercut the unit‘s 
authority, but they also anticipated, at least in embryo, the types of militarized German 
agricultural settlements that the Nazi regime hoped might someday dominate German-
conquered Soviet territory.  While Sonderkommando R‘s economic dependence on 
Transnistria‘s Romanian occupiers stabilized an otherwise fractious relationship, these early 
and ongoing conflicts typified the frequently tortured interactions between German and 
Romanian authorities in the region. 
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 Second, Sonderkommando R‘s Nazification project hinged on establishing 
Volksdeutsche economic dominance in Transnistria.  This initiative took two forms.  On the 
one hand, it entailed the redistribution of scarce local resources to area ethnic Germans, 
primarily through a de facto dissolution of collective farms in many Bereichkommandos.  
This move produced a heated response from local Romanian authorities, who realized that 
unilateral de-collectivization threatened their economic interests in Transnistria.  On the other 
hand, Sonderkommando R imported large amounts of personal effects that the German state 
had stolen from its Jewish victims in occupied Poland and provided them to local 
Volksdeutsche at little or no cost.  These projects had both immediate and long-term 
implications.  In the short run, Sonderkommando R‘s acquisitive policies proved popular 
with local Volksdeutsche, who had lost tremendous amounts of property during Soviet rule 
and who yearned for a return to their once-privileged economic position in the area.  In the 
long run, securing a dominant position for area ethnic Germans promised to cement future 
German influence in southern Ukraine. 
 Finally, Sonderkommando R launched a dedicated, if ultimately incomplete 
propaganda and education campaign to wrest the ideological convictions of a once deeply 
religious Volksdeutsche population that, for more than two decades, had lived under Soviet 
rule.  Based in Odessa, which provided infrastructure that rural Transnistria sorely lacked, 
Sonderkommando R‘s propaganda apparatus depended primarily on a VoMi-published 
newspaper and an impressive National Socialist cultural center.  Perhaps cognizant of the fact 
that Volksdeutsche youth constituted the most fertile ground for its propaganda initiatives, 
Sonderkommando R placed special emphasis on the ideological instruction of the region‘s 
ethnic German youngsters.  The unit developed a substantial school system for local ethnic 
209 
 
German children that combined a high dose of National Socialist ideological instruction with 
a carefully crafted continuing education program for the region‘s Volksdeutsche teachers.  
The unit‘s attempts to create a National Socialist youth movement in Transnistria were, 
however, less successful.  Initially unwilling and eventually reluctant to partner with the 
Office of the Reichsjugendführer (Reich Youth Leader), under whose auspices the area‘s 
National Socialist youth organization was to operate, Sonderkommando R missed a key 
chance to influence the ideological formation of local Volksdeutsche children.  The unit‘s 
inability to capitalize on this opportunity because of the SS‘s determination to maintain its 
independence in the region provides a quintessential example of how Sonderkommando R‘s 
drive for autonomy became self-defeating. 
Germans and Romanians in Transnistria: An Antagonistic Alliance 
 From the start of Sonderkommando R‘s deployment to Transnistria, relations between 
the Romanian government and the SS were antagonistic to the point of dysfunction.  
Antonescu and Himmler detested one another.  Earlier in 1941, the SS had backed a failed 
coup led by Horia Sima‘s Iron Guard against Antonescu.  To make matters worse, Himmler 
had orchestrated Sima‘s transfer to Germany, where the SS kept him on ice in Bavaria as 
alternative to the Conducător.  Had the prospect of territorial expansion into occupied Soviet 
territory not proved so tantalizing to Antonescu, then, in all likelihood, he would have 
preferred to have had nothing to do with the SS.  For the SS‘s part, even after geopolitical 
ambition forced what was undeniably a shotgun marriage, it deceived the Romanians about 
the number of German personnel that it intended to deploy to Transnistria.579  
                                                 
579Copie de pe adresa Nr. 67148 a Ministerului Afacerilor Străine Dir politică către M.St.M., 
September 11,1941, USHMM, RG-31.004M, Reel 2, Fond 2242, Opis 1, Ed Hr 1081, 13.  
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Sonderkommando R‘s partnership with the Romanian civil administration was, to paraphrase 
Reitlinger, ―a house built on sand.‖580 
 Early Romanian moves against Transnistria‘s ethnic Germans, however, expanded 
fissures in this already tumultuous relationship.  From the start of the campaign, Romanian 
forces mistreated southern Ukraine‘s population.  Marauding Romanian soldiers stole 
tremendous amounts of civilian and state property.581  To make matters worse from the 
German perspective, the Romanians did not exempt area Volksdeutsche from their cupidity 
and treated them as a conquered people, whose property was fair game for looting.582  Georg 
B., an ethnic German from Mannheim, later recounted his initial encounter with the 
Romanian Army: ―on the first day of the occupation, we had to hide in the basement and 
could not leave.  . . .  We were under Romanian military guard and were prevented from 
leaving the cellar.  When we were finally let go, all of the poultry had been taken away by the 
Romanians.‖583  Both the Wehrmacht and Einsatzgruppe D took immediate measures to stem 
Romanian banditry during the summer of 1941.  Their protection, however, was incomplete 
and neither the German military nor the German police had the time or resources to rebuild 
the area‘s largely denuded Volksdeutsche communities.  That task fell to Sonderkommando 
R.  As an illustration of the situation‘s magnitude, the unit‘s initial staff orders focused on 
mitigating the effects of Romanian theft.  On September 22, 1941, Hoffmeyer ordered his 
freshly minted Bereichkommandoführer to ―stop all [Romanian] requisitions in 
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Volksdeutsche villages.‖584   Ethnic Germans left homeless by Romanian raids added 
particular urgency to Sonderkommando R‘s efforts.585  Romanian pillaging continued 
throughout the fall of 1941.  In November 1941, Hoffmeyer‘s subordinates warned him of 
―growing Romanian pressure‖ and ―renewed attacks on ethnic Germans near Landau.‖586  
Beyond damaging relations between local Romanian authorities and Sonderkommando R‘s 
staff further, continued Romanian thefts jeopardized the survival of local Volksdeutsche and 
thus threatened to derail Hoffmeyer‘s entire mission in Transnistria. 
 Hoffmeyer responded to Romanian looting in two primary ways.  First, he confronted 
it with direct armed resistance.  With fewer than 150 German subordinates spread thinly 
across Transnistria, he lacked the manpower to interdict Romanian raiding parties.  To 
compensate for its small staff, Sonderkommando R expanded the local ethnic German militia 
or Selbstschutz to protect Transnistria‘s Volksdeutsche settlements against Romanian theft.  
The origins, operations, and demographic composition of the Selbstschutz are discussed in 
detail in chapters seven and eight.  What is important here, however, is the organization‘s 
initial purpose.  As Heinrich Krumbeck, the former Bereichkommandoführer of Janowska, 
later explained: ―Bereichkommandoführer  . . .  were ordered to create a militia made up of 
ethnic German men to protect the Volksdeutsche population because there were no German 
troops  . . .  in the area.  We could not rely on the Romanians.  It was rather the case that we 
had to arm ourselves against the Romanians.‖587  With what amounted to a private army, 
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Hoffmeyer commanded his subordinates to halt continued Romanian assaults on the region‘s 
Volksdeutsche settlements. 
 Now staffed to contest Romanian incursions into areas of Transnistria that 
Sonderkommando R considered its bailiwick, Hoffmeyer‘s command grew more assertive in 
exercising its prerogatives.  Romanian authorities responded in kind, escalating what had 
been simmering hostility into a low-level armed conflict.  A fall 1941 encounter between 
Sonderkommando R‘s staff in Halberstadt and Romanian Army soldiers stationed in nearby 
Varvarivka exemplifies the intensification of this antagonism shortly after the occupation‘s 
beginning.  On November 20, 1941, Sergeant Marinescu of the 78th Romanian Infantry 
Battalion arrived in the predominantly ethnically German town of Steinberg and proceeded to 
the local mill, whose ownership Romanian and German authorities apparently contested.  
There, Marinescu attempted to eject the mill‘s Volksdeutsche employees, screaming ―You 
Germans, you Hitler!‖ (Du Deutsche, Du Hitler!).  At least according to the German version 
of events, during the ensuing brawl Marinescu attempted to throw a twelve-year-old local 
boy into the mill‘s flywheel.  Steinberg‘s local residents appealed to Sonderkommando R‘s 
Bereichkommando in Halberstadt, which sent a member of its staff, SS-Rottenführer Franz 
Leibham, to intercede.  Upon arriving in Steinberg, Leibham detained Marinescu and 
dispatched a local ethnic German, Matthäus Wanner, to report the arrest to Romanian 
authorities in Varvarivka.  Infuriated by Marinescu‘s arrest, his commanders arrested Wanner 
on the likely trumped up charge of publicly insulting Romanian national honor.  Leibham 
then traveled to Varvarivka with Marinescu in tow to negotiate for Wanner‘s release.  
Leibham approached Captain Constantin Sendrea, Marinescu‘s superior, who had imprisoned 
Wanner.  After heated negotiations, in which Leibham banged his fists on the table out of 
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frustration over their mutual communications difficulties, Leibham and Sendrea reached a 
deal: each man would release his prisoner and Marinescu would be banned from patrolling 
near Steinberg.  With the captives traded, Leibham headed home with Wanner.  On the road 
back to Steinberg, they again encountered Marinescu, who, in violation of the agreement, 
was returning to the town accompanied by two fellow Romanian soldiers.  In the ensuring 
wagon chase and shootout, Leibham recaptured Marinescu and took him back to Halberstadt 
for interrogation.  Sonderkommando R released Marinescu back to his unit a short time 
later.588 
 While this bizarre skirmish is among the best-documented, it was by no means 
unique.  Rather, it was part of an ongoing and periodically violent contest between 
Sonderkommando R and Romanian authorities for control of Transnistria‘s Volksdeutsche 
settlements.  This struggle played out both physically and bureaucratically.  Selbstschutz 
units frequently engaged Romanian soldiers, whom they suspected of pillaging ethnic 
German property.  Confrontations between Volksdeutsche militiamen and Romanian soldiers 
were not limited simply to the occupation‘s opening months.  In October 1942, for example, 
Sonderkommando R‘s liaison officer, SS-Untersturmführer Dr. Eckert, lodged a formal 
complaint with Romanian authorities about thefts from the vineyards and corn fields near the 
Volksdeutsche town of Peterstal.  According to Eckert, ―recently this plundering has reached 
                                                 
588 Both German and Romanian accounts of this encounter are preserved in correspondence between 
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such proportions that the [Romanian] soldiers are driving their booty to Odessa to sell.‖589   
The local Selbstschutz responded to one such incursion by firing on the Romanian 
soldiers.590  Sonderkommando R lamented the difficulties of disarming the frequently 
intoxicated Romanian troops peacefully.  In September 1942, for example, Selbstschutz 
sentries in the Volksdeutsche town of Rauch caught and arrested a drunk Romanian soldier 
wandering through the town at three o‘clock in the morning.591  As an indication of this 
conflict‘s duration, well into 1943 Sonderkommando R‘s commanders admonished their 
subordinates to report shootouts between the ethnic German Selbstschutz and the Romanians 
to the unit‘s headquarters in Landau.  Direct confrontations between Sonderkommando R and 
Romanian authorities were a perennial feature of the occupation. 
 Although armed conflagrations between the Romanians and Sonderkommando R 
abounded, many of these engagements simply hemorrhaged ink and red tape.  Transnistria‘s 
Romanian civil administrators sniped at Sonderkommando R over frequently petty issues in 
reams of written complaints.  As early as January 1942, in the midst of the mass killing of 
Jews in the region, Alexianu complained to Hoffmeyer about the ―arbitrariness‖ 
(Eigenmächtigkeit) of Sonderkommando R‘s staff.592  In June of that year, Romanian 
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authorities called SS-Untersturmführer Köhli on the carpet for a litany of matters, including 
disseminating pro-German propaganda to local Ukrainians, spying on Romanian forces, and 
theft of Romanian vehicles.593  His colleague, SS-Untersturmführer Liebl, fared little better.  
In March 1943, the Romanian Prefect in Berezovka (Berezivka) demanded an explanation 
for why local Volksdeutsche were collecting wood from a forest that was off-limits to 
them.594  Sonderkommando R‘s friction with the Romanians could, at least for some 
Bereichkommandoführer, become a death by a thousand paper cuts. 
 The second major way in which Hoffmeyer sought to limit Romanian influence in 
Transnistria was by reorganizing the region‘s demographic landscape to create ethnically 
homogeneous Volksdeutsche strongholds that permitted Sonderkommando R to project its 
authority more effectively.  Historically, the region‘s Volksdeutsche rarely lived in 
homogeneous Germanophone enclaves.  When German and Romanian forces arrived in 
southern Ukraine in the late summer of 1941, even the smallest nominally ethnically German 
localities had residents, whom local German-speakers, let alone the SS, regarded as 
Ukrainians or Russians.595  The demographic upheaval precipitated in the war‘s opening 
months further muddied the region‘s ethnic waters.  While targeted Soviet deportations had 
threatened the viability of some ethnic German communities by reducing the number of 
Volksdeutsche men, in some cases the war effectively created new ethnic German 
                                                 
593 Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle BK XXIV / 1068 an den Hauptstab Landau / Betr.: Stellungsnahme zum 
Schreiben des Departments des Zivilgouverneurs für Transnistrien - Verwaltungsdirektion - Nr. 14 635 vom 
28.3.1942, June 30, 1942, USHMM, RG-31.004M, Reel 2, Fond 2242, Opis 1, Ed. Hr. 1085, 116. 
594 SS-Untersturmführer Liebl an die Präfektur Berezovka / Betr.: Ihr Schreiben vom 20.12.42, March 
25, 1943, USHMM, RG-31.004M, Reel 18, Fond 2361, Opis 1, Ed Hr 70, 8824-8825. 
595 See, for example, Protokol doprosa Ionusa Aleksandra, April 6, 1967, USHMM, RG-31.018M, Reel 
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Protokol doprosa Kokha Floriana, November 14, 1966, USHMM, RG-31.018M, Reel 17, 8703. 
216 
 
settlements.596  Volksdeutsche spread throughout the region left many ethnic Germans 
vulnerable to continued Romanian harassment. 
 The unit‘s solution was to launch an ethnic cleansing campaign to create ethnically 
homogeneous communities where none had existed previously.  As Gustav G., an NSKK 
chauffeur attached to the Bereichkommando in Bischofsfeld, later explained: ―our primarily 
responsibility in the Bereichkommando pertained to concentrating Volksdeutsche insofar as 
they lived with the Russian population in various villages.  The Volksdeutsche were to be 
concentrated in certain residential areas as were the Russian residents.‖597  To achieve this 
historically unprecedented ethnic segregation required Sonderkommando R to relocate both 
area non-Germans and local Volksdeutsche.  In towns with a significant population of 
German-speakers, Hoffmeyer‘s subordinates simply forced local non-Germans to relocate.  
As Franz M., a former resident of Kunersdorf near Berezovka, later explained: ―[area 
Russians] from our locale were expelled.‖598  Similarly, in Friedensfeld, a town of 200 
residents near Rosenfeld, Sonderkommando R deported half of the town‘s residents to create 
an ethnically ―pure‖ Volksdeutsche settlement.599  Where Sonderkommando R‘s staff found 
insufficient numbers of area ethnic Germans to stake a claim to the town, they contented 
themselves with carving out a Volksdeutsche enclave from part of the locality.  Peter B., one 
                                                 
596 In November 1942, for example, in the midst of a dispute about billeting Romanian troops in the 
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of a handful of ethnic Germans in the town of Roshkova, recounted one such effort: ―only 
Russians lived in my neighborhood.  In another section of Roschkova, Russians and 
Volksdeutsche lived mixed together.  . . .  The Germans carried out a resettlement.  All 
Russian had to move into the exclusively Russian neighborhood.  The section of town in 
which the Volksdeutsche lived received the name Weidenau.‖600  Sonderkommando R also 
compelled B. to move to Weidenau, although not before asking him to separate from his 
Ukrainian partner and their two children—a request that he rejected.601  In cases where 
Hoffmeyer‘s subordinates encountered too few ethnic Germans to claim even part of a town, 
they simply relocated individual Volksdeutsche families to larger nearby settlements.602  
Remaking Transnistria‘s demographic landscape constituted a key component of 
Sonderkommando R‘s efforts to limit Romanian influence in the region‘s Volksdeutsche 
settlements. 
 Not surprisingly, the unit‘s attempts at population engineering quickly ran afoul of 
Transnistria‘s Romanian civil administration.  Area Romanian officials complained bitterly 
about the fact that Sonderkommando R‘s expulsions had created indigent refugees, for whom 
local Romanian administrators could not find accommodations.603  To add insult to injury, 
Sonderkommando R‘s deportations extended also to ethnic Moldovans.604  Pressure from 
                                                 
600 Aussage von P. B., October 20, 1964, BAL, B162/2303, 57. 
601 Ibid. 
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603 For Sonderkommando R‘s response to Romanian complaints, see Der Reichsführer SS Hauptamt 
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Alexianu reached such proportions that Hoffmeyer interceded with his staff—one of the rare 
instances in which he did so during 1942.  On June 22, 1942, he ordered his subordinates to 
coordinate their deportations of non-Germans more closely with Romanian authorities.605  
While Hoffmeyer‘s attempts to rein in his staff precipitated more carefully coordinated 
deportations in some instances, it did little to assuage Romanian anxiety about the process.606  
Sonderkommando R‘s capacity to declare part or all of a town ―ethnically German‖ and to 
reengineer local demographics to support that claim provided the unit with a potentially 
exponential capacity to expand its authority at the expense of that of the Romanian civil 
administration.  Although inconclusive, surviving evidence suggests that Sonderkommando 
R used population resettlements not simply to guard against Romanian interference, but also 
to secure a long-term presence in the region.  In April 1942, for example, Bereichkommando 
XI in Rastatt expelled the predominately ethnically Ukrainian residents of the nearby town of 
Gradovka (Hradivka) and replaced them with ethnic Germans from more remote local 
Volksdeutsche settlements, thereby creating a concentrated string of Volksdeutsche 
villages.607  Sonderkommando R‘s population policies provided it with an opportunity to 
expand its authority in the region and to create the islands of ―Germanness‖ necessary to 
secure future German influence in the area—a fact that was not lost on Transnistria‘s 
Romanian civil administrators. 
 Despite the acrimony of this latent conflict, Sonderkommando R‘s economic 
dependence on the Romanian civil administration appears to have blunted at least some of 
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this hostility.  This parasitic relationship resulted from the economic unviability of the 
VoMi‘s operations in Transnistria.  Despite the fact that Sonderkommando R oversaw more 
than 370,246 hectares of farmland—a radically disproportionate 10 percent of Transnistria‘s 
arable land—that produced a diverse and impressive yield, the unit had no cost-effective way 
to bring these goods to market.608  Negotiations with possible German and Romanian buyers 
fell through repeatedly because the market value of Sonderkommando R‘s agricultural 
products in both countries could not, even with subsidies, cover the immense transportation 
costs of shipping these goods via an underdeveloped transportation infrastructure that was 
already buckling in the midst of a war of attrition.609  Hoffmeyer‘s command, however, 
desperately needed to sell its agricultural goods because its small budget was barely 
sufficient to pay its staff and local Volksdeutsche employees.610  Sonderkommando R had but 
one option: it was forced to barter with Transnistria‘s Romanian civil administrators. 
 In exchange for large quantities of agricultural produce, Romanian authorities 
provided Hoffmeyer‘s unit with imported and scare goods that the VoMi could not afford to 
purchase.  Beginning in 1941, Sonderkommando R agreed to provide the Romanian civil 
administration with one half of all Volksdeutsche agricultural output in the region.611  In April 
                                                 
608 According to British signal intelligence, Sonderkommando R reported this figure to Berlin in 
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1942, once road travel became feasible, Siebert ordered his Bereichkommandoführer to 
provide half of the previous year‘s harvest to the agricultural director of the local Romanian 
Prefecture.  Keenly aware of mounting Romanian complaints about his subordinates‘ 
behavior, Siebert ordered his staff to deliver the appropriate goods to the Romanians by June 
1, 1942, and threatened to punish any non-compliant Bereichkommandoführer. 612  Later in 
1942, Sonderkommando R‘s leaders and their Romanian counterparts extended this 
agreement to include wheat, wool, and pelts that ethnic Germans had trapped.613  Despite 
Sonderkommando R‘s earlier violent dispute with local Romanian authorities over a mill in 
rural Transnistria, both sides ultimately reached a profit sharing agreement concerning 
Volksdeutsche-operated mills.  Beginning in August 1942, Romanian authorities agreed to 
allow ethnic Germans to operate some mills and Sonderkommando R consented to pay 
approximately 30 percent of the mills‘ revenue to the Romanian state.614  To fulfill their part 
of the bargain, Romanian authorities granted Sonderkommando R access to otherwise 
inaccessible products.  Throughout 1942, for example, Alexianu‘s staff provided 
Sonderkommando R with rations for area ethnic Germans that included cigarettes, matches, 
and distilled alcohol.615  At year‘s end, the Romanian civil administration traded 100 tons of 
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salt for a special delivery of additional agricultural products from local Volksdeutsche.616  
The Romanians were also a primary source for construction materials that Sonderkommando 
R needed to improve local infrastructure.  In July 1942, the unit asked the Romanian civil 
administration for a wagon of cement for roadwork between Worms and Landau.617  
Sonderkommando R repeated this request the following summer.618  Similarly, in August 
1943, Hoffmeyer‘s subordinates ordered five crates of window glass from the Romanian 
Prefect in Berezovka to fix damaged panes in a local ethnic German school.619  This mutually 
beneficial economic partnership served to solidify an otherwise acrimonious relationship. 
 While trade agreements brokered by high level leaders from both Sonderkommando 
R and the Romanian civil administration—as opposed to their personnel in the field who 
continued to duke out their disputes—stabilized Romanian-German relations in Transnistria, 
they did little to eliminate long-term distrust between the two powers.   Even as 
Sonderkommando R‘s commanders instructed the unit‘s midlevel leaders to cooperate with 
the Romanians, they made it clear to their staff that German and Romanian authorities had 
frequently conflicting interests.  In June 1942, for example, Hoffmeyer reached an agreement 
with the Romanian military, whereby it was permitted to confiscate all vehicles of Soviet 
manufacture.  Shortly after Hoffmeyer signed the agreement, he secretly instructed his 
subordinates to drive all of the unit‘s captured Soviet vehicles to Landau, where its NSKK 
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staff would hide their origin by repainting them with SS registration numbers and issuing 
appropriate paperwork.620  Despite entreaties from their superiors in Landau to cooperate 
with the Romanians, perceptive Sonderkommando R staff understood the subtext: the unit‘s 
alliance with the Romanian civil administration was one of temporary necessity. 
Enriching Transnistria’s Ethnic Germans 
 As Sonderkommando R secured its position in rural Transnistria, it pursued parallel 
initiatives that sought to bolster local Volksdeutsche by helping them to achieve a dominant 
economic position in the region.  Years of Soviet rule had turned a historically prosperous 
ethnic German population into paupers.  Fragmentary information about Volksdeutsche 
property contained in wartime ethnic German naturalization papers is illustrative.  The case 
of Jakob Feininger, an ethnic German from Friedenheim, a Germanophone hamlet near 
Rastatt, underscores the group‘s poverty on the eve of the invasion.  On June 22, 1941, 
Feininger lived in a 50-square-meter one-room stone house with a dirt floor and no running 
water or electricity.  In addition to a small garden plot, Feininger‘s personal possessions 
included two cows, two pigs, two sheep, five geese and a dozen chickens.  He had four years 
of elementary school education and the last of his nine children died in childbirth in 1942. 621  
This snapshot reflects the low level of economic development among area ethnic Germans 
even before the beginning months of Operation Barbarossa, during which both the Red 
Army‘s scorched earth policy and Romanian banditry further endangered the material well-
being of local Volksdeutsche.  When Sonderkommando R arrived in Transnistria in fall 1941, 
the Black Sea Germans were one of, if not the most impoverished group of ethnic Germans 
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that the unit‘s staff had encountered during its numerous deployments to Eastern Europe. 
 One of the two main ways in which Sonderkommando R sought to help local 
Volksdeutsche return to a dominant economic position in the region was to compensate them 
for property that the Soviet regime had expropriated during the 1920s and 1930s.  In rural 
Transnistria, the main assets that the unit could distribute to area Volksdeutsche were 
controlled by the more than 3,100 collective farms in which 70 percent of the region‘s rural 
population labored.622  Sonderkommando R‘s first and most significant step in improving the 
material position of area ethnic Germans was to dismantle a large number of collective farms 
and to redistribute the area‘s primary economic assets—land, agricultural equipment, and 
livestock—to local Volksdeutsche.  Throughout the Transnistrian countryside, 
Sonderkommando R‘s Bereichkommandoführer divvied up collective farms and encouraged 
local ethnic Germans to cultivate crops independently.623  Sometimes Hoffmeyer‘s 
subordinates assigned collective farmland on the basis of prerevolutionary ethnic German 
land claims.624  In other instances, Bereichkommandoführer appear to have reallocated 
collective farmland roughly equally among area Volksdeutsche.625  Bereichkommandoführer 
also removed tractors from nearby Machine Tractor Stations (MTS) and either gave them to 
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or placed them at the exclusive disposal of area ethnic Germans.626  Some enterprising local 
commanders traveled as far afield as the Reichskommissariat Ukraine to obtain the much-
desired machinery.  As SS-Hauptsturmführer Martin Assmann, the one-time 
Bereichkommandoführer in Halberstadt, explained to Soviet counterintelligence in 1944, 
during the fall of 1941 or the spring of 1942, he removed 45 tractors from a MTS in German-
occupied Nikolaev oblast‘, had them driven back to Transnistria, and distributed them to 
local ethnic Germans.627  Similarly, many Bereichkommandoführer emptied collective farms 
of livestock and provided it to area Volksdeutsche.628  If Assmann‘s statements to Soviet 
authorities—who took a keen interest in the theft of Soviet state property—are any 
indication, then the amount of livestock that Sonderkommando R gave to the region‘s 
Volksdeutsche was immense.  According to Assmann, during his tenure as Halberstadt‘s 
Bereichkommandoführer, he emptied the area‘s collective farms of 1,000 cows, 2,000 horses, 
500 sheep, and 30 teams of oxen for distribution to local ethnic Germans.629  Despite the 
scale of these reallocations, Sonderkommando R‘s staff appears to have been sensitive to the 
needs of individual ethnic Germans.  In Worms, for example, the local 
Bereichkommandoführer, SS-Untersturmführer Ludwig Bruderman, demanded that the 
collective farm in Petrovka relinquish two horses, a cart, and a cow to Jacob Herz, a local 
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ethnic German, or suffer ―harsh consequences.‖ 630    Similarly, during 1942, SS-
Untersturmführer Reichert, the Bereichkommandoführer responsible for the ethnic German 
settlement of Marienberg, assisted Richard Tews‘s property claims by ordering the local 
Selbstschutz to strong arm a nearby collective farm into surrendering two horses to him.631  
Between late 1941 and early 1942, Sonderkommando R‘s midlevel leaders effectively 
reversed years of Soviet agricultural policy for many ethnic Germans living in rural 
Transnistria.  
 The decision of Sonderkommando R‘s Bereichkommandoführer to dismantle 
collective agriculture was out of step with German occupation policy in the Soviet Union and 
a violation of superior orders to maintain collective farms in Transnistria.  Despite the 
pronounced desires of most of the local population in occupied Soviet territory to the 
contrary, German authorities opted to continue collective agriculture for the duration of the 
war because it promised the only reliable method of requisitioning agricultural products.632  
Romanian authorities pursued a parallel policy in Transnistria, which, at least initially, 
Sonderkommando R‘s personnel there were to follow.633  Over the course of the occupation, 
the unit‘s commitment to maintaining collective agriculture diminished.  In October 1941, 
Hoffmeyer instructed his staff that collective farms would be maintained indefinitely and 
even ordered the unit‘s Bereichkommandoführer to centralize smaller collective farms to 
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increase efficiency.634  Exactly a year later, however, Hoffmeyer traveled to Bucharest in an 
apparently unsuccessful bid to reach a high level agreement ―to loosen‖ collective agriculture 
in Transnistria.635  According to postwar testimony that his subordinates gave to both Soviet 
and West German authorities, in mid-1943 Hoffmeyer ordered his staff to redistribute land 
from collective farms to area ethnic Germans, officially ending collective agriculture for 
Transnistria‘s Volksdeutsche.636  Although the unit‘s staff orders do not contain this directive, 
they do indicate that, by 1943, Hoffmeyer and his immediate subordinates were not as keen 
to maintain collective farming as they had been two years earlier.637  While many local 
Bereichkommandoführer correctly anticipated this future change in Sonderkommando R‘s 
policies, their unilateral moves against collective farms during fall 1941 and spring 1942—
precisely the time at which Hoffmeyer reiterated his commitment to maintaining them as an 
institution—constituted a violation of their orders.  This explains, in large measures, why, at 
least in a handful of Bereichkommandos, collective agriculture continued well into 1943.638  
The extent to which Sonderkommando R later changed its official policy regarding collective 
farms as a result of mounting pressure from below is purely speculative.   It is, however, 
clear that, as with so many other of Sonderkommando R‘s initiatives in Transnistria, the de 
facto dissolution of collective agriculture was a project driven by the unit‘s midlevel leaders. 
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 It is possible that after two years Hoffmeyer and his immediate subordinates reached 
the same conclusion that many of their Bereichkommandoführer had arrived at almost 
immediately—namely that continuing to operate collective farms did little to advance the 
long-term material status of local Volksdeutsche, let alone Sonderkommando R‘s position in 
the region.  While perpetuating collective agriculture permitted occupation authorities to 
monitor production more closely, it also allowed the local population to pool land and 
particularly motorized equipment.  The latter was particularly important in Transnistria 
because of the scarcity of tractors.  In late summer 1941, Soviet forces had removed or 
destroyed nearly half of the region‘s tractors.639  Tractors in Transnistria were such prized 
commodities that even Sonderkommando R, which was busy acquiring a disproportionate 
share of them for ethnic German use, kept careful tabs on them.  In March 1942, for example, 
NSKK-Sturmführer Hotz, the head of the MTS in Waterloo, decreed that local ethnic 
Germans who had stolen tractor parts had until the following month to return them or face ―a 
general house-to-house search‖ for the missing components.640  According to Hotz, any 
person found intentionally sabotaging agricultural production by hiding the equipment would 
―suffer the harshest penalties.‖641  Although Romanian authorities eventually reopened the 
GINAP agricultural machinery plant in Odessa and imported several hundred tractors, 
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primarily from Germany, agricultural equipment was effectively finite.642  Sonderkommando 
R had good reason to attempt to monopolize this limited resource.  On the one hand, 
confiscating tractors from MTSs permitted local Bereichkommandoführer to increase 
dramatically the amount of VoMi-administered territory under motorized cultivation.  By 
February 1942, for example, Bereichkommando XIV based in Worms used 69 tractors to 
cultivate 56 percent of its more than 25,000 hectares of arable land.643   Access to a 
disproportionate number of tractors provided area Volksdeutsche farmers with a competitive 
advantage over their non-German neighbors.  On the other hand, concentrating tractors in the 
hands of local Volksdeutsche permitted Sonderkommando R to deny them to area non-
Germans, whose agricultural production on behalf of the Romanians suffered.  Maintaining 
collective farms during the occupation only made sense if the desired goal were to increase 
total agricultural output—an aim that much of Sonderkommando R‘s staff understood to be 
incompatible with the unit‘s task of establishing ethnic German economic dominance in the 
region. 
 While Hoffmeyer may have been slow to recognize the degree to which 
Sonderkommando R stood to benefit from eliminating collective agriculture, his Romanian 
counterparts were not.  The Romanian civil administration objected vociferously to 
Sonderkommando R‘s independent moves against collective farms.  As early as late 
November 1941, Alexianu began to forward complaints from his subordinates to 
Sonderkommando R about SS assistance to ethnic Germans in striping collective farms of 
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state property.644  In the midst of initiatives by the unit‘s midlevel leaders to remove a 
disproportionate number of tractors for exclusive Volksdeutsche use, SS-Obersturmführer 
Heinz Born, the commander of Bereichkommando XVI in Rosenfeld, had the temerity to 
request a fuel shipment from his Romanian counterparts to run the very equipment that he 
and his colleagues were quietly acquiring for their own purposes.645  As local 
Bereichkommandoführer intensified their acquisition of land and machinery in early 1942 in 
anticipation of the coming spring, Romanian complaints about Sonderkommando R‘s 
assaults on collective agriculture mounted.646  By late 1942, Romanian remonstrations had 
reached such proportions that the unit‘s liaison officer had no choice but to acknowledge the 
Romanian position and to issue a rare, yet tepid apology.  In response to Romanian charges 
that SS-Untersturmführer Köhli, the Bereichkommandoführer in Neudorf, had removed 
agricultural equipment from a nearby Ukrainian town, Eckert explained that Köhli had 
simply attempted ―to correct an old mistake‖ by returning the equipment to local 
Volksdeutsche, its rightful owners.647  Eckert assured his Romanian opposite numbers that for 
his well-intentioned, but misguided actions, Köhli had ―received the sharpest reprimands 
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from headquarters in Landau.‖648  Given that by November 1942, Hoffmeyer was already 
contemplating an end to collective agriculture, whatever tongue lashing Köhli received was 
more likely for ruffling Romanian feathers than for having removed the equipment.  The 
following month, in a feeble effort to diffuse the situation, Siebert ordered his subordinates at 
least to consult with Romanian Prefects prior to acquiring tractors for Volksdeutsche use.649  
Ironically, Sonderkommando R‘s senior leaders were perhaps the last to recognize that the 
demise of collective agriculture in Transnistria on the SS‘s terms stood to direct substantial, 
yet finite local resources to area Volksdeutsche and to increase the unit‘s position in the 
region at the expense of the Romanians. 
 The second primary way in which Sonderkommando R sought to succor 
Transnistria‘s Volksdeutsche was to supply them with clothing and personal effects stolen 
from the Third Reich‘s Jewish victims.  During the winter of 1941-42, Sonderkommando R 
had already facilitated Volksdeutsche robbery of Jewish property by permitting ethnic 
German militiamen to steal clothes from Jewish deportees.  For Sonderkommando R, this 
experience underscored both the inadequacy and dangers of permitting local Volksdeutsche 
to acquire Jewish property in this fashion.  On the one hand, these earlier thefts highlighted to 
Sonderkommando R both the poverty of local ethnic Germans and the massive amounts of 
purloined clothing that it would have to distribute to area Volksdeutsche to improve their 
general material welfare.  The comparatively small amounts of clothing that the ethnic 
German militia stole during the winter of 1941-42 disproportionately benefited active 
perpetrators.  The murdered Jewish deportees, who originated primarily from Bessarabia, 
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Bukovina, and elsewhere in Ukraine, were on average poorer than their Central or East 
Central European counterparts and had less desirable garments.  Moreover, Romanian 
authorities and their Ukrainian helpers had already fleeced the Jewish deportees repeatedly, 
leaving slim pickings for members of the Selbstschutz.  That Transnistria‘s Volksdeutsche 
militiamen snapped up apparel that even the Romanians had neglected to steal speaks to the 
abject poverty of many local ethnic Germans.  Well into 1943, Germans deployed to 
Transnistria encountered poorly clad Volksdeutsche.650   As an illustration of the dire 
situation of local ethnic Germans, Sonderkommando R explored repeatedly the possibility of 
manufacturing straw shoes for area Volksdeutsche so that they would not have to go barefoot 
in winter.651  As Rafael H., an ethnic German from Katharinenthal later explained, ―given our 
circumstances then,  . . .  Jewish clothes (Judenkleider)  . . .  were very good.‖652  
 On the other hand, the initial theft of Jewish clothing by Selbstschutz members also 
illustrated to Sonderkommando R that independent Volksdeutsche robbery could pose a 
serious public health hazard.  During the winter of 1941-42, Sonderkommando R had ordered 
its militia forces to murder the Jewish deportees in large part because it feared (not without 
reason) that the Jews, who had been held by Romanian authorities in appalling conditions, 
might spread typhus to the region‘s Volksdeutsche communities.  As discussed in chapters 
seven and eight, by allowing ethnic German militiamen simply to take clothing from Jews 
awaiting execution, Sonderkommando R had exposed many local Volksdeutsche to the 
typhus-causing Rickettsia bacteria carried on parasites in the garments.  A mass killing 
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operation predicated at least partially on disease prevention ironically had precisely the 
opposite effect.  Although unwilling to risk again exposing area Volksdeutsche to disease, 
Sonderkommando R remained conscious of local ethnic Germans‘ need for suitable clothes, 
which, within the context of the German war effort, were most readily obtainable from the 
Third Reich‘s Jewish victims killed elsewhere. 
 Sonderkommando R‘s solution was to create a centralized system for distributing the 
personal effects of Jews murdered in German-occupied Poland to Volksdeutsche in 
Transnistria.  As the area‘s entrepôt and, more importantly, as the terminus for the region‘s 
rail system, Odessa was the logical hub for this network.  In early 1942, Sonderkommando R 
established a warehouse there, whose primary function was to store, process, and sort stolen 
Jewish garments in preparation for their transfer to rural Transnistria.  Under the control of 
the Odessa‘s Wirtschaftsgruppe (Economic Group) and known also as the ―clothing camp‖ 
(Kleiderlager) to area Volksdeutsche and to Sonderkommando R‘s staff, the warehouse was a 
substantial facility.  Elvira G., a German secretary for the Odessa-based SS 
Wirtschaftsgruppe, later recounted that ―the [clothing] camp was housed in a school-type 
building.  In [its] many rooms, clothing and underwear from Jews was stacked 1.5 to 2 
meters high, so that the windows were partly covered.‖653  A communiqué from Hoffmeyer 
to Landau on February 13, 1943 provides some sense as the scale of this operation.  He 
notified his subordinates to expect a 45-car train with ―27,800 men‘s coats, 25,925 men‘s 
jackets, 32,325 pairs of men‘s pants, 14,825 men‘s vests, 9,800 pairs of men‘s shoes, 10,025 
pairs of men‘s underpants, 4,700 panties, 5,100 women‘s stockings, 4,200 pairs of women‘s 
shoes, 7,780 pairs of children‘s shoes, 9,000 boy‘s coats, 850 boy‘s jackets, 600 pairs of 
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boy‘s pants, 23,700 men‘s shirts, 600 pairs of men‘s socks, 44,000 women‘s jackets,  . . .  
[and]  . . .  29,085 miscellaneous pieces of women‘s clothing, including shirts . . . [and] 2,500 
blouses.654  Although wartime German records do not specify the origins of these clothes, 
both information gathered by Soviet counterintelligence and postwar testimony taken by the 
West German police indicate that this trainload and earlier shipments had originated in 
occupied Poland, and perhaps in Auschwitz.655  As Johanna W., an NS-Frauenwerk organizer 
attached to Sonderkommando R, later recounted: ―the clothes of at least 10,000 people, and 
probably more, passed through this [clothing] camp.‖656  
 By February 1943, Odessa‘s SS warehouse for looted Jewish goods was much more 
than a simple clearing house.  Upon the arrival of a shipment of items, a team of local 
Volksdeutsche women sorted, washed, and mended the clothes before trucks transported the 
garments to rural Transnistria under armed Selbstschutz guard.657  This procedure served 
three purposes.  The first was disease prevention.  To protect area Volksdeutsche from the 
very illnesses that Nazi ghettoization policy had fueled among Jews, Sonderkommando R 
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took disinfection seriously.  Sonderkommando R‘s threatened to beat any ethnic Germans, 
who procured the garments before they had been cleaned.658  Despite its efforts, 
Sonderkommando R had mixed success in this area.  As the warehouse‘s staff later testified, 
the sheer volume of clothing often required them simply to load the items on trucks for the 
countryside without proper preparation.659  Because of the amount of garments that arrived in 
Odessa, this system broke down in mid-1943.  Initially, Hoffmeyer issued a sternly worded 
complaint about ―inadequately‖ cleaned clothing and ordered that raiment ―for the entire 
Black Sea area [be] returned to Odessa.‖660  In October 1943, Sonderkommando R opted to 
close the facility.661  Cleaning garments previously owned by Jews devolved to Braun and 
her NS-Frauenwerk staff, who created special laundry facilities in Alexanderfeld, 
Johannisfeld, Worms, Speyer, Hoffnungstal, Selz, Gross Liebental, and Odessa.662  Uncertain 
about the effectiveness of these localized disinfection centers, Sonderkommando R‘s 
commanders shifted ultimate responsibility for the cleanliness of the newly acquired apparel 
onto local Bereichkommandoführer and ethnic German mayors, and warned teachers to be on 
the lookout for Volksdeutsche children wearing unwashed clothes.663 
 Second, sorting the items permitted Sonderkommando R‘s commanders to earmark 
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the most desirable clothes to reward Transnistria‘s most cooperative Volksdeutsche.  Müller, 
for example, forbade their subordinates from simply handing out these garments randomly to 
area ethnic Germans.  As he indicated in a March 1943 staff order, ―the items of clothing are 
not gifts, but rather for Volksdeutsche to purchase.‖664  In rural Transnistria, 
Sonderkommando R authorized Bereichkommandoführer to barter the clothes for grain, 
whereas in Odessa the unit expected local ethnic Germans to pay cash for their new 
garments.665  To ensure that the unit was not shortchanged, Sonderkommando R‘s senior 
leadership provided its Bereichkommandoführer with a recommended, and distinctly 
macabre price list.  Despite these careful instructions, Sonderkommando R‘s staff, for 
example, was to charge ethnic Germans between 15 and 50 RKKS 
(Reichskreditkassenschein, Reich‘s Credit Treasury Note) for men‘s coats and 2 to 10 RKKS 
for children‘s shoes, depending on their condition.666  Sonderkommando R‘s commanders 
permitted their subordinates to provide reliable local ethnic Germans with free or privileged 
access to the apparel.  The same month, Müller informed his subordinates that area 
Volksdeutsche mayors, teachers, and other employees were to have first dibs on the 
garments.667  In selecting which local ethnic Germans would be permitted to purchase the 
remaining clothes, Müller recommended that his subordinates sell these items first to 
communities or families ―who had performed exemplary service‖ to the unit.668  
Volksdeutsche families who had lost a son or father in Waffen-SS service were to receive 
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items free of charge.669 
 Finally, cleaning and mending the garments was a feeble attempt to hide their 
provenance from area ethnic Germans.  Beyond the SS‘s immediate public health concerns, 
the garments simply could not be distributed to area Volksdeutsche in the condition in which 
they had arrived because they still bore the stains of genocide.  As Elvira G. later testified, in 
the Odessa warehouse it was apparent ―that a portion of the clothes still had a Jewish star 
attached and were also spattered with blood.‖670  Other garments had visible bloodstained 
bullet holes.671  The SS instructed its female employees to search the clothes for hidden 
valuables that the garments‘ previous owners had sown into the linings and whose discovery 
would have divulged their origins.672  To oversee the day-to-day operations of its clothing 
warehouse in Odessa and to secure its secrecy, Sonderkommando R selected Pius W., the 
former Volksdeutsche mayor of Worms, whose alleged anti-Semitism, independent 
participation in the Holocaust, and thirst for Jewish property made him the ideal manager of 
this ghoulish enterprise.673  At its height, the unit transferred as many as 300 Selbstschutz 
members from rural Transnistria to guard the facility from sticky fingered Volksdeutsche, 
who might remove unwashed clothing, and interlopers, who might discover the warehouse‘s 
activities.674 
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 This attempted subterfuge was as ineffective as it was nonsensical.  As 
Sonderkommando R‘s centralized efforts to disinfect, clean, and repair the apparel buckled 
under the volume of garments that arrived in Odessa, so too did its attempts to remove 
valuables that Jews had sown into their clothing prior to death.  It is unclear whether or not 
the NS-Frauenwerk continued to look for valuables in the garments after it inherited 
responsibility for cleaning them in 1943, or if Sonderkommando R simply gave up on this 
measure entirely.  Regardless, Volksdeutsche began finding an array of hidden items, ranging 
from Polish bank notes to silverware, in items that they referred to as their new ―Jewish 
clothing.‖675  Sonderkommando R responded to these discoveries by ordering all 
Volksdeutsche to surrender these hidden valuables to their local mayors, who were to forward 
them to the unit‘s Bereichkommandoführer.676  This directive merely served to spread the 
word about potential finds to all local ethnic Germans.  Greed got the better of at least some 
ethnic Germans.  When, for example, the Volksdeutsche mayor of Peterstal refused to turn 
over a watch that he had found while passing out clothing to local ethnic Germans, Gross 
Liebenthal‘s Selbstschutz allegedly gunned him down.677 
 Why Sonderkommando R went to such lengths to obscure the origins of the garments 
that it distributed to area Volksdeutsche is unclear.  In its haste to transfer the clothes to 
Transnistria‘s ethnic Germans, the unit had no time to remove the physical evidence of 
genocide.  Any recipients would have grasped that the garments‘ previous owners had not 
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been German donors, as Sonderkommando R‘s cover story indicated, but rather had met with 
an untimely and violent demise.678  Yet, by virtue of their proximity to and direct 
participation in the Holocaust, area Volksdeutsche were unlike most of Hitler‘s other 
―beneficiaries.‖679  Thanks to the bureaucratized and theoretically clandestine ―machinery of 
destruction,‖ most Germans living in the Reich could bury their heads in the proverbial sand 
and claim blissful ignorance about the whereabouts of their former Jewish neighbors, as they 
acquired their property at fire sale prices.  Having witnessed or helped to murder Jews often 
within sight of their own homes, Transnistria‘s Volksdeutsche had no such luxurious distance.  
Attempting to obscure the origins of their new ―Jewish clothing‖ from area ethnic Germans 
amounted to denying the Holocaust to a population that was exceptionally implicated in its 
implementation.  Predictably, except for a handful of prevaricators, both former 
Sonderkommando R members and area Volksdeutsche admitted after the war to having 
received and often relished their new ―Jewish clothes.‖680  
Enlightening and Educating Transnistria’s Volksdeutsche 
 The final component of Sonderkommando R‘s Nazification project was to shape the 
Weltanschauung of Transnistria‘s ethnic Germans through an intense propaganda and 
education campaign.  To supervise the VoMi‘s Volksdeutsche propaganda in Transnistria, 
Sonderkommando R arranged for the transfer of thirty-one-year-old SS-Sturmbannführer 
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Friedrich Hallenberger from the Reichspropagandaamt (Reich Propaganda Office) in 
Saxony.  An early convert to right-wing politics, who protested the French occupation of the 
Ruhr in 1923 and suffered arrest for his membership in the fledgling Nazi party, Hallenberger 
was, as his personnel file noted, ―a model National Socialist.‖681  An ―old fighter,‖ who had 
joined the SA in 1926, and an Ordensjunker (Knight of the SS Order; a graduate of elite SS 
training) in the SS‘s Krössinsee and Vogelsang Ordensburgen (SS castles; elite SS training 
centers), Hallenberger‘s experience as a Volksdeutsche propagandist augmented his stellar 
National Socialist credentials.  During his involvement in the 1940 Bessarabian 
Volksdeutsche ―resettlement,‖ Hallenberger‘s superiors charged him with finding politically 
appropriate reading materials for ethnic German youngsters.  Hallenberger was also a prolific 
Volksdeutsche propagandist, who, on his own initiative, edited periodicals entitled Wir sind 
daheim (We are at Home) and Deutchland grüßt Euch (Germany Welcomes You), the latter of 
which the VoMi had trucked for a time from Dresden to Transnistria.682  Having secured 
Hallenberger‘s transfer to Odessa in 1942, Sonderkommando R charged him with 
propagandizing to the region‘s ethnic Germans in two ways.  First, Sonderkommando R 
placed a wireless propaganda truck at Hallenberger‘s disposal to proselytize to local 
Volksdeutsche.683  Second, beginning in September 1942, Sonderkommando R established its 
own Odessa-based newspaper, Der Deutsche in Transnistrien (The German in Transnistria) 
to trumpet its efforts on behalf of the area‘s ethnic Germans.684  Assisted by a group of local 
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Volksdeutsche women, Hallenberger edited the weekly periodical that the SS distributed 
throughout the city and its environs from July 1942 until March 1944.685  Advertising the 
VoMi‘s efforts on behalf of area ethnic Germans, the newspaper served as the SS‘s primary 
local mouthpiece.686  Görlich, who recently has surveyed the publication in detail, suggests 
quite plausibly that the content of the newspaper‘s articles focused less on naked anti-
Semitism, than on casting mass murder as a component of a broader ideological struggle 
against ―Judeo-Bolshevism.‖687  Above all, Görlich concludes, the periodical was designed to 
communicate the Third Reich‘s ―blood and soil ideology‖  to raise the awareness of local 
Volksdeutsche about their ―Germanness.‖688 
 In addition to Hallenberger‘s propaganda campaign, the SS also established a well-
equipped National Socialist cultural center for Odessa and the surrounding area in the 
recently-confiscated Jewish theater at Gretseskaia Street 46.  The Deutsches Haus (German 
House) opened its doors during a lavish ceremony on June 13, 1942, to which Hoffmeyer 
invited Alexianu.689  The building sported a lecture hall, a cinema (complete with 
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Volksdeutsche ushers), a library, a restaurant, and even an extensive German-language record 
collection—all of which were accessible only to German and Volksdeutsche patrons.690  To 
keep Volksdeutsche abreast of the Reich‘s latest propaganda, Odessa‘s 
Bereichkommandoführer, personally supervised weekly screenings of the Deutsche 
Wochenschau (German Weekly Newsreel), Nazi Germany‘s official newsreel.691  Over the 
next two years the Deutsches Haus added considerable flair to Sonderkommando R‘s 
Nazification project in Transnistria. 
 The same infrastructure that prompted the SS to develop an extensive ethnic German 
education and propaganda hub in Odessa also encouraged the VoMi to establish recreational 
facilities for Sonderkommando R‘s German personnel and trusted Volksdeutsche helpers.  
The Deutsches Haus exemplifies this trend.  At the building‘s inauguration, 
Sonderkommando R not only invited high-level Romanian guests, but also provided a junket 
for Bereichkommandoführer and Volksdeutsche mayors from rural Transnistria, whom 
Hoffmeyer invited to the festivities.692  The visit to the metropolis and respite from the 
drudgery of rural Transnistria was very well received and Siebert extended a follow-up 
invitation to Bereichkommandoführer and ethnic German mayors to celebrate at the 
Deutsches Haus six months later.693  These sojourns to Odessa proved popular and a few 
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months later Sonderkommando R transferred all of its quarterly Bereichkommandoführer 
meetings from Landau to the Deutsches Haus in Odessa.694  The big city lights were so 
attractive to Sonderkommando R‘s personnel stationed in the surrounding countryside that, in 
April 1943, Müller chastised his subordinates that the local Bereichkommandoführer could 
not be expected to take room reservations.695 
 Education constituted the second major component of Sonderkommando R‘s efforts 
to mobilize the Black Sea Germans for National Socialism.  The unit‘s aims were both 
ideological and practical.  One the one hand, area Volksdeutsche youth remained more 
receptive to the Nazi agenda than their parents.  This fact was not lost on Sonderkommando 
R‘s staff, which prioritized elementary education as a propaganda vehicle.  On the other 
hand, Sonderkommando R realized that it would first need to teach local Volksdeutsche 
children the German language.  Historically, even under Soviet rule, local ethnic Germans 
had maintained German-language elementary schools.  Beginning in the late 1930s, however, 
pressure from increasingly suspicious Soviet authorities had circumscribed what had been a 
robust German-language school system in the region and created a growing generation of 
Volksdeutsche, most of whom had little if any formal training in German.  In the midst of the 
invasion, the region‘s predominantly Russian-language school system had collapsed entirely, 
exacerbating the already low level of education in rural Ukraine.696  For Sonderkommando R, 
Transnistria‘s Volksdeutsche children constituted a group of ethnic Germans, who might be 
particularly receptive to the Nazi message, provided, of course, that the unit could teach them 
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German. 
 A desire for linguistic and ideological training shaped Sonderkommando R‘s initial 
foray into education.  In September 1941, shortly after arriving in their rural 
Bereichkommandos, many local commanders reopened ethnic Germans schools on an ad hoc 
basis.697  Beginning in early 1942, however, Sonderkommando R took more comprehensive 
measures to reestablish German-language elementary education for the region‘s 
Volksdeutsche youths.698  In June 1942, for example, Sonderkommando R mandated that all 
ethnic German children begin elementary education at age six.699  The unit took attendance 
gravely seriously, ordering its subordinates to penalize ethnic German parents for their 
children‘s truancy with fines or forced labor.700  Sonderkommando R expected all of the 
region‘s ethnic Germans children to attend eight years of school, after which they would 
become eligible for a diploma that they would be required to show to obtain employment or a 
land grant.701  Despite these lofty plans, anecdotal evidence suggests that Sonderkommando 
R found educating local Volksdeutsche children to be an uphill battle.  In November 1942, 
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for example, Hoffmeyer was compelled to order a special course in Landau for all illiterate 
ethnic Germans youths from the ages of fourteen to eighteen.  The primer that 
Sonderkommando R selected for the class, Sei Deutsche (Be German), was tellingly titled.702  
Similarly, Siebert ordered his subordinates to report all ―blind, deaf-dumb, or idiotic‖ 
students to headquarters in Landau.703 
 Sonderkommando R controlled the content of ethnic German lessons very carefully.  
In November 1942, the unit‘s commanders banned their subordinates from obtaining 
pedagogical materials independently.704  Sonderkommando R‘s precise curriculum remains 
unclear from the available records.  Nevertheless, an undated book purchase order highlights 
the general thrust of the unit‘s efforts.  In addition to requisitioning pens, pencils, and paper, 
Sonderkommando R also ordered 2,200 copies of Mein Kampf (My Struggle), 1,000 copies of 
Philipp Bouhler‘s Kampf um Deutschland: Ein Lesebuch für die deutsche Jugend (The 
Struggle for Germany: A Reader for German Youth), and 200 copies of Alfred Rosenberg‘s 
Parteiprogramm (Party Program) as general instruction materials.  In addition to nearly 
20,000 copies of the apparently desperately needed elementary German-language reader Sei 
Deutsch, some of the unit‘s other purchases included a sizable number of texts produced by 
racial medicine specialists, including Ernst Dobers and Martin Stämmler.  To ensure that 
local ethnic German youths were not overwhelmed by this weighty material, 
Sonderkommando R ordered 3,000 copies of the songbook Lieder unseres Volkes (Songs of 
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our People).  As a further indication of the linguistic difficulties that confronted the unit‘s 
educational efforts, Sonderkommando R bought 50 copies of Unterrichtsmetodik in 
mehrsprachigen Schulen (Instructional Methods for Multilingual Schools).705 
 While Sonderkommando R had a reasonably clear, if unimaginative picture of its 
desired curriculum, it was far less certain about the teaching staff that it had at its disposal.  
At the height of its operation in Transnistria, some 22,000 pupils had enrolled in the unit‘s 
more than 200 schools.706  Sonderkommando R lacked the resources to deploy sufficient 
numbers of teachers to staff a school system of this size, so it was forced to make do with 
local instructors who had worked for years in the Soviet school system.  Given the politically 
sensitive position of teachers under both Soviet and Nazi rule, the fact that most instructors 
had served under the Soviet regime automatically made them suspect in Sonderkommando 
R‘s eyes.  As Görlich has noted recently, local Volksdeutsche functionaries who served under 
both regimes, such as teachers, had to reformulate radically the ideological content of their 
work to satisfy their new masters.707  Prior to reopening the region‘s schools in fall 1941, 
local Bereichkommandoführer and ethnic German mayors screened area teachers before 
authorizing them to teach.708  Initial efforts to weed out Volksdeutsche instructors who 
maintained an affinity for the Soviet regime failed to assuage Sonderkommando R‘s 
commanders.  A half year later, Hoffmeyer continued to complain to Alexianu about the fact 
that many of the region‘s instructors had received their training in ―Bolshevik teaching 
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seminars.‖709 
 To ensure that local Volksdeutsche teachers acquired the appropriate National 
Socialist Weltanschauung, Sonderkommando R implemented both short and long-term 
solutions.  Initially, the unit identified promising local instructors and sent them for 
continuing education training in Germany.  In late spring 1942, the unit dispatched ten ethnic 
German instructors to study in Berlin.710  A further forty ethnic German teachers joined them 
later that summer to take part in a month-long training course.711  Perhaps to instill them with 
the necessary sense of martial urgency, some of the teachers received pistols and ammunition 
for the trip, which a number of them failed to return in a timely fashion.712 
 Perhaps because this solution proved cumbersome, however, Sonderkommando R 
decided to train most Volksdeutsche instructors onsite in a series of SS-run teacher training 
institutes.  This task fell to SS-Sturmbannführer Götz, a long-time Nazi party member and 
professional völkisch writer, whose research trips to Germanophone communities during the 
interwar period included lengthy sojourns to both Palestine and the United States.713  A fêted 
author, in September 1941, Götz received a personal summons from Himmler to assist the 
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VoMi in overseeing its educational policy in the occupied Soviet Union.714  In his capacity as 
Inspekteur für Bildungs- und Kulturarbeit in Transnistrien (Inspector for Educational and 
Cultural Work in Transnistria), Götz supervised the retraining of Volksdeutsche instructors in 
both Transnistria and the Reichskommissariat Ukraine.  As Götz‘s primary base of operations 
was in Prischib in German-occupied Ukraine, day-to-day oversight of Sonderkommando R‘s 
continuing education program for ethnic German teachers was the responsibility of SS-
Obersturmführer Fritz Dankert, a thirty-nine-year-old teacher from Magdeburg.715  Based 
first in Odessa and then relocated to the more centrally situated town of Selz, Transnistria‘s 
Lehrerbildungsanstalt (Teacher Training Institute) attempted to peel back years of suspected 
Soviet contamination through an intensive retraining program that exposed the largely 
sequestered participants to a heavy dose of National Socialist ideological instruction.716  
Whether or not these efforts succeeded is unclear.  Any failures, however, were not for lack 
of effort on Sonderkommando R‘s part.  The unit supported the institute with a 125,000 
Reichsmark grant.717  So strong was the desire to salvage these teachers for the Nazi cause 
that, even after the unit evacuated Transnistria, Götz reestablished the institution in 
Lubrandau in the Warthegau and operated it until the Waffen-SS drafted the institute‘s able-
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bodied instructors in October 1944.718 
 Sonderkommando R‘s final attempt to mobilize Transnistria‘s ethnic German children 
was to establish a National Socialist youth organization, the Deutsche Jugend (The German 
Youth).  Modeled on the Hitler Jugend, the Deutsche Jugend was a distinctly uncooperative 
cooperative enterprise between Sonderkommando R and the Office of the 
Reichsjugendführer.  As noted in chapter two, Sonderkommando R‘s commanders guarded 
the SS‘s autonomy in Transnistria jealously and attempted to limit the number of non-SS 
personnel deployed to the region, who might introduce competitive chains of command and 
thereby threaten the unit‘s independence.  The creation of the Deutsche Jugend posed 
precisely such a challenge to Sonderkommando R‘s authority.  Hoffmeyer repeatedly fought 
against the deployment of Hitler Jugend personnel, who were responsible for establishing the 
youth movement.  In mid-1942, for example, Hoffmeyer ―strongly disapproved‖ of the 
immediate deployment of Hitler Jugend workers to occupied Ukraine and advised the Office 
of the Reichsjugendführer that the Deutsche Jugend should be created only after the 
Bereichkommandos ―are fully organised.‖719  Tensions appear to have continued between the 
two organizations for months.720  Because of Sonderkommando R‘s recalcitrance, earnest 
efforts to establish the Deutsche Jugend in Transnistria did not begin until early 1943, and 
likely stunted the youth movement‘s growth.  In March 1943, Sonderkommando R‘s 
headquarter in Landau ordered its staff to organize ceremonies to induct local children into 
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the Deutsche Jugend the following month.721  Anecdotally, the youth movement‘s 
organization and ideological content seem to have been similar to that of the Hitler Jugend in 
Germany.  Participation in the Deutsche Jugend was mandatory for all youths ages ten to 
fourteen year old.722  To provide more intense ideological instruction, Sonderkommando R‘s 
commanders ordered their subordinates to create a summer camp for the movement in May 
1943.723  The Deutsche Jugend depended particularly heavily on area Volksdeutsche for its 
staffing needs.  It trained area ethnic German men and women to serve as Ortsjugendführer 
and Ortsmädelführerinnen (Local Youth Leaders) and deployed them to Volksdeutsche 
communities in rural Transnistria.724  Despite the continued scarcity of clothing, in April 
1943, Sonderkommando R ordered all local Deutsche Jugend leaders to wear uniforms.725  
Seven months later, the unit ordered the area‘s Bereichsjugendführer (Area Youth Leaders) 
and Ortsjugendführer to train with the Selbstschutz.726  While the Deutsche Jugend presented 
Hoffmeyer‘s command with an opportunity to engage the portion of the region‘s 
Volksdeutsche population that it recognized correctly as most receptive to its ideological 
agenda, the unit‘s greedily guarded autonomy ultimately stymied this effort. 
Conclusion: Hoffmeyer’s Volksgemeinschaft 
 Sonderkommando R‘s multifaceted efforts to mobilize local Volksdeutsche for the 
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National Socialist cause met with mixed results.  On the one hand, the unit‘s initial attempts 
to curtail Romanian intrusions into and theft from local ethnic German communities 
effectively limited Romanian involvement in the region‘s Volksdeutsche affairs.  It also 
provided Hoffmeyer‘s subordinates with an entrée to reengineer the ethnic composition of 
Transnistria‘s Volksdeutsche settlements—a move that permitted the unit to administer local 
ethnic Germans more effectively and to secure a demographic basis for the Third Reich‘s 
long-term influence in the area.  On the other hand, Sonderkommando R‘s propaganda 
initiatives were less potent.  Despite the energy with which the unit developed a propaganda 
apparatus in Odessa, the fact that Sonderkommando R focused its attention on local ethnic 
German youngsters suggests that Hoffmeyer‘s subordinates remained disappointed with the 
ideological commitment of many adult Volksdeutsche, most of whom had been socialized 
prior to or during Soviet rule.  While Sonderkommando R developed an impressive 
Volksdeutsche education system that devoted specific attention to retraining ethnic German 
teachers to become competent National Socialist instructors, its fights with other German 
agencies delayed the implementation of a local Nazi youth movement and undercut its 
efficacy. 
 Sonderkommando R‘s efforts to improve the material position of local Volksdeutsche 
was by far the unit‘s most successful attempt to win the ―hearts and minds‖ of the region‘s 
ethnic Germans.  Under Soviet rule, authorities had targeted local German-speakers 
disproportionately for expropriations because of their substantial land ownership prior to 
1917.  A loosening and in some cases elimination of collective agriculture promised to roll 
back decades of Soviet power and to undo what many area Volksdeutsche regarded as one of 
the Russian Revolution‘s most pernicious consequences.  Similarly, local ethnic Germans 
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snapped up the imported personal effects of murdered Jews with such alacrity that after the 
war former residents made no effort to mask the universally known provenance of what 
many of them called their new ―Jewish clothing.‖  The opportunity to acquire substantial 
personal property constituted the unit‘s most fruitful attempt to secure local Volksdeutsche 
support for the National Socialist enterprise in Transnistria. 
 Materialist explanations for German support for the Nazi regime and its genocidal 
programs have received recent scholarly attention.  Götz Aly‘s seminal study has argued that 
popular access to stolen Jewish property cemented widespread support for the Third Reich in 
Germany.727  While Aly‘s attempts to downplay ideology as a causal factor remain 
problematic, his focus on the material dimensions to National Socialism‘s popularity among 
Germans has merit. Evidence from Sonderkommando R‘s efforts to enrich local 
Volksdeutsche in Transnistria confirms many of Aly‘s findings and suggests that cupidity 
may have played an even greater factor in securing ethnic German support for the Nazi 
project in the region.  Notwithstanding this parallel, it is important to contrast the infinitely 
greater amount of property that Sonderkommando R proffered to Transnistria‘s 
Volksdeutsche with the material goods that the Nazi regime offered to German living in the 
Reich.  In Germany, local residents rarely depended on the Nazi regime, and particularly its 
genocidal projects, to provide them with the bare necessities.  This was not the case for 
Transnistria‘s ethnic Germans.  Years of Soviet rule and successive waves of expropriations 
had left Transnistria‘s Volksdeutsche one of, if not the poorest, groups of ethnic Germans that 
the VoMi had encountered.  The reason why flea-ridden bloodstained clothing from the Third 
Reich‘s victims proved so attractive to the region‘s ethnic Germans was because no better 
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garments were available to them.  In contrast to Reich Germans, Transnistria‘s ethnic 
German often depended on the Nazi regime for the means of survival.  It should thus come as 
little surprise that access to these goods contributed to Volksdeutsche support for the Nazi 
project in a more profound way than for Reich Germans, whom Nazi authorities could offer 
comparatively far less.  Even if individually the spoils of genocide were modest, 
Transnistria‘s Volksdeutsche were comparatively among the primary beneficiaries of the 
Volksgemeinschaft. 
 
  
 
CHAPTER VI: POLICING THE METROPOLIS: GERMANS, 
“VOLKSDEUTSCHE,” AND ROMANIANS IN ODESSA 
 On the morning of October 21, 1941, the custodian of Odessa‘s Museum of Western 
Civilization summoned twenty-three-year-old Eugeniie Anisimova and her middle-aged 
mother to lead an unusual and most demanding tour group.  Having fled the besieged 
metropolis weeks earlier to their former residence in suburban Odessa, the two women had 
returned to their bombed-out apartment in the recently occupied city.  Homeless, the pair had 
sought refuge with the museum‘s caretaker, an old family friend.  Unable to communicate 
with the delegation of SS and Wehrmacht officers who queued for admission, the Russian-
speaking janitor hoped that the two Volksdeutsche women would help disarm the menacing 
visitors by granting them a German-language tour.  Although ostensibly inspecting the 
building for booby traps, the visit‘s true purpose became clear as the Germans began loading 
paintings, rugs, and even a golden saddle into their vehicles.  At the conclusion of the tour-
cum-robbery, the group‘s leader, SS-Obersturmführer Siebert, thanked the two women and 
complimented their excellent German.728  Hearing of their dire situation, Siebert advised 
Anissimoff and her mother to register for support at the local Bereichkommando in a former 
music conservatory on Novovlaskaia Street.729 
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 The following evening, October 22, a Soviet time bomb destroyed the Romanian 
military‘s general headquarters in Odessa‘s former NKVD building.  In retaliation, Romanian 
forces unleashed an orgy of violence against the city‘s Jews.  Likely discouraged by the 
recent events from venturing outdoors, Anisimova proceeded to the Bereichkommando three 
days later.  Upon entering the former music school‘s foyer, Anisimova passed the flag-draped 
casket of the unit‘s former commander, SS-Untersturmführer Walter Güldner—a casualty of 
the recent explosion—whose body was lying in state.730  After paying her respects, 
Anisimova proceeded to the unit‘s Volksdeutsche registration office.  Taking Siebert‘s advice 
to downplay the fact that her Russian father, Nikolai Anisimov, had been a tsarist army 
officer, she used her mother‘s maiden name and registered as Eugenie Beck.  As she would 
do until 1945, Beck omitted reference to her two-year marriage to a Jewish scientist during 
the late 1930s.  Captivated by the attractive, educated, young woman‘s polyglot skills, the 
Bereichkommando‘s ―Volksdeutsche classifier,‖ SS-Oberscharführer Erich-Meinert Claasen, 
issued her a Volkstumsausweis and hired her as his assistant.731  During the next four years 
Beck‘s responsibilities expanded from classifying Odessa‘s denizens, to serving as an 
interpreter for the SS, to working for the VoMi‘s propaganda apparatus—to even 
participating in counterinsurgency deployments.732 
 This chapter reconstructs Sonderkommando R‘s efforts to identify local ethnic 
Germans, like Beck, and to marshal them as a bulwark of Germandom in Odessa.  Its aims 
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are two-fold.  First, it reconstructs the VoMi‘s attempts to mobilize local Volksdeutsche as a 
demographic counterclaim to long-term Romanian designs in the city—the only significant 
urban area in Transnistria.  Second, and more centrally, it probes how the Third Reich 
struggled to layer its demographic plans over the Soviet Union‘s multiethnic reality at the 
local level.733  This chapter argues that the friction between the VoMi‘s racial fantasies and 
Odessa‘s ethnic multiplicity moved Sonderkommando R‘s personnel to murder even when 
doing so fell outside of their bailiwick and superior orders discouraged them.  Charged by 
their superiors with ―culling‖ racially ―pure‖ Volksdeutsche from one of the Soviet Union‘s 
most cosmopolitan cities—a task that local reality would hamstring—Sonderkommando R‘s 
staff used innovative, if counterproductive, mechanisms to identify Odessa‘s ethnically 
German denizens.  Unable to guard access to the Nazi racial community through 
classification, local SS officials emulated their colleagues‘ genocidal campaign in the 
surrounding countryside by deploying a miniature death squad to catch and murder suspected 
Volksdeutsche imposters in Odessa.  Armed with their own terror apparatus, 
Sonderkommando R‘s Bereichkommando in Odessa exploited its purview over 
Volksdeutsche matters to contest the formal control of their Romanian allies. 
Bereichkommando XXV in Odessa 
 The staff that Siebert assigned to Odessa‘s Bereichkommando XXV—the largest and 
most elaborate of his subunits—mirrored Sonderkommando R‘s hodgepodge composition 
discussed in chapter two.  After the bombing of the Romanian military headquarters 
                                                 
733 For an examination of comparable German policies elsewhere in occupied Ukraine see Andrej 
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mentioned above, Siebert replaced Güldner with SS-Untersturmführer Hans-Joachim 
Goerbig, both a longtime National Socialist and an experienced VoMi officer.734  A member 
of the NSDAP since 1929 and of the SS since 1938, his superiors seconded him to the VoMi 
at the beginning of the war.  Except for a brief stint in the Wehrmacht in 1940, over the next 
two years Goerbig participated in all of the VoMi‘s major ―resettlement‖ campaigns to 
relocate Volksdeutsche from East-Central and Eastern Europe to German-occupied Poland.  
When the SS reassigned him from his duties registering Volksdeutsche in Poland‘s General 
Government to the newly-established Sonderkommando R, the thirty-year-old Goerbig 
numbered among the VoMi‘s veterans.735 
 For Goerbig‘s deputy in Odessa, SS-Unterscharführer Erich-Meinert Claasen, service 
with Sonderkommando R provided a jumpstart to a lackluster military career.  A convinced 
Nazi who conceded his political loyalties to the West German police even in the 1960s, 
Claasen had joined the SS Division Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler (Adolf Hitler Bodyguard 
Division) in 1934.736  After participating in the invasion of Poland in 1939, Claasen‘s 
battlefield career ended in 1940, when he was wounded in Arras, France, and transferred to a 
dead-end posting in one of the SS Germania Division‘s reserve battalions.  Following 
friends‘ advice that service with the VoMi could be a ticket to a commission, Claasen 
transferred there in October 1940 and took part in the population transfers of ethnic Germans 
                                                 
734 German Police Decodes Nr 2 Traffic: 26.1.43, February 2, 1943, BNA, HW 16, Piece 37, Part 1, 2. 
735 SS Offizier Akte Hans-Joachim Goerbig, NARA, RG 242, A3343, SSO-019A, 64-65.  RuSHA Akte 
Hans-Joachim Goerbig, NARA, RG 242, A3343, RS B5213, 930-50.  Aussage von H. J. G., August 1, 1962, 
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736 Aussage von E. M. C., August 6, 1962, BAL, B162/2293, 173. 
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from the Baltic, Bessarabia, and Bukovina.  A ―real ‗Siegfried‘-guy,‖737 as one of his 
Volksdeutsche subordinates later described him, the twenty-five-year-old Claasen hoped that 
service in the East would fast track his SS career.738 
 As was the case with Sonderkommando R in general, Bereichkommando XXV‘s 
rank-and-file were on average both older and less ideologically committed to National 
Socialism.  For example, thirty-seven-year-old Herbert Kirschstein, who had floated through 
various food service and hotel jobs during the Weimer Republic, joined the VoMi because it 
permitted him to avoid military service.  While managing a restaurant near Berlin‘s 
Tiergarten in September 1941, Kirschstein bemoaned a possible Wehrmacht draft notice to 
one of his regular customers, a VoMi member.  On his patron‘s recommendation, Kirschstein 
volunteered for what he later described as ―the lesser evil.‖739  Starved for personnel, the 
VoMi overlooked the fact that Kirschstein was neither a Nazi party nor an SS member and 
had no experience with Volksdeutsche matters.740  Within weeks the VoMi deployed him to 
Transnistria as an SS-Unterscharführer.741  Although Kirschstein‘s colleagues later groused 
                                                 
737 Aussage von E. F., December 15, 1966, Staatsarchiv Hamburg, 213/12 Staatsanwaltschaft 
Landgericht NSG 0589-004, Band 8, 1361. 
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Ernennung der Angehörigen des Rußland-Kommandos des Hauptamtes Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle zu 
Fachführern der Waffen-SS in SS Offizier Akte Fritz Dankert, NARA, RG 242, A3343, SSO-135, 1018.  SS 
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739 Verantwortliche Vernehmung von E. A. H. K., June 4, 1962, Staatsarchiv Hamburg, 213/12 
Staatsanwaltschaft Landgericht NSG 0589-001, Band 1, 120. 
740 Sonderkommando R‘s personnel limitations were so severe that in February 1942 VoMi 
headquarters in Berlin warned that there were no available personnel to deploy to Ukraine.  German Police 
Decodes: 25.2.42, February 28, 1942, BNA, HW 16, Piece 46, 2. 
741  Aussage von H. K., January 28, 1963, BAL, B162/2301, 122. 
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about his primitive grasp of Volksdeutsche affairs, limited education, and ―waiter‘s manners,‖ 
within a few months he was spearheading the unit‘s death squad.742 
Everyday Life in Bereichkommando XXV 
 At least initially, VoMi aid attempted to remedy legitimate hardships that Odessa‘s 
Volksdeutsche faced.  Arriving in Odessa immediately after the Romanian Army in mid-
October 1941, Bereichkommando XXV‘s staff encountered a once-thriving Black Sea 
metropolis that had undergone violent changes in the preceding months.  The city‘s two-
month siege and Soviet evacuation took a toll on its local population.  In addition to the 
physical damage caused by military operations, the Soviet government had evacuated much 
of the city‘s industrial and human capital as well as rendered its port inoperable.  By October 
1941, Odessa‘s remaining residents—a mere half of the prewar population of 600,000—
faced dire prospects even before the harsh winter of 1941-42 precipitated a food shortage.  
According to fragmentary postwar testimony, prior to quitting the city the NKVD executed a 
number of ethnic German men and attempted to dynamite the prison.743 
 Although not targeted as a potentially hostile group, ethnic Germans‘ suffering 
compounded under Odessa‘s new Romanian rulers.  At least initially the Romanians interred 
all men of military age.  In many instances this included Volksdeutsche who had endured 
weeks of Soviet captivity.  Moreover, Romanian troops plundered Volksdeutsche property as 
that of everyone else during the first weeks of occupation.  Front-row witnesses to the 
Romanian Army‘s murderous campaign against the Jews both in Odessa and in the suburb of 
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743 Dallin, Odessa, 1941-1944, 51.  Aussage von N. R., November 7, 1963, Staatsarchiv Hamburg, 
213/12 Staatsanwaltschaft Landgericht NSG 0589-003, Band 5, 706. 
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Dalnik, Volksdeutsche had few illusions about their new overlords.744  As one ethnic German 
woman explained a generation later: ―The VoMi shielded [us] from the Romanians.  We were 
therefore very grateful to the Germans and the VoMi in Odessa and happy to be finished with 
Russian rule.‖745  An embattled population without other prospects for relief, Odessa‘s 
Volksdeutsche welcomed the SS‘s much-needed aid. 
 One of the most pressing difficulties was that of food distribution.  Given wartime 
inflation and food scarcity—particularly during the occupation‘s first brutal winter—the 
city‘s Volksdeutsche desperately needed VoMi victuals.746  During the winter of 1941 
inflation was so severe that Transnistria‘s senior Wehrmacht commander, Lieutenant General 
von Rothkirch, voiced concerns to his Romanian allies about the ability of German soldiers 
to supply themselves with food on the open market.747  To placate von Rothkirch, Romanian 
administrators augured that ―with the evacuation of the Jewish population, the market will 
hopefully be controlled.‖748  Notwithstanding Romanian optimism, the following summer, 
even after the supply situation stabilized somewhat, economic advisors at the German 
Embassy in Bucharest were still grumbling to Transnistria‘s Romanian administrators that ―in 
                                                 
744 Reference to Romanian violence litters the postwar German testimony of former Odessians.  See, 
for example, Aussage von L. W., n.d., BAL, B162/2291, 30-31. 
745 Aussage von F. E., August 27, 1963, Staatsarchiv Hamburg, 213/12 Staatsanwaltschaft Landgericht 
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Odessa the price for groceries . . .  are two to five times as high as in Bucharest.‖749 
 To remedy this crisis, Sonderkommando R established an elaborate, independent 
infrastructure for feeding the Odessa‘s Volksdeutsche.  The bearer of a Volkstumsausweis had 
easy access to German ration cards, redeemable at Odessa‘s two Volksdeutsche grocery 
stores as well as its butcher shop, bakery, and oil and flour mills, each of which was managed 
by a Volksdeutsche proprietor.750  The SS apparently provisioned Odessa so well from SS-
administered ethnic German farms in the surrounding countryside that it was necessary to 
hire a full-time worker to make crates just for the foodstuffs that Bereichkommando XXV‘s 
staff smuggled back to Germany.751 
 The SS also facilitated Odessa‘s Volksdeutsche in acquiring apartments previously 
owned by the city‘s Jews.752  Although in postwar statements many Volksdeutsche claimed 
that the SS had simply ―issued‖ them apartments, Beck noted that, in many instances ―the 
unit merely helped ethnic Germans keep apartments they had themselves procured.‖753  
Bereichkommando XXV‘s efforts to reallocate Odessa‘s prime real estate to the city‘s 
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Volksdeutsche dovetailed with Romanian efforts to murder the city‘s Jews.  In mid-February 
1942, for instance, three homeless Volksdeutsche petitioned the city‘s Romanian prefect to 
―kindly place three Jewish apartments at our disposal.‖754  Perhaps to streamline the process 
the VoMi encouraged local ethnic Germans to denounce the few Jews who remained in their 
apartments after ghettoization and deportation in late 1941 and early 1942.  After Romanian 
officials arrested the Jews, the SS stepped in to reward the ethnic German informer with the 
deportees‘ apartment.755  Area Volksdeutsche snapped up this property so quickly that in 
September 1942 the SS bent to Romanian pressure and ordered ethnic Germans to pay rent 
for their purloined apartments to, and to ―purchase‖ their household furnishing from, the 
Romanian administration.756 
 Third, as discussed in chapter five, like their colleagues in rural Transnistria, 
Bereichkommando XXV‘s members enriched local Volksdeutsche by giving them the 
personal effects of murdered Jews.757  Subordinated to the VoMi‘s Wirtschaftsgruppe, rather 
than to Bereichkommando XXV, the SS administered a warehouse in Odessa that served as a 
clearing center for clothing and other personal items that German authorities sent by train 
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from occupied Poland.758  Although in postwar interrogations some erstwhile Volksdeutsche 
asserted that their new clothing had come from German donors, many of them fondly 
remembered their ―good Jewish clothing,‖ some of which Bereichkommando XXV 
distributed to its Volksdeutsche employees for Christmas in 1941.759  Beyond providing for 
the basic needs of its ethnic German charges in Odessa, the SS ensured that local 
Volksdeutsche shared in the ill-gotten fruits of the Third Reich‘s genocide. 
 In addition to breaking the routine of life in occupied rural Ukraine, Odessa‘s VoMi 
leisure institutions provided German SS personnel with access to indigenous female 
companions.  Müller‘s early February 1942 request for ―eight capable, young, good looking 
girls for casino and domestic work‖ from the SS in Nikopol captures Sonderkommando R‘s 
attitude toward local women.760  Odessa‘s VoMi personnel labored to staff recreational 
centers with eligible ethnic German women, who proved easy targets of the SS‘s advances.  
In his capacity as manager of the Deutsches Eck (German Corner) pub, Kirschstein selected 
―capable, young, good looking‖ ethnic German women to work as servers and maids when 
they appeared to register with the VoMi.761  Once on their payroll, Bereichkommando XXV‘s 
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personnel frequently solicited their local female employees for sex.762  Kirschstein, for 
example, offered one of his female workers a pair of nylon stockings if she were ―to be nice 
to him in the evening.‖763  Unfortunately for him, the proposal made little sense to a woman 
who was unfamiliar with nylons, and she declined the offer.764  The woman later stated to the 
Hamburg police that, while cleaning his room the following morning, she discovered that 
Kirschstein had spent the night with two women for whom his charms were more evident.765  
―Orgies‖ and ―‗amusements‘ with local girls‖ were, as a local ethnic German described them, 
a part of the SS‘s Alltag in Odessa.766 
Finding Odessa’s Volksdeutsche 
 Given the SS‘s efforts to underpin and to Nazify local Volksdeutsche, the question 
remains who among Odessa‘s residents should partake in these heady endeavors?  The SS, 
somewhat surprisingly, had little idea.  Even though the VoMi had had extensive practice 
relocating ethnic Germans from earlier population transfers, it proved unable to conceive 
viable litmus tests for a category as slippery as ethnic identity.767  Previous experience led the 
SS to use factors that included ancestry and language skills, as well as cultural and political 
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orientation, in an otherwise nebulous scheme that relied on Gestalt.  Prior to the invasion of 
the Soviet Union, the VoMi knew, or at least thought that it knew, an ethnic German when it 
saw one. 
 Despite Himmler‘s efforts to codify classification criteria in March 1941, the 
established methods for discerning individuals of German ethnicity disintegrated on the other 
side of the Soviet frontier.768  On December 28, 1941, Hoffmeyer circulated the first of many 
staff orders on how to classify Transnistria‘s Volksdeutsche population.  Inspired by, but 
explicitly separate from, the multi-tiered categories of the Deutsche Volksliste (German 
People‘s List) used to classify Volksdeutsche first in occupied Poland, Hoffmeyer‘s new 
schema jettisoned criteria other than ancestry.769   Siebert articulated why Sonderkommando 
R developed uniquely simplified Volksdeutsche criteria for Transnistria a year later in a 
follow-up staff order.  As he explained:  
The preconditions for registering persons of German ethnicity in the former Soviet 
territories are noticeably different than what has been experienced in the German 
Eastern Territories.  The Volksdeutsche in the Soviet Union were never able to 
participate in politics because every political activity meant death or at least 
deportation and exile.  The cultural activity of individuals of the German ethnicity 
was likewise standardized and prescribed by the Soviet regime.770 
 
The VoMi‘s realization that its standard Volksdeutsche identification criteria were ill-suited 
for use within the pre-1939 boundaries of the Soviet Union left Sonderkommando R in 
Transnistria with an ad hoc and diluted classification schema. 
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 For Sonderkommando R Odessa‘s Volksdeutsche remained especially suspect. Even 
before arriving in the city, the SS had concluded that the situation of local ethnic Germans 
was ―catastrophic.‖771  The origins of this perception were four-fold.  First, as prewar Odessa 
had had the highest proportion of Jews of any Soviet city, the SS suspected that earlier 
interaction between the city‘s Volksdeutsche and Jews had eroded the racial ―purity‖ of local 
ethnic Germans.772  Second, in rural Transnistria many Volksdeutsche affiliated with the 
Soviet state or in ―mixed marriages‖ with local Jews had anticipated harsh treatment at the 
hands of the Germans and had voluntarily evacuated with the Red Army.   Odessa‘s two-
month siege, by contrast, had prevented a similar escape.773  Third, unlike Volksdeutsche in 
rural Transnistria, Odessa‘s ethnic Germans had avoided earlier SS efforts to murder what it 
considered racially and politically ―undesirable‖ elements.  Whereas in the Transnistrian 
countryside Einsatzgruppe D had murdered perhaps hundreds of remaining Volksdeutsche 
―communists‖ or members of ―mixed race‖ marriages with Jews, the city‘s ethnic Germans 
were spared the SS‘s first fatal selections.774  Lastly, in the first days of the Romanian 
occupation, Sicherheitsdienst (Security Service, SD) personnel attached to the Romanian 
Special Intelligence Service (SSI) had distributed provisional Volksdeutsche identification 
papers to Odessians without checking to see if the recipients met any of the SS‘s criteria.  
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Arriving on the SD‘s heels, Bereichkommando XXV‘s staff had to rubber stamp—quite 
literally—these temporary ID cards to extricate Volksdeutsche from Romanian custody.775  In 
Odessa, the SS thus confronted an exceptionally suspect local Volksdeutsche population. 
 Rather than offering guidelines on how to proceed, Bereichkommando XXV‘s 
superior orders only underscored its suspicion of Odessa‘s Volksdeutsche.  To prevent further 
Volksdeutsche ―contamination,‖ the SS in Landau banned ethnic Germans in rural 
Transnistria from migrating to the city.776  As for Volksdeutsche already in the metropolis, 
Sonderkommando R‘s leaders could only wring their hands.  Hoffmeyer‘s December 1941 
guidelines, for example, explicitly ordered Bereichkommando XXV not to use 
Sonderkommando R‘s new Volksdeutsche classification schema in Odessa.777  Barred from 
employing Sonderkommando R‘s new Volksdeutsche identification guidelines, 
Bereichkommando XXV‘s staff developed, under Claasen‘s guidance, its own fly-by-night 
criteria that, in his words, were ―not implemented completely systematically.‖778  Not subject 
to the VoMi‘s guidelines, the Volksdeutsche ID cards that Claasen distributed remained valid 
only in Odessa.  According to Sonderkommando R‘s regulations, Volksdeutsche who 
registered with the VoMi‘s Odessa office and then moved to rural Transnistria were to be 
reevaluated and have permanent record of their residence in the city.779  While the VoMi 
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remained convinced that it could identify ethnic Germans in East-Central and Eastern 
Europe, and after a fashion even in rural Transnistria, it considered the candidates in Odessa 
so questionable that it failed to offer the city‘s SS personnel any guidelines on how to 
proceed. 
 The material privileges that Bereichkommando XXV afforded Odessa‘s 
Volksdeutsche and the SS‘s inability to translate its racial fantasies into an operational 
definition of a Volksdeutscher invited many Odessians to apply for a Volkstumsausweis.  
Bereichkommando XXV‘s staff was terrified by the prospect of Jews passing as 
Volksdeutsche to avoid deportation and murder.  As an anonymous February 1942 
denunciation sent to the VoMi‘s Odessa office warned: ―In our city there are still very many 
Jews with German and Russian passports  . . .  Above all pay attention to cleansing the city  . 
. .  Volksdeutsche  . . .  because at most 50 percent of them are Germans and the rest are 
Jews.‖780  While the informant blamed the Jews‘ German-sounding surnames and accents for 
their ability to slip into the category, the reality was probably more prosaic.  As 
Bereichkommando XXV‘s staff suspected—probably correctly—Romanian authorities 
pilfered Volksdeutsche identity papers and sold them to Jews and other eager customers on 
the black market.781  Even if the number of Odessa‘s Jews cloaked as Volksdeutsche 
remained small, they constituted a perpetual boogieman for local SS officials.  In his postwar 
testimony, for example, Goerbig noted that while many Volksdeutsche inhabited Odessa, ―60 
percent of them were Jews.‖782  Experience identifying, relocating, and evaluating the racial 
                                                 
780 Ancel, Transnistria, 1941-42, 1145. 
781 Aussage von P. M., August 29, 1963, Staatsarchiv Hamburg, 213/12 Staatsanwaltschaft Landgericht 
NSG 0589-002, Band 4, 583. 
782 Aussage von H. J. G., August 1, 1962, Staatsarchiv Hamburg, 213/12 Staatsanwaltschaft 
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―worth‖ of other Volksdeutsche groups failed to provide Bereichkommando XXV‘s staff with 
a viable means of identifying Odessa‘s Volksdeutsche.  It did, however, equip it with a deep 
suspicion of local ethnic Germans and a rabid fear of Jewish ―infiltration.‖  Even if local 
VoMi officials could not fashion a definition of an ethnic German, then their experience told 
them that their initial selections had failed. 
 Dissatisfied with the results of its preliminary efforts to identify Volksdeutsche, 
Bereichkommando XXV hit upon an ingenious solution: if it could not find the city‘s ethnic 
Germans, then it would simply hire local employees who could.  Although retained as 
administrative support staff, the VoMi‘s local employees—who were overwhelmingly local 
Volksdeutsche women—soon received expanded responsibilities that included interviewing 
and classifying the more than 8,000 Odessians783 who responded to Bereichkommando 
XXV‘s newspaper, placard, and loudspeaker invitations to apply for Volksdeutsche status.784  
When the SS deployed its new classification scheme is unclear, but within weeks of retaining 
her services, Claasen assigned Beck to begin selecting Volksdeutsche for him.  In drawing 
the crucial distinction between Odessa‘s Jews and Volksdeutsche, the VoMi granted its 
female helpers considerable latitude.  As Edith Herrlich, Beck‘s successor as Claasen‘s 
secretary, later recounted: ―an acquaintance of mine, a teacher named Else A., applied for a 
                                                                                                                                                       
Landgericht NSG 0589-001, Band 2, 98. 
783 Absent Bereichkommando XXV‘s internal documents, it is impossible to determine how many 
ethnic Germans Sonderkommando R identified in Odessa.  Völkl estimates that between 7,580 and 9,016 
Odessians successfully registered with Bereichkommando XXV as Volksdeutsche.  Völkl, Transnistrien und 
Odessa, 88.  Based on the numbering of Volksdeutsche identity cards occasionally included in 1944 ethnic 
German naturalization applications, this estimate appears plausible.  Johannes Volk, for example, received 
Volkstumsausweis number 6,686.  Einbürgerungsantrag Johannes Volk, July 25, 1944, NARA, A3342-EWZ50-
I075, 1298.  According to the Russian Empire‘s 1897 census, Odessa was home to 9,900 Germans, or 2.6 
percent of the city‘s population.  Völkl, Transnistrien und Odessa, 24. 
784 Aussage von H. E. K., March 18, 1966, Staatsarchiv Hamburg, 213/12 Staatsanwaltschaft 
Landgericht NSG 0589-004, Band 8, 1377. 
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Volkstumsausweis from Claasen.  Because Claasen construed the last syllable of her surname 
‗son‘ as the Jewish name ending ‗sohn,‘ she was not going to receive a Volkstumsausweis.  It 
was also the case that she had a slightly curved nose.  Since I knew her parents from the 
Baltic, I could verify that she was not of Jewish ancestry.  She therefore received the ID 
card.‖785  As Herrlich‘s anecdote demonstrates, while Claasen and other SS officials were 
present during the selection process, the unit‘s female Volksdeutsche employees often 
remained the ultimate arbiters of ―Germanness‖ in Odessa. 
 Recruiting its Volksdeutsche classifiers from the initial candidates who applied for a 
Volkstumsausweis, the VoMi had significant choice in whom to hire as a Volksdeutsche 
evaluator.786  In addition to being women, Bereichkommando XXV‘s interpreter-classifiers 
fit a three-point profile.  First, because of their job‘s multilingual requirements, 
Bereichkommando XXV‘s interpreters frequently had university training, making them 
better-educated than most of the unit‘s Reich German personnel.  Second, like many Soviet 
Volksdeutsche, they had suffered under Soviet rule.  And third, despite the fact that most 
interpreters had lived in the region for some time and maintained a command of the area‘s 
ethnic topography, many of them retained familial ties to other Volksdeutsche groups. 
 Like Beck, Claasen‘s second assistant, Herrlich, typified these trends.  Born in 
Moscow and a longtime local resident, the thirty-four-year-old‘s parents were members of 
Riga‘s Baltic German bourgeoisie, who moved to Odessa after her father‘s German employer 
transferred him there in 1908.  Attending Odessa‘s German-language primarily school, 
                                                 
785 Aussage von E. F., December 15, 1966, Staatsarchiv Hamburg, 213/12 Staatsanwaltschaft 
Landgericht NSG 0589-004, Band 8, 1361. 
786 Aussage von M. S., November 7, 1963, Staatsarchiv Hamburg, 213/12 Staatsanwaltschaft 
Landgericht NSG 0589-003, Band 5, 714.  Aussage von N. R., November 7, 1963, Staatsarchiv Hamburg, 
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Herrlich then studied at the short-lived Germanophone Lyceum that German occupiers 
established during their brief control of the city at the end of the First World War.  With the 
Russian Revolution, Civil War, and concomitant closing of Odessa‘s German schools, 
Herrlich enrolled in a two-year pedagogical course at Odessa‘s Institute for Literature and 
Language and embarked on a teaching career.  Shortly after she married in 1930, Soviet 
authorities arrested both her husband and her father, who died in prison the following year.  
Following her spouse into exile in Poltava, where new circumstances frayed their 
relationship, she returned to Odessa.  They divorced in 1935.  Working as a teacher in Odessa 
until the city‘s occupation in 1941, Herrlich registered with Bereichkommando XXV and 
―from its first days‖ served on its staff.787  Capable, unemployed, and embittered, Herrlich 
was eager to help the VoMi identify the city‘s Volksdeutsche. 
 Retaining members of a suspect population to define its own limits proved disastrous 
for the amorphous category‘s integrity.  Bereichkommando XXV‘s Volksdeutsche assistants 
used their new authority to assist fellow Odessians navigate the VoMi‘s complex and lethal 
classification quagmire.  In addition to mistranslating and vouching for a candidate‘s ethnic 
credentials, Bereichkommando XXV‘s Volksdeutsche helpers divulged confidential selection 
guidelines to applicants.  Volksdeutsche with Jewish spouses profited from insider 
information on a key loophole in Bereichkommando XXV‘s classification criteria.  Although 
officially barred by Hoffmeyer from applying Sonderkommando R‘s Volksdeutsche 
classification procedure to Odessa, Claasen and his staff eventually did precisely that.788  
According to Hoffmeyer‘s instructions, Sonderkommando R‘s personnel were to distribute a 
                                                 
787 Einbürgerungsantrag Edith Herrlich, June 30, 1944, NARA, A3342-EWZ50-C074, 1281-32.  
Quoted on frame 1232. 
788 Aussage von E. M. C., August 6, 1962, BAL, B162/2293, 174. 
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Volkstumsausweis to Volksdeutsche with two ―purely‖ ethnic German parents and to 
Volksdeutsche who lived with ―a purely foreign race or predominately foreign race 
individual.‖789  In the latter case, Hoffmeyer directed his subordinates ―to decide on a case to 
case basis‖ according to their ―overall impression‖ of the family.790 
 When, for example, the SS ordered Beck‘s former English instructor, an Australian-
born ethnic German, to register his family at the VoMi‘s Odessa office, he asked Beck how to 
proceed.  Apparently denounced by a local informant, Beck‘s former teacher feared revealing 
his Jewish wife and half-Jewish son to the SS.  Aware that Jewish relatives would doom his 
application, Beck suggested that he present his Russophone wife as an ethnic Russian.791  
With a gentile ―foreign race‖ spouse, the man stood a good chance of presenting a positive 
―overall impression‖ at the interview and receiving a Volkstumsausweis that would shield his 
family from murder.  By helping their non-German and even Jewish acquaintances obtain 
ethnic German identity cards, the VoMi‘s female helpers sabotaged the SS‘s efforts to 
identify Odessa‘s Volksdeutsche—the precise task that the SS had recruited them to perform. 
 Despite the SS‘s dependence on its Volksdeutsche interpreters, postwar testimony 
indicates that they were not above suspicion.  Beck‘s rapid advancement in the VoMi from 
Claasen‘s translator to Goerbig‘s secretary to Hoffmeyer‘s interpreter, combined with her 
haughtiness toward both Volksdeutsche and low-ranking SS personnel, chaffed her 
                                                 
789 Rundanweisung Nr. 11 / Betrifrt [sic] namentliche Erfassung und Registrierung aller 
Volksdeutschen in Transnistrien, December 28, 1941, BB, R 59/66, 132. 
790 Ibid., 132. 
791 Aussage von E. S., November 12, 1963, Staatsarchiv Hamburg, 213/12 Staatsanwaltschaft 
Landgericht NSG 0589-003, Band 5, 746. 
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coworkers.792  Her colleagues began spreading rumors about her Jewish former husband—
now allegedly an NKVD officer—and her half-Jewish child hidden at her family‘s former 
summer residence in nearby Lustdorf.  Kirschstein took these rumors seriously enough to 
hunt for the imaginary child in suburban Odessa while Goerbig, Beck‘s protector, was 
away.793 
 Notwithstanding these reservations, the unit‘s female employees remained 
indispensable to the SS for romantic reasons.  In contrast to ubiquitous casual liaisons 
between the unit‘s German personnel and local Volksdeutsche women, Odessa‘s VoMi 
administrators maintained long-lasting relations with the unit‘s office staff.794  Soon after 
starting as his secretary, for example, Beck began a very public affair with the married 
Goerbig.795  She was not only his frequent guest at high-level social events at Odessa‘s 
German Consulate, but she even accompanied him to official functions, such as the opening 
of the Deutsches Haus.796  Beck ordered a local jeweler to smelt gold rubles into two ersatz 
wedding rings that she presented to Goerbig in 1942.797  After the Germans and many of the 
                                                 
792 Aussage von O. G., October 19, 1963, Staatsarchiv Hamburg, 213/12 Staatsanwaltschaft 
Landgericht NSG 0589-002, Band 4, 687. 
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ethnic Germans evacuated Odessa in March 1944, Goerbig tracked Beck down in VoMi‘s 
Gymnasialstrasse Resettlement Camp (Umsieldlungslager) in Ostrowo, Poland, and whisked 
her off to a romantic getaway in Vienna, where they conceived a child.798  Similarly, after her 
stint as Claasen‘s assistant, Herrlich began a relationship with her supervisor, the head of 
Sonderkommando R‘s accounting office, SS-Oberscharführer Hans Franck.799  The two 
married after the war.800  Kirschstein‘s distain for Beck did not extend to Bereichkommando 
XXV‘s other female interpreters.  Soon after deploying to Transnistria with the unit, he began 
a relationship with Ingeborg Hirsh, the multilingual daughter of the prewar German Vice 
Consul to Kishinev (Chişinǎu) and sole Reich German secretary assigned to 
Bereichkommando XXV.801  When Hirsch and the still-married Kirschstein evacuated 
Odessa, she was four months pregnant.802  Focused on matters of the heart, the VoMi‘s SS 
staff overlooked—either intentionally or unintentionally—continued abuses of its ad hoc 
identification procedures by its Volksdeutsche interpreters. 
 Although retaining local women who resembled the Baltic Germans that 
Bereichkommando XXV‘s staff had encountered in earlier assignments reassured the unit‘s 
                                                                                                                                                       
Landgericht NSG 0589-003, Band 5, 751-52.  According to wartime documentation, SS-Unterscharführer 
Franck‘s duties included liaising with other German units in Odessa.  Abschrift / Fernspruch / an: 
Verbindungsstab der Deutschen Wehrmacht für Transnistrien, April 5, 1942, USHMM, RG-31.004M, Reel 2, 
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802 Ibid., 1132. 
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German personnel, it also granted the VoMi‘s female employees the opportunity to 
participate in and guide the SS‘s murderous ethnic classification enterprise at the grassroots 
level.  Focusing on predominately male local auxiliaries in the Soviet Union, recent research 
has largely overlooked the important role that local women played in the Nazi occupation 
regime.  As scholars like Harvey have noted, German women were important agent of Nazi 
Germanization plans in the East—a position that expanded their freedom of action beyond 
Third Reich‘s gendered constraints.803  As Lower‘s recent research indicates, this expanded 
latitude permitted some German women stationed in the East to murder.804  While there is no 
evidence that Volksdeutsche women attached to Bereichkommando XXV killed, their 
language skills and familiarity with Odessa‘s ethnic topography afforded them exceptional 
input in the SS ethnic classification process.  Area Volksdeutsche women played a significant 
role in identifying ―authentic‖ ethnic Germans in need of aid and Volksdeutsche ―imposters‖ 
to face the SS‘s brutality.  Nevertheless, as the above examples demonstrate, 
Bereichkommando XXV‘s female helpers used their influence over ethnic German 
classification to privilege their friends and acquaintances even when doing so willfully 
undermined their SS superiors.  Confronted with the untidy realities of the city‘s ethnic 
multiplicity, Bereichkommando XXV underpinned its embattled ethnic classification efforts 
with local Volksdeutsche women that it permitted participate in and ultimately to undermine 
its broader demographic project. 
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Bereichkommando XXV’s Descent into Violence 
 Unable to distinguish Volksdeutsche from the rest of the city‘s population either 
themselves or through local intermediaries, the VoMi‘s Odessa office emulated 
Sonderkommando R‘s other Bereichkommandos and began murdering racially suspect 
Odessians caught applying for or carrying a Volkstumsausweis.  Bereichkommando XXV‘s 
decision to solve its classification quagmire through murder was distinct from 
Sonderkommando R‘s mass killing of Jews in rural Transnistria, which is addressed in 
chapters seven and eight.  Rather, Bereichkommando XXV‘s involvement in the VoMi‘s 
carnage in rural Transnistria was tangential.  Although aware of their colleagues‘ crimes, 
Odessa‘s VoMi office lacked both the personnel and the authority to participate in the 
killing.805  As initial Romanian deportations surprised VoMi officials in rural Transnistria, it 
is unlikely that Bereichkommando XXV knew about the deportations until they were already 
underway.  Goerbig and his staff‘s role was limited to facilitating subsequent negotiations 
between Hoffmeyer and Alexianu in which the two may have discussed murdering Jews.806  
While not directly implicated in the killing, the murders signaled to Bereichkommando 
XXV‘s staff that using violence to overcome local obstacles to its plans was now 
Sonderkommando R‘s modus operandi. 
 Bereichkommando XXV‘s killing operations evolved from its efforts to excise 
                                                 
805 Beck testified that Hoffmeyer presented members of Bereichkommando XXV with photographic 
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Romanian influence from Odessa‘s Volksdeutsche affairs.  As discussed earlier, in rural 
Transnistria Sonderkommando R‘s personnel contested the authority of the local Romanian 
civil administration.  In Odessa, this conflict assumed a different, albeit no less acrimonious 
form.  There, the VoMi‘s dozen Reich German staff members administered thousands of 
Volksdeutsche spread throughout a major city under foreign occupation.  Unable to 
concentrate its ethnic Germans geographically or field a militia unit like Bereichkommandos 
in the surrounding countryside, Bereichkommando XXV lacked the strength to deter 
Romanian interference in its affairs, to say nothing of challenging Romanian authorities.807  
With the Germans at their weakest and the Romanians at their strongest, Odessa became a 
lightning rod for tensions between the two allied powers. 
 Despite high-level directives urging restraint, pervasive Romanian retaliation against 
local Volksdeutsche prompted Goerbig to establish a special detachment to contest specific 
instances of perceived Romanian meddling.808  Well-connected via telephone hotline at the 
VoMi‘s Odessa command post, Bereichkommando XXV‘s self-styled Judicial Section 
(Rechtsabteilung) and responsible Court Officer (Gerichtsoffizier) afforded Volksdeutsche 
round-the-clock protection from the city‘s Romanian occupiers.809  Assigned to the post, 
Kirschstein—the unit‘s self-proclaimed ―gofer‖ (Dienstmädchen)—later conceded that these 
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elevated titles were a bit pompous for a one-man operation housed in a backroom marked 
with a cardboard sign.810  Kirschstein nevertheless had his hands full.  As he later noted: ―the 
Romanian police often looked for an excuse to rip off Volksdeutsche ID cards, food, and 
vehicles.‖811  In instances of simple attempted robbery, Kirschstein confronted the Romanian 
perpetrators directly.  As Pauline Zimmermann later recounted: ―Sometime in the summer of 
1942 Romanian officers attempted to take away my concert grand piano.  After notifying the 
[Ethnic] German Liaison Office [Kirschstein] came and prevented its removal.  [Kirschstein] 
admonished the Romanians that they were not permitted to set foot in my apartment again.  
He then attached a sign to the apartment door indicating that no one was to enter my 
apartment again.‖812  Perhaps in retaliation for the continued Romanian theft of 
Volksdeutsche property, Bereichkommando XXV‘s staff—possibly under Kirschstein‘s 
supervision—reportedly began carjacking Romanian employees.  As a local tow truck driver 
for Odessa‘s Romanian administrators complained to Wehrmacht investigators in early 
March 1942, while transporting a commandeered car back to the garage for service ―he was 
chased out of the [tow] truck by German soldiers and the truck with the car attached was 
driven into the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle‘s courtyard.‖813  In the event that Odessa‘s 
                                                 
810 Verantwortliche Vernehmung von E. A. H. K., February 9, 1965, Staatsarchiv Hamburg, 213/12 
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Romanian authorities arrested Volksdeutsche on real or trumped up charges, Kirschstein 
intervened in Romanian court proceedings and boasted that he was even able to obtain stays 
of execution for condemned Volksdeutsche.814  Whether Kirschstein wielded such authority is 
unclear—as Beck later noted, he was ―a poser.‖815  Be that as it may, as the unit‘s Court 
Officer Kirschstein ran interference with Romanian officials on matters ranging from 
securing food shipments to obtaining buildings for Volksdeutsche use from the Romanian 
housing administration.816 
 Realizing in the spring of 1942 that their efforts to distribute ethnic German 
identification cards only to Odessa‘s ―real‖ Volksdeutsche had failed, Goerbig and his 
colleagues decided to expand Kirschstein‘s purview to include murdering racially suspect 
applicants.817  Whether Goerbig‘s superiors consented to Bereichkommando XXV‘s decision 
to murder or whether this is another example of the SS‘s ―on the spot‖ decision-making in the 
East remains unclear.818  Although distinct from Sonderkommando R‘s mass shootings in the 
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surrounding countryside, Bereichkommando XXV‘s staff presented its local initiatives as a 
component of the VoMi‘s mass murder in rural Transnistria.819  As Kirschstein embellished in 
his 1944 RuSHA autobiography, his duties included ―the liquidation of Jews in the Odessa 
area.‖820  At precisely the time that the large-scale murder of Jews in the Transnistrian 
countryside concluded, Bereichkommando XXV‘s personnel began pursuing racially suspect 
Odessians. 
 The VoMi‘s initial murders in Odessa targeted Jews who had obtained a 
Volkstumsausweis illicitly.  Its first documented killing occurred in early March 1942, shortly 
after Kirschstein doubled his staff by recruiting Friedrich Hummel, a twenty-year-old ethnic 
German from nearby Michaelsfeld, as his assistant.821  Apparently on the lookout for 
Volksdeutsche imposters, Claasen detained ―a red-haired, unshaven, medium-sized, Jewish-
looking man‖ when he appeared at the VoMi‘s office with a Volkstumsausweis.822  After a 
brief staff meeting, Goerbig ordered Kirschstein to imprison the man in a temporary 
basement detention cell for interrogation the next morning.  Overnight the man escaped 
Kirschstein‘s flimsy dungeon, only to be recaptured by a VoMi patrol the following day.823  
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822 Aussage von E. S., November 12, 1963, Staatsarchiv Hamburg, 213/12 Staatsanwaltschaft 
Landgericht NSG 0589-003, Band 5, 744. 
823 Verantwortliche Vernehmung von E. A. H. K., June 4, 1962, Staatsarchiv Hamburg, 213/12 
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The man‘s subsequent questioning was brutal.  As Kirschstein later described, during 
interrogations he frequently pummeled suspects with his fists and rubber hoses.824  Satisfied 
that the man was a Jew, Bereichkommando XXV‘s staff decided to murder him. 
 On Goerbig‘s orders, Kirschstein and Hummel loaded the man into a captured Soviet 
staff car to transport him to what would become the unit‘s preferred execution site.  Although 
Hummel and Kirschstein described their Jewish victim as a Russian to conceal their racial 
motives for the killing—motives considered sufficiently ―base‖ as to carry murder charges in 
West Germany—their postwar testimony provides the most vivid account of what 
transpired.825  As Hummel recounted: ―Kirschstein ordered me to keep an eye on the Russian 
and to guard him during the drive.  For this reason I was armed with a Russian percussion 
revolver.  Kirschstein drove the car past Odessa‘s main train station and in the direction of 
the sanitarium that had housed the NKVD headquarters prior to the war.  At a side entrance to 
the sanitarium Kirschstein stopped the car.‖826  As Kirschstein continued: ―Hummel, the 
Russian and I got out.  As Hummel looked for the SD shooting pit, I followed [him] with the 
                                                                                                                                                       
Staatsanwaltschaft Landgericht NSG 0589-001, Band 1, 125.  Verantwortliche Vernehmung von E. A. H. K., 
February 9, 1965, Staatsarchiv Hamburg, 213/12 Staatsanwaltschaft Landgericht NSG 0589-003, Band 6, 918.  
Aussage von H. K., January 28, 1963, BAL, B162/2301, 126. 
824 Verantwortliche Vernehmung von E. A. H. K.‖ February 9, 1965, Staatsarchiv Hamburg, 213/12 
Staatsanwaltschaft Landgericht NSG 0589-003, Band 6, 930. 
825 Hummel later conceded to his interviewers that their ―Russian‖ victim was, in fact, a Jew.  Aussage 
von F. H., May 25, 1964, 213/12 Staatsanwaltschaft Landgericht NSG 0589-003, Band 5, 897.  Although 
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Friedrich H., International Tracing Service, DP Record Collection, 1951, Envelope H-1380.  While Hamburg 
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/ 67 / Vfg., December 21, 1967, Staatsarchiv Hamburg, 213/12 Staatsanwaltschaft Landgericht NSG 0589-004, 
Band 8, 1.  Kirschstein‘s continued denial of racial motives behind the killings apparently dissuaded prosecutors 
from bringing murder charges against him. 
826 Ibid., 894. 
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Russian.  The Russian sensed that he was about to be shot.  As he walked next to me he hit 
me with his right hand.  Due to the blow I lurched to the side.  As I drew my pistol the 
Russian was already 30 to 40 meter away and running.  I fired at him, who despite the shots 
ran farther.  Hummel heard my shots.  He kneed on the ground and fired with his elbow 
propped up.  . . .  The Russian was hit by a bullet and fell to the ground.  I fired a final shot in 
his chest through his heart.‖827  Prior to returning to Bereichkommando XXV‘s headquarters 
Hummel and Kirschstein took turns posing with the body for photographs, which Kirschstein 
showed to his friends and relatives a few weeks later while home in Berlin on leave for 
Easter.828 
 By the time that Kirschstein returned to Odessa in April 1942, murder had become 
routine and applied also to women and children who ―had obtained an ID card 
fraudulently.‖829  Although Bereichkommando XXV‘s primary targets were Jewish 
Volksdeutsche ―imposters,‖ the SS also targeted gentiles who attempted to benefit from 
privileged Volksdeutsche status.  After repeatedly arresting a local woman for impersonating 
an ethnic German without adequate proof to act, for example, Kirschstein finally obtained 
evidence of her Jewish ancestry and had her arrested.830  As Rudolf S., an NSKK member 
                                                 
827 Aussage von H. K., January 28, 1963, BAL, B162/2301, 127.  Although in their postwar 
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829 Verantwortliche Vernehmung von E. A. H. K., February 9, 1965, Staatsarchiv Hamburg, 213/12 
Staatsanwaltschaft Landgericht NSG 0589-003, Band 6, 921.  
830 Aussage von R. S., January 29, 1963, BAL, B162/2301, 132. 
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seconded to Bereichkommando XXV in mid-1942, recounted: ―On the day of her 
interrogation I watched from a neighboring room as Kirschstein brutally beat her with a 
rubber truncheon.  The next morning she was yanked into a car to be liquidated outside of 
Odessa.  Along with NSKK-Scharführer Erwin Nießner831 I drove behind them and 
witnessed Kirschstein murder the woman through a shot to the neck (Genickschuß).  Around 
the location of the murder there were several large open graves that were already partially 
filled with corpses.  The woman‘s body was kicked into one of the graves and doused with 
gasoline from a container that they had brought with to incinerate the body immediately.   
The arrival of a motorized field police patrol (Feldgendarmerie), however, prevented the 
cremation.  The members of the field police fired warning shots to announce their arrival and 
yelled to Kirschstein: ‗don‘t shoot, the woman is a Romanian.‘  Kirschstein responded that it 
was already too late.‖832  As the woman‘s death demonstrates, posing as Volksdeutsche could 
prove deadly to Jews and non-Jews alike. 
 To provide the necessary manpower for expanded operations, the VoMi‘s fledgling 
terror apparatus recruited additional young Volksdeutsche men.  Among the new hires was 
Kirschstein‘s ―right hand,‖ twenty-seven-year-old Johannes Volk.833  As his Volksdeutsche 
coworkers noted after the war, Volk had earned a deservedly ―bad reputation‖ prior to joining 
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Piece 60, 126. 
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833 Aussage von E. F., December 15, 1966, Staatsarchiv Hamburg, 213/12 Staatsanwaltschaft 
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the unit.834  Born in Baden, an ethnic German enclave 60 kilometers north of Odessa, Volk 
attended German-language school until the age of thirteen or fourteen, when he enrolled in a 
movie projector operator course in nearby Selz.  After working as a projectionist for a 
traveling cinema troop and in a state-run fruit store, Volk became Baden‘s postmaster in 
1938.  Presumably because of his assumed reliability as a state employee, the Soviet officials 
exempted him from deportation in August 1941.835  During its sweep of the area a few weeks 
later, Einsatzgruppe D recruited the polyglot Volk—one of the area‘s few remaining ethnic 
German men—to serve as an interpreter.  According to the testimony of Einsatzgruppe D‘s 
former members, by the time that it reached Sevastopol Volk‘s unit was taking part in the 
mass shootings.836  Based on Volk‘s German naturalization application from 1944, he 
acclimatized to the new Nazi order.  Not only did he list his religious affiliation in Nazi 
terminology as ―deistic,‖ (gottgläubig) but he also named his second son, born in February 
1942, Adolf.837  Returning from his Crimean deployment to Baden, Volk relocated to Odessa 
in search of work.838  Impressed by his track record as one of the Third Reich‘s killers, 
Kirschstein recruited Volk for the VoMi‘s terror apparatus.839  Clad as an SS-
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Unterscharführer and armed with both a pistol and a submachine gun, for the duration of 
Odessa‘s occupation Volk reprised his role as one of Nazi Germany‘s henchmen.840 
 Assisted by an experienced group of Volksdeutsche killers, in the fall of 1942 
Bereichkommando XXV further overstepped its mandate and pursued criminals, who in the 
midst of a breakdown of law and order, began preying on the city‘s Volksdeutsche.841  
Although aware that criminal matters fell under Romanian jurisdiction, given its acrimonious 
conflict with Odessa‘s Romanian occupiers Bereichkommando XXV‘s Judicial Section 
doubted that their allies would take action against the alleged perpetrators.842  Resolved to 
stamp out crimes against Volksdeutsche themselves, Bereichkommando XXV launched a 
punitive campaign against Odessa‘s criminals.  For example, after hearing that a pair of 
Russians had kidnapped a young Volksdeutsche woman, raped her, and stolen her clothes, 
Kirschstein and his staff apprehended the culprits.843  As Kirschstein later recounted: ―since 
the two of them refused to confess in the beginning, I admit that I hit them during the 
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interrogation.  What I later found out was hair-raising.  Incensed by their outrageous crimes, I 
drove with them to the outskirts of Odessa.  . . .  At a dip near the catacombs I shot both 
Russians from behind.  The bodies were left at the entrance to the catacombs.‖844  Committed 
to expanding the VoMi‘s sovereignty over Odessa‘s Volksdeutsche affairs, Bereichkommando 
XXV refused to tolerate common criminals threatening the city‘s Volksdeutsche. 
 Perhaps nothing typifies the VoMi‘s determination to use its authority over 
Volksdeutsche affairs in Odessa to expand its influence in the city more than its 1943 anti-
partisan mission against Soviet forces in the city‘s catacombs.  Some 200 kilometers in 
length and with over 160 entrances, Odessa‘s catacombs provided the ideal lair from which 
Soviet agents could launch a sustained underground campaign against the city‘s occupiers.845  
Although quasi-dormant after mid-1942, Soviet partisans in Odessa‘s catacombs remained a 
thorn in the side of the city‘s occupiers that Romanian forces only periodically engaged.846  
When a young Volksdeutsche woman appeared at Bereichkommando XXV‘s command post 
with a fantastic story about her service with the city‘s subterranean fifth column, Goerbig and 
his colleagues pounced on the opportunity to resolve Odessa‘s partisan problem. 
 As Beck later recounted, the very pregnant former medical school student had 
conceived a child with her Russian husband, a Red Army lieutenant stationed in the 
catacombs.  In exchange for prenatal care in Odessa‘s VoMi-run hospital, her husband agreed 
to surrender and work as a double agent.  Reinforced with Sonderkommando R personnel 
from Landau, the entirety of Bereichkommando XXV‘s staff—including its Volksdeutsche 
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auxiliaries, Hummel and Volk—cordoned off Sobornaia Ploshchad‘, the prearranged location 
for the Red Army lieutenant‘s surrender.  So as not to spook the man by the sight of 
uniformed SS personnel, Goerbig assigned Beck to accompany the woman to the meeting 
point and to wait with her for her husband on a park bench.  When the man arrived, they 
proceeded to Bereichkommando XXV‘s headquarters.  Under the supervision of Odessa‘s 
chief Abwehr officer, Lieutenant Colonel Johannes Schindler,847 the Soviet officer used his 
arranged frequency and codes to spread misinformation to his Red Army superiors, who 
recognized the ruse.848  Although unsuccessful, Bereichkommando XXV‘s foray into anti-
partisan measures underscores the unit‘s effort to use its limited authority over Volksdeutsche 
matters as an entrée to expanded influence in Odessa.849 
 While the VoMi‘s Lilliputian terror apparatus inserted the SS into the bailiwick of 
Odessa‘s Romanian occupiers, its efforts to police ―Germandom‘s‖ boundaries were 
ineffective.  As the VoMi prepared to evacuate Odessa in early March 1944, 
Bereichkommando XXV‘s staff implemented a final selection that ironically attempted to 
punish Odessians who denied being Volksdeutsche.  Relaying the evacuation order through 
its local ethnic German precinct captains (Obmänner), the VoMi commanded all 
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Volksdeutsche to report to the city‘s German school with their luggage for evacuation to 
Poland.  As one of the evacuees later testified: ―it was made clear to us that those who did not 
follow the order would be shot.‖850  Anecdotal evidence suggests that the VoMi carried out its 
threat.851  When Odessa‘s Volksdeutsche baker refused to separate from his ethnically 
Russian wife and evacuate with the Germans, for example, Bereichkommando XXV‘s death 
squad allegedly gunned him down.852  Threatening the city‘s denizens who resisted 
evacuation as Volksdeutsche undermined the SS‘s mission to identify Odessa‘s ethnic 
Germans by diluting the category‘s racial and political ―purity.‖  Given that ethnic German 
status provided Odessa‘s residents with an opportunity to flee the Soviet advance, escaping 
the city as a Volksdeutscher proved attractive to many Odessians who might not otherwise 
have chosen to be identified as such.  As the evacuees were to settle German-occupied 
Poland, impressing reluctant and often suspect Volksdeutsche into evacuation transports 
merely further threatened the Nazi population project.  Confronted with an ethnic reality that 
the VoMi could not control, Bereichkommando XXV‘s increased coercion became self-
sabotage. 
Conclusion 
 Bergen has noted that ―the essential tenuousness of the concept [of ‗ethnic 
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Germanness‘] contributed to the production of anti-semitism in Eastern Europe.‖853  This 
same tenuousness also shaped the VoMi‘s bloody attempts to ―make‖ and ―unmake‖ 
Volksdeutsche in Odessa.  The city‘s ethnic German denizens presented the SS with 
tantalizing prospects for a future German outpost to challenge long-term Romanian influence 
in southern Ukraine‘s entrepôt.  Dispatching its largest and most sophisticated 
Bereichkommando in Transnistria, Sonderkommando R attempted to succor Odessa‘s 
Volksdeutsche.  Nevertheless, the SS feared that Odessa‘s fluid ethnic boundaries threatened 
its entire demographic project by degrading the racial ―worth‖ of the city‘s Volksdeutsche 
denizens.  To identify members of the Volksgemeinschaft in Odessa, the SS, aided by local 
Volksdeutsche women, undertook an extensive, but ultimately failed ethnic classification 
campaign.  Unable to separate Volksdeutsche from their fellow Odessians through 
classification, the VoMi, again assisted by local ethnic Germans, expanded earlier efforts to 
frustrate area Romanian authorities to murder systematically suspected Volksdeutsche 
―imposters.‖  Staffed with personnel for operations against local criminals and partisans, 
Odessa‘s VoMi officers used their purview over Volksdeutsche affairs to insert German 
influence into the bailiwick of the city‘s Romanian occupiers.  Not only did the VoMi‘s 
expanded activities fail to dislodge Romanian influence, but using coercion to police 
Germandom‘s boundaries in retreat threatened to dilute further the ―purity‖ of the city‘s 
ethnic German population by encouraging even reluctant residents to flee with the SS. 
 Beyond recovering a previously understudied dimension to the history of the German 
occupation of the Soviet Union, an analysis of VoMi ethnic German policy in Odessa, and 
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especially the practice of Volksdeutsche classification there, highlights three features of 
Sonderkommando R‘s operations in Transnistria.  First, disregarding superior orders to 
maintain good relations with the Third Reich‘s Romanian allies, local SS officials used their 
authority over ethnic German matters to expand dramatically German influence in Odessa.  
Second, when confronted with a local ethnic reality that proved exceptionally difficult to 
classify even in comparison to earlier, tortured SS Volksdeutsche registration efforts 
elsewhere, the VoMi selected murder as a technique to police Germandom‘s imaginary 
boundaries in the city.  And lastly, Bereichkommando XXV‘s rapid evolution from Nazi 
Volksdeutsche welfare agency, to ethnic classification unit, to death squad provided 
opportunities for area residents, and particularly local women, to contribute to, and in some 
instance to steer the ―machinery of destruction‖ at the grassroots level. 
  
 
CHAPTER VII: FROM MOBILIZERS TO KILLERS: SONDERKOMMANDO R 
AND THE MASS MURDER OF TRANSNISTRIA’S JEWS, DECEMBER 1941-
APRIL 1942 
 When interviewed in September 1944 by the deputy head of the Second 
Counterintelligence Division of SMERSH attached to the Second Ukrainian Front in 
Romania, SS-Obersturmführer Assmann explained Sonderkommando R‘s purpose to his 
Soviet interrogators.  According to Assmann, while ―Sonderkommando R  . . .  arrived on 
September 15-16  . . .  in Transnistria under the pretext of aiding the territory‘s 135,000 
[ethnic] Germans and improving their daily existence,‖ the unit‘s true purpose was to insert 
―punitive SS forces in Transnistria for the mass extermination of Soviet citizens, particularly 
Jews.‖854  While Assmann‘s undoubtedly coerced interrogation exaggerates the degree to 
which the VoMi initially regarded mass murder as part of Sonderkommando R‘s 
responsibilities, his statement nevertheless captures the unit‘s rapidly changing mission 
during the winter of 1941-42.  Within the span of a few weeks, Sonderkommando R evolved 
from a Volksdeutsche agency tasked with mobilizing and caring for area Volksdeutsche into a 
killing unit responsible for the murder of tens of thousands of Jews.  Why and how did an 
organization that was barely staffed and equipped to manage Transnistria‘s Volksdeutsche 
settlements begin killing Jews in Romanian-occupied territory?  By recovering the 
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antecedents, implementation, and conclusion of Sonderkommando R‘s participation in the 
mass murder of Jews in Transnistria during late 1941 and early 1942, this chapter addresses 
precisely this question. 
 Sonderkommando R‘s role in mass murder was an unanticipated consequence of the 
Third Reich‘s alliance with Romania.  Despite its established anti-Semitic track record, 
Antonescu‘s Romania pursued murderous anti-Semitic policies that frequently complemented 
but also periodically collided with Nazi Germany‘s aims and timetable.  One key difference 
was conceptual.  For Germany, the Final Solution meant the continental eradication and 
ultimately murder of all European Jewry.  For Romania, solving the Jewish ―question‖ meant 
eliminating Jews from territory that it claimed and controlled.  So long as Jews disappeared 
from its sphere of influence, Romania‘s leadership cared little about their fate.  In 
southeastern Europe, these parallel wars against the Jews precipitated a shoving match 
between the two allied powers over the fate of area Jews—a conflict in which 
Sonderkommando R became a frontline unit.  While the VoMi, and particularly Hoffmeyer‘s 
command, relished projecting its authority in Transnistria, German authorities understood the 
area fundamentally as a Romanian occupation zone.  As such, from the German perspective, 
it was Romania‘s responsibility to pull its weight in the Final Solution and to solve the 
Jewish ―problem‖ in the region without impinging on German interests.  Intent on clearing 
Jews from Romanian-controlled territory, the Antonescu regime regarded Transnistria as an 
intermediary deportation destination for Jews from Bessarabia and Bukovina prior to their 
planned eventual expulsion into German-occupied Soviet territory.  German refusal to permit 
their Romanian allies to deport Jews farther east into the Reichskommissariat Ukraine 
derailed Romanian plans and created a bottleneck of Jewish deportees in northeastern 
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Transnistria—the epicenter of the VoMi‘s efforts to succor and to Nazify the Black Sea 
Germans. 
 While conflicting German and Romanian policies on how to solve the Jewish 
question lay the dry tinder for Sonderkommando R‘s participation in mass murder, the initial 
spark that ignited the murderous conflagration came from a typhus outbreak among Jewish 
prisoners in the region.  In anticipation of being able to deport Jews into German-occupied 
Ukraine, during the fall of 1941 Romanian authorities had concentrated Jewish expellees 
from Bessarabia, Bukovina, and Transnistria in camps and ghettos along the Bug River.  
Owing to the abhorrent sanitary conditions in these facilities, many of the prisoners 
contracted typhus, and the epidemic threatened to spread to the surrounding population—a 
prospect that terrified Sonderkommando R.  In cooperation with local Romanian authorities, 
Sonderkommando R decided to deploy its Selbstschutz to assist the Romanians in murdering 
local Jewish inmates.  As part of this initial wave of killing, Sonderkommando R‘s ethnic 
German militiamen gunned down some 25,000 Jewish inmates at the Bogdanovka 
(Bogdanivka) camp on the Bug River‘s right bank during late December 1941 and early 
January 1942.  In anticipation of killing techniques later used at German extermination 
centers in occupied Poland, the Selbstschutz incorporated both cremation and Jewish forced 
laborers into the killing process to solve concrete obstacles that the perpetrators faced. 
 While this shooting operation was underway, Romanian expulsions of Jews into 
northeastern Transnistria intensified.  Concerned that the increasing number of Jews housed 
in facilities around Odessa constituted both a security threat and a public health hazard in a 
militarily sensitive area, Antonescu ordered his local commanders to remove Jews from the 
city‘s immediate environs.  Still hopeful that future Jewish deportations into German-
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controlled territory might yet be possible and aware that Hoffmeyer‘s command had become 
a most willing partner in mass killing, local Romanian authorities began deporting more Jews 
from the Odessa area into northeastern Transnistria.  Hoffmeyer and his subordinates 
responded to this resurgent epidemic threat by again mustering local ethnic German 
militiamen to murder Jews.  A detailed examination of Selbstschutz units in 
Bereichkommando XI based in Rastatt, which were both the most active and remain the best 
documented, reveals not only the scale and brutality of Volksdeutsche involvement in mass 
killing operations, but also how local commanders refined the tactics that they had developed 
at the Bogdanovka camp.  These killings continued until Romania scaled back its deportation 
in the face of mounting German diplomatic pressure and decreasing Romanian enthusiasm 
for mass murder.  By the time that Romanian deportations ceased in the spring of 1942, 
Sonderkommando R‘s militiamen had murdered close to 50,000 Jews. 
Romania and the Holocaust 
 Romanian involvement in the Holocaust has been the subject of considerable 
historical research by Jean Ancel, Dennis Deletant, and Radu Ioanid, among other 
scholars.855  While the Romanian state‘s fluid anti-Semitic policies remain the topic of recent 
and ongoing study by Romanian specialists, the outline of the country‘s simultaneous, yet 
separate war against the Jews is clear.  Historically, Romania‘s anti-Semitic track record, like 
that of many of its Eastern European neighbors, was well-established.  In contrast to France, 
which granted Jews full civil rights in 1791 or the German Empire, which emancipated Jews 
at its inception in 1871, Romania did not grant full civil equality to Jews until after the First 
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World War, when the conflict‘s victors forced Romania to make this concession in exchange 
for territorial gains.  During the interwar period, preexisting traditional Christian anti-
Judaism, perpetuated by the Romanian Orthodox Church, reinforced economic anti-Semitic 
sentiment directed against the country‘s Jews, who were overrepresented in the Romanian 
middle class relative to their proportion of the population.  Romanian‘s territorial expansions 
into previously Habsburg lands in Transylvania and northern Bukovina and the formerly 
Russian province of Bessarabia at the conclusion of the First World War further exacerbated 
anti-Semitism.  The majority of Jews who inhabited these territories were Yiddish, Hungarian 
or Russian-speaking, which fueled Romanian fears that unassimilated ethnic minorities, and 
especially Jews, were diluting the ethnic purity of the expanded Romanian state.  Anti-
Semitism remained a prominent feature of interwar Romanian political discourse and 
constituted a key platform for the two contemporary political parties, the Christian National 
Defense League and the League of the Archangel Michael (later known as the Iron Guard).  
This discourse found expression in Romanian state policy during the early 1940s.  In August 
1940, the Romanian government under King Carol II emulated the 1935 Nürnberg Laws in 
Germany and enacted Law No. 2650, which circumscribed social interactions between Jews 
and gentiles and codified a more expansive definition of who was a Jew than its German 
model.  After territorial losses following the Second Vienna Award forced Carol II to abdicate 
the following month, Antonescu‘s new Legionary State pursued further anti-Semitic 
measures based on National Socialist policies in Germany.  During his first six months in 
office, Antonescu implemented measures that included expropriating Jews of their property 
for redistribution to the country‘s gentiles, conscripting Jews for forced labor service, and 
limiting Jewish access to education and healthcare.  Within the span of less than a year, 
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Romania erected a wall of anti-Semitic legislation that it had taken the Nazi regime the better 
part of a decade to build in Germany.  Among Germany‘s present and future allies, Romania 
appeared, by early 1941, to be particularly receptive to German entreaties to participate in the 
Final Solution. 
 Despite what the Nazis correctly regarded as auspicious anti-Semitic foundations, 
Romanian anti-Semitic policies differed from those of the Third Reich in both content and 
chronology.  Unlike Nazi Germany, Romania maintained a double standard in that authorities 
regarded those deemed to be assimilated Romanian Jews differently from those viewed as 
unassimilated foreign Jews from newly-acquired territories.  For Romania, like neighboring 
Hungary and Bulgaria, the decisive factor was culture, not race.  While Romania pursued 
expropriatory and discriminatory measures against assimilated Jews in the Regat—the 1859 
boundaries of the principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia—it did not target these Jews for 
annihilation.  By contrast, Romanian authorities sought to remove or murder allegedly 
foreign Jews living in Bessarabia and northern Bukovina, whom they viewed as alien and 
therefore a threat to the expanded Romanian state.  During the war, this distinction led to the 
absurd situation in which the leaders of Romania‘s Jewish community, such as Dr. Wilhelm 
Filderman, continued to meet with high-level members of the Romanian government in 
Bucharest as Romanian military and police forces were murdering thousands of Jews in the 
occupied territories of the Soviet Union—a situation that German authorities found 
unfathomable. 
 The Romanian government‘s appetite for pursing anti-Jewish measures peaked and 
declined with Germany‘s military fortunes.  Although anti-Semitic pogroms had punctuated 
the leadership struggle between Antonescu and the Iron Guard in early 1940, Romanian anti-
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Jewish violence took full form following the invasion of the Soviet Union, in which Romania 
had agreed to participate to make good its recent territorial losses.  At Iaşi, on the border 
between the Regat and Bessarabia, which Soviet forces had occupied the previous year, 
Romanian forces unleashed a multiday pogrom during which more than 4,000 Jews perished.  
This pattern repeated itself as the Romanian military advanced into Bessarabia, Bukovina, 
and the Soviet Union‘s pre-1939 border territories.  In Kishinev, during July 1941, Romanian 
forces and their German counterparts systematically shot many of the city‘s Jewish denizens 
and deported the survivors.  Romanian anti-Jewish violence reached its peak a few months 
later, when, following the destruction of the Romanian military headquarters in Odessa in 
late October 1941, Romanian forces in the city shot and burned to death up to 25,000 Jews, 
whom the Romanians blamed for the explosion.  Although Romanian mass killing of Jews 
escalated well into 1942, the Romanian government‘s appetite for anti-Semitic violence 
waned during the latter half of 1942 as prospects of total German victory faltered.  In fall 
1942, for example, Antonescu postponed indefinitely the implementation of an agreement 
that had been reached with Germany to deport Jews from the Regat to Operation Reinhard‘s 
clandestine killing centers in Poland.  During 1943 and early 1944, Romanian authorities not 
only suspended deportations of Jews and Roma to Transnistria, which they had previously 
pursued with great enthusiasm, but they began to permit the deportees to return to Romanian-
controlled territory.  The coordinated mass killing campaign that Transnistria‘s Romanian 
civil administrators pursued with Sonderkommando R‘s assistance during the winter of 1941-
42 thus constituted the high watermark of a pattern of Romanian anti-Jewish violence that 
tracked carefully with the ebbs and flows of Germany‘s military position. 
 While Romanian and German authorities pursued similarly intense anti-Semitic 
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campaigns during the first year of Operation Barbarossa, the two allies differed significantly 
on what the Jewish problem was and how it might be solved.  Although by summer 1941 the 
Nazi regime had not yet decided to kill all of European Jewry, the Third Reich had 
anticipated murdering initially a portion and eventually all Soviet Jews whom its forces 
encountered.  Prior to the invasion, German planners proposed killing the region‘s Jews 
through an unspecified combination of starvation and exposure in Arctic Russia.  As the 
geographic requirements of this plan became infeasible, German authorities changed to a 
policy of immediate and total mass killing perpetrated by mobile shooting squads.856  By 
contrast, as Vladimir Solonari‘s recent study highlights, the goals of Romanian anti-Semitic 
policies were more limited.  To eliminate what they considered inassimilable ethnic 
minorities and to solidify their control over the provinces of Bessarabia and northern 
Bukovina, which the Soviet Union had wrested from their country in 1940, Romania‘s 
leaders enacted a program of ethnic cleansing designed to eliminate Jews and other allegedly 
troublesome minorities, such as Roma, from the historic borders of Greater Romania.857  
Deportation deep into the Soviet Union and, according to Antonescu, preferably across the 
Ural Mountains, constituted the most attractive means to this end for the country‘s rulers.858  
Provided that Jews from the recently reacquired provinces of Bessarabia and northern 
Bukovina disappeared, it mattered little to Romanian authorities if they reached their 
destination or if Romanians, Germans, or their local auxiliaries murdered them along the 
way.  Whereas by mid-summer 1941 Germans plans envisioned murdering Soviet Jews 
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outright and regarded deportation and ghettoization as stopgap measures, Romanian policies, 
notwithstanding intense killing operations, such as those in Kishinev and Odessa, continued 
to prefer deportation to mass shooting. 
 These contradictory initiatives came to a head shortly after the beginning of the 
invasion of the Soviet Union.  In late July 1941, after German and Romanian forces had 
driven the Red Army out of Bessarabia and northern Bukovina and pushed across the 
Dniester River into the Soviet Union‘s pre-1939 borderlands, Romanian authorities in the 
two reoccupied provinces began deporting local Jews into the occupied Soviet Union.  The 
German Eleventh Army, whose rear area was the intended destination of the Romanian 
Jewish transports, objected vociferously that these uncoordinated expulsions constituted an 
unanticipated security risk and refused to accept the deportees.  German objections and 
Romanian remonstrations reached Antonescu, who explained to Manfried von Killinger, the 
German ambassador to Bucharest, that his subordinates were merely acting in accordance 
with the Third Reich‘s anti-Jewish policies that Hitler had revealed to him during a state visit 
to Munich in early June.   According to Antonescu, it was the Wehrmacht, not the 
Romanians, that was preventing the execution of Hitler‘s orders by refusing to accept the 
Jewish deportees.  As high-level negotiations between the Romanians and the Germans 
progressed and as area Romanian authorities continued to push Jews across the Dniester 
River into the German Eleventh Army‘s operational area, local German commanders tasked 
Einsatzgruppe D with removing the nearly 30,000 Jewish deportees, who had already 
reached the army‘s rear area on the Dniester River‘s left bank.  On or about August 20, 1941, 
Einsatzgruppe D spearheaded a reverse deportation that aimed to return the Jewish expellees 
to Romanian-controlled territory.  Despite localized Romanian resistance, Einsatzgruppe D 
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drove more than 27,000 Jews back into Romanian-controlled territory and murdered more 
than 1,200 deportees, who were physically unable to keep up with the transport. 859  Six 
months later, when Romania and Germany were once more at loggerheads about deporting 
Jews across the Bug River, Romanian authorities again combined unilateral deportations with 
diplomatic prevarication.  This time, however, Sonderkommando R assisted Romanian 
authorities in murdering the Jewish deportees. 
 Subsequent German and Romanian diplomatic agreements about the administration 
of occupied Soviet Union provided the Romanians with territory that simultaneously 
facilitated continued Jewish deportations from Bessarabia and northern Bukovina and yet left 
combustibles to be reignited in the foreseeable future.  Shortly after Einsatzgruppe D 
successfully repelled Romanian deportations across the Dniester River, the August 30, 1941, 
Treaty of Tighina declared the territory between the Dniester and Bug Rivers a Romanian 
occupation zone.  Although the treaty permitted the German military to station liaison and 
logistical units in the region, the accord granted the Romanians a free hand in the area, which 
included the option to ramp up deportations from Bessarabia and Bukovina.  Antonescu was 
so eager to expand earlier deportations that, even before the two powers formalized the 
treaty, he instructed the Romanian Army and Alexianu to begin preparations for the large-
scale expulsion of Jews from Bessarabia and northern Bukovina into Transnistria.  For 
Antonescu, however, Transnistria was merely an intermediate destination, where Romanian 
authorities were to concentrate the Jews of Bessarabia and northern Bukovina before their 
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eventual expulsion deeper into the Soviet Union.860  Despite the fact that the Treaty of 
Tighina countenanced this possibility, section seven of the agreement held that ―the 
deportation of Jews across the Bug is currently not possible  . . .  they [the Jews] must 
therefore be placed in concentration camps and put to work until operations are complete and 
a deportation to the East is possible.‖861  This agreement nevertheless set the stage for a 
future showdown between the allied powers regarding when would be the appropriate time to 
transport surviving Jews from Transnistria into German-occupied Soviet territory.  As 
murdering Jews would occupy German authorities in the region for much of the next three 
years, they had little interest in importing additional Jews, whose murders they regarded as 
the responsibility of their Romanian counterparts.  Likewise, given the Romanian focus on 
ethnic cleansing as a tool to create an ethnically pure Greater Romania—as opposed to 
Germany‘s continent-wide murderous ambitions—and the Romanian desire to enlist German 
support in achieving this aim, the Romanian government had every reason to seek the speedy 
removal of Jews across the Bug River.  While in the short-term the Treaty of Tighina 
alleviated tensions between German and Romanian authorities over Jewish deportations into 
German-controlled territory, it merely delayed an eventual showdown between the two allies. 
Romanian Jewish Deportation to the Bug River 
 The Romanian decision in late 1941 to deport Odessian Jews to the right bank of the 
Bug River, the cusp of the Reichskommissariat Ukraine, was the latest in a series of rolling 
Romanian Jewish deportations.  Of the some 315,000 Jews who inhabited Bessarabia and 
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northern Bukovina prior to the invasion, approximately 125,000 Jews fled with or were 
deported by Soviet authorities, leaving roughly 190,000 Jews under Romanian and German 
control in the region.862  Romanian preparations to deport Bessarabia and northern 
Bukovina‘s remaining Jews started shortly after the provinces‘ occupation by Romanian and 
German forces early in the campaign.  In early October 1941, less than six weeks after the 
Treaty of Tighina had designated Transnistria as a Romanian occupation zone, Antonescu 
ordered the wholesale expulsion of Jews from Bessarabia and northern Bukovina across the 
Bug River and into Transnistria.863  Romanian authorities detained local Jews and 
incarcerated them in either makeshift ghettos or transit camps, such as those in Secureni, 
Edineţi, Mărsuleşti, and Vertujeni.864  Bessarabia and northern Bukovina‘s occupiers gave 
little thought to public hygiene or to provisioning these facilities.  Perpetual theft by 
Romanian guards exacerbated the already dire living conditions of the growing number of 
Jewish captives.  Ioanid estimates that of the 190,000 Jews that Romanian authorities sought 
to deport to Transnistria, only 125,000 Jews survived long enough to cross the Dniester River 
between 1941 and 1942.  The territories‘ remaining 65,000 Jews were either murdered on the 
spot by Romanian and German forces or died as a result of the deplorable living conditions 
that their Romanian captors had created for them as they awaited deportation to 
Transnistria.865 
 While Romanian deportations emptied Bessarabia and Bukovina of their Jewish 
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populations, these coordinated expulsions increased dramatically the number of Jews in 
Transnistria.  Based on the admittedly problematic 1939 Soviet census, the portion of 
southern Ukraine designated as Transnistria by the Treaty of Tighina had a Jewish population 
of 311,000, of whom more than 200,000 Jews lived in Odessa and accounted for 
approximately a third of the city‘s population.866  As in Bessarabia and Bukovina, Soviet 
authorities had relocated (either voluntarily or involuntarily) a sizable portion of the local 
Jewish population to the Soviet interior.  Informed estimates suggest that Soviet officials 
removed between one third and one half of the region‘s Jews prior to the arrival of German 
and Romanian forces.867  Soviet authorities were unable to maintain this rate of evacuation in 
Odessa, which remained under siege by invading forces from August to October 1941.  Much 
of the city‘s large Jewish population was thus unable to flee ahead of the Red Army‘s 
retreat.868  Ironically, the number of local Jews who made good their escape roughly equaled 
the number of Jews whom Romanian authorities deported to Transnistria.  By dint of their 
country‘s own policy of coordinated Jewish expulsion, at the start of the occupation 
Romanian officials administered territory whose total number of Jews remained virtually 
unchanged from 1939. 
 Transnistria‘s Romanian occupiers made two incorrect assumptions that ultimately 
doomed Romanian attempts to solve its Jewish ―problem‖ through the continuous expulsion 
of Jews yet deeper into the Soviet Union.  First, Romanian planners, Antonescu included, 
                                                 
866 Ancel, Transnistria, 1941-42, vol. 1, 17. 
867 Ioanid, The Holocaust in Romania, 177. 
868 Dallin argues convincingly that Soviet authorities placed greater emphasis on dismantling and 
removing Odessa‘s industrial base and port facilities than on evacuating local residents.  Dallin, Odessa, 1941-
1944, 34. 
303 
 
assumed that the Treaty of Tighina‘s prohibition against the deportation of Jews across the 
Bug River and into German-occupied Ukraine was a temporary restriction.  Given the 
success of the renewed German advance into the Soviet Union in September and October 
1941, the commensurate expectation of imminent victory, and the fact that the earlier ban on 
expelling Jews across the Dniester River had evaporated quickly, the Romanians believed 
quite plausibly through the fall of 1941 that deportation would still solve their Jewish 
―problem.‖  Second, Romanian authorities had anticipated that the majority of Transnistria‘s 
Jews would flee prior to the occupation, leaving only a few local Jews in the area.869  These 
Jews, the Romanians concluded, could be expelled farther east along with the newly arrived 
Jewish deportees from Bessarabia and northern Bukovina, thereby making Transnistria also 
judenrein.  Owing to the German refusal to open its portion of occupied Ukraine to Jewish 
deportees and the unexpectedly large number of local Jews who remained in Transnistria, 
Romanian anti-Jewish policy in the region was flawed from its very inception—a reality that 
would have dire consequences for area Jews. 
 Based on these presuppositions, during the fall of 1941 Romanian authorities began 
to incarcerate both local Jews and Jewish deportees in a series of temporary concentration 
camps and ghettos located strategically near the Bug River so that once German authorities 
green lighted a resumption of expulsions, the facilities‘ prisoners could be spirited into 
German-occupied territory.870  Transnistria‘s Romanian civil administrators forced tens of 
thousands of Jews into camps and ghettos that, even by the undeniably low standards of 
wartime Romania, were abysmal.  Beyond the notorious lack of concern by Romanian 
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authorities for the welfare of their Jewish captives, the facilities were designed neither to 
house the number of Jewish inmates that Romanian authorities imprisoned, nor to be in use 
for more than a short period of time.  Jewish inmates in Romanian captivity in Transnistria 
suffered from an acute lack of sanitation and what food Romanian authorities made available 
to them was frequently unfit for human consumption.871  As Deletant, who has studied 
Transnistria‘s Jewish ghettos and concentration camps, plausibly suggests, their conditions 
were worse than comparable sites of internment in German-occupied Poland.  Whereas in 
occupied Poland, German authorities frequently established ghettos in cities with large 
preexisting Jewish populations that provided an infrastructure on which Jews could draw for 
support, their Romanian counterparts created concentration camps and ghettos in proximity 
to likely points of departure for subsequent deportation.  Similarly, while Polish Jews 
ghettoized in their home towns could live off saved resources, Jewish deportees to 
Transnistria arrived in the region destitute.  During the winter of 1941-42, Transnistria‘s 
ghettos thus had a mortality rate that was more than twice as high as that of the Warsaw 
ghetto.872  The collision of Romanian plans to expel a more limited number of Jews across 
the Bug River within a matter of weeks or months collided with the realities of German 
allies, who had no plans to open their occupation zone to Jewish deportees from Transnistria, 
and an unexpectedly large remaining local Jewish population.  The result was what Raul 
Hilberg described as a ―prolonged disaster.‖873  
                                                 
871 Ioanid, The Holocaust in Romania, 202-217. 
872 In comparison to the Warsaw ghetto, which had a 12 to 15 percent mortality rate, during the winter 
of 1941-42, Transnistria‘s ghettos had a 30 to 50 percent mortality rate.  Deletant, ―Ghetto Experience in Golta, 
Transnistria, 1942-1944,‖ 28. 
873 Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews, 283.  
305 
 
The German Fear of Epidemic Typhus 
 Sonderkommando R‘s involvement in the mass murder of Jews in coordination with 
the Romanian military and civil administration constituted a departure from the unit‘s 
established tasks of succoring the region‘s Volksdeutsche and mobilizing them for the 
National Socialist cause.  While Hoffmeyer‘s subordinates used brutal and frequently 
murderous tactics to police the region‘s Volksdeutsche settlements for the Nazi regime‘s 
racial or political opponents, these localized killings were a far cry from the mass shootings 
that Sonderkommando R perpetrated during the winter of 1941-42.  In principle, 
Einsatzgruppe D‘s sweep through southern Ukraine during the summer of 1941 had been the 
German contribution to the murder of the region‘s Jews—an enterprise that, by the fall of 
1941, the Nazi regime regarded as an exclusively Romanian affair.  Why did 
Sonderkommando R, a unit whose personnel remained mired in what was periodically a low-
level conflict with Transnistria‘s Romanian rulers, agree to assist their Romanian 
counterparts in murdering Jews when established German precedent dictated that the 
Romanians alone were responsible for solving the region‘s Jewish ―problem‖? 
 The decision of Sonderkommando R‘s commanders to cooperate with the Romanians 
in the mass murder of Jews in rural Transnistria was both a consequence of a deep-seeded 
German perception that Jews were carriers of communicable disease and an incremental 
response to the escalation of Romanian Jewish deportations.  Both Romanian and German 
authorities—including Sonderkommando R—recognized that the Romanian policy of 
ghettoizing Jews along the Bug River created the perfect environment for the outbreak of 
epidemics, especially typhus.  During the fall of 1941, typhus erupted throughout Romanian 
ghettos in Transnistria and reached such proportions that, by December 1941, it was a 
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frequent topic of discussion between Alexianu and Antonescu.874  The typhus epidemic that 
raged among Transnistria‘s Jewish prisoners posed not simply a public health hazard to the 
region‘s other residents, but also fueled established German anti-Semitic fears that Jews were 
especially prone to spreading the disease.  According to German medical assumptions that 
predated the Nazis, because of their alleged poor hygienic habits Jews were often infested 
with body lice that carried the typhus-causing Rickettsia bacteria.875  For many German 
physicians, the medical term for typhus, Fleckenfieber (spotted fever), quickly evolved into 
Judenfieber (Jew fever).876  To combat this public health hazard, German medical personnel 
in occupied Poland were among the first to advocate ghettoization as a means of quarantining 
the supposedly infectious Jews from the rest of the population.877  Given the appalling 
overcrowding, lack of sanitation, and scarcity of food, typhus became what Hilberg described 
as ―the ghetto disease par excellence.‖878  German authorities created a ―self-fulfilling 
prophecy‖ whereby supposedly diseased Jews were placed in a situation that was guaranteed 
to make them contract typhus.879  Limited typhus outbreaks in Breslau, Dresden, and 
Nürnberg during the winter of 1940-41, which German authorities attributed to forced 
laborers and prisoners of war from Eastern Europe, reinforced the German medical 
assumption that there was a connection between typhus and supposedly racially inferior 
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peoples.880  As German authorities in the German-occupied Poland escalated ghettoization 
under the guise of disease control measures, they aggravated the situation in which their 
racist fears became medical reality.  
 During Operation Barbarossa, typhus prevention measures became inexorably linked 
with mass murder.  Even prior to the invasion, the German Army‘s medical staff was 
concerned with the Wehrmacht‘s susceptibility to typhus.881  In light of the fact that the 
German Army was to operate in the western Soviet Union, and precisely in the area of a 1921 
typhus epidemic, the German military‘s medical staff anticipated that the region‘s inhabitants 
would have a higher natural immunity to typhus than German soldiers from the typhus-free 
Reich.882  Although neither Hitler, nor the German General Staff initially shared these 
concerns, during the winter of 1941-42 typhus prevention became a German military 
priority.883  Disease control assumed two forms.  First, German personnel attempted to 
exterminate the bacteria-carrying lice that spread typhus.  The Ministry for the Occupied 
Eastern Territories, for example, constructed a series of delousing stations and the German 
Army issued strict guidelines for their soldiers‘ personal hygiene.884  Second, the SS in 
particular had orders to murder suspected typhus carriers under the pretext of a proactive 
public health campaign.885  Regardless of the fact that high rates of typhus infections among 
Jews and Slavs were a byproduct of German policies, the connection between genocide and 
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public health was rapidly becoming the SS‘s standard operating procedure in the occupied 
Soviet Union by the winter of 1941-42. 
 During 1941 and 1942, German forces stationed in Transnistria, including 
Sonderkommando R, remained highly sensitive to the issue of typhus.  As a report from the 
British Radio Code and Cypher School noted, during late December 1941 and January 1942 
―the prevention of typhus continues to occupy the [German] authorities both at home [in the 
Reich] and in Russia.‖886  A May 1, 1942, report circulated to the Wehrmacht‘s agricultural 
advisors attached to the Romanian Prefectures in Transnistria described typhus as the 
region‘s ―most important epidemic.‖887  The memo bemoaned the fact that local medical 
supplies were woefully inadequate to combat the disease.888  It also informed the region‘s 
German agricultural advisors that, as per an agreement with local Romanian authorities, ―in 
urban areas with Jewish dwellings Jews will be sought out and made responsible for carrying 
out special disease prevention measures.‖889  For their part, Sonderkommando R‘s 
Bereichkommandoführer were to report instances of Volksdeutsche contracting typhus to the 
unit‘s commanders at regular staff meetings.890  In an April 1, 1942, staff order, Siebert 
reminded his subordinates that ―if new cases of typhus have appeared since the last 
notification deadline ([the] B[ereichkommandoführer] meeting on March 3, 1942), the 
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number of sick, their gender, previous place of residence and current whereabouts (at home, 
in a hospital, etc.) are to be forwarded [to Landau].  Deaths are obviously also to be 
reported.‖891  As late as February 1943, VoMi headquarters in Berlin regarded the issue of 
typhus as so important that it notified Sonderkommando R‘s headquarter in Landau that six 
ethnic Germans had contracted typhus in Zhytomyr and that two of them had succumbed to 
the illness.892  Even before Romanian-imposed conditions in camps and ghettos along the 
Bug River precipitated a typhus epidemic, German authorities stationed in Transnistria, 
including Sonderkommando R, were primed to understand typhus both as a serious public 
health hazard and as a component of the Jewish question. 
Sonderkommando R’s Decision to Murder 
 Before attempting to reconstruct the specific circumstances in which 
Sonderkommando R‘s leaders decided to intensify their own anti-Jewish measures in 
response to a change in Romanian policies, it is necessary to acknowledge some of the 
difficulties inherent in this undertaking.  Reconstructing the decision-making process in 
which Sonderkommando R opted to participate in the mass murder of Jews during the winter 
of 1941-42 is challenging for four reasons.  First, although the general outline of the 
escalation of Romanian anti-Jewish violence from deportation to mass killing during 
December 1941 is clear, future research by Romanian specialists on the topic may add new 
detail to Romanian decision-making surrounding the killings, particularly on the local level 
in Transnistria.893  Second, with a number of important exceptions, few of Sonderkommando 
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892 German Police Decodes Nr 2 Traffic: 8.1.43, January 21, 1943, BNA, HW 16, Piece 37, Part 1, 1. 
893 Although scholars, such as Vladimir Solonari, are working on this issue, at present Ancel‘s detailed 
overview of the Holocaust in Transnistria provides the most detailed description of Romanian decision-making 
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R‘s wartime records on the subject survive.  Postwar testimony strongly suggests that prior to 
and during its retreat Sonderkommando R destroyed some or most of its internal records and 
presumably gave special attention to eradicating documents that implicated the unit in mass 
murder.894  Third, postwar testimony by the unit‘s officers on this issue is particularly 
unreliable.  Key leaders, such as Hoffmeyer and Müller, committed suicide in August 1944 
after Soviet forces had captured them in Romania.895  Other high-ranking members of the 
unit, such as Siebert, refused to speak to West German investigators, a tactic that successfully 
hamstrung the initial criminal probe.896  The handful of accessible protocols of Soviet 
interrogations of Sonderkommando R‘s leaders during and immediately after the war, such as 
those of Assmann, typically portray the unit as a specially created death squad—an assertion 
that the bulk of the available historical record suggests is highly implausible.  Lastly, many of 
the available wartime and postwar records about Sonderkommando R‘s decision to 
participate in the killings are contradictory.  Evidence gathered by West German and by 
                                                                                                                                                       
during this period.  
894 A wartime notation in Gerhard Wolfrum‘s SS officer file indicates that Sonderkommando R was 
unable to evacuate all of its files from Landau during its withdrawal in March 1944.  Given the length of the 
unit‘s preparations to withdraw, it appears likely that its commanders ordered the destruction of key documents 
that could not be evacuated.  Brief von SS-Obersturmführer Wolfrum an den SS-Obersturmbannführer 
Brückner, November 24, 1944, in SS Offizier Akte Dr. Gerhard Wolfrum, NARA, RG 242, A 3343, SSO 001C, 
728.  In addition to intentional document destruction, much of Sonderkommando R‘s equipment and many of its 
records appear to have been destroyed during its withdrawal from the region.  In her April 1944 request for 
expedited permission to marry, Ingeborg Hirsch complained that ―all of our command‘s large pieces of 
luggage,‖ which contained her fiancée‘s records, were lost during the retreat.  Brief von Ingeborg Hirsch an das 
RuSHA, April 28, 1944, in RuSHA Akte Herbert Kirschstein, NARA, RG 242, A 3343-RS-C5436, 1143.  
According to unconfirmed postwar testimony by a former ethnic German resident of Transnistria who evacuated 
with Sonderkommando R in mid-1944, the remainder of Sonderkommando R‘s records were transported to SS-
Untersturmführer Erich von Fircks‘s recently acquired family estate in the Warthegau.  There, former members 
of the unit attempted unsuccessfully to destroy the records before Soviet forces closed in.  Aussage von V. S., 
April 14, 1965, BAL, B162/2305, 56-57. 
895 Protokol doprosa / A. M. G., September 20, 1944, Staatsarchiv Münster, Nr. 2902, 34. 
896 During Siebert‘s 1963 interview with the West German police, he telephoned his attorney during a 
lunch break and refused to answer further questions.  Aussage von K. S., October 30, 1963, Staatsarchiv 
Münster, Nr. 2690, 77. 
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Soviet investigators, for example, provides competing chronologies as to when 
Sonderkommando R‘s commanders decided to assist the Romanians in murdering Jews in 
rural Transnistria.  What follows is thus an effort to reconstruct the decision-making process 
of Sonderkommando R‘s leaders based on incomplete and frequently incongruous evidence. 
  Sonderkommando R‘s involvement in the mass shooting of Jews in rural Transnistria 
during the winter of 1941-42 has been the subject of past historical inquiry.  Although the 
issue was peripheral to their central research interests, both Ancel and Angrick have touched 
on it, drawing primarily on Romanian and German sources, respectively.897  While the 
general outlines of Sonderkommando R‘s initial participation in the mass shooting of Jews in 
rural Transnistria appears largely accurate, a careful examination of previously unused 
wartime German documents as well as wartime and postwar Soviet investigative records 
suggests two new insights into the killings.  First, German involvement appears to have 
begun earlier than suspected.  And second, Sonderkommando R‘s midlevel leadership 
responded to events on the ground with frequently little or at best delayed input from the 
unit‘s commanders. 
 As Ancel and Angrick have recognized, during December 1941 and January 1942, 
Transnistria‘s Romanian administrators successfully exploited Sonderkommando R‘s fears 
that typhus-carrying Jews posed an immediate public health hazard to the region‘s ethnic 
Germans and enlisted the unit‘s assistance in mass murder.  While both scholars aptly note 
that early January 1942 marked the beginning of an intense period of cooperative mass 
shooting operations between Romanian and German-led forces in the region, based on 
compelling Soviet investigative records, it appears that Sonderkommando R‘s initial shooting 
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deployments began in mid-December 1941 around and eventually at the Bogdanovka 
concentration camp.  Established under the authority of Colonel Modest Isopescu, the 
Romanian Prefect of  Golta (Pervomaisk) on the Bug River‘s right bank some 45 kilometers 
northwest of Nikolaev, the Bogdanovka concentration camp appeared well-suited as a 
location at which to house Jewish expellees before pushing them into the German-occupied 
Reichskommissariat Ukraine—a prospect that Romanian authorities believed would happen 
in short order.  Romanian civil administrators created the camp on the site of a former 
collective farm (sovkhoz) by relocating the farm‘s predominately ethnically Ukrainian 
inhabitants to the nearby village of Bogdanovka.  Under the guard of Romanian gendarmes 
and their Ukrainian auxiliaries, Romanian authorities began deporting Jews from Bessarabia, 
northern Bukovina, and elsewhere in Transnistria to the camp.898  Upon arrival, Romanian 
authorities confiscated the inmates‘ remaining valuables and food.  Bogdanovka‘s guard staff 
systematically denied their Jewish captives food and water and interdicted efforts by local 
residents to provide the camp‘s prisoners with sustenance.899  The camp‘s density was 
appalling.  Its inmate population of 1,000 in September 1941 increased more than fifty fold 
by the end of the year.900  According to a report generated by the Soviet Extraordinary State 
Commission immediately after the Red Army reoccupied southern Ukraine, the camp‘s more 
                                                 
898 Akt No. 49, October 10, 1944, USHMM, RG-22.002M, Reel 6, Fond 7021, Opis 69, Delo 75, 203. 
899 Protokol / Samoil Isakovich Soifer, May 10, 1944, USHMM, RG-22.002M, Reel 6, Fond 7021, 
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than 56,000 residents were housed in and around the farm‘s former outbuildings.  Initially, 
inmates were simply left outdoors to fend for themselves.901  As the winter cold set in, the 
camp‘s Romanian guards moved some prisoners under shelter.  In some instances the camp‘s 
administrators housed 2,000 inmates in a pigsty designed to hold just 200 animals.902  
Despite this overcrowding, Romanian authorities apparently gave no thought to sanitation or 
hygiene, with predictable consequences.  At Bogdanovka, Romanian authorities created 
precisely the conditions that not only lead to death by starvation, but also fueled the spread of 
disease and especially epidemic typhus.  If, as Ancel has described, Golta was the ―kingdom 
of death,‖ then the Bogdanovka camp was its capital.903 
 By December 1941, it had become clear to the camp‘s Romanian administrators—and 
indeed to Romanian officials throughout northeastern Transnistria—that disease among 
Jewish prisoners had reached epidemic proportions and that expulsion across the Bug River 
anytime in the immediate future was an increasingly dim prospect.  Unable to wait for 
eventual deportation, Isopescu enlisted Sonderkommando R‘s assistance in murdering the 
Bogdanovka camp‘s inmates.  Precisely how this transpired is unclear from the available 
German and Soviet documentation.  Owing to wartime document destruction and a postwar 
conspiracy of silence among suspected surviving German perpetrators, West German 
prosecutors were unaware of the Bogdanovka camp‘s existence—let alone Sonderkommando 
R‘s involvement in the murder of its inmates—until years into their investigation, when 
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Soviet authorities shared fragmentary Extraordinary Commission Report material with their 
German counterparts.904  Any explanation as to why Sonderkommando R opted to participate 
in this initial mass killing operation must therefore remain speculative.  There are, however, 
two likely possibilities: either the local Bereichkommandoführer, whose Volksdeutsche 
militia forces participated in the killing, ordered the operation on his own authority or 
Sonderkommando R‘s senior leadership directed the mission. 
 Owing to Sonderkommando R‘s organizational culture and practice as well as the 
uncharacteristic independence of the local Bereichkommandoführer, who supervised the 
participation of the Selbstschutz in the shootings, it is possible that one of the unit‘s midlevel 
leaders organized the killing operation independently.  As discussed earlier, for 
Sonderkommando R, ―on the spot‖ decision making was both an organizational ethos and a 
practical necessity.905  Operating frequently in geographically remote Volksdeutsche 
population centers with only rudimentary means of communicating with their superior in 
Landau, Bereichkommandoführer were expected to operate largely on their own.  Although 
an operation of this size would ordinarily have required superior orders to carry out, it is 
conceivable that Sonderkommando R‘s midlevel leaders could have ordered the start to such 
an operation and then sought ex post facto approval from their superiors when it became 
convenient to do so.906 
 The possibility that the local Bereichkommandoführer authorized the mass killing 
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initially or entirely independently of his supervisors in Landau is all the more likely because 
the local SS commander enjoyed unique independence and powerful patrons outside of the 
VoMi.  SS-Obersturmführer Rudolf Hartung, who supervised the Selbstschutz‘s murder spree 
at the Bogdanovka camp, remains one of Sonderkommando R‘s most mysterious officers.  
Despite (or perhaps because of) Hartung‘s involvement with the Nazi party in Berlin, neither 
a Nazi party card nor an SS officer file exists for him, and his suicide in Berlin in April 1945 
robbed investigators of the opportunity to interview him.907  What little can be reconstructed 
about his biography comes from statements that his family, former colleagues, and erstwhile 
Volksdeutsche subordinates gave about him to investigators after the war.  Hartung was born 
in Bucharest in 1905 and spent much of the interwar period living in Galicia.  To avoid a 
draft notice from the Polish Army, Hartung relocated to Berlin in 1926.  An early member of 
the Nazi party, in 1934 he joined the staff of Nazi party‘s Gauleitung in Berlin, which the 
Minister of Propaganda, Josef Goebbels, headed.908  Perhaps due to his previous experience 
in Eastern Europe, Hartung‘s superiors seconded him to Hoffmeyer‘s population transfer 
operations beginning in 1939.909  Although part of the VoMi unit prior to his transfer back to 
Berlin‘s Gauleitung in 1943,910 Hartung maintained close connections with his former 
superiors, who, following his deployment to Transnistria, provided his command with 
privileged access to scarce equipment, such as hunting rifles for his SS subordinates and 
                                                 
907 Hartung‘s former secretary in Berlin testified after the war to his probable suicide to avoid capture 
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unique light colored dress uniforms for his Volksdeutsche militiamen.911  Despite a noticeable 
speech impediment caused by a severe overbite,912 Hartung was a cunning linguist, whose 
mastery of Russian fueled a number of wild rumors that he was alternatively the son of a 
White officer who was exiled after the Revolution,913 a former German spy in the Soviet 
Union,914 and an erstwhile NKVD agent.915  He was so comfortable in the language that upon 
taking up his command as Bereichkommandoführer in Rastatt in September 1941, he joked 
in Russian with a local resident that SSSR (USSR) should stand for ―sakhar stoit sto rublei‖ 
(sugar costs one hundred rubles).916  Hartung‘s sense of humor was apparently lost on many 
of his Volksdeutsche charges.  Like other Bereichkommandoführer, he had a well-deserved 
reputation for beating local ethnic Germans.917  As one of Rastatt‘s former residents 
recounted, ―Hartung was generally known as a swine.  He was the worst of them all.‖918  A 
committed National Socialist, whose rising star in Berlin‘s Gauleitung promised him career 
opportunities after his stint in the East, Hartung was both inclined and uniquely positioned to 
exercise his autonomy in spearheading Sonderkommando R‘s initial foray into mass murder.  
While it is unclear whether or not he did so, his biography certainly helps to explain why his 
command embraced the unit‘s ―dirty work,‖ as he allegedly described his duties to his wife in 
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a letter home.919 
 A second possibility supported by available, albeit circumstantial evidence is that the 
unit‘s senior leadership, and perhaps Hoffmeyer, coordinated the shooting operations with 
Isopescu in mid-December 1941.  Sheremet Karp, one of the few survivors of the 
Bogdanovka camp, recounted to representatives of the Soviet Extraordinary State 
Commission after liberation that on December 18, 1941, two German officers arrived at the 
camp, examined the terrain, and photographed both the inmates and the nearby ravine, where 
the mass shooting began a few days later.920  Despite the fact that after the war Bauer, 
Sonderkommando R‘s official photographer, explicitly denied have taken any photos of mass 
shooting sites during his deployment to Transnistria, other postwar testimony contradicts his 
assertion.921  Beck, the secretary and mistress of Odessa‘s Bereichkommandoführer, later 
testified that Bauer had not only photographed execution sites, but also presented his 
snapshots to his fellow SS officers.922  As Bauer was frequently a member of Hoffmeyer‘s 
entourage, it is plausible, although admittedly speculative, that the two German officers 
whom Karp observed touring the Bogdanovka camp immediately prior to the shootings were 
Hoffmeyer and Bauer on a reconnaissance mission.923  If Hoffmeyer or one of his immediate 
subordinates had examined the site before the unit deployed members of the Selbstschutz to 
assist the Romanians in the killing, then it would suggest that Isopescu or perhaps Alexianu 
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coordinated the killing directly with Sonderkommando R‘s commanders in Landau. 
 Regardless of whether or not Sonderkommando R‘s initial cooperation with 
Romanian authorities in murdering Jews was a result of the initiatives of a midlevel SS 
officer or a consequence of decisions that the unit‘s senior leaders took, during December 
1941 Hoffmeyer‘s command assisted Golta‘s Romanian occupiers in murdering Jews in and 
around the Bogdanovka concentration camp.  Sonderkommando R had only a handful of 
German personnel in proximity to Golta, of whom more than half were NSKK members, 
whose commitment to the Nazi project and its murderous agenda their SS superiors rightly 
questioned.  Blocked by treaty from transferring additional personnel from German-occupied 
Ukraine—in the unlikely event that other potential killers had been available—
Sonderkommando R deployed members of the ethnic German Selbstschutz from nearby 
Bereichkommando XI based in Rastatt.  While the structure, collective biography and 
decision-making context of the ethnic German militia force that operated in and around 
Rastatt is covered in the following chapter, it is important here to highlight that 
Sonderkommando R‘s decision to deploy an auxiliary force of local Volksdeutsche was a 
reflection of the unit‘s ad hoc participation in the mass murder of Jews in Romanian-
controlled territory.  A ragtag irregular force that was barely capable of fulfilling its intended 
role of projecting Sonderkommando R‘s influence in its running confrontations with 
Romanian authorities numbered among Hitler‘s least prepared and most unanticipated 
executioners. 
Sonderkommando R’s Inaugural Killing Operation at the Bogdanovka Camp 
 The Selbstschutz‘s initial foray into mass murder began in mid-December 1941 with a 
series of killing operations designed to cordon off the Bogdanovka camp before German and 
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Romanian forces murdered the camp‘s prisoners.  It appears that even after Romanian and 
German authorities reached at least a tentative agreement to murder Jews at the Bogdanovka 
camp, Romanian gendarmes and their Ukrainian auxiliaries continued to march columns of 
Jewish prisoners to the Bogdanovka camp in a quixotic effort to facilitate their expulsion into 
the Reichskommissariat Ukraine that was increasingly unlikely to occur.  Rather than permit 
the Jews to reach the facility and thus exacerbate its overcrowding and the typhus epidemic 
that Romanian administrators and Sonderkommando R planned to contain, local Romanian 
and German commanders diverted these transports to area Volksdeutsche settlements en route 
to the Bogdanovka camp.  There, Romanian gendarmes and their Ukrainian auxiliaries 
transferred their Jewish prisoners to ethnic German militia forces that Hartung controlled.  
Under the careful supervision of Hartung and his immediate German subordinates, who 
circulated peripatetically to intercept the Romanian Jewish transports and to mobilize their 
ethnic German subordinates, members of Bereichkommando XI‘s hastily organized 
Selbstschutz shot hundreds of these newly-arrived Jews within their own communities.924   
 According to Soviet investigative records, the joint Romanian and German killing 
operation at the Bogdanovka camp began in mid-December 1941.  On December 13 or 
December 14, Isopescu visited the camp in a final effort to collect any remaining valuables 
from its prisoners prior to the start of the mass shootings.  He ordered local Ukrainian 
residents in the nearby village of Bogdanovka to bake bread, which his subordinates sold to 
emaciated camp residents at the exorbitant price of five rubles per half kilogram.  According 
to Boris Nilimov, one of the camp‘s inmates, Isopescu transferred the bread sale‘s proceeds 
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320 
 
back to Golta before departing the camp.925  A few days later, on December 18 or December 
19, the Romanian gendarmerie, which was guarding the camp, sealed the entrances to two 
large pigsties in which they had housed more than 2,000 of the camp‘s more infirm prisoners 
and set them alight, incinerating all but a few of the inmates.926  The following day, a 
detachment of 60 Selbstschutz members, whom Hartung had mustered from the towns of 
Rastatt, München, Michialovka, Mariankova and Leninental as well as the collective farms 
of Neu-Amerika and Bogandovka, arrived at the Bogdanovka camp by horse and buggy.927  
Many of these men were fresh from the recent killing deployments that Hartung had led 
against transports to the Bogdanovka camp.928 
 On December 21, the mass killing operations commenced at the Bogdanovka camp.  
Owing to the fact that survivors frequently failed to differentiate Romanian from German-led 
perpetrators and that the rank-and-file Volksdeutsche killers, whom Soviet authorities 
interviewed after the war were not privy to arrangements between Hartung and his Romanian 
counterparts, it is possible only to speculate on how Romanian and German authorities 
coordinated the joint operation.929  While survivors were clear that the 60 Volksdeutsche 
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Ancel, Transnistria, 1941-42, 124-127. 
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militiamen and the roughly 70 Romanian policemen and Romanian-led Ukrainian auxiliaries 
all participated in the shootings, the role of forces under Romanian command is more opaque 
because Soviet authorities did not focus on their participation as heavily after the war.930  It is 
plausible that Romanian-led forces operated in tandem with Hartung‘s militiamen.  Prior to 
the beginning of the killings, German or more likely Romanian authorities culled the camp 
for able-bodied Jews capable of assisting the perpetrators with body disposal during the 
killing and segregated more than a hundred young men to serve in the so-called ―labor 
brigade‖ (rabochaia brigada).931  As he had done in previous smaller-scale deployments, 
Hartung divided his militiamen into three roughly equal squads, possibly organizing these 
teams around the local militia units in which each of his militiamen served.  The first squad 
rounded up groups of 40 to 50 Jews, often driving them out of their cramped 
accommodations in the former farm‘s outbuildings and gunning down prisoners who were 
too infirm to move.  The second Selbstschutz squad guarded the prisoners during the one and 
a half kilometer forced march from the camp to the ravine that German authorities had 
allegedly scoped out a few days earlier. 
 Approximately 30 meters behind the ravine near the right bank of the Bug River, the 
final squad of ethnic German militiamen received the Jewish inmates, forced them to undress 
to their undergarments, and collected any remaining valuables that Isopescu‘s earlier cupidity 
had not already stripped from them.  Members of the Selbstschutz led the condemned in 
groups of 25 to 30 individuals to the edge of the ravine.  There, the militiamen and at times 
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the Jewish members of the labor brigade, bludgeoned the captives into the ravine.  Under the 
supervision of Hartung and his German subordinates, the militiamen in groups of five and six 
fired their rifles at their victims at the bottom of the ravine from a distance of three to five 
meters, taking aim at the base of their victims‘ skulls as their German superiors had 
instructed them to do.  Between volleys, as the militiamen reloaded the five-round clips at an 
ammunition box some 10 meters behind the firing line, members of the Jewish labor brigade 
began stacking the corpses into a pyre.932  The killings continued with such speed that 
members of the labor brigade found themselves working in pools of blood up to their knees, 
which Soviet investigators later described as ―a river of blood.‖933 
 When the number of corpses at the bottom of the ravine reached a critical mass 
capable of fueling a sustained fire, the perpetrators ignited the pyre, presumably using 
gasoline as an accelerant.  As the fire burned, the members of the Selbstschutz arranged their 
Jewish victims at the edge of the inferno and shot them so that their bodies tumbled directly 
into the blaze.  The operation‘s commanders ordered members of the labor brigade to stoke 
the fire by throwing the bodies of victims that had not fallen directly into the flames onto the 
fire.  The putrid stench of burning flesh was so pungent that local residents on both sides of 
the Bug River could have had little doubt as to the fire‘s origin.934  The shootings continued 
from December 21 through Christmas Eve, when the Selbstschutz and their Romanian-led 
counterparts broke for Christmas and at least some of the militiamen returned home to 
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celebrate.935  The killing recommenced three days later on December 27 and continued into 
the first week of 1942 with declining intensity.936  According to the findings of the Soviet 
Extraordinary State Commission, by the conclusion of the main killings at the Bogdanovka 
camp on January 15, 1942, German and Romanian forces had murdered some 52,000 Jews—
virtually the camp‘s entire prisoner population.937 
 The German and Romanian killing operation at the Bogdanovka camp was at once 
conventional and yet innovative.  On the one hand, Hartung and his Romanian colleagues 
applied a template for mass shootings that German and to a lesser extent Romanian forces 
elsewhere in the Soviet Union—including Einsatzgruppe D during its earlier deployment to 
southern Ukraine—had developed.  On the other hand, the use of cremation and Jewish slave 
labor for body disposal anticipated, at least in embryo, procedures that German authorities 
would deploy in their clandestine extermination centers in occupied Poland.  While it may 
appear fruitful to trace these continuities, cremation and use of Jewish laborers to feed pyres 
near the Bogdanovka camp appears to have been an extemporaneous response to the 
obstacles that Romanian and German forces faced in murdering the camp‘s prisoners.  Mass 
cremation proved attractive to German and Romanian authorities at the Bogdanovka camp 
for two practical reasons.  First, as German and Romanian forces cooperated in the operation 
to prevent the spread of typhus, body burning promised to stop the epidemic.  Second, in the 
middle of the unusually severe winter of 1941-42, burial, the other option for body disposal, 
                                                 
935 Protokol / Stoioga Pavl, May 10, 1944, USHMM, RG-22.002M, Reel 6, Fond 7021, Opis 69, Delo 
342, 70.  Nimilov stated that the shooting recommenced on December 28, 1941.  Pokazal / Boris Filipovich 
Nilimov, May 10, 1944, USHMM, RG-22.002M, Reel 6, Fond 7021, Opis 69, Delo 342, 74.  
936 Ibid. 
937 Akt, May 2, 1944, USHMM, RG-22.002M, Reel 6, Fond 7021, Opis 69, Delo 342, 53. 
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was impractical, as it would have been extraordinarily difficult, if not impossible for the 
killers to excavate a mass grave without heavy equipment.  The Romanian and German 
decision to cremate the bodies of their victims at the Bogdanovka camp was a response to the 
specific situational pressures that they faced. 
 The German and Romanian use of Jewish forced laborers to stoke the pyres was a 
similar solution to the acute manpower shortage that the perpetrators faced at Bogdanovka.  
With perhaps 130 shooters to kill more than 50,000 Jews, the operation‘s Romanian and 
German leaders had to mobilize every available source of manpower—including Jewish 
laborers.  From the available records, it is unclear why the killing operation‘s leaders did not 
draw more heavily on local Ukrainians from the town of Bogdanovka to provide logistical 
support for the murders.  That local Ukrainians had attempted to succor the camp‘s inmates 
during fall 1941 perhaps suggested to Romanian authorities that they might be uncooperative 
in the killing operation.  Alternatively, it is possible that the mass shooting‘s Romanian and 
German orchestrators depended on Jewish forced labor simply because the number of 
potential victims permitted them to find Jews who, despite the inhumane conditions in which 
they had been housed, were still physically fit enough to perform the necessary heavy labor 
of stoking the fire.  The ethnic German militia assigned twenty-nine-year-old Petr 
Nunershein, one of the few survivors of the Bogdanovka camp, to the labor brigade for 
precisely this reason.  Nunershein hailed from Kamianka, a town in extreme southwestern 
Ukraine, and Romanian authorities had deported him and his family to the Bug River‘s right 
bank relatively late in December 1941.  His transport was not intercepted by 
Bereichkommando XI‘s Selbstschutz in the surrounding countryside and he arrived in one of 
the last forced marches to the Bogdanovka camp on December 16, a mere five days before 
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the shooting operation began.938  Although Nunershein‘s Romanian and Ukrainian guards had 
pilfered his food and water en route, as a recently arrived inmate in the Bogdanovka camp, 
Nunershein had yet to succumb fully to the camp‘s deadly overcrowding and lack of 
sanitation and food.  On December 23, the Selbstschutz removed Nunershein and his family 
from the pigsty in which they had been imprisoned and marched them to the shooting site at 
the nearby ravine.  As Nunershein and his family were waiting to proceed to the shooting 
line, an ethnic German militiaman asked him about his occupation.  When Nunershein 
replied that he was a barber, the militiaman pulled him aside and assigned him to the labor 
brigade.  Nunershein watched as the Selbstschutz gunned down his mother, his wife, and 
their five-year-old son.  Nunershein was then made to throw their corpses onto the pyre.939  
As Nunershein‘s tragic case underscores, German and Romanian authorities at the 
Bogdanovka camp deployed Jewish forced laborers opportunistically because Jews, like 
members of the Selbstschutz, were a manpower pool of last resort. 
 Sonderkommando R‘s participation in the killings at the Bogdanovka camp marked 
both the beginning of the unit‘s involvement in the mass killing of Jews in rural Transnistria 
and perhaps the most concentrated participation of Soviet Volksdeutsche in the Holocaust.  
Within the span of little more than three weeks, German and Soviet estimates suggest 
plausibly that Hartung‘s 60 militiamen murdered more than 25,000 Jews.940  Assuming that 
                                                 
938 Nunershein later indicated that local residents, whom he had passed during his family‘s forced 
march to Bogdanovka, warned him that he was likely to be murdered near the Bug River.  Protokol / 
Nunershein Petr, May 10, 1944, USHMM, RG-22.002M, Reel 6, Fond 7021, Opis 69, Delo 342, 72. 
939 Ibid. 
940 Establishing the number of Jews that Bereichkommando XI‘s Selbstschutz murdered at the 
Bogdanovka camp is difficult to do with any precision.  The existing German and Soviet estimates were made 
years after the shooting.  Nevertheless, both Soviet and German estimates are remarkably consistent.  The 1944 
Soviet State Extraordinary Commission summary report concludes that German and Romanian-led forces 
murdered between 52,000 and 54,000 Jews at the camp.  Akt, May 2, 1944, USHMM, RG-22.002M, Reel 6, 
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Romanian and Ukrainian forces under the command of Hartung‘s Romanian allies killed a 
roughly comparable number of Jews at the camp, then the number of victims in this operation 
exceeded those of Babi Yar a few months earlier, in which German forces shot more than 
33,000 Jews.  In spite or rather perhaps because of the intensity of these killings, it appears 
that Sonderkommando R regarded its operations at the Bogdanovka camp as the limit to its 
unexpected participation in the mass murder of Jews in rural Transnistria.  With the spread of 
epidemic typhus no longer a threat, Hoffmeyer and his subordinates returned to the 
established German position that murdering the region‘s Jews was the exclusive 
responsibility of Transnistria‘s Romanian occupiers.  Local Romanian authorities, however, 
seem to have drawn the opposite lesson from the operation.  Having established that the 
German fear epidemic typhus could move Sonderkommando R to assist in the mass murder 
of Transnistria‘s Jews, Romanians authorities concluded, quite correctly, that this same 
anxiety could be mobilized to secure German support for subsequent killing operations. 
                                                                                                                                                       
Fond 7021, Opis 69, Delo 342, 53.  Protokol / Litvinanko Nadzhda, May 10, 1944, USHMM, RG-22.002M, 
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militiamen, estimated that he and his compatriots murdered approximately 30,000 Jews at the Bogdanovka 
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T120/3132/E510806.  If Franz Rademacher‘s notation referred simply to the killings at the Bogdanovka camp, 
then it is similar to later Soviet estimates.  Likewise, in his 1957 blackmail letter, Walter Vahldieck estimated 
that Hartung had orchestrated the murder of 36,000 Jews, approximately 20,000 more victims than Liebl, a 
neighboring Bereichkommandoführer who had not deployed to the Bogdanovka camp.  50 000 Juden aus 
Odessa / Tatsachenbericht von W. V., 1957, BAL, B162/2295, 26.  The murder of 16,000 Jews under Liebl‘s 
command is confirmed by Soviet counterintelligence records.  Protokol doprosa / A. M. G., September 20, 
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N. E., January 16, 1962, BAL, B162/2290, 184. 
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The Intensification of Romanian Deportations 
 Hartung and his Romanian counterparts could not have augured that Transnistria‘s 
Romanian rulers would again attempt to enlist Sonderkommando R‘s assistance in the mass 
murder of Jews during early 1942 because the origins of this second wave of killing were the 
result not of local circumstances, but a consequence of a radicalization of Romanian anti-
Jewish policy.  During the winter of 1941, Romanian military setbacks during the campaign 
in southern Ukraine moved Romanian authorities to intensify their anti-Jewish measures—a 
move that exacerbated the increasingly unviable policy of concentrating Jewish deportees 
near the Bug River in preparation for future, but perpetually postponed expulsion farther into 
the Soviet Union.  In contrast to their German allies, who intensified their anti-Jewish 
measures amid the ―euphoria of victory,‖ during 1941 and early 1942, Romanian authorities 
sharpened their anti-Jewish policies in response to the Romanian military‘s disappointing 
performance against the Red Army.941  German and Romanian forces crossed the Dniester 
River on July 15, 1941, and, in just over two weeks, the German-led Blitzkrieg had overran 
the entirety of what would become Transnistria with the exception of Odessa and its 
suburbs.942  Insistent that the Romanian army prove its mettle against Soviet forces, 
Antonescu ordered the Romanian Third and Fourth Armies to attack Odessa without German 
assistance.  The assault began on August 18, but it soon became bogged down.  Romania was 
forced to seek German assistance, which arrived on September 24.  Despite heavy casualties 
on both sides, the Soviet command did not evacuate by sea until October 16, thereby denying 
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the Romanian army its quick, decisive victory.943  After two months of combat, the badly 
mauled Romanian army entered the city and pillaged the region‘s entrepôt.  During the initial 
days of the occupation, Romanian forces vented their frustration by murdering as many as 
8,000 civilians, and targeting specifically some 70,000 Jews remaining in the city, who had 
been unable or were unwilling to flee with retreating Soviet forces.944 
 Romanian authorities ramped up anti-Jewish measures after a Soviet-planted bomb 
destroyed the Romanian General Staff headquarters, located in the former NKVD building, 
on October 22.  In addition to killing more than 50 Romanian soldiers and a handful of 
German officers, including Sonderkommando R‘s first Bereichkommandoführer in Odessa, 
the bomb claimed the life of General Ion Glogojanu, Odessa‘s new Romanian military 
commander.  To add insult to injury, the Romanian military had received creditable 
intelligence indicating that the building was booby trapped prior to the explosion, and yet 
took no preventative action.945  As an illustration of the degree to which, at least in the fall of 
1941, the Romanian government regarded the removal of Jews from its sphere of influence 
as an integral component of its campaign against the Soviet Union, Romanian forces exacted 
revenge for their own incompetence against the city‘s Jews.  Based on fantastic claims that 
Odessa‘s Jews had triggered the bomb by remote control, on Antonescu‘s orders the 
Romanian army rounded up many of the city‘s Jews and, over the course of the next three 
days, savagely murdered between 18,000 and 25,000 men, women, and children in nearby 
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suburban Dalnic.946  In the weeks that followed the massacre, Romanian forces deported a 
further 35,000 Jews from the city to a series of camps and ghettos on Odessa‘s environs and 
to detention facilities in the Golta District, such as the Bogdanovka camp.947 
 Even after the murder of tens of thousands of Jews in and around Odessa, for 
Transnistria‘s Romanian occupiers the continued presence of Jews near the city constituted a 
twofold military threat—the first real and the second wholly imagined.  On the one hand, as 
at their concentration camps along the Bug River‘s right bank, Romanian authorities 
remained concerned about the spread of epidemic typhus among Jewish prisoners 
incarcerated near Odessa.948  As a central artery for supplying Romanian forces both in the 
region and fighting alongside the Wehrmacht deeper in the Soviet Union, southern 
Transnistria was key to the Romanian war effort.  Although purely a product of Romanian 
ghettoization and deportation policies, the alarming spread of typhus among Jewish prisoners 
housed along the Romanian military‘s central supply route alarmed the Romanian leadership, 
which feared that infection might spread to Romanian personnel stationed in and transiting 
through the area.949  On the other hand, Romanian authorities remained convinced that Jews 
constituted a security threat to their forces.  To the Romanian military and civil 
administration, the destruction of the Romanian military headquarters in Odessa in late 
October 1941 served as a reminder not of the failures of Romanian counterintelligence, but 
of the continued threat that the city‘s Jewish civilians posed to Romanian rule.  In late 1941, 
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the Romanian SSI reported that the Red Army was planning a landing behind the front near 
Odessa and that the city‘s Jews would likely operate as a fifth column for Soviet forces—a 
report the Antonescu took seriously.950  For both Romanian occupation authorities in and 
around Odessa and for the Romanian leadership in Bucharest, the continued presence of Jews 
in the Romanian military‘s central supply route constituted an increasingly intolerable 
danger. 
 These fears came to a head during a December 16, 1941, cabinet meeting in 
Bucharest.  Following a report on the situation of Odessa‘s Jews that Alexianu had submitted 
to the cabinet, Transnistria‘s governor described the current state of Romanian Jewish policy 
in and around the city.  Downplaying the typhus epidemic that raged among Odessa‘s 
increasingly ghettoized Jews, Alexianu emphasized his own plan of putting able-bodied Jews 
to work and imprisoning the rest of the city‘s Jews in the former Soviet naval base near 
Ochakov.951  Obviously frustrated by what he regarded as a lack of progress on the Jewish 
question and the continued threat that he suspected that the Jews posed to the Romanian 
military, Antonescu admonished Alexianu that: 
The Germans want to bring all the Yids from Europe to Russia and settle them in 
specific areas, but it will take time until this is actually carried out.  What will we do 
with [the Jews] in the meantime?  Wait for a decision that affects us?  Guarantee their 
safety?  Pack them into the catacombs!  Throw them into the Black Sea!  But get 
them out of Odessa!  As far as I‘m concerned, a hundred can die, a thousand can die, 
they can all die!952 
 
At Antonescu‘s behest, immediately after the cabinet meeting Alexianu ordered the 
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Romanian Third Army, stationed in Odessa, to begin deporting Jews.953 
 Alexianu and his subordinates selected the northern Ochakov and southern Berezovka 
districts as deportation destinations for Jews housed in concentration camps and ghettos 
around Odessa.  These destinations had two likely advantages for the Romanians.  First, like 
the Bogdanovka camp, they were comparatively close to the Bug River and could facilitate 
further expulsion to the Reichskommissariat Ukraine—a solution to the Jewish ―problem‖ 
that, at least publicly, Alexianu still regarded as imminent in December 1941.  Despite 
damage to the region‘s rail network during the opening months of the campaign, connections 
between Odessa and Berezovka remained largely intact, a fact that would speed the 
deportation of Jews out of the militarily sensitive corridor around Odessa.954  As the typhus 
epidemic among Jewish prisoners had halted deportations to Golta, the northern Ochakov 
and southern Berezovka districts may have appeared to Alexianu and his subordinates as the 
next best place to relocate Jews in preparation for a subsequent deportation farther east. 955  
Second, although speculative, it seems highly probable that local Romanian authorities 
selected these deportation destinations precisely because they were a geographical focus of 
the VoMi‘s efforts to mobilize area Volksdeutsche.  Sonderkommando R‘s participation in the 
murder of prisoners at the Bogdanovka camp, which during late December 1941 was still 
ongoing, likely underscored to local Romanian leaders that the fear of epidemic typhus could 
be used to secure the unit‘s participation in mass murder even in the face of established 
German precedent that dictated that the Romanians were alone responsible for the murder of 
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Jews in territory that they occupied. 956  The killings at the Bogdanovka camp appear to have 
provided Alexianu and his subordinates with a strategy that they applied to subsequent 
deportations from Odessa. 
 The Romanian deportations of Jews into rural northern Transnistria began in early 
January 1942 and caught Sonderkommando R by surprise.957  Despite the fact that 
Sonderkommando R‘s Bereichkommando XXV was located in Odessa, Goerbig, the local 
Bereichkommandoführer, failed to catch wind of the deportations and to warn his superiors 
in Landau.  The first indication that Hoffmeyer‘s command had about the Romanian 
deportations from the area around Odessa to rural Transnistria came shortly after New Year 
1942, when SS-Untersturmführer Bernhard Streit, the Bereichkommandoführer based in 
Worms, reported an influx of Jewish deportees into VoMi-controlled territory.958  As one of 
his former comrades recounted after the war, Streit appeared at the unit‘s headquarters in 
Landau and reported that ―tens of thousands of Odessa Jews were marching through his 
territory in a northeasterly direction.  Hundreds of them lay [dying] along the route from 
hunger and hypothermia.‖959  Fearing that the Jewish deportees might ―infiltrate‖ 
Volksdeutsche settlements in his Bereichkommando, Streit inquired about how to proceed.960  
Aware that Hartung and his militia forces were still carrying out a mass shooting operation at 
the Bogdanovka camp and likely suspecting that the newly arrived Jewish deportees also 
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were infected with typhus, Streit‘s superiors ordered him to use all necessary force to prevent 
the deportees from reaching the region‘s ethnic German settlements.961 
 Over the following weeks, Sonderkommando R‘s leaders opted to expand 
Bereichkommando Rastatt‘s initial participation in mass shooting at the Bogdanovka camp 
into the unit‘s standard operating procedure.  They came to this decision as part of a 
consultative process, the precise contours of which remain unclear.  According to postwar 
German sources, which historians such as Angrick have used to reconstruct this decision 
making process, Hoffmeyer contacted Einsatzgruppe D and requested that it return to 
Transnistria to shoot the Jewish deportees.962  Citing the restrictions imposed on German 
forces in Transnistria by the Treaty of Tighina, SS-Standartenführer Otto Ohlendorf, the 
unit‘s commander, refused.  Hoffmeyer then traveled to Berlin, where he met with either 
Himmler963 or with Lorenz and his deputy, SS-Standartenführer Walter Ellermeyer.964  While 
in Berlin, Hoffmeyer learned about the Nazi regime‘s decision to murder European Jewry 
and received orders for Sonderkommando R to emulate Einsatzgruppe D‘s earlier murderous 
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Gerhard Wolfrum and Wilhelm Stutzmann for the sum of 20,000 Deutschmark.  SS Offizier Akte Wilhelm 
Stutzmann, NARA, RG 242, A3343, SSO-169B, 662.  Urteil gegen den Kaufmann Walter Paul Vahldieck, April 
10, 1958, BAL, B162/2295, 23.  While Vahldieck contended that Wolfrum issued Streit orders on how to 
proceed, this appears unlikely given Wolfrum‘s position in the unit.  Given the unit‘s typical chain of command, 
it is far more likely that Siebert issued Streit his initial orders on how to handle the Jewish deportees.  Even after 
admitting to attempted blackmail, Vahldieck testified that the information included in the report was true.  
Aussage von W. V., August 30, 1957, BAL, B162/2295, 6. 
96250 000 Juden aus Odessa / Tatsachenbericht von W. V., 1957, BAL, B162/2295, 26-27. 
963 During her 1966 interview, Hoffmeyer‘s wife recounted to the West German police that her husband 
had received the order for Sonderkommando R to expand its killing operations from Himmler directly.  Aussage 
von A. H., April 22, 1966, BAL, B162/2306, 92-93.  To cover his own involvement as Hoffmeyer‘s direct 
superior, Lorenz suggested improbably that Hoffmeyer enjoyed a close relationship with Himmler.  
Vernehmung von Werner Lorenz, April 16, 1973, Staatsarchiv Münster, Nr. 2787, 102. 
964 Vahldieck advanced the latter version.  50 000 Juden aus Odessa / Tatsachenbericht von W. V., 
1957, BAL, B162/2295, 26-27.  Angrick, ―The Escalation of German-Rumanian Anti-Jewish Policy after the 
Attack on the Soviet Union,‖ 233-234. 
334 
 
sweep through the region by killing the Jews whom the Romanians were in the process of 
expelling from the Odessa area.965 
 Although this explanation is generally plausible, it is one that is not well-supported by 
circumstantial evidence from available fragmentary wartime German records.  It seems 
highly unlikely that Hoffmeyer met with Himmler personally to discuss the matter before 
ordering his subordinates to conduct further mass shooting operations in rural Transnistria.  
Based on Himmler‘s day planner, not only is there no evidence that he met with Hoffmeyer 
during December 1941 or January 1942, but there is also no record of a face-to-face meeting 
between the two men until early April 1942—an appointment for which Hoffmeyer had to 
wait more than four months.966  Likewise, despite the fact that Sonderkommando R had used 
its police band radio transmitters in Landau both to contact Einsatzgruppe D967 and to notify 
the unit‘s superiors about Hoffmeyer‘s travel plans, neither an alleged appeal to Ohlendorf‘s 
command, nor a last-minute trip by Hoffmeyer to Berlin during December 1941 or January 
1942 appears in messages that British signals intelligence intercepted.968  Rather than a quick 
visit to Berlin to confer with his superiors about how to respond to the latest spate of 
Romanian Jewish deportations, intercepted German radio traffic indicates that Hoffmeyer 
traveled to Bucharest in early January 1942 for six days of ―urgent conferences‖ with his 
Romanian counterparts.969  While the summit‘s agenda cannot be reconstructed from the 
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decoded messages, it is clear that Hoffmeyer‘s decision to travel to Bucharest invoked the ire 
of his superiors, who chastised him for not having consulted with SS-Obergruppenführer 
Hans-Adolf Prützmann, the High SS and Police Leader for the Reichkommissariat Ukraine 
prior to the trip.970  That the Office of the Reichsführer SS called Hoffmeyer on the carpet for 
having overstepped his authority suggests that, at least as of early January 1942, he had not 
yet communicated with his superiors in Berlin.  While it is conceivable that Hoffmeyer 
eventually traveled to Berlin to consult with the VoMi‘s leadership, previously unexamined 
records suggest that, when confronted with the unexpected arrival of additional Jews in 
northeastern Transnistria, Hoffmeyer‘s initial impulse was to seek clarification from 
Bucharest rather than to confer with other responsible German authorities. 
 In Hoffmeyer‘s absence, Romanian forces continued to deport Jews by rail to 
Berezovka and then on foot in forced marches northeast in the direction of Voznesensk on the 
Bug River.  In addition to Bereichkommando XIV based in Worms under Streit, who had 
reported the initial expulsions, Bereichkommandos XI and XX, based in Rastatt and 
Lichtenfeld, respectively, lay in the immediate path of the deportations.  With Hartung still 
supervising the final stages of the mass killing operation at the Bogdanovka camp, 
responsibility for intercepting Romanian-guarded Jewish transports fell to Streit and his 
counterpart in Lichtenfeld, SS-Untersturmführer Liebl, whose command posts were both 
closer to the railheads in Berezovka.  Although their neighboring commander Hartung had 
spearheaded the shootings at the Bogdanovka camp, initially both Streit and Liebl appear to 
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have reacted far more cautiously and interpreted their orders to mean that they were simply 
to interdict the Jewish deportees before they reached the area‘s Volksdeutsche settlements.  
To this end, initially both commanders ordered militiamen under their command simply to 
stop the Jewish deportees from transiting through local Volksdeutsche settlements.971  There 
are two possible explanations for Streit and Liebl‘s apparent reluctance to begin murdering 
the Jewish deportees without explicit orders to do so.  First, that neither SS officer enjoyed 
Hartung‘s high-level patronage may have made both officers reticent to exceed their orders 
for fear of running afoul of their superiors.972  Second, and more likely, they may have 
misunderstood the beginning of wholesale Romanian deportations from Odessa‘s environs to 
rural Transnistria as simply a continuation of earlier Romanian ghettoization efforts—
initiatives that a November 1941 agreement permitted the Romanian civil administration to 
pursue.973  On January 9, 1942, for example, Liebl demanded from the Romanian prefecture 
in Berezovka that ―Jews not be driven through the German town of Kartekai.‖974  Still 
apparently unaware of Romanian aims, Liebl warned his counterpart that ―beginning today I 
will post Selbstschutz guards, who will stop the marches.‖975  Without clear orders on how to 
deal with the Jewish deportees or unusually independent midlevel officers who demonstrated 
enthusiasm for killing Jews, at first Sonderkommando R‘s Bereichkommandoführer 
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responded cautiously to Romanian deportations. 
Sonderkommando R’s Second Wave of Killing 
 That Sonderkommando R‘s midlevel leaders deployed their Volksdeutsche militia 
forces to murder the Jewish expellees shortly after the conclusion of Hoffmeyer‘s trip to 
Bucharest suggests not only that Hoffmeyer coordinated the mass shootings with his 
Romanian counterparts during his visit, but also that he had received the necessary 
authorization to proceed from his superiors in Berlin by the second week of January 1942.  
Within days, Selbstschutz units from Bereichkommandos in Lichtenfeld, Rastatt, and Worms 
began to murder the Jewish deportees in coordination with local Romanian authorities.  
Reconstructing individual shooting operations within each of the three Bereichkommandos is 
infeasible both because of the number of deployments in which each Selbstschutz unit 
participated and because of the limitations of postwar investigative records.  From January 
through April 1942, Volksdeutsche militia units in all three Bereichkommandos conducted 
dozens of individual shooting deployments of varying magnitudes, ranging from 
approximately 150 to 1,000 victims each.  Absent wartime German records, which 
Sonderkommando R probably haphazardly maintained at the time and likely destroyed at the 
war‘s end, it is difficult to document individual shooting operations with any precision.   
Moreover, postwar statements that suspected perpetrators and occasionally survivors gave to 
West German and Soviet investigators provide the most detailed accounts of the killings and 
yet suffer from two limitations.  First, postwar testimony rarely distinguishes one murder 
operation from another.  And second, the historically useful information available in postwar 
testimony frequently is shaped by the questions that investigators posed.  One consequence 
of this bias is an uneven geographic focus in postwar testimony that provides far greater 
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information about the activities of militia units that Hartung commanded, because of their 
earlier operations at the Bogdanovka camp, than about neighboring Selbstschutz formations 
subordinated to Bereichkommandos based in Lichtenfeld and Worms.  Given this 
documentary imbalance and the fact that militia units from all three Bereichkommandos 
operated in a similar fashion, what follows is an effort to provide a sense of this phase of 
Sonderkommando R‘s involvement in the mass shooting of Jews in rural Transnistria by 
focusing on the Selbstschutz‘s crimes in Bereichkommando XI near Rastatt. 
 As in other Bereichkommandos, mass shootings spearheaded by Bereichkommando 
XI‘s Selbstschutz primarily during January and February 1942 were merely the conclusion of 
a killing process that had begun with murderous Romanian expulsions from camps and 
ghettos on Odessa‘s outskirts.  Romanian deportations during early 1942 were an effort not 
simply to remove the Jews from the militarily sensitive area around Odessa, but also to 
ensure that as few Jews as possible reached their destinations in the surrounding countryside.  
Weakened and frequently ill with typhus because of the conditions in which their Romanian 
captors had housed them, the Jewish deportees frequently were in fragile health even prior to 
deportation.  Transit to Berezovka in overcrowded, poorly ventilated, unheated cattle cars 
during the exceptionally frigid month of January 1942—when temperatures reached as low 
as -30 to -35 degrees Celsius—further endangered the deportees.976  Upon arriving in 
Berezovka, Romanian gendarmes and their Ukrainian helpers unloaded the surviving 
expellees and led them on forced marches designed to kill as many of the prisoners as 
possible through starvation and exposure.  Many of these marches merely went in circles to 
increase the prisoners‘ exposure to the elements.  The deportees‘ lack of clothing surprised 
                                                 
976 Aussage von R. S., September 17, 1964, Staatsarchiv Münster, Nr. 2671, 69. 
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even some of their suspected murderers.  As one alleged Selbstschutz member recounted 
after the war, the deportees ―were partially without shoes, ragged, and physically completely 
finished.‖977  As at the Bogdanovka camp in late 1941, during these death marches Romanian 
authorities systematically prevented local residents from providing their Jewish prisoners 
with food and water.978  Romanian-led guards either simply abandoned or shot any deportee 
who was physically unable to continue on the march.  Local Volksdeutsche later recounted 
seeing corpses strewn along the sides of the road.979  Even before handing their prisoners 
over to Sonderkommando R‘s Selbstschutz, Romanian authorities had subjected their Jewish 
prisoners to murderous conditions designed to kill as many of them as possible. 
 Owing to the limitations of the available records, it is unclear whether or not 
Selbstschutz units under Hartung‘s command began mass shooting operations in 
Bereichkommando XI at the same time or slightly later than their counterparts in 
Bereichkommandos XIV in Worms and XX in Lichtenfeld.  It appears, however, that 
following the conclusion of mass shooting operations at the Bogdanovka camp, Hartung and 
his German subordinates deployed their Volksdeutsche militiaman to murder recently arrived 
Jewish prisoners almost immediately.980  Although it is evident that Hartung and his 
subordinates applied and even refined the killing techniques that they had honed at the 
                                                 
977 Zeugenschaftliche Vernehmung von J. F., January 17, 1962, BAL, B162/2290, 170-171. 
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the Jewish labor brigade continued to cremate victims‘ corpses into February 1942.  Akt, May 2, 1944, 
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Bogdanovka collective farm, this new escalation of Romanian deportations presented 
Hartung and his subordinates with a new series of challenges.  Unlike at the Bogdanovka 
camp, at which the Selbstschutz‘s victims were neatly concentrated and Sonderkommando R 
merely had to deploy its killers, the Jewish deportees who arrived in Bereichkommando XI 
under Romanian-led guard in forced marches from the Berezovka rail depot during early 
1942 had to be intercepted, guarded for up to several days, transported to a preselected 
killing site, and ultimately murdered.  Despite the scale of the mass shooting deployments to 
the Bogdanovka camp, the Selbstschutz‘s subsequent killing operations in Bereichkommando 
XI were logistically far more complex and placed far great manpower demands on Hartung 
and his staff.  Bereichkommando XI‘s German personnel responded to these difficulties by 
increasing dramatically the number of ethnic German militiamen assigned to participate in 
the killing operations.  Whereas at the Bogdanovka camp Hartung deployed roughly 60 
militiamen to murder the Jewish inmates, during subsequent local killing operations, he 
mustered over 250 Selbstschutz members.981  For earlier deployments at the Bogdanovka 
camp, Hartung and his subordinates could draw on militia units based in Volksdeutsche 
settlements near the Bug River and appear, at least anecdotally, to have assigned relatively 
young ethnic German men to the killing missions.  To interdict Romanian Jewish marches, 
which could appear throughout his bailiwick, Hartung deployed Volksdeutsche militiamen 
from all of his territory‘s major ethnic German population centers.  Occasionally, this meant 
that Hartung called up all able bodied ethnic German men of military age in a particular 
locality.  Sonderkommando R‘s manpower needs for its localized mass shooting operations 
                                                 
981 Pokozal / Sheremet Karneevich Karp, May 10, 1944, USHMM, RG-22.002M, Reel 6, Fond 7021, 
Opis 69, Delo 342, 75.  Akt, May 2, 1944, USHMM, RG-22.002M, Reel 6, Fond 7021, Opis 69, Delo 342, 48.  
Protokol doprosa / A. M. G., September 20, 1944, Staatsarchiv Münster, Nr. 2902, 52. 
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during early 1942 precipitated an exceptionally high level of Volksdeutsche involvement—
either directly or indirectly—in the Holocaust in the region. 
 German and Romanian authorities appear to have coordinated these expulsions into 
Bereichkommando XI very poorly if at all.  Jewish deportees arrived under Romanian and 
Ukrainian guard—often to the surprise of local ethnic Germans—at the town of Rastatt, its 
daughter settlement Klein Rastatt, Gradovka,982 Michialovka, München, and at the Neu 
Amerika collective farm (sovkhoz).983  Local Volksdeutsche riders informed Hartung and his 
Rastatt-based staff about the arrival of each transport, and Bereichkommando XI‘s German 
personnel darted from settlement to settlement to intercept the deportees, muster the local 
militiamen, and begin the killing process.984  In contrast to Sonderkommando R‘s operations 
at the Bogdanovka collective farm, the beginning of this second phase of killing was 
characterized not by a stationary mass shooting operation, but by arduous and hurried treks 
across a frozen countryside locked in the grip of an exceptionally harsh winter. 
 After intercepting the Romanian-led Jewish deportation marches, Bereichkommando 
XI‘s militiamen imprisoned the deportees for up to several days prior to murder.  As at the 
Bogdanovka collective farm, Bereichkommando XI‘s militiamen converted the outbuildings 
                                                 
982 When the shootings occurred in January and February 1942, Gradovka was a predominately 
ethnically Ukrainian village.  After March 1943, Sonderkommando R transferred local residents to the 
Bogdanovka collective farm (kolkhoz) and relocated ethnic German residents to Gradovka, renaming the town 
Neustadt (New City).  Zeugenschaftliche Vernehmung von L. B., January 16, 1962, BAL, B162/2290, 164.  
Protokol doprosa / Kokha Floriana Frantsevicha, February 7, 1967, USHMM, RG-31.018M, Reel 17, 8772. 
983 Protokol doprosa / Ionusa Aleksandra, April 3, 1967, USHMM, RG-31.018M, Reel 17, 8445. 
984 Hartung and his subordinates were almost always present at mass shooting operations.  Protokol 
doprosa / Ionusa Alexandra, November 3, 1966, USHMM, RG-31.018M, Reel 17, 9014.  Protokol doprosa / 
Kokha Floriana, October 13, 1966, USHMM, RG-31.018M, Reel 17, 8610.  Given that Sonderkommando R 
depended on local riders to communicate, particularly in winter when automobile transportation was unreliable, 
mounted messengers appear to have been the only way for local residents to notify Bereichkommando XI‘s staff 
about the arrival of a Jewish transport.  German Police Decodes Nr 2 Traffic: 21.12.41, January 6, 1942, BNA, 
HW 16, Piece 32, 2. 
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of former collective farms into makeshift prisons that Selbstschutz sentries guarded. 985  To 
contain the spread of typhus, the militiamen selected structures that were typically some 
distance from the nearest ethnic German settlement.986  For Hartung and his underlings, 
imprisonment prior to murder served two purposes.  First, it permitted Bereichkommando 
XI‘s staff to assemble a critical mass of both victims and shooters.  As Hartung and his 
colleagues had learned during their operations at the Bogdanovka camp, a large-scale killing 
operation was a more economical use of finite manpower than a series of smaller 
deployments, particularly when the perpetrators had to travel some distance during winter.  
Romanian gendarmes and their Ukrainian auxiliaries often escorted relatively small groups 
of 50 to 100 Jews from Berezovka into Bereichkommando XI.987  As it was impractical to 
gun down these smaller transports as they arrived, local Selbstschutz units frequently 
assembled prisoners from four or five transports before organizing a mass shooting operation.  
The delay that imprisoning the Jews afforded also allowed Hartung and his subordinates to 
muster militiamen from neighboring Volksdeutsche settlements to assist in the killings.988  
Occasionally, Bereichkommando XI‘s staff ordered their local ethnic German helpers to 
transport their new Jewish captives from one makeshift prison to another, either on foot or by 
                                                 
985 Aussage von V. H., September 7, 1964, Staatsarchiv Münster, Nr. 2684, 53-54.  Aussage von N. R., 
November 3, 1964, BAL, B162/2303, 99.  Aussage von L. V., October 8, 1964, BAL, B162/2303, 4-5. 
986 Aussage von M. B., June 10, 1965, BAL, B162/2305, 196. 
987 Romanian Jewish transports appear to have had an average size of 50 to 100 prisoners.  Aussage 
von V. A., November 19, 1964, BAL, B162/2303, 147.  Witnesses and suspected perpetrators reported shooting 
deployments that targeted between 150 and 1,000 Jewish prisoners.  Aussage von G. K., September 18, 1963, 
BAL, B162/2302, 286.  Aussage von M. B., June 10, 1965, BAL, B162/2305, 195. 
988 For larger shootings operations, Selbstschutz units deployed for multiday shooting missions to 
neighboring towns, villages, and collective farms.  Aussage von V. H., September 7, 1964, Staatsarchiv 
Münster, Nr. 2684, 53-54. 
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sled and wagon, to even out the ratio of intended victims to available perpetrators.989  Short-
term incarceration was thus a tactic that Bereichkommando XI‘s staff employed to streamline 
the killing process and to stretch the capabilities of a comparatively small manpower pool. 
 Second, and equally if not more importantly to the perpetrators, temporary 
imprisonment created prime conditions under which they could rob their Jewish victims prior 
to murder.  Volksdeutsche militiamen deployed to guard these hastily organized prisons 
routinely pledged to release their Jewish captives in exchange for valuables.990  In this 
respect, Sonderkommando R emulated Romanian authorities at the Bogdanovka camp, where 
Isopescu sold bread to starving Jewish prisoners at exorbitant prices to strip them of their 
remaining property immediately before the start of the mass shooting operation.  Impetus for 
this theft came from Bereichkommando XI‘s German personnel, who profited from the 
robbery.  Hartung and his staff‘s lust for Jewish valuables was legendary among local ethnic 
Germans.  According to Eugen A., a suspected Selbstschutz member from Rastatt, Hartung 
and his German subordinates ―were always after the Jews‘ gold.‖991  This greed found 
expression even after the conclusion of shooting operations.  As Josef F., a seventeen-year-
old resident of Rastatt later recounted: ―I saw how the SS men pulled rings off the victims‘ 
fingers and rummaged through what little food the victims had brought with because they 
knew from experience that some of the Jews had baked their gold pieces into cakes and 
bread.‖992  Hartung‘s office contained a cabinet that, according to another Rastatt resident, 
                                                 
989 Ibid. 
990 Aussage von F. F., April 13, 1967, BAL, B162/2307, 478.  Aussage von V. H., September 7, 1964, 
Staatsarchiv Münster, Nr. 2684, 53-54.   
991 Aussage von E. A., August 18, 1964, Staatsarchiv Münster, Nr. 2684, 32. 
992 Aussage von J. F., September 20, 1963, BAL, B162/2302, 300. 
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was crammed full of jewelry and gold coins that the militiamen had stripped from their 
Jewish victims.993  Hartung later passed many of these items, including ―a man‘s pocket 
watch [and] a gold wrist bracelet,‖ to his wife in anticipation of ―difficult times‖ ahead and as 
parting gifts to his secretary at the Gauleitung in Berlin during April 1945.994  In one of the 
most macabre episodes of the postwar West German investigation, during a police interview 
Hartung‘s wife produced a wedding band, engraved with date 1933, which she had received 
from her husband at the war‘s end and which their daughter continued to wear as jewelry 
during the mid-1960s.995 
 Anecdotal evidence suggests that Hartung‘s cupidity was representative of that of 
Sonderkommando R in general.  Hartung and his colleagues‘ haul was so large that they 
shared at least a portion of their ill-gotten gains with their superiors in Landau.  One of 
Hartung‘s fellow SS officers later stated that Bereichkommando XI‘s staff ―delivered a 
massive quantity of gold rubles, watches, rings, and chains to headquarters‖ in Landau.996  In 
addition to these valuables, Hartung and his fellow local commanders also forwarded gold 
fillings to their superiors.  Hoffmeyer allegedly instructed Niessner,997 the dental technician 
whose NSKK superiors had seconded him to Sonderkommando R, to open a practice for the 
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unit.998  At his office in Landau, Niessner smelted both fillings and 10 ruble gold pieces to 
use as dental gold for Sonderkommando R‘s German personnel.999  An array of Germans, 
ranging from SS officers to German Red Cross nurses, availed themselves of the opportunity 
to repair their inferior dental work at no cost.1000  SS-Oberscharführer Friedrich Marx, the 
unit‘s paymaster, kept the remainder of stolen Jewish valuables, which was either ill-suited or 
not needed for Niessner‘s services, in a large wooden chest, which Sonderkommando R sent 
to Ellermeyer in Berlin for safekeeping during the unit‘s 1944 withdrawal from 
Transnistria.1001  Despite the perpetual complaints that Germans lodged against their 
Romanian allies for corruption, for Sonderkommando R, no less than their Romanian 
counterparts, robbery became both a motivation and a reward for murder. 
 As the next step in the killing process underscored, Sonderkommando R‘s German 
staff members were not the only direct beneficiaries of these mass shootings.  When local 
Selbstschutz units had assembled a sufficiently large number of Jewish inmates in their 
makeshift prisons, the militiamen summoned their German superiors, and typically Hartung 
personally, to oversee the operation.1002  Selbstschutz guards escorted groups of Jews from 
their temporary jails to predetermined killing sites.  There, ethnic German sentries instructed 
their Jewish victims to strip to their underwear and collected their clothes, shoes, and 
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remaining personal items.1003  Selbstschutz members, who were the primary beneficiaries of 
this theft, appear in some cases to have begun dividing up their spoils in the middle of killing 
operations.1004  Hartung not only tolerated robbery but encouraged Volksdeutsche militiamen 
under his command to keep stolen Jewish property.1005  Local ethnic Germans were 
particularly keen on acquiring what they regarded as luxury items from their urban and more 
affluent victims.  Shoes, leather boots, gold coins, suits, and even women‘s undergarments 
became prized possessions for the killers.1006  The amount of property that this robbery netted 
for Bereichkommando XI was so large that Hartung simply could not give it all away to the 
executioners and was forced to warehouse many of the items in Rastatt.  Franz F., who lived 
next to the impromptu warehouse, described its contents: ―On the neighboring farm, there 
was a cow barn, approximately 10 x 8 m[eters] in size, which was full of articles of clothing 
that had come from the [Jewish] victims.  A member of the Selbstschutz stood guard there 
through the night.  Photos and identification papers from the victims lay on the field in front 
of the barn and children picked them up and played with them.‖1007  To ensure that no hidden 
valuables had escaped him, Hartung selected a couple of old ethnic German women to search 
through the items in the cow barn and to surrender any discovered valuables to him.1008  
Except for the most choice pieces, which he and his fellow Germans kept for themselves or 
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which Bereichkommando XI sold in local stores, Hartung ordered the Selbstschutz to 
distribute the remaining clothes to area Volksdeutsche.1009  In Bereichkommando XI, greed 
shaped the involvement of German and ethnic German perpetrators alike.  
   Hartung and his German subordinates instructed their Volksdeutsche militiamen to 
murder the Jewish deportees in one of two ways.  The first represented a continuation of the 
tactics that Hartung‘s command had developed during deployments to the Bogdanovka 
collective farm and the second was an opportunistic effort to correct problems with precisely 
those procedures.  Initially, Bereichkommando XI‘s militiamen escorted their victims from 
barns in which they had been held to shooting pits some distance from Rastatt.  A so-called 
―cadaver pit,‖ (Kadavargrube) which local residents had used prior to the war to discard the 
carcasses of their dead cattle, roughly two kilometers from Rastatt, was a choice execution 
site because it required little excavation.1010  The Selbstschutz also dug out other naturally 
occurring hollows to reach the desired depth for a mass grave.1011  Once at the murder site, 
Bereichkommando XI‘s Selbstschutz members selected the few still physically robust male 
Jewish prisoners to assist them by building a pyre in the pit using a combination of gasoline 
or straw as accelerants.1012  With these preparations in place, the militiamen forced their 
victims to strip down and hand over their property.  Selbstschutz members then gunned down 
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groups of between five and 20 Jews at a time with aimed shots to the base of the skull.1013  
The Selbstschutz‘s Jewish forced laborers then threw the victims‘ corpses on to the fire.  As 
one group of militiamen shot, a second group of Selbstschutz members transported the next 
group of victims to the shooting pit—a procedure that continued until all of the Jewish 
captives had been murdered.  The militiamen then shot their forced laborers and incinerated 
their bodies before returning home with their stolen Jewish property.1014 
 Nikolaus R., a local Rastatt resident and suspected Selbstschutz member, described 
one of these shooting operations to West German investigators more than two decades later: 
In Rastadt [sic], roughly 500 to 600 Jews were housed in the cow barn at the fork in 
the road to München and Neu-Rastadt [Klein Rastadt].  . . .  From a distance of about 
600 meters I witnessed hundreds of [Jews] shot on a hill north of Rastadt [sic].  I 
could tell that these people had to strip naked.  They were brought to a specially dug 
pit and shot.  When the wind blew in the right direction, one could hear the screams 
and whimpers of these people clearly.  The mass executions at this place continued 
for many days and each time several hundred Jews were shot.  One evening after an 
execution I was standing near the pit and saw that it was 5 x 6 meters in size and had 
a depth of 15 meters.  In the pit a kind of grate had been constructed and under the 
grate a fire burned constantly.  The victims fell onto the grate and burned up.  One 
could clearly see charred human remains in the pit.1015 
 
 Despite the assembly line model for these mass shootings, the militiamen periodically 
failed to kill all of their victims and encountered survivors.  As R. continued:  
As I was standing next to the pit with a group of people a completely naked Jew 
jumped out and attempted to flee.  [Georg E., a local militiaman] yelled in the 
direction of the Selbstschutz‘s headquarters that Jews were still running around here.  
. . .  After about 10 minutes Eugen G. [another militiaman] appeared with a rifle.  
There was snow on the ground and the Jew did not get far, having lain down from 
exhaustion.  He kneeled and begged for his life.  Georg E. took G.‘s rifle and shot the 
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Jew right there.  E. and G. then strapped a belt around his neck and dragged him the 
50 meters back to the pit and threw him in.1016 
 
In another instance, while sorting through their victims‘ clothing, Rastatt‘s Selbstschutz 
members discovered a live infant in a rucksack that they had taken as booty.  According to 
one ethnic German witness, ―one of the SS officers [present] stated that he wanted to shoot or 
to bludgeon the child to death, whereupon one of his colleagues said that he should not strain 
himself and rather throw the child onto the pyre alive, which he did.‖1017  In another instance, 
a Jewish prisoner escaped, overpowered his would-be killer, and wounded a militiaman in the 
leg with his captured rifle before being gunned down by other Selbstschutz members.1018  
Mass shootings near the town of Rastatt were a gruesome and occasionally dangerous affairs 
that required both German and Volksdeutsche perpetrators to carry out mopping up 
operations even after the conclusion of their primary killing deployments. 
  In the series of initial shooting operations near Rastatt, Hartung‘s command applied 
the tactics that it had used during its earlier deployments at the Bogdanovka camp.  In other 
parts of Bereichkommando XI, however, it adapted its procedures to correct a problem in the 
killing process that had become acute since the end of this operation—namely that these 
types of mass shootings were a highly inefficient use of Sonderkommando R‘s scarce 
ammunition.  Notwithstanding the fact that at the Bogdanovka camp less than 100 
Selbstschutz members had gunned down perhaps 25,000 Jews in less than a month of 
sustained shooting operations, the militiamen expended an extraordinarily large quantity of 
ammunition.  Sonderkommando R was simply not equipped for this type of an operation and 
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certainly not for one of this size.  As a unit tasked with mobilizing southern Ukraine‘s ethnic 
Germans, the VoMi had issued its German personnel small arms for personal defense.1019  To 
supply the Selbstschutz, a move that VoMi planners apparently had not anticipated, 
Sonderkommando R had distributed both old hunting rifles, some of which had been 
confiscated from local non-Germans, and a mishmash of captured Soviet firearms. 1020  
Referred to in the unit‘s staff orders as ―junk rifles,‖ (Shrotflinten) some of these weapons 
were so decrepit that Sonderkommando R‘s leaders instructed their subordinates to inspect 
and confiscate defective firearms from local ethnic Germans.1021  Selbstschutz weapons were 
in such short supply that militiamen frequently had to share rifles, which they had to sign in 
and out of local armories to perform guard duty.1022  In some instances, no rifles were 
available and Sonderkommando R armed its Volksdeutsche militiamen with clubs.1023  The 
dearth of ammunition also limited Selbstschutz firearms training.1024  The lack of safety 
instruction contributed to foolish accidents.1025  When militiamen did obtain ammunition, 
they were so careless that Siebert had to issue strict guidelines on firearms safety.1026  
Sonderkommando R‘s Selbstschutz was as limited by ammunition constraints as it was in the 
                                                 
1019 Aussage von F. D., November 27, 1964, BAL, B162/2303, 207. 
1020 Sonderkommando R scrambled to find weapons for the Selbstschutz in October 1941.  
Rundanwesiung Nr. 5, October 13, 1941, BB, R 59/66, 148. 
1021 Rundanweisung Nr. 8, n.d., BB, R 59/66, 142.  Stabbefehl Nr. 115, August 28, 1943, BB, R 59/67, 
35. 
1022 Vernehmungsniederschrift von J. S., July 31, 1962, BAL, B162/2296, 108. 
1023 Aussage von J. E., August 20, 1962, BAL, B162/2302, 170. 
1024 Aussage von O. F., November 17, 1964, BAL, B162/2303, 130. 
1025 See, for example, Aussage von P. H., September 10, 1964, BAL, B162/2304, 281. 
1026 Rundanweisung Nr. 39 / Betr.: Schießübungen des Selbstschutzes, April 22, 1942, BB, R 59/66, 93. 
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skills necessary to use its weapons. 
 Highly exceptionally, during their operations at the Bogdanovka camp, Hartung‘s 
militiamen did not want for weapons.  Armed with captured Soviet rifles, one of the 
militiamen later recounted that during the operation he had had a seemingly limitless supply 
of cartridges, which he and his fellow killers carried in their pockets and brought with them 
in ammunition chests.1027  Where Hartung and his staff obtained this additional armament is 
unclear.  It seems unlikely that Bereichkommando XI could have fielded such well-armed 
militiamen independently, given the unit‘s overall lack of weapons.  It is possible that 
Hartung drew on stores of captured Soviet weapons and ammunition in Landau, from 
German forces on the Bug River‘s left bank, or from Romanian authorities in Golta.1028  
Regardless of where Hartung obtained what by Sonderkommando R‘s standards was a 
dizzying armory, the rate at which Volksdeutsche militiamen under his command depleted 
their supply of ammunition during their operations at the Bogdanovka camp was 
unsustainable.  The unit‘s orders to reduce ammunition consumption during 1942 are 
illustrative.  In March 1942, when, in the wake of its most intense mass shooting operations, 
Sonderkommando R was able to reevaluate its ammunition supply, Hoffmeyer ordered local 
Bereichkommandoführer to rein in firearms use and chided his men for wasting rounds ―in 
pointless shootings.‖1029  While he noted that ―German and Russian rifle ammunition is 
available in sufficient quantities,‖ Hoffmeyer warned his subordinates that ―the supply of 
                                                 
1027 Protokol doprosa / Ionusa Alexandra, November 1, 1966, USHMM, RG-31.018M, Reel 17, 9002. 
1028 Of these, the first appears to be the most plausible.  Sonderkommando R allegedly mustered 
Volksdeutsche youths to collect unexpended and discarded munitions.  Aussage von E. E., November 19, 1964, 
BAL, B162/2303, 152. 
1029 Einheit Feldpost Nr. 10528 / Betr.: Munitionsverbrauch und Gebrauch von Schußwaffen, March 
14, 1942, BB, R 59 / 66, 111. 
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pistol ammunition is very limited and [that] there is no possibility of expanding or 
supplementing [it].‖1030  The same was also true of sub-machine gun ammunition, which 
Hoffmeyer ordered his staff to use ―strictly sparingly.‖1031  He concluded by forbidding his 
staff members from expending more than 10 rounds each, after which they would be charged 
one Reichsmark per cartridge.1032  Sonderkommando R‘s participation in mass shooting 
operations in rural Transnistria, and especially its role in the killings at the Bogdanovka 
camp, merely exacerbated the unit‘s ammunition shortage. 
 In response to mounting pressures to curtail ammunition use and to compensate for 
the comparatively few militiamen that Bereichkommando XI had at its disposal to murder 
newly arrived Jewish deportees, Hartung‘s command streamlined its tactics to economize 
both its cartridge consumption and its personnel needs.  Rural Ukraine‘s infrastructure 
provided Hartung and his subordinates with precisely the facilities necessary to make the 
killing process more efficient.  Large brick lime kilns dotted southern Ukraine‘s countryside.  
As they had through western and central Europe from the Middle Ages through the end of the 
nineteenth century, lime kilns were a primary means of making lime, a chemical with myriad 
uses, ranging from mortar to fertilizer.  A lime kiln was essentially a bricked-in shaft with 
three sections.  The center of the shaft was a combustion chamber in which either wood of 
charcoal burned at high temperature.  Limestone, a common sedimentary rock in southern 
Ukraine, was then dropped through the top of the furnace.  When heated, limestone produced 
lime, which fell through to the lowest of the three chambers for easy collection.  Under 
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1031 Ibid. 
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Hartung‘s command, the Selbstschutz transformed these previously innocuous furnaces into 
crematoria. 
 Whereas in Rastatt, Klein Rastatt, and München the absence of lime kilns meant that 
Bereichkommando XI‘s militiamen had to rely on mass shootings in front of open air pyres, 
at the town of Gradovka and the Neu Amerika collective farm (sovkhoz), the existence of 
lime kilns provided Hartung and his subordinates with the infrastructure for an alternate 
killing method.1033  Perhaps in consultation with local Volksdeutsche, Hartung determined 
that these kilns made excellent crematoria because, unlike open air pyres, they were already 
built and burned hotter, making body disposal both quicker and less demanding on his scare 
manpower pool.  Gradovka appears to have been a choice killing location because its two 
furnaces permitted the militiamen to stagger their use.1034  While one furnace could be used 
for body burning, the second could be cleaned and prepared for service.  The twin kilns, 
which had a roughly five to six meter diameter and a depth of six to eight meters, were 
recessed into a hill outside of town, presumably because this configuration made it easier to 
transport limestone to the top of the furnace.1035  Gabriel K., a Rastatt resident and suspected 
Selbstschutz member, described one of the initial shooting operations at the Gradovka lime 
works: 
                                                 
1033 There is evidence that Bereichkommando XI used lime kilns at the Neu Amerika collective farm 
for the same purpose.  Aussage von V. A., November 19, 1964, BAL, B162/2303, 147.  Aussage von E. S., 
October 17, 1964, BAL, B162/2303, 38.  Outside of Bereichkommando XI, lime kilns were also used as 
crematoria in Speyer and at Sucha Verba in Bereichkommando XX based in Lichtenfeld.  Aussage von R. W., 
October 15, 1964, BAL, B162/2303, 30.  Aussage von K. E., February 16, 1965, BAL, B162/2303, 314.  
Aussage von H. Z., November 5, 1964, BAL, B162/2303, 110.   Aussage von A. L., April 4, 1962, BAL, 
B162/2292, 45. 
1034 Aussage von V. H., September 7, 1964, Staatsarchiv Münster, Nr. 2684, 53-54. 
1035 Aussage von F. H., July 2, 1964, BAL, B162/2304, 143.  A similar configuration is described in 
Soviet records.  Protokol doprosa / Renner Yakov Yakovich, May 28, 1948, USHMM, RG-38.018M, Reel 79, 
3703. 
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I remember an instance in which roughly 150 to 200 Jews were shot at the lime 
works.  The victims had to strip to their underwear and had to leave their valuables in 
a particular place.  I still remember that it was winter and bitter cold.  The women and 
children also had to undress.  The shootings proceeded in the same way as had been 
the case in Rastadt [sic] before.  [After being shot] the victims fell forward into the 
lime works‘ furnace.  The bodies that did not fall directly into the furnace were 
thrown into the furnace by their Jewish fellow sufferers.  These scenes played out like 
a conveyer belt.  I can confirm that [during January and February 1942] several 
thousand Jews were killed in this fashion.1036 
 
As shootings at the Gradovka lime works continued, Hartung and his subordinates introduced 
two additional refinements to the killing process that further economized Selbstschutz 
manpower and ammunition.  First, perhaps because as the winter progressed and the 
militiamen could find progressively fewer able bodied Jews to assist them with body 
disposal, they began to recruit local ethnic Ukrainians, either voluntarily or forcibly, to assist 
with body disposal.1037  Second, Bereichkommando XI‘s German and Volksdeutsche 
perpetrators eventually positioned a machine gun at the top of the lime kilns and used it 
rather than their rifles to gun down their victims.1038  This innovation reduced ammunition 
consumption because, unlike in shootings in front of open-air pyres, the perpetrators had to 
be far less precise.  Any victim thrown into the furnace dead or alive was unable to survive 
the kiln‘s intense heat.  The shootings and body incinerations at the Gradovka lime works 
represented an evolution in hastily devised killing tactics that Hartung and his subordinates 
first deployed at the Bogdanovka camp a few weeks earlier.1039 
                                                 
1036 Aussage von G. K., September 18, 1963, BAL, B162/2302, 285-286. 
1037 Although H. identified these additional prisoners as Russians, they identified themselves almost 
certainly as ethnic Ukrainians.  Aussage von F. H., July 2, 1964, BAL, B162/2304, 144. 
1038 Protokol doprosa / Renner Yakov Yakovich, May 28, 1948, USHMM, RG-38.018M, Reel 79, 
3703. 
1039 Anecdotally, it appears that militia units subordinated to Bereichkommando XX in Lichtenfeld 
employed similar tactics.  Aussage von J. N., February 24, 1965, BAL, B162/2303, 337. 
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 As their Volksdeutsche militia became a more expert group of killers, Hartung and his 
German staff began deploying their Selbstschutz units outside of VoMi-administered 
localities—an effort that grew from isolated mass shootings into an attempt to control 
Romanian deportations into Bereichkommando XI.  Rather than permitting Romanian 
authorities to transport Jewish deportees to Bereichkommando XI‘s strongholds for the 
Selbstschutz to murder, Hartung increasingly brought the Selbstschutz to the Jewish 
deportees.  As early as the shootings at the Bogdanovka camp, Bereichkommando XI had 
dispatched some of its more seasoned militia units to conduct autonomous operations against 
Jewish expellees in nearby towns and villages, such as Velikovka and Anetovka.1040  Over the 
course of the shooting operations in Bereichkommando XI, Hartung ordered his militiamen 
against targets in both Domanevka and Mostovoi—regional centers that Romanian forces 
used as staging areas for final forced marches into VoMi-administered territory.1041  Thanks 
to survivor testimony, the outlines of the Selbstschutz‘s missions to Mostovoi can be 
reconstructed.  Apparently dissatisfied with continued Romanian deportation directly into 
local Volksdeutsche communities, Hartung deployed Selbstschutz units to intercept 
Romanian transports at the rail terminus in Berezovka.  Local Romanian officials, who had 
not received prior warning of this policy change, refused to violate their standing orders to 
transport their Jewish prisoners in the direction of the Bug River and rebuffed German 
demands that the Jews be handed over in Berezovka.1042  It appears, however, that local 
                                                 
1040 Protokol doprosa / Kokha Floriana Frantsevicha, February 27, 1967, USHMM, RG-31.018M, Reel 
17, 8803. 
1041 On Domanevka see, Protokol doprosa / Ionusa Aleksandra, May 29, 1967, USHMM, RG-
31.018M, Reel 17, 8519.  Protokol doprosa / Kokha Floriana, October 14, 1966, USHMM, RG-31.018M, Reel 
17, 8626.  
1042 Aussage von R. S., September 17, 1964, Staatsarchiv Münster, Nr. 2671, 69. 
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Romanian and German authorities quickly reached a compromise, whereby the Romanian 
gendarmerie and their Ukrainian auxiliaries marched their prisoners north to the town of 
Mostovoi, some five kilometers to the west of Rastatt.  There, Hartung and his subordinates 
took control of the prisoners and incarcerated them temporarily in Mostovoi‘s previously 
abandoned fortress, a capacious one-story structure with imposing towers.1043  One of the 
prison‘s few surviving inmates later testified that ―traces of criminal acts‖ were readily 
apparent from the walls, which were spattered with blood and covered with polyglot 
inscriptions that previous inmates had scratched to warn newly arrived prisoners of their 
impending demise.1044  Typically, the Selbstschutz transported Jewish prisoners from the 
fortress to be murdered at either Rastatt, or likely more often to Gradovka, which was both 
closer to Mostovoi and had lime kilns to streamline the killing process.1045  In some 
instances, perhaps when a backlog of victims made removal to either Gradovka or Rastatt 
impractical, Hartung‘s ethnic German militia murdered the deportees directly at the 
fortress.1046  As the capabilities of Bereichkommando XI‘s killers expanded, so too did their 
commander‘s desire to influence how and where their victims arrived to their deaths. 
 Based on admittedly imprecise, yet fairly consistent postwar estimates by West 
German and Soviet investigators, militiamen under Hartung‘s command murdered more than 
10,000 Jews in mass shooting operations in and around Bereichkommando XI, in addition to 
the some 25,000 Jews that some of his Selbstschutz units gunned down at the Bogdanovka 
                                                 
1043 Aussage von M. K., July 29, 1969, Staatsarchiv Münster, Nr. 2786, 137. 
1044 Aussage von R. S., September 17, 1964, Staatsarchiv Münster, Nr. 2671, 69. 
1045 Survivors, who escaped from the fortress, did not accompany the victims on the final leg of their 
journey and therefore simply stated that the Selbstschutz murdered them near Rastatt.  Aussage von R. S., 
September 17, 1964, Staatsarchiv Münster, Nr. 2671, 69-70. 
1046 Aussage von M. K., July 29, 1969, Staatsarchiv Münster, 137. 
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camp.1047  These murders were public.  The sheer number of victims meant that no local 
resident in this part of Transnistria plausibly could claim ignorance about the murders.  In 
some localities, the entire adult male population participated, if sometimes indirectly, in the 
killings.  Many, if not all area denizens benefited mightily from the theft of the personal 
effects of the Selbstschutz‘s Jewish victims.  The sight of these open air shootings and 
particularly pyres used to cremate the bodies of the Jewish deportees were even visible from 
the air.  Upon return to their base at Martinvoka (Martinivs‘ke) to the northeast of Rastatt, a 
Luftwaffe squadron of trimotor Junkers Ju-52 transport aircraft overflew one of the pyres.  
The pilots later drove to Rastatt to see the killing first hand and, according to at least one 
witness, took a turn at shooting Jews.1048  For area Volksdeutsche, the perpetual reminder that 
they lived at the epicenter of the Holocaust in Transnistria was the smell.  Even former 
residents, who implausibly denied direct knowledge let alone involvement in the killings, 
recounted the ―bestial smell‖ of burning flesh and hair that wafted into the region‘s 
Volksdeutsche communities from Rastatt‘s pyres and from Gradovka‘s lime works.1049  Josef 
F., a former resident of Klein Rastatt, may well have been telling the truth when he claimed 
                                                 
1047 During his interrogation by Soviet counterintelligence in 1944, Assmann estimated that 
Selbstschutz units under Hartung and Liebl‘s command murdered more than 15,000 Jews near Berezovka.  
Protokol doprosa / A. M. G., June 7, 1945, Staatsarchiv Münster, Nr. 2902, 100-101.  In his 1957 blackmail 
report, Vahldieck estimated that Hartung‘s command gunned down 36,000 Jews and Liebl‘s 16,000.  50 000 
Juden aus Odessa / Tatsachenbericht von W. V., 1957, BAL, B162/2295, 26.  If one were to assume that 
Hartung‘s units murdered 25,000 Jews at the Bogdanovka camp, then it appears that his command killed 11,000 
Jews in localized killing operations. 
1048 Zeugeschaftliche Vernehmung von N. E., January 16, 1962, BAL, B162/2290, 184.  Aussage von 
V. H., September 7, 1964, Staatsarchiv Münster, Nr. 2684, 54-55.  Aussage von M. B., June 10, 1965, BAL, 
B162/2305, 195-196. 
1049 Aussage von J. T., October 16, 1964, BAL, B162/2303, 36.  Aussage von M. E., May 19, 1965, 
BAL, B162/2305, 113.  Aussage von V. A., November 19, 1964, BAL, B162/2303, 147.  Aussage von G. B., 
January 12, 1965, BAL, B162/2303, 178.  Aussage von F. W., October 13, 1967, Staatsarchiv Münster, Nr. 
2699, 23.  Aussage von F. H., July 2, 1964, BAL, B162/2304, 143-144.  Aussage von E. K., March 3, 1965, 
BAL, B162/2303, 321. 
358 
 
that ―these things were simply not discussed among us.‖1050  There was little need to 
converse about events that were undeniably ―a very open secret.‖1051 
  Under Hartung‘s command mass murder and robbery reached a magnitude that not 
only helped to propel the killings, but ultimately undercut the central reason why 
Sonderkommando R began shooting operations in Romanian-occupied Transnistria.  As 
mentioned above, the unit‘s original mission was not to murder Jews, but rather to mobilize 
local Volksdeutsche for National Socialism.  Hoffmeyer‘s command took on this additional 
murderous responsibility as a disease prevention measure, designed to avert the spread of 
epidemic typhus to the region‘s Volksdeutsche settlements.  Sonderkommando R tasked its 
Bereichkommandoführer and their Selbstschutz units with murdering the Jewish deportees 
simply because they were the only available personnel who could carry out a mission of this 
scale.  By dangling the personal effects and particularly the clothing of Jewish deportees 
before local militiamen as an enticement to participate in mass shooting operations, however, 
Hartung and his fellow Bereichkommandoführer created precisely the circumstances that 
facilitated the spread of typhus—the very threat that the killings were designed to prevent.  
Either ignorant of or more likely unconcerned with the fact that bacteria carried on parasites 
embedded in their victims‘ clothes was the primary means of contagion, Hartung and his 
colleagues‘ greed fueled the spread of typhus.  As statements that former militiamen gave to 
both Soviet and West German investigators indicate, from the very beginning of operations 
militiamen who pilfered and wore unwashed clothing from their Jewish victims became 
                                                 
1050 Aussage von J. F., September 20, 1963, BAL, B162/2302, 298. 
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infected and spread the disease to the region‘s Volksdeutsche settlements.1052  Rather than 
preventing the disease, mass murder and robbery facilitated infection and thereby sabotaged 
the central aim of Sonderkommando R‘s plunge into mass murder. 
German Diplomatic Pressure and the End of Mass Killing 
 Despite the fact that Sonderkommando R‘s mass killings in rural Transnistria failed to 
contain typhus, the unit stopped murdering Jews in large-scale operations only when 
Romanian authorities ceased to hand their deportees over to the unit to be killed.  To 
understand this change in Romanian policy, it is necessary to return to high level negotiations 
between Romania and Germany and how best to solve the Jewish ―problem,‖ a discussion 
that ironically had little to do with Sonderkommando R. 
 Beginning in mid-January 1942, Romanian occupation authorities ramped up 
deportations from the Odessa area, in which, with one exception, at least one and as many as 
three trains departed daily from Sortirovka station to northeastern Transnistria during the next 
six weeks.  Given the harsh winter and the poor quality of coal that the Romanians had 
available to fire their locomotives, this rate of deportation is particularly impressive.1053  Just 
as Romanian deportations intensified during the first week of February 1942 (three transports 
departed on February 2, two on February 3, and two on February 4) German civil 
administrators on the opposite bank of the Bug River began protesting the deportations.1054  
                                                 
1052 Reconstructing the number of militiamen who contracted typhus is not possible from the available 
records.  Based on postwar testimony from some of the most heavily implicated perpetrators, this was a fairly 
common way to contract the disease.  See, for example, Protokol doprosa / Kokha Floriana Frantsevicha, March 
7, 1967, USHMM, RG-31.018M, Reel 17, 8838.  Aussage von J. N., February 24, 1965, BAL, B162/2303, 338.  
Aussage von F. V., June 24, 1970, Staatsarchiv Münster, Nr. 2702, 85.  Aussage von A. W., April 23, 1965, 
BAL, B162/2305, 80. 
1053 Ancel, Transnistria, 1941-42, 247.  
1054 Ibid., 259-60. 
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Apparently unaware of Sonderkommando R‘s decision to assist Romanian authorities in 
murdering Jews in northeastern Transnistria, on February 9, 1942, Generalkommissar Erwald 
Oppermann in Nikolaev called his patron and fellow Königsberger Reichskommissar Erich 
Koch in Rowno by radio telephone and complained that ―a large number of Jews, who are 
hardly being properly buried, are dying daily‖ on the opposite bank of the Bug.1055  In 
Oppermann‘s view, ―this impossible situation will pose a great danger for the ethnic German 
villages in Transnistria and for the bordering area of the Reichskommissariat Ukraine.‖1056  
Four days later, Oppermann again complained to Koch that the Romanians had deported 
6,500 Jews to the west bank of the Bug immediately opposite his station in Nikolaev, and that 
in nearby Voznesensk the Romanians had delivered an additional 8,000 Jews ―without 
sufficient security.‖1057  Individual groups of Jews had apparently attempted to cross the 
border into the Reichskommissariat Ukraine.1058  According to a Romanian border patrol 
officer, Oppermann reported, the Romanians were deporting up to an additional 60,000 Jews 
toward the Bug.1059  He reiterated that unless the deportations stopped, typhus would be a 
serious threat both to the German military as well as to the Transnistria‘s Volksdeutsche 
settlements.1060  Acknowledging that their Romanian allies were ―practically deporting‖ Jews 
in violation of the Tighina Treaty, Koch authorized Oppermann to keep a 50 kilometer swath 
                                                 
1055 Funkspruch Gen. Komm. Nikolajew Oppermann an der Reichkomm. Ukr. Rowno, February 9, 
1942, NARA, T120/3132/E510845. 
1056 Ibid. 
1057 Funkspruch Gen. Komm. Nikolajew Oppermann an der Reichkomm. Ukr. Rowno, February 12, 
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1058 Ibid. 
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of the Bug River‘s west bank clear—an order with which their Romanian counterparts 
refused to comply.1061  Koch was apparently so concerned about the threat of typhus from 
Jewish deportees, that he ordered his subordinate to operate in territory that, according to the 
Tighina Treaty, fell inside of the Romanian occupation zone. 
 Why both Oppermann and Koch remained in the dark about Sonderkommando R‘s 
participation in the killing remains unclear.  There are, nevertheless, two likely possibilities.  
First, given Sonderkommando R‘s drive to maintain its institutional independence in 
Transnistria, it is possible that that unit refused to inform other German agencies, and 
especially the Sipo-SD and German civil administration in the Reichskommissariat Ukraine, 
about its activities in the region as a matter of principle.  Sonderkommando R, which 
operated in both the Reichskommissariat Ukraine and in Transnistria, enjoyed an exceptional 
degree of administrative autonomy, particularly in Romanian-controlled territory.  In 
principle, Himmler had removed Sonderkommando R from the VoMi‘s chain of command 
and subordinated it directly to himself, essentially creating his private Volksdeutsche affairs 
units in Ukraine.1062  In the field, the reality was more complicated—an ambiguity that led to 
friction between both the Sipo-SD and the German civil administration.  In matters related to 
security and policing, Hoffmeyer was to report to the local Higher SS- and Police Leader in 
an arrangement that was sufficiently ambiguous that it precipitated seemingly endless 
                                                 
1061 Koch an Generalkommissar Oppermann / Fernschreiben, Rowno, February 20, 1942, NARA,  
T120/3132/E510838.  Telegrama an Generalkommisar [sic] Opermann Nikolajev [sic], February 27, 1942, 
USHMM, RG-31.004M, Reel 2, Fond 2242, Opis 1, Ed. Hr. 1084, 249. 
1062 Lorenz, for example, claimed that Himmler removed Hoffmeyer from his chain of command and 
subordinated Sonderkommando R to the Higher SS- and Police Leader.  Vernehmung von Werner Lorenz, April 
16, 1973, Staatsarchiv Münster, Nr. 2787, 102.  As such a position did not exist for Transnistria, Hoffmeyer 
reported directly to Himmler. 
362 
 
internal discussions about the limits of Sonderkommando R‘s authority.1063  In the 
Reichkommissariat Ukraine, Hoffmeyer‘s relationship with the civil administration was still 
more unclear and proportionately more acrimonious.  Both organizations regarded 
Volksdeutsche affairs as being within their portfolios and tussled over issues, such as the 
control of ethnic German schools.1064  Similarly, in the Reichskommissariat Ukraine, the civil 
administration and Sonderkommando R competed over quality ethnic German personnel, 
who were in great demand.1065  As British signals intelligence concluded in 1943: ―The 
connection between Vomi and the civil administration under the Ost-Ministerium in Ukraine 
is not sharply defined, their respective fields of activity often overlap and there appears to be 
a complete lack of co-operation bordering on hostility between the two organizations.‖1066  
As Lower has noted, with the exception of carrying out the Nazi regime‘s anti-Jewish 
policies, in German-occupied Ukraine interagency cooperation was abysmal.1067 
 Sonderkommando R‘s conflicts with both the Sipo-SD and the German civil 
administration in the Reichskommissariat Ukraine were absent in Transnistria because 
neither organization operated in the region.  As a Romanian occupation zone, Transnistria 
                                                 
1063 See, for example, SS- und Polizeigericht XVIII in Kiew an den SS-Richter beim Reichsführer-SS 
und Chef der Deutschen Polizei SS-Obersturmbahnnführer Bender, February 15, 1942, BAL, B162/2292, 130.  
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1064 German Police Activities in the Soviet Union, Summary Covering the Period of 1 November - 31st 
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had no Higher SS- and Police Leader.  Hoffmeyer therefore had no immediate superiors in 
the region and reported directly to Himmler and indirectly to his VoMi superiors in Berlin, 
including Lorenz.1068  Similarly, in Transnistria, Sonderkommando R had to compete not 
with German civil administrators, but with their Romanian counterparts.  Challenging local 
Romanian authorities proved far easier for Sonderkommando R because, in contrast to 
German civil administrators in the Reichskommissariat Ukraine, Hoffmeyer‘s command 
simply ran roughshod over the Romanians.  Absent local oversight and with only weak 
supervision from Berlin, in Transnistria Hoffmeyer‘s command enjoyed exceptional 
autonomy—an independence that the unit guarded jealously.  It seems unlikely that 
Sonderkommando R would have involved a competing organization, whose jurisdiction did 
not extend to Transnistria, in the sole region where Hoffmeyer‘s command could operate 
without outside interference.  If Hoffmeyer had objected to increases in non-SS personnel 
under his command in Transnistria, then it is improbable that he would have voluntarily 
shared information about his unit‘s activities with rival German agencies, let alone ones that 
Sonderkommando R at least regarded as unaffected by its actions. 
 Aside from Hoffmeyer‘s natural disinclination to cooperate with other German 
bureaucracies in Ukraine, a second reason why Hoffmeyer did not inform his colleagues in 
the Reichkommissariat Ukraine‘s civil administration may have been because he was 
physically unable to do so.  According to British signals intelligence, Hoffmeyer became so 
seriously ill in early February 1942 that his staff had him airlifted from Novo Archangelsk, a 
                                                 
1068 Hoffmeyer remained at least partially under Lorenz‘s command.  During the evacuation of 
Transnistria‘s Volksdeutsche, for example, Lorenz chastised Hoffmeyer for failing to report in.  German Police 
Decodes No. 1 Traffic: 18.4.44, BNA, HW 16, Piece 40, 3. 
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town near Uman, to Kiev for treatment.1069  The precise nature of Hoffmeyer‘s malady is 
unclear and he returned to work later that year without any apparent lasting effects.  The 
timing of his illness—at the height of Sonderkommando R‘s mass shooting operations in 
Transnistria—and the fact that its onset was not referenced in his personnel file or by his wife 
during her West German police interview, raises the possibility that Hoffmeyer‘s affliction 
was psychological, rather than physical.  As an officer without any apparent experience in 
dispensing mass violence, it is conceivable that Hoffmeyer bent under the pressure of leading 
a mass killing operation.  Regardless of the cause of his illness, the fact that Hoffmeyer had 
become so gravely ill by early February 1942 indicates that he was in no position to 
communicate effectively with German units elsewhere in Ukraine.  Given that Hoffmeyer 
personally was the central pipeline for contact between Sonderkommando R‘s forces in 
Transnistria and the Reichskommissariat Ukraine, his incapacity temporarily severed links 
between the VoMi‘s headquarters in Landau and German units stationed elsewhere in the 
occupied Soviet Union.  Either because of Hoffmeyer‘s disinclination or inability to do so, 
Sonderkommando R failed to communicate its participation in the mass murder of Jews in 
northeastern Transnistria with German officials elsewhere in Ukraine. 
 Regardless of why Sonderkommando R failed to communicate its activities to the 
German civil administration in the Reichskommissariat Ukraine, as the situation escalated 
both German and Romanian sides applied lessons that they had learned during their 
diplomatic skirmish over Romanian expulsions across the Dniester river some six months 
earlier.  Without a clear understanding of the role that Hoffmeyer‘s command was playing in 
the killings across the Bug River, Koch intensified his efforts to stop Romanian deportations 
                                                 
1069 Teleprinter Message, 7.2.42, n.d., BNA, HW 16, Piece 54, 6. 
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into northeastern Transnistria.  He shared his concerns with the German Interior Ministry and 
the Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories, which in turn asked the Foreign 
Office to intervene with Bucharest.1070  Although the Foreign Office quickly forwarded these 
complaints up the chain of command, Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop concluded 
on February 13, 1942, ―that the imprecise claims of a local commander are not sufficient 
cause for diplomatic intervention.‖1071  Likely cognizant of the ultimately futile diplomatic 
wrangling over Romanian efforts to expel Jews from Bessarabia and Bukovina into the 
German Eleventh Army‘s rear area toward the beginning of Operation Barbarossa, the 
Foreign Office was initially gun shy and unwilling to revisit this topic with its Romanian 
allies.  From the Foreign Office‘s perspective, there was little reason to burn through good 
will when, as before, the situation was likely to resolve itself on the ground. 
 Despite the Foreign Office‘s reluctance, after continued complaints from the Ministry 
for the Occupied Eastern Territories, which included copies of reports penned by local 
German officials testifying to the perceived severity of the problem, it eventually raised the 
issue with the Romanian government in late March 1942.1072  According to Ambassador von 
Killinger‘s report to the Foreign Office on March 26, 1942, he broached the issue with Mihai 
Antonescu, the vice president of the Council of Ministers.  During their meeting, the latter 
had assured von Killinger that although he would seek a mutually convenient solution to the 
                                                 
1070 Although it is unclear when Koch‘s office contacted the Foreign Office, given that 
Unterstaatssekretär (Under State Secretary) Martin Luther forwarded a memo to Foreign Minister Joachim von 
Ribbentrop on February 11, 1942, the Foreign Office must have received these complains almost immediately. 
Vortragsnotiz, February 11, 1942, NARA, T120/3132/E510849. 
1071 Büro RAM, February 13, 1942, NARA, T120/3132/E510850. 
1072 Karl Leibbrandt forwarded the appropriate materials to the Foreign Office on February 19, 1942.  
Brief von Liebbrandt an das Auswärtiges Amt, February 19, 1942, NARA, T120/3132/E510847. 
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problem, because ―he was not informed about the details,‖ he would first have to consult his 
subordinates.1073  Given that Mihai Antonescu was a member of the Romanian Council of 
Ministers and, as indicated by his extensive postwar testimony, intimately familiar with 
Romania‘s Jewish deportations, it appears that his excuses to von Killinger were merely an 
effort to stall German requests while Alexianu completed the rest of the Odessa 
expulsions.1074  Like the German Foreign Office, the Romanian leadership drew on the earlier 
diplomatic row over Jewish deportations across the Dniester.  As Mihai Antonescu and his 
compatriots correctly concluded from this previous episode, continued diplomatic 
negotiations benefited only them because they bought valuable time.  As before, either 
German policy might change or, at the very least, the delay would permit events on the 
ground to unfold, including Sonderkommando R‘s continued participation in the shootings.  
This supposition proved correct and Sonderkommando R sustained its killing operations, 
with declining intensity, until the spring of 1942. 
 Why Romanian expulsions of Jews from the area around Odessa to northeastern 
Transnistria tapered off after February 1942 is not entirely clear and in need of further 
investigation by Romanian specialists.  It appears, however, that two factors were at work.  
First, German diplomatic pressure, which continued well into early June 1942, may have 
influenced the Romanian leadership‘s decision to halt further deportation.1075  Second, and 
perhaps most importantly, the deportations had succeeded in their original goal of clearing 
                                                 
1073 Verschiebung von rumänischen Juden in die besetzten Ostgebiete, March 26, 1942, NARA, 
T120/3132/E510804. 
1074 Ancel highlights Mihai Antonescu‘s familiarity with Romanian deportation policy in his postwar 
statements.  Ancel, Transnistria, 1941-42, 87-88.  
1075 Der Chef der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD an das Auswärtiges Amt, / z.Hd. von Herrn 
Konsulatssekretär Engelke, June 8, 1942, NARA, T120/3132/E510795. 
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Jews from the militarily sensitive region near Odessa.  Just as the start of Sonderkommando 
R‘s killings was a response to the rate of Romanian deportations, so too was its conclusion. 
Conclusion 
 The description of Sonderkommando R as a unit designed ―for the mass shooting of 
Soviet civilians, and particularly Jews‖ that Soviet counterintelligence attributed to one of the 
unit‘s midlevel officers reflects accurately the unit‘s rapid evolution into a killing force from 
December 1941 until the spring of 1942.  Rather than by design, Sonderkommando R‘s 
mission changed from mobilizing area ethnic Germans to killing Jews en masse in response 
to situational pressures created by friction between Germany and Romanian‘s competing 
anti-Jewish policies.  The primary goal behind the Antonescu regime‘s anti-Semitic policies 
was to eliminate Jews from the Romanian sphere of influence.  To this end, Antonescu and 
his subordinates followed the most convenient possible interpretation of German plans—
namely that Jews simply would be deported to the east and thus cease to be Romania‘s 
problem.  This understanding propelled Romanian expulsions of Jews first across the 
Dniester river in August 1941 and then a policy of Jewish deportation to and internment in 
northeastern Transnistria, which Romanian authorities regarded as an ideal point of departure 
for a future expulsion across the Bug River and into the Reichskommissariat Ukraine that, in 
the fall of 1941, appeared months, if not weeks away.   While this plan suited Romanian 
goals perfectly, simply expelling Jews into the German occupation zone failed to satisfy Nazi 
plans for the continent-wide elimination of Jews.  With the Nazi regime already set to murder 
a significant portion of Soviet Jewry from the beginning of Operation Barbarossa, it made 
little sense for German authorities to accept more Jews into the Reichskommissariat Ukraine, 
when their forces there were already shooting Jews at a feverish pace.  From the Third 
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Reich‘s perspective, Transnistria‘s Jews were Romania‘s problem alone and German 
authorities shelved plans to permit the Romanians to expel Jews into German-occupied 
Ukraine indefinitely. 
  Unable to deport Jews across the Bug River and unwilling to stop expulsion to its 
right bank, the Romanians unwittingly created the perfect conditions to enlist German 
support in solving their Jewish ―problem.‖  As the concentration camps and ghettos along the 
Bug River, which Romanian authorities intended as brutal way stations before immediate 
deportation farther east, became permanent, conditions for the facilities‘ inmates plummeted 
and epidemic typhus broke out.  Fearing that the disease might spread to local ethnic German 
communities and thereby jeopardize its entire undertaking in Transnistria, Sonderkommando 
R, the only available German unit, partnered with local Romanian authorities to murder 
prisoners at the Bogdanovka camp just across the Bug River from the Reichskommissariat 
Ukraine.  Before these killings had concluded, local Romanian authorities accelerated 
deportations, predicated on alleged military necessity, from Odessa‘s environs into the heart 
of Sonderkommando R‘s operations in the region.  Effectively, Romania brought its Jewish 
―problem‖ to Hoffmeyer‘s doorstop.  Confronted with a potentially even more serious threat 
to the welfare of local ethnic Germans, Sonderkommando R‘s leaders resolved, relatively 
independently, to expand the Selbstschutz‘s operations at the Bogdanovka camp into a 
systematic effort to intercept and murder Jewish deportees as Romanian authorities expelled 
them to the area.  These deportations continued until a combination of German diplomatic 
pressure, initiated by German occupation officials in Ukraine who were uninformed of 
Sonderkommando R‘s role in the killings, and a drought of victims halted these expulsions in 
the spring of 1942.  Within the span of less than four months, Sonderkommando R‘s 
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militiamen murdered nearly 50,000 Jews. 
 Sonderkommando R‘s involvement in the mass murder of Jews in rural Transnistria 
from December 1941 until spring 1942 is remarkable not simply because of its scale and 
brutality, but also because of the alacrity with which both Hoffmeyer‘s German personnel 
and their Volksdeutsche militiamen embraced mass murder.  As a third-rate unit designed to 
mobilize area ethnic Germans—a pet project of Himmler‘s, but one of no military 
significance—Hoffmeyer‘s superiors had assigned him men whom the Nazi regime regarded 
not only as unfit for combat, but, in some instances, as unsuited even to murder unarmed 
civilians.  The involvement of rank-and-file killers in the Selbstschutz is even more puzzling.  
Having lived under Nazi rule for less than four months at the start of the killings and 
organized in formations that appeared barely adequate to fend off marauding Romanian 
troops, Transnistria‘s ethnic German militiamen were among the least prepared and most 
randomly selected killers that Nazi Germany ever fielded in its war against the Jews.  Yet, as 
a detailed examination of crimes of militia units subordinated to Bereichkommando XI in 
Rastatt indicates, these perpetrators not only answered the Nazi regime‘s call to genocide, but 
implemented, refined, and expanded their killing operations until they ran out of victims.  
Why these killers behaved as they did is the subject of the final chapter. 
  
 
CHAPTER VIII: TRANSNISTRIA’S SELBSTSCHUTZ AND THE HOLOCAUST 
 Shortly before Christmas 1941 militiaman Johann Pastushchenko chose to become 
one of the Third Reich‘s mass murderers.  A member of Bereichkommando XI‘s Selbstschutz 
unit based at the Bogdanovka collective farm (kolkhoz),1076 Pastushchenko belonged to the 
group of militiamen that Hartung deployed in the initial joint killing operations with 
Romanian-controlled forces near the Bug River.  As he recounted one of his initial crimes to 
Soviet interrogators in the late 1960s: 
In the guard barracks Johann Büchler [the local militia commander] told me that the 
sick Jews housed in the stable at the Comintern collective farm needed to be shot.  I 
walked over to the stable and saw people lying in various places.  I asked all of them 
why they had fallen behind the column and were in the stable.  A man answered me: 
―We are sick and cannot move.  Do with us what you want.‖  After that I fired my 
rifle and first shot the man and then the women and little girl.  Today I cannot 
remember who I shot first: the five women or the little girl.  I shot them in the head.  
The people were in a helpless condition and offered no resistance.1077 
 
 Born in 1916 in Vygoda near Odessa, Pastushchenko was an unlikely Volksdeutscher.  
His Ukrainian father, Demia Pastushchenko, had married his mother, Anastasiia Martin, in 
Poltava Oblast‘ in 1905.  Pastushchenko‘s family relocated to Odessa oblast‘ after the 1917 
Russian Revolution and eventually received land on a collective farm.  With the death of 
Pastushchenko‘s father in the early 1920s, his upbringing became the purview of his German-
                                                 
1076 It is crucial to distinguish the Bogdanovka sovkhoz, the site of the Romanian concentration camp 
where Bereichkommando XI participated in mass shooting operations, and the Bogdanovka kolkhoz, a smaller 
multiethnic settlement some fifteen kilometers southwest of the Bug River. 
1077  Protokol doprosa / Pastuschenka Ivana, March, 16, 1967, USHMM, RG-31.018M, Reel 17, 1040-
41. 
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speaking mother, who dutifully had her son baptized a Roman Catholic.  After completing 
four years of German-language elementary education near Vygoda, he and his mother moved 
to the Germanophone Neudorf settlement on the Bogdanovka collective farm some 60 
kilometers northwest of Nikolaev in the early 1930s.  After completing a year-long training 
course as a veterinary assistant, Pastushchenko became the farm‘s veterinarian and in 1935 
married Elanteria Ebenal, a widowed member of the settlement‘s dominant clan.1078  What 
convinced a twenty-five-year-old half Ukrainian to murder sick women and children in the 
service of the Third Reich—a regime with which he had had virtually no contact until a few 
months earlier?  This chapter aims to answer precisely this question by probing the 
motivations of the members of the Selbstschutz to participate in mass murder during the 
winter of 1941-42. 
 Although scholars have devoted a tremendous amount of attention to Holocaust 
perpetrators, with the exception of some recent works, much of this inquiry has focused on 
analyzing the behavior of German killers.  During the decades immediately following the 
Second World War, social scientists probed the psychology of individual perpetrators and the 
ways in which institutions and situational dynamics shaped their actions.1079  Importing many 
of these insights into their analysis, historians have examined the behavior of an array of 
German perpetrators during the past thirty years.1080  This rich empirical base has yielded a 
                                                 
1078 Einbürgerungsantrag von Johann Pastuschenko, 1944, NARA, RG 242, A3342-EWZ50-G019, 
110-22.  Protokol doprosa / Pastuschenka Ivana, April 28, 1967, USHMM, RG 38.018M, Reel 17, 8485-88.  
Protokol doprosa / Pastuschenka Ivana, March 16, 1967, USHMM, RG-31.018M, Reel 17, 8394-95. 
1079 On the psychology and sociology of individual perpetrators see Kelley, 22 Cells in Nuremberg.  
Gilbert, Nuremberg Diary; Adorno, et. al., The Authoritarian Personality.  For analysis of broader social 
structures on perpetrators see Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews; Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem.  
More recently see Milgram, Obedience to Authority.  Zimbardo, The Lucifer Effect. 
1080 For an overview of this broad field, see Gerhard Paul‘s introductory essay in Gerhard Paul, Die 
Täter der Shoah: fanatische Nationalsozialisten oder ganz normale Deutsche?  
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nuanced, albeit general model for analyzing perpetrators that considers ideological, cultural, 
situational, and dispositional factors.1081  As historical inquiry into German perpetrators has 
reached maturity, scholars also have begun to recognize the important role that non-Germans 
played in carrying out the Holocaust.  This insight has become particularly apparent as part 
of research on the Holocaust in the occupied territories of the Soviet Union.1082  While 
current and ongoing study of indigenous perpetrators in the occupied Soviet Union has 
recovered a significant amount of historical information on local participation in the 
Holocaust, scholars have yet to devote more than cursory attention to explaining why area 
gentiles took part in genocide.1083  Insofar as scholars have begun to address the role of 
Soviet Volksdeutsche in the Holocaust in the occupied Soviet Union, the scholarly focus on 
historical reconstruction is particularly pronounced.1084 
 This chapter contributes to research on perpetrators from the Soviet Union, and 
                                                 
1081 See Browning, ―Ideology, Culture, Situation, and Disposition.  Holocaust Perpetrators and the 
Group Dynamics of Mass Killing.‖ 
1082 Perhaps most significantly, recent and forthcoming monographs, such as those of Omer Bartov, 
Kate Brown, Shimon Redlich, and Timothy Snyder, have contextualized the Holocaust within Eastern Europe‘s 
cultural multiplicity.  See Omer Bartov‘s forthcoming study on the East Galician town of Buczacz.  Brown, A 
Biography of No Place; Shimon Redlich, Together and Apart in Brzezany: Poles, Jews, and Ukrainians, 1919-
1945 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002); Snyder, The Reconstruction of Nations. 
1083 Focusing on the complicity of the predominantly Slavic local police in Belarus and Ukraine, for 
example, Bernhard Chiari, Martin Dean, and Dieter Pohl have examined the crucial contribution of non-German 
Holocaust perpetrators in the Soviet Union.  Chiari, Alltag hinter der Front; Dean, Collaboration in the 
Holocaust; Pohl, ―Ukrainische Hilfskräfte beim Mord an den Juden.‖ 
1084 Scholars who address Soviet ethnic German perpetrators, such as Jean Ancel, Andrej Angrick, and 
Wendy Lower, note the prominent part that Volksdeutsche played in the Final Solution, but focus their studies 
on Reich German or Romanian occupation officials, rather than on ethnic Germans themselves.  Ancel, 
Transnistria, 1941-42; Angrick, Besatzungspolitik und Massenmord; Lower, Nazi Empire-Building.  Moreover, 
several recent articles by Martin Dean and Wendy Lower raise important broader questions about the role of 
Soviet ethnic Germans in the Holocaust.  Dean, ―Soviet Ethnic Germans and the Holocaust in the Reich 
Commissariat Ukraine, 1941-1944;‖ Lower, ―Hitler‘s ‗Garden of Eden‘ in Ukraine: Nazi Colonialism, 
Volksdeutsche, and the Holocaust, 1941-44.‖ 
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specifically ethnic Germans, by analyzing why Transnistria‘s militiamen, such as 
Pastushchenko, murdered Jews with such apparent enthusiasm when Sonderkommando R 
mustered them during the winter of 1941-42.  It is divided into four parts.  The first section 
contextualizes the Selbstschutz‘s crimes by recovering the organization‘s institutional history.  
Focusing on Sonderkommando R‘s efforts to marshal area Volksdeutsche to participate in the 
Holocaust, this portion discusses how Transnistria‘s ethnic German militia evolved from a 
rudimentary self-defense force into a sophisticated killing organization.  Using wartime and 
postwar sources, the chapter‘s second section recovers the backgrounds of the Selbstschutz‘s 
members by constructing a prosopography of militiamen subordinated to Bereichkommando 
XI—the most heavily implicated of Sonderkommando R‘s militia units.  The third section 
provides a case study of the initial killing deployment of one of Bereichkommando XI‘s 
militia units to explore the specific dynamics of the Selbstschutz‘s participation in the 
Holocaust.  The chapter concludes by using information gathered from all three sections to 
outline the constellation of motivations that moved the militiamen to commit murder.  While 
a handful of universal antecedents, especially social psychological pressures that commonly 
shape the dynamics of individual behavior within groups, operated powerfully on the 
Selbstschutz‘s members, the roots of their genocidal violence lay in situational factors—
many of which Hoffmeyer‘s subordinates manipulated, both wittingly and unwittingly, to 
encourage ethnic German participation in the Holocaust.  By employing a flimsy, yet 
surprisingly potent propaganda campaign against the ―Judeo-Bolshevik‖ enemy and by 
offering local Volksdeutsche exceptional material incentives to participate in mass murder, 
Sonderkommando R helped to create circumstances in which a population with little history 
of anti-Jewish violence fielded some of the Holocaust‘s most brutal murderers. 
374 
 
The Selbstschutz 
 Transnistria‘s Volksdeutsche Selbstschutz was an organization that traced its lineage 
to prewar indigenous ethnic German self-defense formations.  During the Revolutions of 
1905 and 1917 as well as the Russian Civil War, area non-Germans attacked and pillaged 
their German-speaking and historically wealthier neighbors.  In response to each of these 
threats, area Volksdeutsche created local self-defense forces that they based in major towns to 
deter would-be marauders.1085  In some instances, and particularly during the Russian Civil 
War, area ethnic German militia units cooperated with local non-Germans to defend their 
communities against outside aggression.1086  While no militia force existed under Soviet rule, 
the Wehrmacht recreated these units during the summer of 1941 to combat continued 
Romanian army attacks on area Volksdeutsche settlements.1087  When Einsatzgruppe D 
passed through the area during its peripatetic killing deployment, it inherited and supported 
these earlier Wehrmacht-created ethnic German militia units.1088  In at least a few instances, 
Einsatzgruppe D appears to have recruited members of the units to exhume mass graves 
during killing operations in area Volksdeutsche settlements.1089  Despite this entrée to the 
                                                 
1085 Fleischhauer, Die Deutschen im Zarenreich, 375. 
1086 Roemmich, ―Die evangelische Kirche in Russland in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart,‖ 254. 
1087 It is unclear whether the German army, which had equipped and trained these militia forces during 
1918, was cognizant of the fact that it had assisted earlier iterations of the region‘s ethnic German militia.  
Aussage von F. W., November 19, 1962, BAL, B162/2299, 166. 
1088 Aussage von K. T., December 6, 1962, BAL, B162/2300, 69.  British signals intelligence confirms 
that assisting Volksdeutsche militia forces elsewhere in the Soviet Union was Einsatzgruppe D‘s standard 
operating procedure.  German Police Decodes Nr. 2 Traffic: 12.10.42, October 16, 1942, BNA, HW 16, Piece 
36, 4. 
1089 There was a personnel overlap between Volksdeutsche whom Einsatzgruppe D tasked with 
assisting its shooting operations and member of the Selbstschutz.  See, for example, Aussage von F. V., June 24, 
1970, Staatsarchiv Münster, Nr. 2702, 82.  It is likely, but admittedly speculative, that Einsatzgruppe D used 
membership in these early militia units as a basis for recruiting helpers. 
375 
 
Holocaust, Transnistria‘s Volksdeutsche Selbstschutz was not one of Sonderkommando R‘s 
creations, but rather a recent iteration of a decades-old local organization whose primary 
function—quite legitimately—was defensive. 
 Upon taking up its assignments in rural Transnistria, Sonderkommando R expanded 
the Selbstschutz dramatically in both size and mission.  The unit‘s commanders ordered their 
Bereichkommandoführer to enlarge the often modest militia units that the Wehrmacht and 
Einsatzgruppe D had created in larger Volksdeutsche settlements and to establish new units in 
smaller localities, where earlier German forces had not operated.  Absent superior orders on 
whom to recruit for militia service, Bereichkommandoführer grew their Selbstschutz forces 
in an ad hoc fashion that varied both within and among Bereichkommandos.  In general, 
Bereichkommandoführer labored to ensure that between eight and 10 Selbstschutz members 
guarded each VoMi-administered locality.1090  While the initial kernel of personnel came 
from existing militia forces that the Wehrmacht and Einsatzgruppe D had organized, during 
the fall of 1941 Bereichkommandoführer went on a recruitment drive.  Sonderkommando R 
appears to have favored young ethnic German men in their late teens and twenties, perhaps 
because they regarded them as less influenced by Soviet rule.1091  Owing to the large number 
of Volksdeutsche men whom Soviet authorities had deported to the country‘s interior prior to 
the arrival of German and Romanian forces, sometimes it proved impossible to fill even the 
early Selbstschutz‘s modest ranks with men from this age cohort.  In some cases, 
Bereichkommandoführer had to recruit men up to the age of 40 and, particularly in smaller 
                                                 
1090 Aussage von J. F., March 27, 1962, BAL, B162/2292, 29-30.  Aussage von K. Z., November 19, 
1962, BAL, B162/2299, 108-109.  Vernehmung von J. B., November 15, 1962, BAL, B162/2299, 254.  
Protokol doprosa / Fet Ivan, May 22, 1948, USHMM, RG-38.018M, Reel 79, 3753-3754. 
1091 Aussage von E. P., July 16, 1964, BAL, B162/2304, 192.  Aussage von J. R., August 24, 1962, 
BAL, B162/2302, 7. 
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localities, Sonderkommando R had to muster all of the settlements‘ able-bodied ethnic 
German men.1092  Postwar accounts by former militiamen are replete with statements 
indicating that their participation in the Selbstschutz had been mandatory.1093  In some 
instances, this may have been the case.  Nevertheless, the comparatively small number of 
ethnic German men required to staff Sonderkommando R‘s militia units, relative to 
Transnistria‘s total Volksdeutsche population, suggests strongly that in many instances militia 
service was voluntary.  
 It may also have been relatively easy for Sonderkommando R to recruit its first 
militiamen because the expanded Selbstschutz‘s mission differed little from that of earlier 
home-grown irregular forces that local Volksdeutsche historically had formed in times of 
crisis.  During the fall of 1941, the initial catalyst for Sonderkommando R to beef up the 
region‘s Volksdeutsche militia forces remained continued Romanian theft.  Earlier efforts by 
the Wehrmacht and Einsatzgruppe D to interdict Romanian raiding parties had failed because 
neither organization had remained on site for long enough or been able to devote sufficient 
resources to stamping out Romanian banditry.  That task had fallen to Sonderkommando R, 
which, like many of the area‘s Volksdeutsche residents, regarded it as one of its utmost 
priorities.  By assisting local residents to develop an indigenous militia force, during the first 
weeks and months of its deployment to Transnistria, Sonderkommando R assumed the role 
played by earlier German units, including ones that had operated in the area at the end of the 
First World War.  Local Volksdeutsche would have not only recognized this pattern of 
                                                 
1092 Aussage von G. S., March 2, 1962, BAL, B162/2292, 6.  Zeugenschaftliche Vernehmung von J. D., 
August 13, 1962, BAL, B162/2296, 159. 
1093 Aussage von J. S., April 13, 1962, BAL, B162/2292, 53.  Protokol doprosa / Kokha Floriana, 
October 8, 1966, USHMM, RG-31.018M, Reel 17, 8580. 
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German assistance, but also had every reason to cooperate, because these militias were all 
that stood between their property and the Romanian military‘s sticky fingers.  To area 
Volksdeutsche, the Selbstschutz was a desirable organization to join during the fall of 1941. 
 In the latter half of 1941, Transnistria‘s Volksdeutsche Selbstschutz was a ragtag local 
police force.  In each ethnic German settlement, the eight to 10 local militiamen reported to 
an area resident, whom the responsible Bereichkommandoführer had designated the local 
militia commander or Selbstschutzführer.1094  Sonderkommando R appears to have selected 
Selbstschutzführer not only based on their presumed ideological reliability, but at least 
anecdotally, on previous Red Army service.1095  Each Selbstschutz unit established a local 
command post that was frequently next to the seat of municipal government, the 
Bürgermeisteramt.1096  Transnistria‘s ethnic German militia units were initially badly clothed, 
armed, and trained.  With the exception of the local militia commanders, for whom 
Sonderkommando R periodically provided surplus Wehrmacht tunics, Selbstschutz members 
had no uniforms.1097  The best that Sonderkommando R‘s personnel could do to clothe their 
militiamen was to outfit them with homemade white armbands marked with swastikas.1098  
                                                 
1094 Aussage von E. T., May 20, 1965, BAL, B162/2304, 69.  Aussage von J. E., November 17, 1962, 
BAL, B162/2299, 263.  Aussage von K. U., January 28, 1963, BAL, B162/2301, 143.  Protokol doprosa / Fet 
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1095 Protokol doprosa / Fet Ivan, May 18, 1948, USHMM, RG-38.018M, Reel 79, 3749. 
1096 Aussage von F. V., June 24, 1970, Staatsarchiv Münster, Nr. 2702, 83-84.  Aussage von F. D., 
November 27, 1964, BAL, B162/2303, 206. 
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Zeugenschaftliche Vernehmung von D. R., n.d. BAL, B162/2290, 136.  Aussage von B. B., November 13, 1962, 
BAL, B162/2300, 54. 
1098 German Police Activities in the Soviet Union, Summary Covering the Period of 29 June - 28 July 
1943, August 10, 1943, BNA, HW 16, Piece 6, 4.  Protokol doprosa / Ionusa Aleksandra, May 29, 1967, 
USHMM, RG-31.018M, Reel 17, 8504.  Protokol doprosa / Kokha Floriana, October 8, 1966, USHMM, RG-
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As discussed in detail in chapter seven, Sonderkommando R relied on obsolete and often 
defective hunting rifles and Soviet firearms that German and Romanian forces had captured 
during the invasion.1099  Training for these early militia units was virtually non-existent.  In 
some cases, the local Bereichkommandoführer, or more often an SS or NSKK non-
commissioned officer assigned to his command, offered area militiamen rudimentary 
instruction on basic military skills during occasional clinics.1100  In other instances, 
Bereichkommandoführer provided Volksdeutsche militiamen with no instruction 
whatsoever.1101  Until Sonderkommando R‘s mass shooting operations during the winter of 
1941-42, Transnistria‘s Selbstschutz was barely capable of fulfilling its assigned tasks of 
guarding sensitive infrastructure and conducting nighttime patrols to ward off Romanian 
attacks.1102 
 As the threat of continued Romanian pilfering abated during the fall of 1941, thanks 
in part to the Selbstschutz‘s vigilance, Sonderkommando R‘s Bereichkommandoführer began 
to deploy militiamen under their command to perform two additional missions—one external 
and the other internal.  No longer content simply to command a reactive force that 
intercepted Romanian raiding parties, as chapter five discusses, many 
Bereichkommandoführer used their militia forces to bring the fight to the Romanians.  The 
militiamen became foot soldiers in Sonderkommando R‘s ongoing struggle with Romanian 
                                                                                                                                                       
31.018M, Reel 17, 8579.  Aussage von M. B., June 10, 1965, BAL, B162/2305, 193.  Aussage von J. S., March 
17, 1964, BAL, B162/2304, 8. 
1099 Rundanwesiung Nr. 5, October 13, 1941, BB, R 59/66, 148.  Protokol doprosa / Ionusa Aleksandra, 
May 28, 1967, USHMM, RG-31.018M, Reel 17, 8504.   
1100 Aussage von I. F., July 27, 1962, BAL, B162/2300, 102. 
1101 Protokol doprosa / Fet Ivan, May 29, 1948, USHMM, RG-38.018M, Reel 79, 3766. 
1102 Aussage von J. H., September 9, 1964, BAL, B162/2304, 278. 
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forces stationed in Transnistria.  At roughly the same time, as addressed in chapter three, 
many of Transnistria‘s Bereichkommandoführer launched a parallel campaign to root out the 
Third Reich‘s racial and political enemies within Transnistria‘s Volksdeutsche settlements.  
As with Sonderkommando R‘s struggle against Romanian control in the region, local ethnic 
German militiamen contributed integral manpower to this expanded mission.  During the fall 
of 1941, the Selbstschutz, an organization designed initially to thwart marauding Romanian 
troops, evolved into a manpower pool that Hoffmeyer‘s subordinates had begun to dip into to 
meet the personnel needs of the unit‘s expanded agenda well before the beginning of 
shooting operations at the Bogdanovka camp. 
 The Selbstschutz‘s expanded role in Sonderkommando R‘s enterprise in Transnistria 
during the fall of 1941 had two implications for the region‘s ethnic German militia.  First, 
Sonderkommando R deployed Transnistria‘s Selbstschutz units unequally and devoted 
significantly greater attention and resources to more active formations.  Based on surviving 
evidence, it appears that the most heavily engaged militia units during late 1941 were based 
in larger ethnic German enclaves.  The reasons for this were twofold.  On the one hand, 
Sonderkommando R had stationed its Bereichkommandos in more sizeable Volksdeutsche 
settlements.  Nearby militiamen logically became the first ethnic Germans that 
Sonderkommando R‘s staff tapped to man new missions against Romanian forces and 
internal enemies.  On the other hand, Sonderkommando R‘s leaders may have concentrated 
their campaign against racially and politically suspect local residents in larger locales 
because they concluded that bigger towns, which during Soviet rule had served as 
administrative centers, had attracted local residents of Jewish origin as well as those 
individuals suspected of ―communist‖ collaboration.  Selbstschutz formations in larger 
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Volksdeutsche settlements thus became frontline units in Sonderkommando R‘s dual internal 
and external campaigns. 
 Establishing differences among individual Selbstschutz units, and particularly 
between more and less active militia forces is difficult.  Owing to the fact that postwar 
investigators honed in on the most heavily implicated Selbstschutz units, little information 
about less involved ethnic German militia formations exists.  Nevertheless, based on 
fragmentary information, it is apparent that during the fall of 1941 Sonderkommando R 
diverted the lion‘s share of its meager armament and haphazard training efforts to frontline 
Selbstschutz units in major Volksdeutsche communities, where militiamen might be 
mobilized.  In contrast to militia units in larger ethnic German settlements, Selbstschutz 
detachments in smaller localities were exceptionally poorly armed, often depending not on 
firearms but rather on clubs.1103  Training for militia units in these small settlements was even 
less impressive.  In the relatively rare instances in which Sonderkommando R bothered to 
teach basic tactics to these more remote militia forces, Selbstschutz members from more 
active units, whom German authorities had trained only a few months earlier, alone 
supervised drills.1104  During the first few months of their existence, Transnistria‘s 
Selbstschutz units varied tremendously in both activity and the resources that 
Sonderkommando R devoted to them. 
 The second outcome of Sonderkommando R‘s efforts to curtail Romanian authority 
and to root out suspected internal political enemies was that, during the fall of 1941, a 
handful of Transnistria‘s militiamen acquired expertise in carrying out the Nazi regime‘s 
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violent agenda.  Prior to December 1941, at least some of Sonderkommando R‘s militia 
forces had evolved from simple self-defense units into violent and at times murderous 
instruments of the Nazi regime‘s policies.  While numbering perhaps a few dozen 
Volksdeutsche spread throughout Transnistria, the members of Sonderkommando R‘s most 
active Selbstschutz units had experience in projecting German authority beyond their 
hometowns and in assisting in the murder of individuals—and often their neighbors—whom 
their German superiors had declared to be the Third Reich‘s enemies.  At the Bogdanovka 
camp at the end of 1941, at least a handful of these seasoned Selbstschutz members would 
form the backbone of Sonderkommando R‘s foray into mass killing. 
 As noted in chapter seven, Hoffmeyer‘s command deployed its Selbstschutz units to 
murder Jewish deportees in northeastern Transnistria in what it perceived as an act of last 
resort.  Confronted with a potentially catastrophic public health crisis, Sonderkommando R 
mustered its militia forces first to the Bogdanovka collective farm and then in the region 
surrounding the Berezovka rail terminus not because of the Selbstschutz‘s proven abilities, 
but rather because the unit lacked any other personnel to murder the Jewish expellees.  These 
new assignments taxed both the militiamen‘s capabilities and ultimately the Selbstschutz‘s 
organizational structure, training, and weaponry. 
 In response to the militia‘s new role, during the winter of 1941-42, Sonderkommando 
R radically revamped its Selbstschutz forces.  To staff the killing operations at the 
Bogdanovka camp, Hartung deployed roughly 60 militiamen, who constituted all or virtually 
all of the Selbstschutz members that Bereichkommando XI had at its disposal.  These units 
were of unequal quality.  Some Selbstschutz detachments had already acquired weeks, if not 
months of experience in enforcing Sonderkommando R‘s brutal and at times murderous rule 
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in area Volksdeutsche settlements.  In other instances, Hartung and his staff mustered 
Selbstschutz units from remote Volksdeutsche communities, with whom Bereichkommando 
XI had maintained little contact during the fall of 1941.  While Hartung‘s command was able 
to deploy a sufficient number of shooters to contribute to a joint killing operation at a facility 
where Romanian authorities had already concentrated and imprisoned their Jewish victims, 
the Selbstschutz‘s capabilities were inadequate to conduct more complex operations.  This 
fact became apparent to the unit‘s Bereichkommandoführer, when Sonderkommando R 
decided to ramp up its killing operations in rural Transnistria—an undertaking that required it 
to field forces capable of interdicting, guarding, and ultimately murdering Jewish expellees in 
any one of three Bereichkommandos. 
 Sonderkommando R‘s response to expanded killing operations near Berezovka was to 
increase the Selbstschutz‘s size by mobilizing virtually all Volksdeutsche men of military age 
to participate in the militia.  Recovering the precise process by which Sonderkommando R 
converted what had been a relatively limited ethnic German auxiliary police force into a mass 
organization is difficult from the existing records, as only fragmentary references in wartime 
documents related to this process have survived.1105  In their postwar testimony, many 
suspected militiamen drew a careful, and frequently overly nuanced distinction between 
―active‖ (aktiv) and ―passive‖ (passiv) Selbstschutz formations.1106  As the names imply, the 
former were purportedly far more heavily involved in implementing Sonderkommando R‘s 
                                                 
1105 See, for example, Stabbefehl Nr. 102, April 18, 1943, BB, R 59/67, 99.  Stabbefehl Nr. 109, June 
22, 1943, BB, R 59/67, 59. 
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policies, including the mass shooting of Jewish deportees.1107  Not surprisingly, most alleged 
militiamen classified themselves as members of the latter type of units.1108  Although many 
of these labels were self-serving, the ubiquity of this distinction and the fact that it remains 
consistent in statements that both West German and Soviet investigators collected suggests 
that Sonderkommando R created active and what might more accurately be termed reserve 
Selbstschutz formations to cope with its expanded manpower demands.1109  While in 
Bereichkommandos XI, XIV, and XX, this expansion was clearly a response to the specific 
personnel pressures that local commanders faced, the fact that other Bereichkommandos also 
attempted to beef up their Volksdeutsche militia forces suggests that Sonderkommando R‘s 
senior leadership directed their subordinates to take these steps.1110  It is uncertain whether or 
not Sonderkommando R feared that Romanian authorities would expand their Jewish 
deportations into other areas of Transnistria and ordered an increase in the size of the 
Selbstschutz as a precautionary measure.  Alternatively, Sonderkommando R‘s amplified 
manpower needs for more sophisticated deployments near Berezovka may have offered a 
convenient pretext for the unit to expand the militia, which was, after all, also a key weapon 
in its struggle against local Romanian authorities.  In all likelihood, both factors played a role 
in Sonderkommando R‘s decision to enlarge its militia forces in Transnistria during the 
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winter of 1941. 
 How precisely local Bereichkommandoführer established active duty and reserve 
militia forces is uncertain.  Based on anecdotal evidence gleaned from postwar statements 
that former militiamen gave, during early 1942 it appears that throughout Transnistria 
Sonderkommando R ordered all able-bodied men to join the Selbstschutz.1111  Exemptions 
from militia service were rare and Sonderkommando R reserved these for Volksdeutsche 
whose alleged racial and political reliability excluded them from bearing arms in the Third 
Reich‘s service.1112  Younger ethnic German men who had gained earlier experience in 
localized killing deployments or, in the case of those attached to Bereichkommando XI, had 
participated in the shootings at the Bogdanovka camp, formed an active, hard core of this 
dramatically expanded militia force.1113  Sonderkommando R assigned older Volksdeutsche 
men, whose age and greater degree of interaction with the Soviet regime prior to the war had 
made them less desirable recruits in German eyes during the fall of 1941, to reserve units.1114  
The active duty unit members served fulltime as German auxiliaries and continued to assist 
Sonderkommando R in its ongoing struggle with local Romanian authorities and in 
eliminating the Nazi regime‘s racial and political enemies.  Their older, reserve colleagues, 
by contrast, maintained their previous jobs and could be mustered for special deployments at 
                                                 
1111 Former militia members later testified about Sonderkommando R‘s efforts to expand militia 
membership.  Aussage von J. E., November 17, 1962, BAL, B162/2299, 264. 
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the local militia command post‘s signal, which was frequently a volley of rifle fire.1115  While 
the Selbstschutz‘s active duty formations appear to have been sufficient for most day-to-day 
operations, mass shootings in the area of Berezovka required area Bereichkommandoführer 
to deploy both active and reserve militia units.  In some instances, Bereichkommandoführer 
may have detailed their more experienced active duty militiamen to conduct the actual 
shootings.  In most large-scale killing operations, however, Bereichkommandoführer had 
little option but to use both active duty and reserve militia forces interchangeably.1116  
Evidence, while skeletal, suggests that both groups of militiamen preformed equally 
effectively in these grisly missions. 
 In response to its dramatically increased militia force, Sonderkommando R redoubled 
its efforts at militia training.  In contrast to earlier halfhearted and sporadic attempts to 
instruct militiamen under their commands, beginning in late December 1941 and early 
January 1942, Bereichkommandoführer throughout Transnistria began organizing mandatory 
training courses for local Selbstschutz members.1117  Based typically near a 
Bereichkommando‘s headquarters, these instructional sessions usually lasted for several days 
and focused on basic military tactics and drills as well as weapons training.1118  Perhaps most 
importantly, Bereichkommando staff used these training courses to provide Selbstschutz 
members with National Socialist ideological instruction that had been largely absent from 
earlier instructional regimens.  Efforts at what amounted to very rudimentary indoctrination 
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served two purposes.  On the one hand, it bolstered units that Sonderkommando R had 
deployed recently and unexpectedly to participate in the mass murder of Jewish deportees.  
On the other hand, it sought to integrate older Volksdeutsche militiamen, whom area German 
personnel may have suspected as having been more attached to and potentially compromised 
by their earlier interactions with Soviet power.  Selbstschutz training during the winter of 
1941-42 was designed as much to hone practical skills as it was to provide an ideological 
foundation for the ethnic German militia‘s new murderous role. 
 The so-called Day of National Rising (Tag der nationalen Erhebung), which marked 
the ninth anniversary of the Nazi regime‘s rise to power in Germany, became the capstone of 
Sonderkommando R‘s early efforts at indoctrination in the midst of its mass killings near 
Berezovka.  Siebert ordered the area‘s Bereichkommandoführer to organize elaborate, fire-
bathed ceremonies for all of Transnistria‘s Selbstschutz members, which were to commence 
simultaneously at 7 PM on January 30, 1942.  Perhaps to appeal to local residents‘ religious 
convictions, the pageant‘s format resembled a high liturgical church service, complete with a 
confession of faith in National Socialism.  Following an elaborate flag ceremony, which was 
eerily reminiscent of the procession of the cross at the beginning of the liturgy, local 
militiamen were to sing a medley of what Siebert termed ―the songs of the nation.‖1119  The 
Bereichkommandoführer was then to give a homily concerning the history of the National 
Socialist seizure of power, with particular attention to the ―juxtaposition of National 
Socialism and Bolshevism.‖1120  Local commanders were to impress upon their 
                                                 
1119 Rundanweisung Nr. 17 / Betr.: Feier des Tages der nationalen Erhebung, January 20, 1942, BB, R 
59 / 66, 125. 
1120 Ibid. 
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Volksdeutsche subordinates the ―duties and responsibility of the Selbstschutz.‖1121  Siebert 
then instructed his subordinates to complete the ceremony by ordering all militiamen to 
swear a personal oath to Hitler according to the following text: ―As a carrier of German 
blood I swear to you, Adolf Hitler, the Führer of all Germans, to be true onto death, to do my 
best, and to be absolutely obedient to all of my superiors.  So help me God.‖1122  Given the 
detail in which former militiamen recounted this ceremony to their West German and Soviet 
interrogators decades later, its pomp and circumstance must have been quite memorable.1123 
  Sonderkommando R appears to have continued extemporaneous ideological and 
practical Selbstschutz instruction during its early 1942 killing operations.  As the unit‘s 
involvement in mass shooting operations wound down, however, the sophistication and scale 
of its training efforts increased.  There are two explanations for this apparent paradox.  First, 
following the conclusion of major shooting operations in rural Transnistria, 
Sonderkommando R‘s senior leaders and local commanders had time and resources to devote 
to continued militia training.  Second, the Selbstschutz‘s performance during these killing 
deployments may have underscored the militiamen‘s potential to Sonderkommando R and 
convinced its leaders that area ethnic Germans were worth the added investment of time and 
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resources for subsequent instruction.  No longer content to delegate training responsibilities, 
Sonderkommando R‘s leaders centralized the instructional process by creating Selbstschutz 
academies in larger ethnic German settlements, such as Hoffnungsthal, where the unit 
converted an abandoned Red Army barracks into a militia school.1124  The unit staffed these 
facilities with trainers from both Sonderkommando R‘s headquarters in Landau and the 
Wehrmacht Liaison Office for Transnistria (Verbindungsstab der Deutschen Wehrmacht für 
Transnistrien).  During the training courses, which typically lasted from four to six weeks, 
Sonderkommando R provided its militiamen with military and, although less well-
documented, presumably also ideological instruction.1125  At the conclusion of the training, 
Selbstschutz men who had arrived at the training unarmed often received captured Soviet 
rifles, which Sonderkommando R had scrounged together, as parting gifts.1126  Insofar as 
their trainers could provide them, graduates of these Selbstschutz academies also received at 
least parts of Wehrmacht uniforms, which Sonderkommando R had stripped of rank insignias 
prior to distribution.1127  The energy and resources that Sonderkommando R poured into 
Transnistria‘s Selbstschutz during 1942 is evident from both the disproportionate number of 
training schools and militiamen in the region.  In the whole of occupied Ukraine, 
Sonderkommando R trained more than 12,500 Volksdeutsche militiamen at some 27 
Selbstschutz academies.  More than 7,000 of these militiamen and more than half of all 
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Selbstschutz training schools were in Transnistria.1128  Even accounting for the concentration 
of Volksdeutsche in Transnistria, this geographic focus is nevertheless telling.  After 
Transnistria‘s Selbstschutz had proven its mettle during mass shooting deployments during 
early 1942, Sonderkommando R lavished the militia with as much attention as the painfully 
ill-equipped and understaffed unit could marshal. 
 Selbstschutz academies were not the final stage of Volksdeutsche training, but rather 
proving grounds designed also to identify and select more promising ethnic German 
candidates for subsequent instruction.  Sonderkommando R recalled particularly adept, and 
generally young Volksdeutsche militiamen for multi-month training courses at elite 
Selbstschutz schools that the unit ran in conjunction with the Wehrmacht in Odessa, 
Nikolaev, and Gut Rauch, a converted collective farm in rural Transnistria.1129  These 
facilities were themselves feeder institutions.  Initially, Sonderkommando R earmarked the 
graduates of these schools for active duty service in one of the unit‘s elite cavalry squadrons 
(Reiterschwadronen).  As Sonderkommando R‘s cavalry squadrons were not the focus of 
postwar criminal probes into the unit‘s crimes, comparatively little information about these 
formations exists.  Based on information from British signals intelligence, it is evident that 
the cavalry squadrons were active by mid-1942.1130  In Transnistria, anecdotal evidence 
suggests that the cavalry squadrons functioned as Sonderkommando R‘s rapid reaction force 
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B162/2304, 69.  Aussage von J. B., October 6, 1964, BAL, B162/2304, 336.  Aussage von H. S., September 30, 
1966, BAL, B162/2306, 263-264. 
1130 German Police Activities in the Soviet Union, Summary Covering the Period of 1st May-30th June 
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and occasionally deployed to hunt for escaped Jewish prisoners.1131  The unit‘s cavalry 
squadrons appear to have been one of the few German units to have operated in both 
Transnistria and the Reichskommissariat Ukraine.1132  Both their large deployment area and 
high-caliber personnel made them a prime target for both the Sipo-SD and the Wehrmacht, 
which both attempted to wrest control of Sonderkommando R‘s cavalry squadrons.1133  While 
the Wehrmacht lost its bid to co-opt the units, it appears that, at least in the 
Reichskommissariat Ukraine, Hoffmeyer had to share his authority over the detachments 
with the Higher SS- and Police Leader.1134  Sonderkommando R‘s cavalry squadrons 
remained active in Ukraine until 1944, when, after providing security for the VoMi‘s 
withdrawal from the region, Hoffmeyer‘s superiors compelled him to transfer their personnel 
to SS-Obergruppenführer Hans Fegelein in occupied Poland.1135 
 While building up Sonderkommando R‘s cavalry squadrons may have been 
Hoffmeyer‘s preference, Germany‘s declining military position in the occupied Soviet Union 
following the battle of Stalingrad prompted the unit to begin transferring its most able 
militiamen to the Waffen-SS.1136  Beginning in early 1943, Sonderkommando R began 
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mustering young Volksdeutsche Selbstschutz members, including those upon whom it had 
devoted substantial resources and training, to appear before Waffen-SS medical examination 
boards in Landau.1137  Sonderkommando R then transferred Volksdeutsche recruits, who 
passed their preliminary physical examinations, to Odessa, where the Waffen-SS transferred 
them via Germany to Holland for basic training in artillery and cavalry units.1138 
 Although Sonderkommando R surrendered perhaps a quarter of the Selbstschutz‘s 
most promising personnel to the Waffen-SS during the first half of 1943, Transnistria‘s 
Volksdeutsche militia continued its operations in the region until the very eve of the German 
withdrawal in March 1944.  Immediately prior to the evacuation, Sonderkommando R 
deployed Selbstschutz personnel to kill the unit‘s prisoners, whom the unit could not 
transport much less settle in occupied Poland.1139  During the retreat, Selbstschutz units, like 
the cavalry squadrons, provided security for the columns of Volksdeutsche refugees, whose 
evacuation route through southeastern Europe became increasingly more precarious as the 
Red Army approached.1140  The Waffen-SS drafted virtually all of the remaining militiamen 
upon their arrival in Poland.1141 Sonderkommando R‘s ambitions to create an independent 
                                                 
1137 German Police Activities in the Soviet Union, Summary Covering the Period of 7th March - 7th 
April 1943, April 8, 1943, BNA, HW 16, Piece 6, 4.  Protokol doprosa / Ionusa Aleksandra, April 3, 1967, 
USHMM, RG-31.018M, Reel 17, 8442-8443.  Aussage von J. F., November 29, 1963, BAL, B162/2301, 19. 
1138 German Police Activities in the Soviet Union, Summary Covering the Period of 8 April - 8 May 
1943, May 9, 1943, BNA, HW 16, Piece 6, 3.  German Police Decodes Nr 3 Traffic: 21.4.43, May 9, 1943, HW 
16, Piece 25, 2.  German Police Section Weekly Report No. 9 for week ending 16.4.43, n.d., BNA, HW 16, 
Piece 69, 1.  Aussage von J. F., November 29, 1963, BAL, B162/2301, 19.  Protokol doprosa / Ionusa 
Aleksandra, May 29, 1967, USHMM, RG-31.018M, Reel 17, 8506.  Verantwortliche Vernehmung von G. E., 
April 25, 1962, BAL, B162/2292, 100-101.  Vernehmungsniederschrift von L. H., August 7, 1962, BAL, 
B162/2296, 145.  Zeugenschaftliche Vernehmung von R. F., August 10, 1962, BAL, B162/2296, 157. 
1139 Aussage von H. J., May 19, 1965, BAL, B162/2304, 64-65.  Aussage von W. M., May 24, 1965, 
BAL, B162/2305, 148.  Aussage von A. F., May 22, 1965, BAL, B162/2305, 134. 
1140 German Police Decodes No. 1 Traffic: 20.4.44, April 26, 1944, BNA, HW 16, Piece 40, 3. 
1141 Aussage von H. S., November 10, 1962, BAL, B162/2299, 116.  Protokol doprosa / Ionusa 
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fighting force in Transnistria were ultimately sacrificed to mobilize men for frontline service 
as Germany‘s military fortunes waned. 
 While a departure from the Selbstschutz‘s established mission of guarding the 
region‘s Volksdeutsche settlements from external threats, the militia‘s participation in the 
mass murder of Jews in rural Transnistria during the winter of 1941-42 proved decisive in its 
institutional development.  Prior to its role in the mass murder campaign, Sonderkommando 
R‘s leaders conceived of their militia forces as a small auxiliary force capable of assisting its 
personnel in projecting German influence in the region and ferreting out remaining internal 
enemies within local Volksdeutsche settlements.  The voracious manpower needs that mass 
shooting operations created forced the unit‘s leaders to increase radically the Selbstschutz‘s 
size and to intensify ideological and military training for their militiamen.  When the 
members of the Selbstschutz acquitted themselves well during the mass killing of Jewish 
deportees, Sonderkommando R devoted the resources necessary to distill ragtag irregulars 
into an effective fighting force that its German institutional competitors coveted.  Although 
the German war machine‘s insatiable manpower needs in the midst of looming defeat 
ultimately hamstrung Sonderkommando R‘s plans, mass murder during the winter of 1941-42 
remained the organization‘s defining event. 
Ordinary Militiamen: A Collective Biography of Bereichkommando XI’s Selbstschutz 
 Who were the men who served in Sonderkommando R‘s Selbstschutz?  A collective 
biography of militiamen subordinated to Bereichkommando XI, the most heavily implicated 
and best-documented Selbstschutz unit in Transnistria, helps to answer this question.  
                                                                                                                                                       
Aleksandra, February 25, 1967, USHMM, RG-31.018M, Reel 17, 8337.  Protokol doprosa / Kokha Floriana, 
January 10, 1967, USHMM, RG-31.018M, Reel 17, 8745. 
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Reconstructing the units‘ membership is a difficult undertaking, as no roster has survived the 
war and as Sonderkommando R does not appear to have maintained personnel files for its 
Selbstschutz members.  Given the ad hoc fashion in which Hartung mustered his militiamen 
during late 1941 and early 1942, it is possible that Bereichkommando XI‘s staff either kept 
no militia roster or more likely maintained only an incomplete list of Selbstschutz members 
under its command.  While no accessible wartime records about the militia‘s membership 
survive, it is possible to reconstruct a partial membership roll for Bereichkommando XI‘s 
Selbstschutz during the winter of 1941-42 by compiling an aggregate list of accused 
militiamen, whom witnesses, victims, and suspected perpetrators implicated in postwar 
interviews that West German and Soviet investigators conducted.1142   This approach is 
admittedly problematic for two reasons.  First, it assumes that the testimony, taken years after 
the events, is accurate enough to identify individual perpetrators.  Although these accusations 
alone would have been inconclusive in some criminal proceedings—and indeed were during 
a decades-long investigation in Germany—the diversity of testimony helps to control for 
inconsistencies.  That interviewees, interrogated years and thousands of kilometers apart by 
very different investigators with divergent procedural rules and agendas, frequently fingered 
the same area residents as militiamen bolsters the probability that these claims are accurate.  
Moreover, the fact that this information corresponds very closely to wartime Volksdeutsche 
registration records adds additional support to these postwar statements.  The second 
difficulty with this approach is that membership in Bereichkommando XI‘s Selbstschutz 
alone illuminates little about a given militiaman‘s role in the killings.  The scale of the 
                                                 
1142 This is precisely the approach that West German investigators followed.  Einstellungsverfügung, 
December 27, 1999, Staatsarchiv Münster, Nr. 2812, 11-18. 
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murder operations that Hartung supervised in Bereichkommando XI relative to the number of 
Selbstschutz members that he had at his disposal meant that virtually all militiamen had a 
hand in the killing.  Nevertheless, aside from anecdotal evidence, it is difficult to determine 
whether a particular militiaman shot Jewish deportees only when carefully supervised by his 
German superiors or operated as an enthusiastic mass murderer who required little if any 
prompting to kill.  While admittedly less than ideal, in the absence of comprehensive wartime 
records about Bereichkommando XI‘s militia membership, aggregating accused militiamen 
implicated in West German and Soviet investigative records provides the most fruitful way to 
reconstruct a partial list of the region‘s rank-and-file perpetrators. 
 Without personnel files for Selbstschutz members, recovering biographical 
information about the suspected militiamen constitutes another challenge.  Nevertheless, the 
aggregate list of accused militiamen can be used to locate immigration records that the SS-
run Einwandererzentrale (EWZ) generated in occupied Poland for ethnic Germans who had 
fled Transnistria with Sonderkommando R during March 1944.  The EWZ‘s purpose was to 
screen Volksdeutsche ―resettlers‖ to German-occupied Poland for their racial suitability as 
members of the Third Reich‘s planned demographic bulwark in the region.  To this end, SS 
intake officers interviewed ethnic Germans as they appeared at EWZ offices to compile 
biographical information about the Volksdeutsche immigrants that would facilitate their 
racial classification according to the four-tiered categories of the Deutsche Volksliste.  The 
EWZ generated a number of intake records, including two card indices, as well as more 
detailed, but often rarer complete application files (Anträge) organized by country of 
origin.1143  Particular care must be used in reconstructing biographical information about 
                                                 
1143 Although there is significant overlap between these three collections, records for some individuals 
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ethnic Germans using these records.  On the one hand, the Nazi regime collected this 
information for the purpose of racial categorization, and analysis must account for the fact 
that the SS gathered and interpreted this data according to its narrow racial worldview.  On 
the other hand, these records are uniformly non-uniform in the information that they contain.  
SS personnel created these records using an array of forms at offices throughout occupied 
Poland.  Classifications in regard to the occupation, attitude, and particularly racial ―purity‖ 
of Volksdeutsche often reflected the whims of SS intake officers, rather than systematic 
categorization guidelines.  Notwithstanding these limitations, these records frequently 
provide the only surviving wartime biographical information about ethnic German men who 
likely participated in the mass killings that Bereichkommando XI spearheaded during the 
winter of 1941-42. 
 Using EWZ materials to recover biographical information about Selbstschutz 
members is challenging for two reasons—one of which is related to the collection‘s 
organization and the second a product of peculiar naming practices in southern Ukraine‘s 
Volksdeutsche villages.  Owing to the fact that the massive collection is organized 
alphabetically by male head of household, it is infeasible to search for ethnic Germans by 
geographical area.  As Selbstschutz membership did not constitute a criterion that EWZ 
intake officers used in determining the racial status of a particular ethnic German, intake 
personnel documented earlier militia service haphazardly.1144   Without searching for 
                                                                                                                                                       
appear in only one of them. 
1144 Occasionally SS intake officers noted Selbstschutz membership in narrative personal histories for 
ethnic Germans.  Antrag von Johann Gärtner, NARA, RG 242, A3342, EWZ50, B91, 2878-2904.  Antrag von 
Philipp Obenloch, NARA, RG 242, A3342, EWZ50, G5, 1092-1114.  Antrag von Johannes Reichert, NARA, 
RG 242, A3342, EWZ50, G61, 1618-1640.  Antrag von Jakob Thomä, NARA, RG 242, A3342, EWZ57, T75, 
2692-2703.  In some instances, SS intake officers included Selbstschutz identification cards as proof of identity 
in naturalization applications.  Antrag von Georg Hanecker, NARA, RG 242, A3342, EWZ50, C47, 1988-2016.  
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individual names, there is thus no ready way to cull the collection for records about 
Selbstschutz members in Bereichkommando XI.  Identifying individuals by name is itself 
difficult because many local Volksdeutsche in the region shared only a handful of common 
names.  Within any given town, most residents had one of perhaps a dozen surnames.  To 
make matters worse, in most ethnic German settlements relatives frequently shared the same 
names.1145  Sometimes local Volksdeutsche men had virtually identical biographical profiles.  
Postwar testimony, for example, accused two different ethnic German men, both named 
Jakob Thomä, of having served in München‘s Selbstschutz during its shooting deployments 
in early 1942.  The two men were both born in 1918, were of identical height and build, and, 
based on photographs taken of the two men in 1944, shared a strong family resemblance.  
The only discernable difference between the two men was that they were born two and half 
weeks apart in December 1918.1146  Even controlling for the requirements for active and 
reserve militia membership—having been between the ages of 18 and 60 and having been 
present in the area in early 1942—locating the corresponding EWZ records for the accused 
militiamen is a painstaking process.1147  Despite these difficulties, of the nearly 300 
                                                                                                                                                       
Antrag von Franz Kniel, NARA, RG 242, A3342, EWZ50, E21, 110-130.  Antrag von Peter Mekler, NARA, 
RG 242, A3342, EWZ50, F44, 626-652.  Antrag von Jakob Nuss, NARA, RG 242, A3342, EWZ50, G4, 2156-
2184.  Antrag von Eduard Redler, NARA, RG 242, A3342, EWZ50, G58, 1198-1224.  Antrag von Franz 
Thomä, NARA, RG 242, A3342, EWZ50, I50, 402-428. 
1145 In a classic example, Bereichkommando XI was home to four men named Franz Heck, all of who 
allegedly participated in shooting operations as part of the militia.  E-G Karte von Franz Heck, NARA, RG 242, 
A3342, EWZ57, L105, 972-980.  E-G Karte von Franz Heck, NARA, RG 242, A3342, EWZ57, L105, 984-994.  
Antrag von Franz Heck, NARA, RG 242, A3342, EWZ50, C56, 2500-2502.  E-G Karte von Franz Heck, 
NARA, RG 242, A3342, EWZ57, L105, 998-1006.  Also see, E-G Karte von Jakob Feininger, NARA, RG 242, 
A3342, EWZ57, K56, 1898-1906.  E-G Karte von Jakob Feininger, NARA, RG 242, A3342, EWZ57, K56, 
1888-1898.  E-G Karte von Josef Fröhlich, NARA, RG 242, A3342, EWZ57, K112, 1598-1604.  E-G Karte von 
Josef Fröhlich, NARA, RG 242, A3342, EWZ57, K112, 2182-2184. 
1146 E-G Karte von Jakob Thomä, NARA, RG 242, A3342, EWZ57, T75, 2692-2703.  E-G Karte von 
Jakob Thomä, NARA, RG 242, A3342, EWZ57, T75, 2704-2718. 
1147 After the war, accused former militiamen offered wildly divergent, and often exculpatory 
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militiamen identified in postwar testimony as having served under Hartung‘s command 
during the mass shooting operations in Bereichkommando XI, it is possible to identify EWZ 
records for 89 or roughly 30 percent of the men with a high degree certainty.1148  Although 
providing only an incomplete picture, these records nonetheless paint a most vivid portrait of 
Bereichkommando XI‘s rank-and-file killers. 
 In terms of occupational and educational backgrounds as well as family life, alleged 
Selbstschutz members differed little from their non-German neighbors.  The vast majority of 
alleged militiamen worked in agriculture.  In 1944, SS intake officers classified 71 percent of 
the accused former Selbstschutz members as farmers.1149  The SS identified a further 10 
percent as agricultural administrators, such as collective farm managers and bookkeepers, 
and roughly seven percent as former tractor operators at the region‘s Machine Tractor 
Stations.  According to EWZ intake officers, skilled laborers, such as electricians and 
barbers, constituted a smaller, but nevertheless significant 10 percent of the former 
militiamen.  Teachers and students enrolled in higher education courses beyond what was 
available locally made up only three percent of suspected perpetrators under Hartung‘s 
command.  Even accounting for the fact that accused teachers had attended at least 10 years 
                                                                                                                                                       
descriptions of the age requirements for Selbstschutz service.  The most plausible age cohort called up for 
militia service appears to have been local men aged 18 to 60.  Aussage von J. S., August 13, 1962, BAL, 
B162/2292, 53. 
1148 Postwar investigative records confirm wartime estimates of the number of militiamen under 
Hartung‘s command during early 1942.  Whereas Hartung‘s fellow Bereichkommandoführer Assmann 
estimated that the former supervised roughly 250 Selbstschutz members, postwar West German and Soviet 
investigators identified 289 local ethnic German men, whom interviewees implicated conclusively in the mass 
murder of Jews during the early months of 1942.  For a listing of the EWZ records consulted, see Appendix. 
1149 The SS drew a distinction between Landwirt (farmer) and Landarbeiter (agricultural laborer).  As 
all ethnic German farmers in the region had been part of collective farms during the 1930s and early 1940s, the 
basis for this distinction is unclear.  Anecdotally, however, it appears that SS intake personnel may have 
distinguished agricultural laborers from farmers based on whether or not the ethnic German could make a strong 
claim to owning farmland. 
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of primary and secondary school, the unit‘s typical level of education was low.  Suspected 
militia members had on average 4.3 years of elementary education in local German schools.  
Six percent of alleged militiamen had no formal schooling and, despite Sonderkommando 
R‘s educational initiatives, remained illiterate when SS intake officers registered them in 
occupied Poland in 1944.  The accused militiamen married early and had large families.  The 
mean and median marriage age for alleged Selbstschutz members about whom the EWZ 
registered this information was twenty-three years old.  Ninety-two percent of accused 
militiamen were married and had, on average, four children.  Hartung‘s militiamen were, in 
terms of occupation, education, and family, the prototypical rural Soviet residents and 
differed little from their predominantly ethnically Ukrainian neighbors.  Based on these 
criteria, Bereichkommando XI‘s militiamen were no more primed to participate in the 
Holocaust than were their non-German neighbors. 
 Although the men alleged to have served under Hartung differed little from other 
rural populations elsewhere in the occupied Soviet Union in some respects, confession 
distinguished the accused militiamen in Bereichkommando XI from most Soviet citizens.  
With one exception, all of the accused militiamen in Bereichkommando XI identified in 
EWZ records were Roman Catholic.1150  As scholars have long noted that the Catholic milieu 
operated as an immunization against National Socialism in Germany, it is tempting to latch 
on to Bereichkommando XI‘s Selbstschutz as a counterexample, underscoring 
disproportionate Catholic participation in the Holocaust.1151  Doing so, however, would grant 
confession an inappropriate causal role in explaining the role of individual Selbstschutz units 
                                                 
1150 For the one likely exception see, E-G Karte von Peter Ackermann, NARA, RG 242, A3342, 
EWZ57, I4, 1386-1396. 
1151 Kershaw, Popular Opinion & Political Dissent in the Third Reich, 331-357.   
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in mass shooting operations for two reasons.  First, while almost all militia units were 
essentially mono-confessional, Volksdeutsche membership in the Selbstschutz was 
independent of denomination.  On Sonderkommando R‘s orders, all ethnic German men aged 
18 to 60, regardless of whether or not they identified themselves as Protestants or Catholics, 
had to serve in militia units located throughout the region‘s town and collective farms.  
During the nineteenth century, German-speakers had founded these settlements along strict 
confessional lines and their descendants‘ subsequent highly incestuous marriage and 
migration patterns ensured that, on the whole, Transnistria‘s Volksdeutsche enclaves 
remained largely segregated between Catholics and Protestants.  Sonderkommando R‘s 
Selbstschutz units thus reflected the bifurcated religious affiliations of local ethnic Germans. 
 Second, Sonderkommando R assigned militia units to murder the Jewish deportees 
not because of their confessional composition, but rather because of other factors, notably 
their physical proximity to their Jewish victims.  During the first wave of killing at the 
Bogdanovka camp, Bereichkommando XI‘s predominately Catholic militiamen spearheaded 
the unit‘s initial foray into mass murder.  Their involvement in these early shooting missions 
can be attributed both to their units‘ propinquity to the camp and to their German 
commander, who had exceptional latitude to and likely exceptional interest in carrying out a 
shooting operation of that size.  During the second wave of killing near Berezovka, 
Sonderkommando R mobilized militia units from Bereichkommandos XI, XIV, and XX—
units that were again closest to the rail terminus from which Romanian forces were deporting 
Jews into the surrounding countryside.  As before, the militiamen‘s confession played no 
role.  Whereas militiamen in Bereichkommandos XI and XIV were Catholic, their 
counterparts in Bereichkommando XX were predominantly Protestant.  That Catholic 
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militiamen were heavily implicated in the shootings in terms of both length of deployment 
and number of victims, and thus a greater focus of postwar investigations, was simply 
geographic accident. 
 The available evidence suggests that Selbstschutz units composed of Catholic and 
Protestant militiamen preformed no differently when their SS superiors ordered them to 
murder Jews.  Given that recent scholarship has highlighted instances in which Catholic 
would-be perpetrators tended more often to evade participating in the murder of Jews in 
mixed Catholic and Protestant units, the fact that confession appears to have had no impact 
on how well Selbstschutz members carried out their genocidal duties is tantalizing.1152  That 
the Selbstschutz operated in religiously homogenous units may have smoothed cooperation 
between militiamen based in neighboring communities that Sonderkommando R mustered 
for killing operations.  Nevertheless, the relationship between confession and Volksdeutsche 
willingness to participate in the Holocaust in Transnistria is perhaps not analogous to 
instances involving would-be German perpetrators that scholars have examined.  As 
discussed in chapter four, owing to repressive Soviet and Nazi religious policies, unlike 
Reich Germans, Transnistria‘s Volksdeutsche had enjoyed few recent opportunities to 
practice their faith openly or to commune with their fellow believers outside of southern 
Ukraine.  Although evaluating the depth of religious conviction among ethnic Germans in 
Transnistria is difficult based on the available sources, it is evident that circumscribed 
opportunities for religious expression made the relationship between area Volksdeutsche and 
their faith very different from that of Reich Germans.  At the very least, as Sonderkommando 
                                                 
1152 Beorn, ―Negotiating Murder: A Panzer Signal Company and the Destruction of the Jews of 
Peregruznoe, 1942,‖ 204-205. 
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R recognized, the absence of religious leaders, let alone an independent Church hierarchy—
which the unit denied both Catholics and Protestants through early 1942—hamstrung 
organized religious responses to the unit‘s murderous agenda.  While it is conceivable that 
Sonderkommando R‘s religious policies may have deprived Transnistria‘s ethnic Germans of 
a basis for resisting its murderous agenda, the evidence suggests that confession failed to 
shape the participation of Transnistria‘s Volksdeutsche militiamen in the mass shooting of 
Jews. 
 More so than occupation, education, family structure, or religion, the distinguishing 
biographical feature of militiamen subordinated to Bereichkommando XI was their brutal 
encounter with Soviet power.  Virtually all of Bereichkommando XI‘s militiamen had 
suffered because of collectivization in rural Ukraine.  Of the suspected militiamen identified 
in the EWZ materials, roughly a fifth had owned their own farms prior to 1917 and yearned 
for what they regarded fondly as the golden era of independent agricultural production.  With 
the exception of all but the youngest fifth of the militiamen, who were born between 1921 
and 1926, all Selbstschutz members under Hartung‘s command would have remembered the 
confiscation of either their or their families‘ farms between 1929 and 1931, when the Soviet 
regime pursued collectivization in the region.  Notwithstanding a handful of ethnic Germans, 
whom Soviet authorities permitted to pursue higher education in cities like Odessa, 
beginning in the early 1930s the Soviet state had forced virtually all of Hartung‘s militiamen 
to live and work on collective farms.1153  Soviet rule had transformed Bereichkommando XI‘s 
Selbstschutz members from prosperous farmers to landless laborers.  The Soviet regime had, 
                                                 
1153 Accused Selbstschutz member Michael Ehrmanntraut was a quintessential example of this 
exception.  Antrag von Michael Ehrmanntraut, NARA, RG 242, A3342, EWZ50, B36, 894-910.   
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in effect, created class enemies where none had existed previously. 
 For future Selbstschutz members, expropriation was the beginning of a continually 
declining standard of living.  Aside from information about Soviet expropriation of ethnic 
German farmland during the late 1920s and early 1930s, which the SS appears to have 
collected to determine the amount of land to which the Volksdeutsche ―resettlers‖ allegedly 
were entitled in occupied Poland, EWZ intake officers failed to keep systematic records 
about the lives of ethnic Germans under Soviet rule.  Anecdotal evidence that can be pieced 
together from these wartime immigration files is nevertheless compelling.  The declining 
quality of life during the 1920s and 1930s for future militiamen is apparent from their poor 
health and continued harassment by Soviet security forces.  Likely owing to the effects of the 
1932-33 famine, to which a significant number of area ethnic Germans succumbed, some 
accused members of Bereichkommando XI‘s Selbstschutz appear to have been physically 
underdeveloped.1154  According to EWZ data, the militiamen had an average height of five 
feet six inches (169 centimeters) and an average weight of only 143 pounds (65 kilograms).  
The latter figure is particularly startling, as the SS took these measurements in 1944 after 
years of German policy aimed at granting Volksdeutsche privileged access to food.  In 
addition to experiencing the likely effects of food shortages that Soviet agricultural policies 
precipitated, many future militiamen suffered from epidemic disease during the 1920s and 
1930s.  Even allowing for incomplete EWZ record keeping, which undoubtedly 
underrepresented earlier illnesses, 30 percent of the suspected militiamen suffered from 
                                                 
1154 As West German, let alone Soviet investigators rarely broached the issue of the 1932-33 famine, 
fragmentary evidence from postwar testimony suggest that the death toll may have been significant.  See, for 
example, Vernehmungsniederschrift von A. D., July 18, 1962, BAL, B162/2296, 98.  Aussage von G. M., 
October 9, 1964, BAL, B162/2303, 11.   
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serious contagious diseases, such as typhoid and cholera, at some point between 1917 and 
1941.  No less than one-fifth of the alleged future Selbstschutz members contracted malaria 
during an epidemic that raged through the region during the mid-1930s.  While perhaps not 
exceptionally so in comparison to their non-German neighbors, Soviet rule was a health 
hazard for Hartung‘s future militiamen. 
 Continued harassment by Soviet security forces, which both preceded and followed 
expropriation, constituted a perennial feature of the prewar lives of Selbstschutz members 
alleged to have been subordinated to Hartung‘s command.  Josef Mayer, a suspected 
militiaman from the town of München, exemplified the types of repeated arrests that many of 
Bereichkommando XI‘s future Selbstschutz members endured under Soviet rule.  As Mayer 
explained to EWZ intake officers in 1944, during the early 1920s Soviet authorities arrested 
him on two separate occasions as a class enemy.  In 1924, Soviet security personnel again 
detained him for having provided an insufficient portion of his harvest to the state.  Six year 
later, in 1930, local Soviet officials confiscated what remained of Mayer‘s land and 
compelled him to move onto a collective farm.  In the midst of Ukraine‘s 1932-33 famine, 
Soviet authorities again arrested and imprisoned Mayer for two months for having sold bread 
on the black market.1155  Economic sabotage,1156 corresponding with friends and relatives in 
Germany,1157 and fascist espionage1158 were among the most common crimes for which 
Soviet authorities had arrested Bereichkommando XI‘s alleged Selbstschutz members.  
                                                 
1155 Antrag von Josef Mayer, NARA, RG 242, A3342, EWZ50, F21, 756-800.   
1156 Antrag von Josef Hirsch, NARA, RG 242, A3342, EWZ50, D8, 1454-1470.   
1157 Antrag von Josef Gärtner, NARA, RG 242, A3342, EWZ50, B91, 2930-2964.   
1158 Antrag von Johannes Thomä, NARA, RG 242, A3342, EWZ50, I50, 550-576.   
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Penalized for these offenses, some future suspected militiamen endured months and even 
years of incarceration and exile in the Soviet Union.1159 
 While it may appear that Bereichkommando XI‘s militiamen bore the full brunt of the 
Soviet security apparatus, it is important to remember that they remained among the lucky 
ones.  In contrast to many of their friends and relatives, accused militiamen had escaped 
permanent deportation to the Soviet interior either before the war or during its opening 
months.  According to wartime German estimates, prior to the fall of 1941 Soviet authorities 
had deported some 17 percent of Transnistria‘s Volksdeutsche population—a figure in which 
male heads of household were overrepresented.1160  The deportees‘ absence served as a 
perpetual reminder to Hartung‘s alleged militiamen of the brutality of Soviet power and their 
highly tenuous position under Soviet rule. 
 As members of a socio-economically and increasingly ethnically suspect group, the 
alleged members of Bereichkommando XI‘s militia were not only the targets of Soviet 
repression, but were also largely excluded from the opportunities that the Soviet system 
afforded to at least some of their non-German neighbors.  This pattern is apparent from both 
circumscribed employment opportunities and a low rate of military service.  Anecdotally, 
future purported Selbstschutz members found that their ascribed class and ethnic 
backgrounds stunted their career prospects.  Josef Schmidt, an ethnic German teacher from 
the town of München, was one of the few accused Selbstschutz members to have pursued 
education beyond the local elementary school, attending the Agricultural Technical Middle 
School in Landau from 1930 to 1932 and completing a four-year course on agricultural 
                                                 
1159 E-G Karte von Peter Ackermann, NARA, RG 242, A3342, EWZ57, I4, 1386-1396. 
1160 Zusammenstellung: der aufgebauten kulturellen Einrichtungen von Sonderkommando ‗R,‘ n.d., 
NARA, T175/ 72/2589157, 2589167. 
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mechanization in Odessa.  As he explained to his EWZ evaluators in a handwritten 
autobiography that he appended to his 1944 application for German citizenship, after 
completing his studies he began work as a technician at Landau‘s Machine Tractor Station, 
―but could not stay there long, because they wanted to remove me from the position as a 
class-enemy element  . . . [and]  . . .  I had to leave the job.‖1161  In addition to these career 
restrictions, future purported Selbstschutz members attached to Bereichkommando XI appear 
to have had an unusually low rate of service in the Red Army.  Of the suspected militiamen 
about whom EWZ documentation exists, only seven percent of them served in the Soviet 
military during the 1920s and 1930s.  To be sure, as the case of Johann Fett, an ethnic 
German militiaman originally from Michialovka, illustrates, some Selbstschutz members 
were Red Army veterans.  Fett both served in Mongolia during the late 1930s and took part in 
the failed Soviet invasion of Finland during 1940.1162  Nevertheless, presumably because 
increasing tensions with Nazi Germany during the latter half of the 1930s discouraged Soviet 
military officials from calling up the region‘s Volksdeutsche, those alleged future 
Selbstschutz members who did serve in the Red Army almost invariably did so before 1935.  
Deemed first class and then also national enemies by the Soviet regime prior to 1941, 
Hartung‘s suspected killers had been historically disenfranchised from the Soviet system by 
limited employment opportunities and exclusion from the Red Army, one of the Soviet 
Union‘s most powerful tools for integrating ethnic minorities into the post-revolutionary 
order. 
 For the accused Selbstschutz members in Bereichkommando XI, the preceding 15 
                                                 
1161 Lebenslauf des Bürgers Josef Schmidt in Einbürgerungsantrag Josef Schmidt, 1944, NARA, RG 
242, A3342, EWZ50, H46, 2330.   
1162 Protokol doprosa / Fet Ivan, May 18, 1948, USHMM, RG-38.018M, Reel 79, 3749. 
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years of Soviet rule had ended in disaster.  Virtually all of the alleged militiamen had 
experienced the brutality of collectivization first hand as either its targets or their sons.  
Members of a once privileged and prosperous minority, during the late 1920s and 1930s 
Hartung‘s future militiamen had been the targets of Soviet redistributive policies that had not 
only impoverished them, but, in forcing them to live and work on state-owned collective 
farms, had reshaped their traditional patterns of life radically.  Like many of their non-
German neighbors, Bereichkommando XI‘s accused Selbstschutz members suffered from 
malnutrition and disease as a consequence of flawed Soviet agricultural policies.  Moreover, 
as a socio-economically and, increasingly, during the latter half of the 1930s, as an ethnically 
suspect population, Bereichkommando XI‘s accused Selbstschutz members had little chance 
to adapt to the new Soviet order.  Constantly harassed by Soviet security services, denied 
career opportunities, and largely excluded from Red Army service, Hartung‘s suspected 
militiamen had been deprived of precisely the advancement opportunities that the Soviet 
system had proffered to other non-Russian minorities.  Bereichkommando XI‘s killers, like 
the region‘s Volksdeutsche more generally, were, put simply, Stalin‘s victims. 
Initiation to Mass Murder at the Bogdanovka Collective Farm: The Situational 
Dynamics of Volksdeutsche Participation in the Holocaust 
 To reconstruct the precise situational factors at play during Sonderkommando R‘s 
mass killing operations, it is useful to return to the Bogdanovka collective farm and 
reconstruct the context in which Pastushchenko and his fellow militiamen perpetrated their 
initial crimes.  After setting up their sub-unit‘s central command post in the parsonage of 
Rastatt‘s abandoned Catholic church during October 1941, Hartung and his three 
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subordinates, SS-Untersturmführer Johann Stettler,1163 NSKK-Oberscharführer Walter 
Petersen,1164 and NSKK member Hans Gleich,1165 toured their Bereichkommando‘s three 
other Volksdeutsche villages and two collective farms.1166  When they arrived at the 
Bogdanovka collective farm some 12 kilometers north of Rastatt, the farm‘s prospects as a 
German bulwark in Ukraine appeared mixed.  Perhaps due to its small size, the Bogdanovka 
collective farm‘s machinery and livestock had weathered both the Soviet retreat and 
Romanian pillaging.1167  From the Hartung‘s perspective, however, the farm‘s ethnic 
composition constituted a concern.  During collectivization, Soviet authorities had formed 
the Bogdanovka collective farm from two distinct hamlets—one German and one Ukrainian.  
Although the predominately ethnically Ukrainian Comintern settlement and the largely 
Germanophone Neudorf village had enjoyed a degree of administrative autonomy during the 
Soviet period, the collective farm‘s ethnic boundaries remained fluid.1168 
 The multi-ethnic Ebenal family—the Neudorf settlement‘s dominant clan—typifies 
                                                 
1163 SS Offizier Akte Johann Stettler, NARA, RG 242, A3343,  SS0 158B, 1297-1368. 
1164 Although the protocol of Petersen‘s 1971 West German police interview provides valuable 
biographical information, only fragments of his SS personnel file survived.  The majority of Petersen‘s SS 
officer file appears to have been burned.  SS Offizier Akte Walter Petersen, NARA, RG 242, A3343, 510-521.  
Verantwortliche Vernehmung von W. J. G. P., June 29, 1971, Staatsarchiv Münster, Nr. 2703, 125-126. 
1165 Very little information about Hans Gleich exists.  As a likely member of the NSKK, his personnel 
information did not survive the war.  His 1962 death prevented West German investigators from interviewing 
him.  Verfügung über H. G., October 16, 1964, BAL, B162/2303, 258.  Gleich was promoted to the rank of SS-
Obersturmführer and deployed to Crimea in April 1943.  Stabbefehl Nr. 101, 10 April 1943, BB R 59/67, 104. 
1166 Aussage von A. B., January 3, 1962, BAL, B162/2290, 155-56.  Zeugenschaftliche Vernehmung 
von L. B., January 16, 1962, BAL, B162/2290, 165.  Aussage von K. T., January 24, 1962, BAL, B162/2291, 
141.  Protokol doprosa / Ionusa Aleksandra, April 6, 1967, USHMM, RG-31.018M, Reel 17, 8445.  Protokol 
doprosa / Ionusa Aleksandra, June 1, 1967, USHMM, RG-31.018M, Reel 17, 8525-26. 
1167 Zeugenschaftliche Vernehmung von L. B., January 16, 1962, BAL, B162/2290, 164.  Protokol 
doprosa / Kokha Floriana, January 11, 1967, USHMM, RG-31.018M, Reel 17, 8858. 
1168 Protokol doprosa / Kokha Floriana, October 1, 1966, USHMM, RG-31.018M, Reel 17, 8546.  
Protokol doprosa / Kokha Floriana, October 10, 1966, USHMM, RG-31.018M, Reel 17, 8590. 
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the village‘s permeable prewar ethnic borders.  Numbering perhaps fifty in 1941, virtually all 
of the hamlet‘s denizens claimed membership in the family through either blood or 
marriage.1169  This extended family included members whom even their relations identified 
as being ethnically non-German.  Pastushchenko, for example, had married into the family in 
1935 and fathered several children.1170  Pastushchenko‘s brother-in-law, Alexander 
Orgiganov, the Comintern collective‘s ethnically Russian tractor driver, had likewise joined 
the family.1171  Distant cousin Valdemar Hübner and his Russian wife Nina also lived in the 
German part of the Bogdanovka collective farm.1172  Although the farm‘s existing 
infrastructure and German-speakers were tantalizing, Hartung and his colleagues recognized 
the need to identify the town‘s Volksdeutsche. 
 Doing so, however, proved easier said than done because, as discussed in chapter six, 
Sonderkommando R had no serviceable definition of who could be considered an ethnic 
German in Transnistria.1173  The absence of a working definition of a Volksdeutscher was a 
consequence of the VoMi‘s population transfers from Eastern Europe prior to the invasion of 
the Soviet Union.  During these operations, Hoffmeyer and his subordinates registered and 
classified ethnic Germans seeking to relocate to Germany using the multi-tiered categories of 
the Deutsche Volksliste, which German authorities first had introduced in occupied Poland.  
                                                 
1169 A local resident estimated the collective farm‘s prewar population to be roughly 45.  
Zeugenschaftliche Vernehmung von L. B., January 16, 1962, BAL, B162/2290, 162. 
1170 Einbürgerungsantrag von Johann Pastushchenko, 1944, NARA, RG 242, A3342-EWZ50-G019, 
110-22. 
1171 Protokol doprosa / Ionusa Aleksandra, April 6, 1967, USHMM, RG-31.018M, Reel 17, 8454.  
Protokol doprosa / Kokha Floriana, October 1, 1966, USHMM, RG-31.018M, Reel 17, 8556. 
1172 Protokol doprosa / Kokha Floriana, October 1, 1966, USHMM, RG-31.018M, Reel 17, 8555.  
Protokol doprosa Kokha Floriana, November 14, 1966, USHMM, RG-31.018M, Reel 17, 8703. 
1173 Rundanweisung Nr. 11 / Betrifrt [sic] namentliche Erfassung und Registrierung aller 
Volksdeutschen in Transnistrien, December 28, 1941, BB, R 59/66, 132. 
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As most of the Deutsche Volksliste‘s classification criteria, such as ―culture,‖ depended on 
subjective evaluations by German intake officers, SS authorities placed emphasis on prewar 
political activities as a gauge of ethnic identity.  While still problematic, outside of the Soviet 
Union this litmus test had some utility.1174  Ethnic Germans from Bessarabia, who had joined 
the crypto-fascist Erneuerungsbewegung, for example, were unlikely to have identified 
themselves as ethnic Romanians prior to 1940.  As Hoffmeyer‘s subordinates quickly 
realized, however, within the pre-1939 border of the Soviet Union, local ethnic Germans had 
little opportunity to engage in activities that marked ―Germanness‖ for the SS.  Soviet 
authorities had regarded a perpetuation of pre-Revolutionary contact with Germany—let 
alone openly fascist activities—with the utmost suspicion.  Soviet security forces had 
arrested and deported any would-be Volksdeutscher who could have met the SS‘s criteria 
long before the occupation.  To make matters worse for the SS, the situation in Transnistria 
differed from earlier ―resettlement‖ operations in that the incentives for local residents to 
deceive SS evaluators had increased.  Although many non-German Eastern Europeans 
attempted to escape the gathering Soviet storm by posing as Volksdeutsche during VoMi-led 
operations in Eastern Europe, applicants at least demonstrated anti-Soviet credentials by 
seeking to relocate—a process that required them to sign over the bulk of their property in 
trust to the German state.1175  By contrast, in Transnistria, where prospective ethnic Germans 
were permitted to retain their property and could bank on preferential treatment from German 
authorities, faking Volksdeutsche credentials had little (at least initially apparent) cost to the 
                                                 
1174 Bergen, ―The Nazi Concept of ‗Volksdeutsche‘ and the Exacerbation of anti-Semitism in Eastern 
Europe, 1939-45;‖ Bergen, ―The ‗Volksdeutschen‘ of Eastern Europe, World War II, and the Holocaust: 
Constructed Ethnicity, Real Genocide;‖ Bergen, ―The Volksdeutsche of Eastern Europe and the Collapse of the 
Nazi Empire, 1944-1945.‖ 
1175 Lumans, Himmler’s Auxiliaries, 169. 
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applicant.1176  Confronted by an alien local population whose historical divorce from 
Germany and limited opportunities for individual political expression blunted even the SS‘s 
crude ethnic classification tools, Hoffmeyer and Siebert could offer their subordinates little 
constructive guidance on how to proceed.1177  Sonderkommando R fielded personnel to 
identify Transnistria‘s ethnic Germans just as it articulated the difficulties of doing precisely 
that. 
 Absent superior orders on how to determine ethnicity, Hartung employed an efficient, 
albeit problematic method of identifying Volksdeutsche; he simply retained allegedly reliable 
local ethnic Germans to conduct the classification for him.  In Neudorf, Hartung appointed 
Josef Faltis as mayor1178 and Johann Büchler as the local militia commander.1179  After 
acceding to Büchler‘s request that local residents Johann Kühlwein and Josef Hass serve as 
his deputies, Hartung fulfilled his orders to create an indigenous ethnic German militia to 
thwart marauding Romanian soldiers by instructing Faltis and Büchler to establish Neudorf‘s 
militia unit.1180  Why Hartung opted to create the militia in this obviously slipshod fashion is 
                                                 
1176 Bryant has argued convincingly that the prospect of Wehrmacht service dissuaded many of 
Prague‘s residents from seeking Volksdeutsche status.  Bryant, Prague in Black, 53-55. 
1177 Rundanweisung Nr. 89 / Betr.: Stellungsnahme zu dem Entwurf des Reichskommissars für die 
Ukraine II a-2 vom 3.11.42 / Aufnahme der Volksdeutschen in der deutsche Volksliste, December 15, 1942, BB, 
R59/66, 32-33. 
1178 During their postwar interviews, witnesses described the position of mayor differently to West 
German and Soviet investigators.  In West German statements, witnesses termed the position as Bürgermeister 
(mayor), whereas in testimony to Soviet authorities they described the position as starosta (village elder), an 
equivalent pre-Revolutionary position that German occupation authorities revived in the Reichkommissariat 
Ukraine during the war. 
1179 Romanian authorities, who occupied the Bogdanovka collective farm prior to Sonderkommando 
R‘s arrival, had named Faltis and Büchler to their posts.  Protokol doprosa / Kokha Floriana, October 1, 1966, 
USHMM, RG-31.018M, Reel 17, 8851. 
1180 Protokol doprosa / Ionusa Aleksandra, March 6, 1967, USHMM, RG-31.018M, Reel 17, 9052.  
Protokol doprosa / Ionusa Aleksandra, March 9, 1967, USHMM, RG-31.018M, Reel 17, 8308-10.  Protokol 
doprosa / Kokha Floriana, October 1, 1966, USHMM, RG-31.018M, Reel 17, 8552. 
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unclear.  Given that, during the fall of 1941, Bereichkommandoführer appear to have focused 
their attention on organizing Selbstschutz units in larger Volksdeutsche localities, which 
might be deployed against the Romanians or alleged internal racial and political enemies, it is 
likely that Hartung regarded the Bogdanovka collective farm‘s remote militia unit as one of 
little importance.  He was thus reluctant to devote his staff‘s time and energy to determine 
which local residents were eligible to serve in its ranks.  By delegating the militia‘s creation 
to his Volksdeutsche subordinates, Hartung assigned members of a suspect group to define 
their own identities. 
 Local residents found militia membership highly desirable because their 
classification, or more accurately, their self-identification as Volksdeutsche entitled them to 
the bounty that the Third Reich promised cooperative ethnic Germans.  First, in contrast to 
their non-German neighbors, the Bogdanovka collective farm‘s militiamen received 
expanded, choice garden plots.1181  Given Sonderkommando R‘s ambivalence about ending 
collective agriculture, this expanded autonomy proved attractive to Neudorf‘s denizens, 
many of whom yearned for their pre-Revolutionary, autonomous land ownership.1182  
Second, on Hartung‘s orders Büchler confiscated the Bogdanovka collective farm‘s livestock 
and the local Atmecheskoi Machine Tractor Station‘s equipment—which had been shared 
with local Ukrainians—and distributed them exclusively to Selbstschutz members.  As the 
tractors and teams of horses that each ethnic German militiaman received were the only 
means by which to plant crops in the coming spring, the SS‘s initial property distribution 
                                                 
1181 Protokol doprosa / Kokha Floriana, March 9, 1967, USHMM, RG-31.018M, Reel 17, 8378.  On 
Sonderkommando R‘s decision to maintain collective agriculture see Dienstanweisung Nr. 2, September 22, 
1941, BB, R59/66, 152.  Rundanweisung Nr. 7, October 14, 1941, BB, R59/66, 143. 
1182 Sonderkommando R‘s decision not to end collective agriculture outright angered many area 
Volksdeutsche.  See, for example, Rundanweisung Nr. 7, October 14, 1941, BB, R59/66, 136-37. 
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provided Neudorf‘s inhabitants with a glimpse of the new German-imposed racial 
hierarchy.1183  The SS planned to starve the farm‘s non-Germans to fatten local 
Volksdeutsche. 
 Given that militia membership was an avenue to privileged status, the multi-ethnic 
Ebenal family conspired to staff the local unit along familial, rather than ethnic lines.  Faltis 
and Büchler‘s decision to include Alexander Orgiganov, the Comintern village‘s Russian 
tractor driver, in the militia underscores the pliability of the Third Reich‘s seemingly rigid 
ethnic categories at the local level.  Word about the material advantages that militia 
membership and thus Volksdeutsche classification afforded permeated the incestuous 
enclave.  As the two local leaders gathered to pen the unit‘s roster, Orgiganov‘s ethnic 
German wife Silvia burst into the unit‘s makeshift command post and beseeched her kinsmen 
to include her husband in the militia.  Taking pity on their distant cousin and her family, 
Neudorf‘s local leaders included Orgiganov in the militia.1184  Accounting for as much as 20 
percent of the Neudorf unit, the Ebenal clan‘s non-German family members compromised the 
SS‘s ethnic designs for the village. 
 Beyond the initial visit of Bereichkommando XI‘s staff and the subsequent initial 
property redistribution, the residents of the Bogdanovka collective farm maintained minimal 
contact with VoMi authorities during the subsequent six weeks.  This changed during mid-
December 1941 when, in anticipation of planned mass shooting deployments at the 
Bogdanovka camp, Hartung resolved to prevent subsequent Romanian Jewish transports 
                                                 
1183 On the distribution of livestock to militia members see Protokol ochnoi stavki, April 26, 1967, 
USHMM, RG-31.018M, Reel 17, 8902.  Protokol doprosa / Kokha Floriana Frantsevicha, March 9, 1967, 
USHMM, RG-31.018M, Reel 17, 8842-43.  On the distribution of agricultural machinery—presumably along 
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from reaching the facility by diverting them to Volksdeutsche settlements, such as Neudorf, 
where local militia units were to murder them.  This plan entailed mustering militiamen who, 
even by the Selbstschutz‘s undeniably low standards, had received the least attention from 
Sonderkommando R.  During the fall of 1941, Hartung had deemed the Neudorf unit so 
isolated and unimportant that he had not bothered to select its members, let alone to train or 
arm them.  Sonderkommando R picked Pastushchenko and his fellow militiamen from 
Neudorf to spearhead perhaps its inaugural mass killing deployment because they lived in the 
path of a Romanian Jewish transport on its way to the Bogdanovka camp. 
 The Neudorf militia‘s involvement in the Holocaust began in mid-December 1941.1185  
Arriving on a bitterly cold December morning, Hartung sought out the two local leaders, 
Faltis and Büchler, as his SS subordinates unloaded the ammunition box stowed in their staff 
car.  When Hartung found Faltis and Büchler, the two men probably suspected the reason for 
the SS‘s visit.  The previous day Romanian troops and their Ukrainian auxiliaries had 
marched several hundred Jews—predominately women, children, and old men—through the 
Comintern settlement and incarcerated them in the horse stable and pigsty at the collective 
farm‘s western edge.  At the conclusion of their brief meeting with Hartung, Faltis and 
Büchler mustered the unit.  After the militia assembled at the farm‘s barnyard, Hartung 
addressed its eighteen members.  Although postwar accounts confirm his ideological 
language and murderous orders, conflicting and often exculpatory statements make Hartung‘s 
words unclear.  As far as can be reconstructed, however, Hartung commanded all militia 
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members without exception to participate in the shootings.1186 
 On Hartung‘s orders, Büchler divided the 18-man unit into three squads and began the 
bloody business of murder—a process that anticipated the tactics that the Selbstschutz would 
later deploy at the Bogdanovka camp.  One six-man subunit relieved the local Ukrainian 
auxiliaries who had guarded the Jewish captives since the previous evening.  Another squad 
escorted groups of 20 Jews from the farm‘s outbuildings, across the narrow bridge spanning 
the Bakshala River that divided the Ukrainian and German villages, and to the execution site, 
a gulley at the collective farm‘s eastern border.  There, the final six-man squad ordered the 
Jews to undress to their undergarments and collected remaining personal items in a bucket.  
Supervised and encouraged by Hartung and his SS personnel, the militiamen took up position 
less than three meters behind their victims and, as the SS had instructed them to do, fired at 
the base of the skull.  As the victims tumbled into the ravine, Bereichkommando XI‘s 
German staff gunned down any survivors with sub-machine guns.1187  To reduce the physical 
and psychological strain on the killers, the SS rotated the three subunits at regular intervals so 
that each squad shot a roughly equal number of victims.  By day‘s end, some two to three 
hundred Jews lay dead. 1188 
 Following the conclusion of the shooting, the SS, the Volksdeutsche militiamen, and 
the Ukrainian auxiliaries who stood guard the previous night divvied up their spoils.1189  
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Although contrary to standing German orders, theft of Jewish property at Neudorf replicated 
the Third Reich‘s racial hierarchy in miniature.  SS personnel received the valuables that their 
Romanian allies had not stripped from their victims.  The SS then permitted the 
Volksdeutsche militiamen to select good quality clothing—such as winter coats and shoes—
that they and their families sorely lacked.  Lastly, the unit‘s Ukrainian helpers received the 
least desirable items.1190  As an indication of the improvised nature of the killing, in contrast 
to future deployments in which Selbstschutz members and their German superiors developed 
increasingly innovative means of body disposal, during this initial operation local militiamen 
appear simply to have left their victims‘ corpses uncovered in the pit. 
Social Psychological Pressure, Anti-Bolshevism, Theft, and Status: The Motivations of 
Sonderkommando R’s Militiamen 
Scholarship on the Holocaust has long attempted to unlock what motivated 
perpetrators to kill.  Specialists have argued convincingly that, for virtually any perpetrators, 
a constellation of factors shaped their decisions to murder.  The explanatory weight that 
researchers grant to different factors thus varies from one group of killers to another.1191  This 
chapter concludes by charting the specific array of factors that operated most powerfully on 
Sonderkommando R‘s militiamen during their participation in mass murder during the winter 
of 1941-42.  It proceeds by evaluating motivations that scholars have most frequently 
deployed to explain perpetrator behavior, such as social psychological pressure and anti-
Semitism, and then dissects the lesser studied, yet exceptionally potent factor of material 
gain.  A careful analysis of these components suggests that while some of the seeds of 
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genocide may have been homegrown, they were fertilized by Sonderkommando R‘s policies. 
Scholars have identified a panoply of social psychological factors that shaped 
interpersonal relations within groups of Holocaust perpetrators and catalyzed mass 
murder.1192  With a few exceptions, scholars have rarely applied these explanations to 
perpetrators from the Soviet Union and instead focused on recovering their role in the 
Holocaust.1193  While the constellation of factors varied depending on specific circumstances, 
these universal explanations have broad applicability, including in helping to explain the 
participation of Pastushchenko and his fellow militiamen during their first shooting 
deployment.  Rather than enumerating all of the social psychological factors that acted upon 
the Bogdanovka collective farm‘s militiamen during their first mission, it is useful here to 
focus on two of them that operated exceptionally powerfully on the Selbstschutz members 
during their initial killing operation: obedience to authority and pressure to group conformity.  
In both instances it is fruitful to compare the Bogdanovka collective farm‘s ethnic German 
militiamen with Browning‘s now paradigmatic reconstruction of Reserve Order Police 
Battalion 101‘s first killing action in Józefów, Poland.   
 The situational pressures to obey murderous orders were far stronger for the Neudorf 
village‘s militiamen during their initial deployment than they were for Police Battalion 101 at 
Józefów the following year.  Although Browning draws on the findings of Stanley Milgram‘s 
classic study as a partial explanation for Police Battalion 101‘s initial role in the Holocaust, 
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he identifies two structural discontinuities between the laboratory experiment and the 1942 
mass shooting operation.1194  Neither of these differences existed for the members of 
Neudorf‘s militia in their first genocidal mission and both of these factors would have 
increased the tendency of would be perpetrators to comply with their orders.  First, whereas 
Major Wilhelm Trapp, Police Battalion 101‘s commanding officer, proffered his subordinates 
an opportunity to stand aside without penalty, Hartung ordered all of his militiamen to 
participate in the shooting.1195  In contrast to their counterparts in Police Battalion 101, the 
Bogdanovka collective farm‘s militiamen had no officially sanctioned avenue to avoid 
murdering.  Second, unlike Police Battalion 101‘s initial deployment, in which many of 
Trapp‘s men opted not to shoot when left unsupervised, Hartung‘s subordinates operated 
under the watchful eyes of their German superiors, who were omnipresent and cajoled their 
Volksdeutsche subordinates to continue killing during the entire operation.1196  The ways in 
which Bereichkommando XI‘s staff ordered the Bogdanovka collective farm‘s militiamen to 
carry out their initial mass shooting mission more closely paralleled Milgram‘s experiment 
than did Police Battalion 101‘s first killing deployment at Józefów.   
 Beyond these two structural differences, the members of the Bogdanovka collective 
farm‘s militia unit were biographically conditioned to comply with authority in ways that 
differed fundamentally from either Police Battalion 101‘s personnel or the American subjects 
of Milgram‘s 1960s experiment.  Hartung‘s militiamen, like members of the Selbstschutz, in 
general, were more likely to obey their superiors because they understood the potentially dire 
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consequences of directly challenging state authority.  Both Soviet and Nazi rulers had 
reinforced this lesson.  Under the Soviets, local administrators had targeted area ethnic 
Germans, and particularly those whom Sonderkommando R later mustered for militia 
service, first as class enemies and then as members of an ethnically suspect minority.  This 
experience left militiamen under Hartung‘s command with little doubt about the hazards of 
running afoul of the establishment.  If these encounters with Soviet power were an 
insufficient illustration, then the Red Army‘s vicious retreat through southern Ukraine during 
the summer of 1941—a withdrawal that precipitated at least the temporary deportation of 
virtually all area ethnic German men—provided the militiamen with a vivid reminder of the 
state‘s capacity to direct violence against its uncooperative citizens. 
 This is not to suggest that the only lesson about authority that local Volksdeutsche 
learned from their encounter with Soviet power was slavish compliance.  Under Soviet rule, 
local ethnic Germans had myriad ways to withhold cooperation.  A particularly popular 
method of evasion that many of southern Ukraine‘s ethnic Germans used was flight to 
another Volksdeutsche settlement elsewhere in the Soviet Union.1197  While, under Soviet 
rule, local ethnic Germans had a number of viable options to resist state and party authorities, 
direct confrontation was one that, from personal experience, most Volksdeutsche knew was 
prone to disaster. 
 The violent contours of German administration of Transnistria‘s Volksdeutsche 
settlements further reinforced this lesson.  German authorities in Transnistria were no less 
brutal in their treatment of local residents whom they found objectionable than their Soviet 
                                                 
1197 See, for example, Aussage von G. K., February 16, 1962, BAL, B162/2291, 61.  Aussage von P. 
W., January 31, 1962, BAL, B162/2291, 168. 
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predecessors and introduced violence that was, in general, far more public.  Einsatzgruppe 
D‘s murderous sweep through Transnistria and Sonderkommando R‘s continued efforts to 
root out suspected racial and political enemies from area Volksdeutsche settlements provided 
local ethnic Germans with stark examples of Nazi brutality.  That neither unit had focused 
exclusively on murdering local Jews and had also targeted area Volksdeutsche deemed by 
their neighbors or determined by German authorities to be ―communists‖ underscored that 
area ethnic Germans could become targets of Nazi violence on behavioral rather than on 
exclusively racial grounds.  Although, during the summer and fall of 1941, Nazi brutality had 
been concentrated in larger Volksdeutsche settlements, which were the foci of both 
Einsatzgruppe D and Sonderkommando R‘s operations, it seems unlikely that ethnic German 
residents in smaller hamlets, such as Neudorf, remained ignorant of the scale of German 
violence.  If anything, the events of the preceding six months had illustrated to local 
Volksdeutsche the brutal lengths to which state authorities—both Soviet and Nazi—would go 
to achieve their ends and the possible consequences for local residents who opposed those 
aims. 
 How severe Hartung‘s militiamen judged the possible penalties for failing to obey 
their murderous orders is unclear from the available records.  As scholars have long noted, 
after the war many accused German perpetrators defended their actions by claiming that they 
feared that they would have suffered dire and perhaps lethal punishment for failing to 
participate in the Holocaust.  As no defendant has been able to demonstrate even one instance 
in which an alleged killer risked death for failing to carry out his or her murderous orders, 
specialists have aptly dismissed these postwar claims as mere prevarication.1198  In light of 
                                                 
1198 As Browning notes, ―in the past forty-five years no defense attorney or defendant in any of the 
420 
 
this well-supported scholarly consensus, it is difficult to evaluate similar assertions that 
suspected militiamen and their relatives made to both West German and Soviet 
investigators.1199  In at least one permutation of Hartung‘s orders, prior to the start of the 
inaugural shooting deployment at the Bogdanovka collective farm, he threatened to execute 
any militiamen who failed to participate in the operation.1200  Absent wartime records that 
demonstrate conclusively that Sonderkommando R shot Volksdeutsche militiamen for failing 
to murder Jews, a handful of postwar statements are insufficient evidence that German 
authorities explicitly threatened their ethnic German subordinates.  Nevertheless, given the 
brutality of German rule in the region, it is possible that local Volksdeutsche understood this 
threat to be tacit.  If Einsatzgruppe D and Sonderkommando R had been prepared to gun 
down ethnic Germans for alleged prewar collaboration with Soviet officials and would later 
do so for comparatively petty offenses, such as the drunken sale of German identification 
papers to local Ukrainians, then what might have happened if ethnic German militiamen had 
refused to obey Sonderkommando R‘s panicked orders to begin murdering Jews—an 
operation predicated on stopping the threat of epidemic?  While Hartung may not have 
articulated the possible consequences for failing to participate in the Holocaust, it is unlikely 
that he or any of his fellow Bereichkommandoführer would have reacted as benignly as 
Police Battalion 101‘s Major Trapp did to his subordinates‘ decision not to participate in a 
                                                                                                                                                       
hundreds of postwar trails has been able to document a single case in which refusing to obey an order to kill 
unarmed civilians resulted in the allegedly inevitable dire punishment.‖ Browning, Ordinary Men, 170.  Also 
see Herbert Jäger, Verbrechen unter totalitärer Herrschaft. Studien zur nationalsozialistischen 
Gewaltkriminalität (Olten: Walter-Verlag, 1967), 71. 
1199 Aussage von A. D., August 13, 1964, BAL, B162/2304, 221.  Aussage von H. H., June 30, 1964, 
BAL, B162/2304, 131-132.  Aussage von K. B., June 4, 1964, BAL, B162/2304, 118. 
1200 Protokol doprosa / Ionusa Aleksandra, June 1, 1967, USHMM, RG-31.018M, Reel 17, 8527-8528. 
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mass killing operation.  In all likelihood, Hartung did not have to make explicit threats to 
back up his orders.  Nothing in the backgrounds of his Volksdeutsche militiamen, particularly 
in light of their experiences during the previous six months, inclined them to test Hartung‘s 
lenience.  A brutalized population under both Soviet and Nazi rule, southern Ukraine‘s 
Volksdeutsche militiamen were far more disposed than their German counterparts to obey 
orders to kill because they understood exceptionally, if not uniquely well the likely penalties 
for confronting authority directly. 
 In addition to an acute tendency to obey authority, the pressure to group conformity 
operated as an exceptionally powerful pressure on the Bogdanovka collective farm‘s 
militiamen during their first shooting mission.  Highlighting the peer pressure that Police 
Battalion 101‘s members experienced during this preliminary deployment, Browning 
concludes convincingly that members of the unit ―who did not shoot risked isolation, 
rejection, and ostracism—a very uncomfortable prospect within the framework of a tight-knit 
unit stationed abroad among a hostile population.‖1201  A comparable, albeit more intense 
pressure to group conformity likely functioned within the Bogdanovka collective farm‘s 
militia during its first set of mass murders during December 1941.  The different 
compositions of both units of perpetrators had important implications for the pressure to 
conform that each group experienced.  In contrast to the members of Police Battalion 101, 
who understood that their intimate affiliation with one another would last only until the war‘s 
end, the Bogdanovka collective farm‘s militiamen had to negotiate a set of familial 
relationships that existed independently of the conflict.  Individual recalcitrance by a 
militiaman would have risked negatively impacting his immediate family in the eyes of the 
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broader clan and potentially threatened the entire community in the eyes of the Germans.  
The members of the ethnic German militia unit, put simply, were closely linked to their 
potential accomplices—a situation in which the pressures to conform and participate were 
particularly profound.  While research on Holocaust perpetrators from the Soviet Union has 
yet to consider comprehensively how social psychological factors influenced the decision of 
indigenous killers to participate in mass murder, the example of the first deployment of the 
Bogdanovka collective farm‘s Selbstschutz unit underscores the value of this vein of inquiry 
and suggests that specific historical circumstances may have intensified some social 
psychological pressures to participate in genocide. 
 Recent research on the Holocaust in the Soviet Union has placed great emphasis on 
the region‘s historically high level of indigenous anti-Semitism as an engine for driving the 
Holocaust at the grassroots level.1202  Analyzing the degree to which local anti-Jewish 
sentiment played a role in the Selbstschutz‘s participation in the Holocaust is a difficult 
undertaking.  The primary sources for recovering this period, postwar West German and 
Soviet investigative records, do not capture prewar or wartime anti-Semitism very well.  
Interviewees, conscious that they were under suspicion for wartime crimes and acutely aware 
of the fact that naked anti-Semitism was part of the official postwar discourse of neither 
country, were careful to censor anti-Semitic statements from their testimony.  The easiest way 
for former ethnic Germans to do so was often simply not to discuss their prewar interactions 
with Jews, tacitly suggesting to investigators that the two groups had maintained limited 
                                                 
1202 As Karel Berkhoff and Amir Weiner note, the region‘s indigenous anti-Semitism was a crucial 
engine for driving the Holocaust at the grassroots level.  Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair; Weiner, Making Sense of 
War.  Similarly, in his case study of the Holocaust in Jedwabne, Poland, Gross points to the primary importance 
of local anti-Semitism in the decisions of Poles to murder their Jewish neighbors.  Gross, Neighbors. 
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contact prior to the war.  Although only a comparatively small number of postwar statements 
that former ethnic German residents gave to their interviewers mentioned local Jews, those 
that did frequently portrayed Jews as agents or protégées of the Soviet regime.  
Volksdeutsche witnesses depicted this relationship in one of two ways.  First, erstwhile ethnic 
Germans identified Jews as area communist party officials and collective farm 
administrators—the precise individuals responsible for enforcing Soviet rule at the local level 
and whose actions had been so injurious to Volksdeutsche.1203  Second, many former 
residents remained convinced that during the summer of 1941 the Soviet state had taken 
special care to evacuate its loyal area Jewish citizens ahead of advancing German and 
Romanian forces.1204  Whereas, in the words of one suspected militiaman, local 
Volksdeutsche celebrated the moment at which ―Hitler freed us from the yoke‖ of 
Bolshevism, area ethnic Germans witnessed what they regarded as local Jews fleeing back to 
the safety of their Soviet masters.1205  From the available records it is unclear whether or not 
either of these perceptions was based in reality.  Given the region‘s proximity to Odessa, a 
city with a historically large Jewish population, it is conceivable that Jews constituted a large 
and perhaps disproportionately large number of local Soviet officials in the region.  It is also 
likely that many area Jews fled the German and Romanian advances under their own steam 
because they feared for their safety not as communists, but as Jews.  In the minds of many 
ethnic Germans, however, at least some Jews had contributed to their socio-economic decline 
                                                 
1203 Vernehmungsniederschrift von J. M., August 7, 1962, BAL, B162/2296, 142.  Aussage von R. B., 
November 28, 1962, BAL, B162/2301, 47-48.  
1204 Aussage von J. G., November 26, 1962, BAL, B162/2299, 142.  Vernehmungsniederschrift von W. 
H., July 24, 1962, BAL, B162/2296, 68.  Aussage von H. D., December 16, 1964, BAL, B162/2303, 238. 
1205 Lebens Lauf [sic] Redler Edmund geboren 21.1.23 in Rastadt in Einbürgerungsantrag Edmund 
Redler, 1944, NARA, A3342-EWZ50-G58, 1210. 
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and suffering under Soviet rule as agents of the state—a belief that poured the foundation for 
a very deadly reality.   
 Superficially, the association between Soviet power and local Jews that many ethnic 
Germans maintained even after the war appears analogous to the type of indigenous anti-
Semitism that scholars have identified as a key engine for propelling pogroms in western 
Ukraine during the opening weeks and months of Operation Barbarossa.1206  Despite some 
similarities, there were nevertheless two important differences.  On the one hand, as 
discussed in first chapter, until the 1917 Russian Revolution area ethnic Germans had 
maintained historically good relations with their Jewish neighbors.  As ethnic and religious 
minorities, who remained socio-economically and linguistically distinct from the majority of 
the population, Volksdeutsche and Jews shared similar experiences, including being targeted 
by their largely Slavic neighbors for periodic violence.1207  In contrast to local Ukrainians, 
there is little evidence that area Volksdeutsche participated in anti-Jewish pogroms in the 
region during the late nineteenth or early twentieth centuries.  The Black Sea Germans on the 
whole were not historic anti-Semites who also became anti-Soviets, but rather anti-Soviets 
who identified Jews as among their primary Soviet tormentors. 
 On the other hand, in contrast to the origins of some pogroms in western Ukraine, the 
perception that local Jews had contributed to their suffering under Soviet rule did not move 
Volksdeutsche to murder Jews independently at the start of Operation Barbarossa.  Despite 
                                                 
1206 See, for example, Jared McBride‘s recent work on Ukrainian violence against Jews in Olev‘sk in 
Ukraine‘s Zhytomyr Oblast‘ during mid-1941.  Jared McBride, ―Eyewitness to an Occupation: Collaboration 
and the Holocaust in Olevs‘k, Zhytomyr Region.‖ John-Paul Himka has highlighted the centrality of anti-
Semitism to the Ukrainian nationalist project.  Himka, ―The Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) and the 
Holocaust.‖ 
1207 Fleischhauer, Die Deutschen im Zarenreich, 375. 
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ample opportunity to vent their frustration on their Jewish neighbors during the brief 
interlude between Soviet and German rule, no evidence of Volksdeutsche participation in 
locally organized anti-Semitic violence exists.  A likely reason for this absence of violence is 
that area ethnic Germans did not assign collective responsibility for their brutal encounter 
with Soviet power to all local Jews, but rather identified individuals Jews, whom they held 
responsible for the Soviet regime‘s evils.  Given that many of these Jews had departed with 
Soviet forces before the occupation, there were few immediate targets for retribution.  As one 
former area Volksdeutsche resident later explained, ―before the war the bad Jews had already 
moved away.‖1208  That Volksdeutsche assigned Jews individual as opposed to collective 
blame for their suffering helps to explain why Volksdeutsche often denounced only a portion 
of local Jews to Einsatzgruppe D and yet conspired to hide more thoroughly integrated Jews, 
whom area Volksdeutsche presumably considered less culpable of Soviet-era repression, 
from Sonderkommando R until well into 1942.  In comparison to local residents in areas such 
as western Ukraine, the more nuanced way in which Transnistria‘s Volksdeutsche understood 
the alleged complicity of Jews in the Soviet regime shaped interactions between the two 
groups that, at least at the beginning of the occupation, were not marked by significant 
autonomous violence. 
 While the connection that local ethnic Germans established between many, or perhaps 
even most area Jews and Soviet power proved insufficient motivation to move them to 
commit mass murder independently, then it was nevertheless a bedrock upon which the Nazi 
regime could construct a propaganda campaign around the principle of ―Judeo-Bolshevism.‖  
During the winter of 1941-42, Sonderkommando R‘s propaganda initiatives, which 
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eventually grew to substantial proportions, remained in their infancy.  What little is known 
about these early efforts, such as Siebert‘s detailed instructions for the January 1942 
Selbstschutz swearing in ceremony, suggests that, as in its later programs, the unit‘s 
propaganda attempted to link anti-Semitism with anti-Bolshevism.1209  Admittedly, 
Sonderkommando R‘s neophyte ideological instructional campaign appears flimsy and 
unconvincing.  A handful of pep talks by SS commanders and the odd nocturnal ceremony 
would not have won over the ―hearts and minds‖ of most listeners to the National Socialist 
justification for mass murder.  Sonderkommando R‘s militiamen, however, were not most 
listeners.   As members of a repressed socio-economic and ethnic minority under Soviet rule, 
local Volksdeutsche had little doubt about the ills of Soviet power.  Many area ethnic 
Germans had also already begun to identify at least some of their Jewish neighbors with the 
Soviet system.  All that Sonderkommando R‘s admittedly unimpressive propaganda efforts 
had to do was to provide a framework in which local Volksdeutsche expanded purported 
individual Jewish complicity in the crimes of the Soviet regime into a wholesale conflation of 
Jews with the Soviet system.  A brutalized population anxious to revenge itself on its 
perceived Soviet enemies, local Volksdeutsche would have been a receptive audience for 
Sonderkommando R‘s unarguably paltry measures to help them bridge this conceptual gap.  
The fact that during 1942 area Volksdeutsche began revealing Jews, whom they and their 
neighbors had hidden from German authorities since the preceding summer, suggests that at 
least some of Transnistria‘s ethnic Germans were prepared, under Sonderkommando R‘s 
tutelage, to expand their hatred of the Soviet system to all Jews.  The experience of 
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Transnistria‘s ethnic Germans under Soviet rule primed them, perhaps more so than any of 
the Nazi regime‘s other indigenous helpers in the occupied Soviet Union, to embrace the 
notion of a war against ―Judeo-Bolshevism.‖  Although not historically especially anti-
Semitic, Volksdeutsche suffering under Soviet rule was dry tinder for the match of Nazi anti-
Semitic propaganda. 
 Variables like anti-Semitism and social psychological pressures, such as group 
conformity and obedience to authority, are not unique in explaining the violent behavior of 
the Bogdanovka collective farm‘s militia.  To varying degrees, they played a role in shaping 
the decisions of any group of Holocaust perpetrators.  Explanations for the complicity of 
local non-Germans in the Soviet Union would have to consider similar factors and probably 
would reach comparable findings about the propensity of the indigenous perpetrators to obey 
authority and the high level of local anti-Semitism.  What then was exceptional about the 
involvement of Transnistria‘s Volksdeutsche militiamen in the Holocaust?  The answer, in 
large measure, rests on the material rewards that Sonderkommando R proffered to local 
ethnic Germans, both directly and indirectly, for participating in the Holocaust. 
 In contrast to research on ideological or social psychological motivations, relatively 
little scholarship exists on the role that material gain played in propelling the Holocaust.  
There are a couple of reasons for this lacuna.  First, as much of the research on Holocaust 
perpetrators has been based on the German example, scholars have justifiably focused on 
other, more germane antecedents to genocide, such as anti-Semitism.   Only recently, as 
research on these causes has matured, have historians, such as Götz Aly and Martin Dean, 
raised the issue of theft of Jewish property.1210  Second, researchers have been cautious of 
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providing a materialist explanation for the Holocaust for fear that doing so might perpetuate 
the anti-Semitic myth that all Jews were wealthy.  While this issue must be treated delicately 
to avoid fueling this stereotype, simply avoiding this important issue fails to capture an 
important historical dimension to the Holocaust in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.  As 
historians such as Radu Ioanid and Dean have underscored, theft of Jewish property 
characterized the Holocaust in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.1211  In contrast to 
Holocaust victims from Western, Central, and East Central Europe, where theft and murder 
were typically chronologically discrete activities, in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union 
these crimes occurred virtually simultaneously.  Moreover, the often comparative poverty of 
Eastern European and Soviet perpetrators was such that local gentiles valued the material 
inducements to participate in murder far more than did their German counterparts.  Few 
German perpetrators stationed at extermination camps in occupied Poland, for example, 
participated in the killing process because they were angling to obtain the paltry personal 
effects of their victims.  For killers from the rural Soviet Union, however, the access to scarce 
goods that taking part in the murders facilitated operated as a powerful inducement to 
commit genocide. 
 In this respect, the Volksdeutsche Selbstschutz‘s participation in the Holocaust in 
Transnistria was exceptional only because of the degree to which German authorities enabled 
its members‘ cupidity.  Insofar as researchers have probed the materialist dimensions to the 
Holocaust in the Soviet Union, local residents usually robbed Jews with little or no 
involvement from German security forces that usually oversaw or encouraged these killing 
                                                                                                                                                       
the Holocaust, 1933-1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008). 
1211 Ioanid, The Holocaust in Romania, 108-9; Dean, Collaboration in the Holocaust, 70-71. 
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operations.1212  German killers, moreover, chastised their local helpers, and particularly their 
Romanian allies, for stealing their victims‘ property.  Sonderkommando R‘s orientation 
toward the theft of Jewish possessions, however, was fundamentally different.  As the 
example of the first killing operation that the Bogdanovka collective farm‘s militia 
perpetrated underscores, Sonderkommando R‘s German leaders not only tolerated, but aided 
in the theft of their victims‘ property.  Although few of the Selbstschutz‘s killing missions can 
be reconstructed with this degree of detail, the available evidence suggests that robbery was 
not only a hallmark of all militia deployments, but shaped the ways in which 
Sonderkommando R carried out its mass shooting operations. 
 There are two reasons why Sonderkommando R‘s leaders proved eager to support the 
theft of Jewish property by their Volksdeutsche subordinates.  First, Sonderkommando R‘s 
German staff was, even by the Third Reich‘s unarguably low standards, exceptionally greedy.  
As indicated by Siebert‘s robbery at Odessa‘s Museum of Western Civilization during 
October 1941, this corruption emanated from the unit‘s apex.  Hoffmeyer and Siebert were 
apparently happy to share the spoils of the occupation and genocide with their German 
subordinates, who lapped up these ill-gotten gains with alacrity.  The unit‘s senior leadership, 
after all, authorized Sonderkommando R‘s dentist to smelt down stolen Jewish dental gold 
for his practice.  Despite knowing exactly where the gold originated, many and perhaps most 
of the unit‘s mid-level and rank-and-file personnel availed themselves of this material to 
repair their own dental work at no cost.  Although the loose control that Sonderkommando 
R‘s headquarters in Landau exercised over its Bereichkommandoführer in rural Transnistria 
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meant that especially avaricious local commanders, such as Hartung, could siphon off a 
significant amount of Jewish property for their own use, cupidity nevertheless remained an 
integral component of the unit‘s institutional culture. 
 Second, during the winter of 1941-42, Sonderkommando R needed stolen Jewish 
property to secure a dominant material position for Transnistria‘s ethnic Germans.  Although 
the reallocation of collective farms and other agricultural infrastructure granted area 
Volksdeutsche with a privileged socio-economic position, it did little to provide badly needed 
consumer goods to local German speakers.  As German personnel stationed in the region 
later remarked, the condition and especially the quantity and quality of the clothing of most 
local Volksdeutsche was abysmal.  During the winter of 1941-42, well before the VoMi began 
transporting stolen Jewish property from occupied Poland to distribute to local ethnic 
Germans in rural Transnistria, Sonderkommando R had no other source of raiment to give to 
local Volksdeutsche other than that which their Jewish victims were wearing at the times of 
their murders.  While providing the militiamen with access to stolen Jewish property alone 
was insufficient to ameliorate the poverty of all local Volksdeutsche, it constituted an 
important first step.  The seduction of simultaneously preventing the introduction of 
epidemic disease into Transnistria‘s ethnic German communities and taking a stab in 
providing area Volksdeutsche with much-needed possessions was so powerful that local 
commanders apparently gave no thought to the fact that Volksdeutsche robbery of clothing 
could, in fact, precipitate the outbreak of the very epidemic that the murders were designed to 
prevent. 
 Robbery operated as a powerful inducement for Transnistria‘s Volksdeutsche 
militiamen to participate in the Holocaust during the winter of 1941-42.  Most obviously, 
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taking part in the killings permitted the militiamen to acquire among the most desirable 
clothing and personal effects for themselves and their families.  Given that the Jews whom 
Romanian forces deported from Bessarabia, northern Bukovina, and Odessa typically were 
wealthier than their Volksdeutsche killers in rural Transnistria, this incentive was particularly 
powerful.  Moreover, access to comparatively high quality Jewish clothing and personal 
effects also may have reinforced precisely the anti-Semitic stereotypes of a ―Judeo-
Bolshevik‖ conspiracy that were the focus of Sonderkommando R‘s propaganda campaign.  
If, as Sonderkommando R had been attempting to impress upon area Volksdeutsche, Jews 
were behind a Soviet regime that had expropriated and brutalized area ethnic Germans, then 
the sudden appearance of Jews clad in superior garments may have seemed to some killers as 
evidence of a ―Judeo-Bolshevik‖ cabal.  For some local ethnic Germans, the Jewish 
deportees likely appeared not simply to have been more affluent, but, as the alleged architects 
of their expropriation, to have been the beneficiaries of a Soviet system that precipitated 
several generations of Volksdeutsche decline.  Theft of Jewish property not only lubricated 
the Selbstschutz‘s participation in the Holocaust, but the specific dynamics of this robbery 
may have reinforced one of the tenets of Nazi propaganda about the ―Judeo-Bolshevik‖ 
enemy. 
 Privileged access to stolen Jewish clothing constituted one portion (and perhaps the 
least important though most immediate) of the material inducements that Sonderkommando 
R had for local Volksdeutsche to take part in the Holocaust.  Membership in the Nazi racial 
community extended even more powerful structural material incentives to carry out mass 
murder.  Sonderkommando R‘s enterprise in Transnistria sought to underpin the Third 
Reich‘s demographic claims to the region by helping local Volksdeutsche to achieve a 
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dominant socio-economic position in the area.  Although the full dimensions of this project 
remained embryonic until later in 1942, the contours of these initiatives were already 
apparent to local ethnic Germans.  Hartung‘s redistribution of previously shared property at 
the Bogdanovka collective farm during the fall of 1941 provided area Volksdeutsche with a 
stark illustration of German plans to enrich area ethnic Germans at the expense of their non-
German neighbors as well as the clear material advantages of being identified by German 
authorities as Volksdeutsche. 
 The very pliability of the category of ―ethnic German‖ provided Sonderkommando R, 
somewhat unwittingly, with powerful leverage to encourage the participation of area 
Volksdeutsche in the mass murder of Jews.  Here again, the way in which Sonderkommando 
R formed the Bogdanovka collective farm‘s militia unit is illustrative.  Even if Hartung and 
his colleagues failed to grasp the degree to which local leaders had packed the militia with 
non-Germans, the militiamen certainly did.  While the members of the Bogdanovka 
collective farm‘s Volksdeutsche militia could not have anticipated the circuitous chain of 
events that prompted the SS to order them to murder when they formed the unit months 
earlier, once asked to kill they used the opportunity to take part in the Holocaust as a chance 
to verify their ―Germanness.‖  Although the militiamen were not privy to internal 
Sonderkommando R memoranda that grappled with the issue of how to classify the local 
population, they perceived, quite correctly, that failure to obey their murderous orders would 
have demonstrated an inadequate commitment to the National Socialist cause that for 
Sonderkommando R‘s staff defined ―Germanness.‖  Volksdeutsche recalcitrance would have 
invited Bereichkommando XI to reexamine the provisional boundaries of Germanness that it 
had allowed area residents to establish and could have uncovered the local conspiracy to 
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undermine the SS‘s ethnic categories.  Exposure was a very real threat.  In both 
Bereichkommando XI and elsewhere, Sonderkommando R‘s local commanders did not issue 
permanent ethnic German identity papers until April 1942, the precise point at which both 
Romanian deportations and Sonderkommando R‘s mass shootings wound down.1213   The 
high level of ethnic German complicity in the Holocaust smoothed the entry of the unit‘s 
members and their families into the Volksgemeinschaft.  Had any would be ethnic German 
refused to dirty his hands in the Reich‘s service, he would almost certainly have doomed his 
application to join the Nazi racial community.  It was thus the SS‘s inability to operationalize 
its definition of a Volksdeutscher in Transnistria that unintentionally equipped it with a 
powerful fulcrum to encourage a local Volksdeutsche participation in the Holocaust. 
Conclusion 
 When Sonderkommando R arrived in Transnistria‘s Volksdeutsche settlements during 
the early fall of 1941, the region‘s ethnic Germans had little inkling that within a few short 
months their new German administrators would muster them to participate in the Holocaust.  
Were it not for a collision of German and Romanian anti-Jewish policies, Volksdeutsche 
involvement in the Holocaust in Transnistria would likely have been limited to fingering the 
handful of remaining Jews, whom local residents had identified with Soviet power, and 
assisting their new German overlords to enforce Nazi rule at the grassroots level.  From the 
perspective of local ethnic Germans who had historically fielded homegrown militia forces 
for self-defense in times of crisis, nothing suggested before December 1941 that the 
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434 
 
Selbstschutz under Sonderkommando R‘s control would be anything other than a local 
auxiliary police force—one, moreover, that promised to shield them from continued 
Romanian attacks.  As Romanian assaults slackened during the fall of 1941, 
Sonderkommando R channeled the majority of the meager resources allocated to build the 
Selbstschutz to militia units in larger Volksdeutsche settlements, where their members could 
be used to enforce the Third Reich‘s repressive racial and political policies.  Not only did this 
leave militia units in smaller Volksdeutsche settlements underdeveloped, but it illustrated to 
local ethnic Germans the Selbstschutz‘s relative unimportance to area VoMi administrators.  
Before its first killing deployments during December 1941, Sonderkommando R‘s 
Selbstschutz was little more than local muscle for its Nazification project. 
 Romanian deportations of Jews into northeastern Transnistria and Sonderkommando 
R‘s decision to counter the public health hazard that these expulsions posed to area 
Volksdeutsche caught local ethnic Germans, like their VoMi superiors, completely off guard.  
Hoffmeyer‘s subordinates mustered selected Selbstschutz units, which they expanded rapidly 
to fulfill the organization‘s growing role, not because of the enthusiasm that particular groups 
of militiamen demonstrated for the Nazi agenda, but rather because they were based en route 
to or near intended Romanian deportation destinations.  To suggest that for local 
Volksdeutsche Sonderkommando R‘s entreaties to join the ranks of the Holocaust‘s most 
heavily involved perpetrators came out of the clear blue sky would be little exaggeration. 
 Why Sonderkommando R‘s militiamen, members of an ethnic minority that had 
maintained historically comparatively good relations with area Jews, participated so heavily 
in the Holocaust was a product of both indigenous historical factors and specific German 
policies, albeit not in equal measure.  As a careful analysis of biographical information of 
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militiamen subordinated to the most heavily implicated Bereichkommando indicates, Soviet 
rule had been an unmediated disaster.  All of the militia‘s members had seen either their or 
their family‘s property expropriated by Soviet authorities during the late 1920s and early 
1930s and forced to work in collective agriculture.  While this transition was not unique for 
local residents, it was acutely felt by area Volksdeutsche, whose historically disproportionate 
landholdings made them ready targets for collectivization.  In contrast to the majority of their 
predominantly Slavic neighbors, however, area ethnic Germans were prevented first as class 
enemies and then as members of a suspect ethnic minority from integrating into the post-
revolutionary Soviet order.  This Soviet experience sharpened their receptivity to German 
orders to kill Jews in two ways.  First, it conditioned area ethnic Germans to be particularly 
responsive to orders when placed in a situation in which the only option for non-compliance 
was to challenge directly state power.  Nothing in this population‘s experiences under Soviet 
rule and none of its early and often brutal encounters with German forces suggests that 
confronting authority—much less in a crisis situation—would end positively. 
 Second, the militiamen‘s negative experiences with Soviet rule poured a solid 
foundation upon which Sonderkommando R could build a propaganda campaign against the 
―Judeo-Bolshevik‖ enemy.  Local Volksdeutsche did not require German propaganda to see 
―Bolshevism‖ as their primary enemy—several decades of Soviet rule had already driven that 
point home.  From the fragmentary postwar evidence, it also appears that area ethnic 
Germans had begun independently to associate at least some local Jews with Soviet power.  
In all likelihood this perception had some basis in reality.  In previously ethnically 
homogenous communities, Volksdeutsche would have regarded newly arrived Jews, and 
particularly any Jews in administrative positions, as agents of the Soviet state.  Moreover, 
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many local Jews correctly predicted their fate under occupation and fled with the Soviet 
military—the very forces that had tormented area Volksdeutsche particularly during the 
retreat.  German propaganda did not have to construct the notion of a struggle against the 
―Judeo-Bolshevik‖ enemy from scratch, but rather had merely to expand an indigenous 
association between some Jews and the evils of the Soviet system into a conflation of Jews 
and Soviet power.  As evidenced by the disclosure during 1942 of local Jews, whom area 
Volksdeutsche had hidden until then from the Germans, it appears that, for at least some 
ethnic Germans, Sonderkommando R‘s inarguably flimsy propaganda apparatus proved 
sufficiently persuasive. 
 More so than social psychological factors or German-guided anti-Semitism, the 
material inducements that Sonderkommando R proffered to cooperative Volksdeutsche 
constituted a quintessential and perhaps a prime reason why so many militiamen took part in 
the Holocaust.  These incentives operated on two levels.  First, and most immediately, 
participation in genocide permitted area Volksdeutsche to profit directly from the killing by 
acquiring the clothing and personal items that their victims were wearing immediately prior 
to the killing.  Not only did VoMi-sponsored theft provide militiamen with much-needed 
garments, but the appearance of more urban and, on average, wealthier Jews, likely fueled 
Nazi anti-Semitic stereotypes of the Judeo-Bolshevik enemy responsible for the 
expropriation of Volksdeutsche property prior to the war. 
 Second, and perhaps more powerfully, participating in the killings was a way to 
clarify the ethnic status of individual militiamen and whole militia units.  As the example of 
the Bogdanovka collective farm‘s Selbstschutz indicates, both local German administrators, 
who had defined the boundaries of ―Germanness‖ in only the loosest fashion, and area 
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Volksdeutsche, who had intentionally undermined the Third Reich‘s racial categories, 
grasped the tenuousness of Volksdeutsche status.  Local ethnic Germans, who had witnessed 
the Nazi regime‘s brutality against area non-Germans and seen Sonderkommando R‘s first 
moves to improve the material status of Transnistria‘s Volksdeutsche, had little doubt about 
the material privileges that membership in Nazi Germany‘s racial community afforded them.  
They also understood that standing aside from the killings would do little to solidify their still 
inchoate ethnic position in the eyes of local German administrators.  Given that 
Sonderkommando R did not conduct comprehensive ethnic classification until after the 
conclusion of its major killing operations in April 1942, this assumption proved correct.  
Volksdeutsche who had participated in the killings could demonstrate that they were entitled 
to the Volksgemeinschaft‘s material rewards.  Any ethnic German who had opposed the 
killings or had refused to participate would have been in the impossible position of having to 
justify his membership in the Nazi racial community despite having objected to taking part in 
the regime‘s dirty work.  While the historical experiences of area Volksdeutsche communities 
under Soviet rule may have made local ethnic Germans receptive to Sonderkommando R‘s 
orders to participate and propaganda, the specific contours of VoMi rule in the region granted 
the unit powerful leverage over area Volksdeutsche to encourage their contribution to the 
Holocaust. 
 
  
 
CONCLUSION 
 Sonderkommando R‘s Volksdeutsche project in southern Ukraine faded with German 
military fortunes in the Soviet Union.  In contrast to the first eighteen months of the 
campaign, when German forces and their allies penetrated deep into the Soviet Union, the 
year 1943 was marked by a progressive series of defeats.  The German Sixth Army‘s 
destruction at Stalingrad early that year was followed by a failed summer offensive at Kursk 
in August 1943.  Between late August and October 1943, the Third and Fourth Ukrainian 
Fronts advanced some 200 kilometers to Nikopol and the Dnieper River‘s banks.  Despite 
clear evidence by early 1943 that the German position in the Soviet Union was increasingly 
untenable, Hoffmeyer refused to organize the wholesale evacuation of Sonderkommando R‘s 
personnel and Volksdeutsche from occupied Soviet territory.  Rather than concede defeat, 
Sonderkommando R‘s senior leaders maintained that Transnistria could still be held and 
directed Bereichkommandoführer in the Reichskommissariat Ukraine to relocate local ethnic 
Germans to the region, where the German military was beginning to usurp Romanian 
control.1214  As an illustration of Sonderkommando R‘s increasingly fanciful plans to 
continue its mission in the Soviet Union, Hoffmeyer ordered his subordinates to prepare 
quarters for thousands of Volksdeutsche from the Crimea and Halberstadt.1215  Romanian 
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authorities in Transnistria had a far soberer assessment of their losing war against the Soviet 
Union.  Having witnessed the defeat of the Romanian Third and Fourth Armies at Stalingrad 
earlier that year, in November 1943 they began the evacuation of Odessa by ordering key 
personnel to return to Romania.1216  Hoffmeyer responded to this move by grumbling to the 
German military that these measures were premature.1217  Having invested so much time and 
energy to mobilizing the largest population of Soviet ethnic Germans under Nazi control, 
Hoffmeyer and his subordinates were loath to abandon their Volksdeutsche enterprise in 
Transnistria, particularly when doing so meant that the unit‘s German personnel invariably 
would receive transfers to more hazardous postings at the front. 
 It was not until the very beginning of 1944, when the Red Army penetrated into 
central Ukraine, recaptured Kiev, and threatened rail and road connections between 
Transnistria and German-occupied Poland, that the VoMi resolved to relocate the region‘s 
Volksdeutsche.1218  In coordination with the Race and Settlement Main Office‘s SS-
Obergruppenführer Richard Hildebrandt, Hoffmeyer agreed to transfer Transnistria‘s ethnic 
Germans to the Warthegau in German-occupied Poland, where they could continue to serve 
as the demographic building blocks for German territorial expansion.  Hoffmeyer dawdled 
until the last possible moment to authorize the unit‘s withdrawal from Transnistria.  Only in 
early March 1944, with the Red Army poised to retake Nikolaev on the Bug River‘s left 
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bank, did Hoffmeyer green light Transnistria‘s evacuation.1219  The brutality that had 
characterized its two-and-a-half-year rule over Transnistria‘s Volksdeutsche also typified 
Sonderkommando R‘s flight from the region.  Echoing the scorched earth policy that Soviet 
forces pursued during their retreat from southern Ukraine during the summer of 1941, 
Sonderkommando R planned to denude Transnistria of its German-speakers and whatever 
property that could be relocated to German-occupied Poland.  Most local Volksdeutsche 
eagerly awaited evacuation.  With memories of the brutal Soviet withdrawal from southern 
Ukraine still fresh as well as awareness of their own privilege and complicity in the ensuring 
German occupation, the majority of Transnistria‘s ethnic Germans understood that the return 
of Soviet power was imminent and would have dire consequences for them.  Unsure that it 
could depend on individual Volksdeutsche initiative to clear Transnistria of German-speakers, 
Sonderkommando R threatened dire consequences for any reluctant ethnic Germans who 
failed to register for evacuation.1220  Sonderkommando R also oversaw the relocation of 
thousands of horses and cattle that the unit had transferred to local ethnic Germans during the 
course of the occupation.1221  As a parting illustration of the unit‘s suspicion of politically or 
behaviorally unreliable Volksdeutsche, Sonderkommando R‘s final action prior to 
withdrawing from Transnistria was to order its Selbstschutz to gun down the Johannisfeld 
concentration camp‘s surviving inmates.1222 
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 Having waited until the eleventh hour to begin its retreat, Sonderkommando R‘s 
escape routes from Transnistria were limited.  At the beginning of March 1944, it evacuated a 
small number of Volksdeutsche to Łódź by rail across a German-controlled bridgehead on the 
Dniester River.  When the Red Army‘s advance cut this artery, Sonderkommando R was 
reduced to transporting the region‘s Volksdeutsche refugees overland by truck, wagon, and 
foot through Bessarabia and northern Bukovina.  Although Selbstschutz units guarded these 
treks, the scale of this operation and the unit‘s antediluvian communications infrastructure 
precipitated a breakdown of command and control.  Hoffmeyer simply lost track of the more 
than 70,000 ethnic Germans who crossed the Dniester River during March and April 1944.  
Owing to poor planning and inadequate sanitary facilities en route, many Volksdeutsche 
evacuees contracted communicable diseases.  Sonderkommando R established its temporary 
headquarters in Galaţi in eastern Romania and attempted to corral its increasingly 
disorganized Volksdeutsche transports.  There, in consultation with the Antonescu regime, 
Hoffmeyer drew on the playbook that his command had developed during its earlier 
Volksdeutsche ―resettlement‖ campaigns in the region.  As the VoMi had in 1940, Hoffmeyer 
sent more than a 100,000 Volksdeutsche by steamer up the Danube River to Belgrade, where 
they proceeded to German-occupied Poland.1223  Hoffmeyer dispatched a smaller, but 
nevertheless significant transport of ethnic Germans along one of the Wehrmacht‘s primary 
supply lines overland to southeastern Hungary, where VoMi officials and the German Red 
Cross received the Volksdeutsche refugees and forwarded them to the Warthegau.1224  By the 
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end of May 1944, the VoMi had relocated most Volksdeutsche from southeastern Hungary to 
German-occupied Poland.  With the last of southern Ukraine‘s Volksdeutsche in the Reich, 
the VoMi decommissioned Sonderkommando R at its suburban Berlin headquarters in early 
July 1944.1225 
 The war‘s final ten months were equally grim for Sonderkommando R‘s former 
German personnel and Transnistria‘s erstwhile Volksdeutsche residents.  Hoffmeyer, whose 
performance during the evacuation Himmler praised ―with my full recognition and thanks,‖ 
received orders to return to Romania as head of a special SS unit to defend the Ploieşti oil 
fields from rapidly advancing Soviet forces.1226  Staffed with many of his former 
subordinates from Sonderkommando R—some of whom had served under his command 
since 1939—Hoffmeyer‘s new unit arrived in Romania in mid-July 1944.  During his brief 
deployment, Hoffmeyer did little more than irk his superior Hildebrandt, who also served as 
the Higher SS and Police Leader Black Sea (Höhere SS- und Polizeiführer Schwarze Meer).  
Hildebrandt complained vociferously about Hoffmeyer‘s rudeness and insubordination.1227  
No sooner had Hoffmeyer‘s forces arrived in Romania, than increasing Soviet military 
pressure brought down the Antonescu regime and with it Romania‘s alliance with the Third 
Reich.  The new Romanian government declared war on Germany and captured German 
personnel in the country as prisoners of war.  This included Hoffmeyer and his subordinates.  
The Romanian military incarcerated Hoffmeyer and many of Sonderkommando R‘s former 
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senior and midlevel commanders in the city of Craiova.  There, much of the unit‘s former 
officer corps committed suicide with pistols that they had smuggled past their Romanian 
guards.1228  Romanian authorities turned the handful of Sonderkommando R‘s surviving 
former officers over to SMERSH, which interrogated them.1229  After a speedy trial, Soviet 
forces executed some of the SS officers and repatriated the others to West Germany only in 
the 1950s.1230 
 After arriving in German-occupied Poland, ethnic Germans from Transnistria fared 
little better.  Housed in often primitive VoMi resettlement camps near Łódź, Volksdeutsche 
from southern Ukraine underwent a final round of SS ethnic classification.1231  The SS finally 
registered Transnistria‘s Volksdeutsche according to criteria specified by the Deutsche 
Volksliste.  The consequences of receiving permanent Volksdeutsche status became 
immediately apparent to the Black Sea Germans, as the Waffen-SS drafted virtually all able-
bodied men.  Many of them perished in the brutal fighting that typified the war‘s final 
months.  Soviet authorities captured thousands of Transnistria‘s former ethnic Germans in 
Waffen-SS uniform and deported them to special NKVD penal camps in Central Asia, where 
they faced secret trials and executions.  A similar future awaited the region‘s former 
Volksdeutsche, whom Allied forces captured and forcibly repatriated to the Soviet Union 
during 1945.  Ethnic German civilians also faced compulsory return to the Soviet Union.  In 
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late 1944, with the Red Army advancing through central Poland, many recently arrived Black 
Sea Germans fled further west to avoid capture by Soviet forces and permanent deportation 
to the Soviet interior.  Soviet authorities deported any former ethnic German residents that 
they captured to ―special settlements‖ in the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic.  
Volksdeutsche who avoided the Red Army filtered into the Allied occupation zones of 
Germany.  A handful of Black Sea Germans, who were often the most heavily implicated in 
the mass killing of Jews in the occupied Soviet Union, later applied for Displaced Persons 
status and immigrated to North America, where, with varying degrees of success, they 
avoided detection by postwar investigators.1232  Most Black Sea Germans, however, 
remained in what would become the Federal Republic of Germany and, despite maintaining 
Heimat organizations, such as the Landsmannschaft der Deutschen aus Russland, integrated 
into postwar West Germany. 
* * * 
 This dissertation, focused on Transnistria in southern Ukraine, the epicenter of 
Sonderkommando R‘s mission to conquered Soviet territory, has explored a comparatively 
under-studied dimension to wartime Nazi efforts to secure Lebensraum in the occupied 
Soviet Union: the wartime mobilization of Volksdeutsche as the vanguard of planned German 
settlement in the region.  Unable to populate conquered Soviet territory with Germans during 
the war, the Nazi regime marshaled local ethnic Germans for the National Socialist cause to 
stake a demographic claim to occupied Soviet territory.  To implement its wartime 
Volksdeutsche policy, Himmler dispatched Sonderkommando R, a special VoMi unit, to the 
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occupied Soviet Union in July 1941.  The region was home to the Black Sea Germans, whose 
130,000 members were the largest population of Soviet Volksdeutsche to come under the 
control of Nazi Germany and its allies during the Second World War.  Transnistria was also 
the venue in which Sonderkommando R had exceptional latitude to implement its plans.  
Unlike in the Reichskommissariat Ukraine, where Sonderkommando R had to contend with 
often uncooperative and powerful German authorities, who frequently remained hostile to the 
SS‘s efforts to mobilize area Volksdeutsche, in Transnistria Hoffmeyer‘s command had to 
deal with the region‘s Romanian occupiers.  Through a combination of high-level agreements 
and the willingness of the unit‘s local commanders to prosecute a low-intensity conflict with 
their Romanian counterparts, this exceptional situation proffered the SS a unique opportunity 
to enact its demographic fantasies in the occupied Soviet Union. 
 In Odessa and the surrounding countryside, Sonderkommando R launched an 
impressive campaign to mobilize the region‘s ethnic Germans as the biological building 
blocks of future Nazi territorial domination in the conquered Soviet Union.  
Sonderkommando R organized the region‘s ethnic German communities in anticipation of 
the militarized, agricultural settlements that the Nazi regime anticipated would someday dot 
the occupied countryside.  Its first move was an ambitious and brutal program of murder and 
ethnic cleansing.  Following on Einsatzgruppe D‘s earlier sweep through the region, 
Sonderkommando R identified and killed local Jews and the members of ―mixed race‖ 
families as well as area Volksdeutsche whom their neighbors denounced as ―communists.‖  
The unit then reorganized Transnistria‘s population by forcibly rearranging Volksdeutsche 
and Ukrainians to create ethnically homogenous Germanophone settlements, where none had 
existed previously.  To fend off Romanian pillaging and to secure durable SS influence in the 
446 
 
area, Sonderkommando R established a small, yet potent ethnic German militia force to 
guard the region‘s Volksdeutsche communities from outside interference.  The VoMi then 
channeled the region‘s scare agricultural resources to local Volksdeutsche—an initiative that, 
much to the delight of area ethnic Germans, effectively ended collectivized farming and 
reversed the community‘s past decades of socio-economic decline.  Hoffmeyer‘s 
subordinates supplemented these economic initiatives by importing massive quantities of 
clothing and other personal items from murdered Jews in occupied Poland to redistribute to 
Transnistria‘s Volksdeutsche.  Having purged Transnistria‘s ethnic German communities of 
racially, politically or behaviorally ―undesirable‖ individuals, Sonderkommando R enriched 
local members of the Nazi racial community. 
 Sonderkommando R‘s mission in Transnistria was not simply one of selective killing, 
ethnic cleansing, and targeted material support.  It also sought to shape the ideological 
convictions of area Volksdeutsche.  Without securing the support of area German-speakers 
for the National Socialist cause, the VoMi‘s efforts to mobilize them as a bulwark of 
―Germandom‖ in the occupied Soviet Union made little sense.  Hoffmeyer and his 
subordinates labored to ensure that the Nazi worldview was the only one available to local 
Volksdeutsche.  Dealing with a historically deeply religious people, Sonderkommando R had 
to wean the Black Sea Germans of their attachment to the Church for Nazi ideology to take 
root.  To this end, Sonderkommando R brutally circumscribed organized Christianity among 
Transnistria‘s Volksdeutsche by repressing the Catholic Church‘s activities and deploying 
Protestant clergy with impeccable National Socialist credentials to ensure that religious 
expression took the appropriate, National Socialist form.  In place of the Church, 
Sonderkommando R sought to secure the ―hearts and minds‖ of Transnistria‘s Volksdeutsche 
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through an impressive propaganda apparatus and youth education program.  Although limited 
by the resources at the unit‘s disposal, Sonderkommando R‘s newspaper, schools, and Nazi 
youth organizations labored to make Transnistria‘s Volksdeutsche into unflinching National 
Socialists. 
 Despite its unbridled ambition, Sonderkommando R‘s inability to establish the 
boundaries of ―Germandom‖ in the region hamstrung the VoMi‘s efforts in Transnistria.  The 
reasons for this were twofold.  First, the unit‘s general understanding of who qualified as an 
ethnic German was poorly calibrated to local realities.  During 1939 and 1940, much of 
Sonderkommando R‘s staff and most of its leadership corps had served as part of 
Hoffmeyer‘s Volksdeutsche ―resettlement‖ operations in Eastern Europe.  Over the course of 
these population transfers, the VoMi had developed a fly-by-night schema of ethnic 
classification that depended in large part on a prospective ethnic German‘s behavior, as 
measured by his or her historical affinity for National Socialism.  In short, for the SS real 
Volksdeutsche were good Nazis and vice versa.  As Sonderkommando R‘s staff rapidly 
realized, and as the unit‘s leaders readily admitted to their subordinates, these general criteria 
were badly suited to categorize the Black Sea Germans, who had a comparatively exceptional 
historical divorce from Germany and circumscribed opportunities for the type of prewar 
National Socialist activity that denoted ―Germanness‖ for the SS.  Spread thinly across 
Odessa and a vast expanse of surrounding countryside and without clear instructions on how 
to categorize a population that their superiors suggested could not be classified easily, 
Sonderkommando R‘s mid-level leaders frequently recruited supposedly reliable local ethnic 
Germans to identify the area‘s Volksdeutsche for them.  Asking a suspect population to define 
its own boundaries, and thereby to identify who would benefit materially from Nazi rule, 
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courted abuse.  Sonderkommando R‘s local helpers used the power to admit area residents to 
the Volksgemeinschaft to reward their non-German, and often their Jewish friends and 
relatives with this privileged status.  In locales, such as Odessa, where local SS officials 
caught wind of these Volksdeutsche ―imposters,‖ Sonderkommando R reacted brutally and 
used violence and murder in a futile attempt to clarify what they regarded as the region‘s 
ethnic quagmire. 
 Second, Transnistria‘s would-be Volksdeutsche often failed to live up to the SS‘s 
expectations.  Initially, Sonderkommando R‘s personnel believed that Einsatzgruppe D‘s 
sweep through the region during the summer of 1941 had murdered Jews and the members of 
―mixed race‖ marriages in Transnistria‘s Volksdeutsche settlements.  In mid-1942, however, 
they discovered that local ethnic German communities had conspired to hide a handful of 
thoroughly integrated local Jews and their immediate relatives from the SS.  While 
Hoffmeyer‘s subordinates ferreted out and murdered individuals who had eluded 
Einsatzgruppe D, the realization that area residents had undermined the Nazi project in the 
region shook Sonderkommando R‘s confidence in local ethnic Germans.  Frustrated by their 
inability to classify a local population that continued to assist some area Jews and their 
relatives, Sonderkommando R‘s midlevel leaders tried to crush largely imagined ethnic 
German resistance to its National Socialist project in Transnistria.  Absent clear guidelines 
from their superiors, many local SS commanders began to mete out increasingly harsh 
punishments to Transnistria‘s Volksdeutsche, which included incarceration, forced labor 
assignments, and even execution.  This violence reached such proportions and became so 
destructive that Hoffmeyer, ever the aloof commander, sacked Sonderkommando R‘s senior 
officer in Transnistria and establish a concentration camp for the region‘s ethnic Germans to 
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rein in his subordinates.  Everyday life under VoMi rule in Transnistria was a potentially 
dangerous one even for the area‘s Volksdeutsche. 
 In the midst of Sonderkommando R‘s progressively more brutal attempts to Nazify 
Transnistria‘s Volksdeutsche, local circumstances moved it to enlist area ethnic German 
assistance in implementing the Holocaust in the region.  From the beginning of Operation 
Barbarossa, German and Romanian forces had engaged in a diplomatic and periodically 
physical shoving match over how to ―solve‖ Transnistria‘s ―Jewish problem.‖  Romanian 
authorities preferred to deport the region‘s Jews farther eastward into German-occupied 
Soviet territory, where the Romanians believed that they would suffer a dire fate at German 
hands.  The Germans, by contrast, regarded the murder of Transnistria‘s Jews as the primary 
responsibility of their Romanian allies, who formally occupied the region.  Although accords 
between the two powers thwarted Romanian desires to relocate Jews across the Bug River to 
German-occupied Ukraine, nothing diminished the Romanian belief that Jews, many of 
whom they had deported into Transnistria with great enthusiasm, constituted a Soviet fifth 
column and a security threat.  Believing that advances at the front would soon permit the 
removal of Transnistria‘s Jews deeper into the occupied Soviet Union, throughout late 1941 
Romanian authorities concentrated Jewish prisoners in a series of camps along the Bug 
River‘s right bank.  These facilities were located near the region‘s primary concentrations of 
ethnic Germans and the heart of Sonderkommando R‘s mission in Transnistria.  When a 
typhus outbreak at one of the area‘s major Romanian concentration camps threatened to 
spread the disease to local Volksdeutsche, Sonderkommando R deployed its ethnic German 
militiamen to assist Romanian authorities in murdering the camp‘s prisoners during a multi-
week shooting operation.  As these killings were underway, the Romanian government 
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resolved that the continued presence of Jews near Odessa constituted an intolerable security 
threat and ordered their deportation in the direction of the Bug River.  Having already 
plunged into mass murder and suspecting that these Jews also constituted an immediate 
health hazard to the region‘s Volksdeutsche, Sonderkommando R mustered its ethnic German 
militia forces to interdict and ultimately to murder the deportees.  Although fully congruent 
with the Nazi regime‘s wider aims and practices, Hoffmeyer‘s command in Transnistria 
murdered tens of thousands of Jews at this particular time in this particular region for specific 
situational reasons and enlisted local Volksdeutsche assistance in genocide because it lacked 
other killers. 
 Why the Black Sea Germans agreed to participate in the Holocaust is a complicated 
question.  Their role in mass murder constituted a departure from historically comparatively 
good relations with area Jews.  In contrast to many residents of western Ukraine, during the 
summer of 1941 Transnistria‘s Volksdeutsche did not participate appreciably in pogroms.  
More so than deep historical anti-Semitism, the brutality of Soviet rule primed area 
Volksdeutsche to respond positively to Sonderkommando R‘s propaganda efforts to tie Jews 
to the Soviet regime—a connection that some local ethnic Germans had begun to make on an 
individual basis even prior to the invasion.  The potency of the Nazi propaganda apparatus is 
evident from Volksdeutsche treatment of local Jews.  In the fall of 1941, area ethnic Germans 
differentiated between a small number of thoroughly integrated local Jews, whom they had 
hidden from Einsatzgruppe D, and many other Jews, whom they regarded as responsible for 
Soviet repression and denounced to German authorities.  By contrast, in mid-1942, local 
Volksdeutsche revealed surviving Jews, whom they and their neighbors had hidden from the 
SS for months during one of the Holocaust‘s most intense episodes, to Sonderkommando R.  
451 
 
Although Soviet violence had planted the seeds of Volksdeutsche anti-Semitism, they 
germinated under Sonderkommando R‘s meticulous gardening. 
 In addition to cultivating indigenous anti-Semitism, Sonderkommando R consciously 
and unconsciously brought powerful pressures to bear on the region‘s Volksdeutsche 
militiamen that encouraged their participation in the Holocaust.  On the one hand, specific 
situational factors, such as operating in militia units that were extended families, and 
historical conditions, such as the brutality of Stalinist rule, sharpened the potency of 
universally applicable social psychological factors.  The members of Transnistria‘s 
Volksdeutsche Selbstschutz thus responded to pressures to conform to group behavior and to 
obey authority very differently than most German perpetrators whom scholars have 
examined.  On the other hand, the tenuousness of the category of ―Germanness‖ in the region 
equipped Sonderkommando R with unique leverage to encourage Volksdeutsche complicity 
in the Holocaust.  Area residents, whom prewar Soviet authorities had schooled in the local 
politics of property redistribution and agricultural production, were keenly aware of the 
material benefits of presenting themselves as Volksdeutsche to the SS.  They were also 
acutely sensitive to the permeability of the boundaries of ―Germanness‖ in the region 
because many of them had used control over ethnic classification to obtain property and 
security for their non-German and sometimes Jewish neighbors and relatives.  Taking part in 
the Holocaust became, for many local residents, a key way to demonstrate their National 
Socialist credentials that denoted ―Germanness‖ for the SS.  Sonderkommando R‘s efforts to 
mobilize area Volksdeutsche in southern Ukraine helped to create a situation in which area 
denizens chose to participate in the Holocaust. 
 This dissertation has recovered Sonderkommando R‘s efforts to mobilize ethnic 
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Germans in Romanian-controlled southern Ukraine and the unit‘s involvement in the 
Holocaust.  It has also reconstructed and analyzed the decision-making context in which the 
area‘s Volksdeutsche decided to participate in mass murder.  Beyond contributing new 
information about an understudied episode of the Nazi occupation of the Soviet Union during 
the Second World War and dissecting the motivations of a prominent, but little-researched 
group of Holocaust perpetrators, this study has two broader implications for future 
scholarship on the history of the Holocaust.  First, it highlights the specific circumstances in 
which area Volksdeutsche chose to participate in genocide.  Scholars have long rejected 
claims by accused perpetrators that they killed because they feared dire consequences for not 
complying with their murderous orders.  Instead, social scientists and historians have charted 
a constellation of reasons why perpetrators killed that include anti-Semitism, indoctrination, 
and social psychological pressures.  This study explores how the Nazi regime created 
circumstances that left some prospective perpetrators with decisions that were not the 
―choiceless choices‖ of their victims, but nevertheless difficult ones.1233  It demonstrates that 
the Third Reich was able to create killers by combining a system of extreme reward and 
punishment with an exploitation of past resentments, which, in the case of the Black Sea 
Germans, were more anti-communist than anti-Semitic.  This dissertation supports the need 
for multicausal explanations for perpetrator behavior that is cognizant of particular contexts 
and circumstances—factors that are key to understanding the role of Soviet Volksdeutsche in 
the Holocaust. 
 Second, it highlights the value of local and regional studies to recover the antecedents 
                                                 
1233 Lawrence L. Langer, Versions of Survival: The Holocaust and the Human Spirit (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1982), 146. 
453 
 
to genocide in the occupied territories of the Soviet Union.  Insofar as scholars have charted 
preliminary explanations for the participation of local residents in the Holocaust, such as a 
historically high rate of anti-Semitism and venality, they have focused on large swaths of 
territory and extrapolated local conditions from one area to another, often without a detailed 
understanding of the occupation‘s dynamics or the local interethnic topography.  Pogroms in 
western Ukraine during the summer of 1941, for example, have become either implicitly or 
explicitly the paradigm for understanding all indigenous complicity in the Holocaust.  Yet 
ongoing research underscores that region‘s unique historical features and questions its 
representativeness for the occupied Soviet Union as a whole.  This study‘s findings, 
moreover, suggest that very different local dynamics were at play in Transnistria‘s 
Volksdeutsche settlements.  Further scholarship focused on the local and regional levels will 
help to nuance research on how the Nazi regime layered its plans for a demographic 
revolution over the Soviet borderlands‘ often violent interethnic milieu.  The Holocaust, Jan 
Gross reminds us, was often a neighborhood affair. 
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APPENDIX 
Einwandererzentrale (EWZ) records for the 89 militiamen attached to Sonderkommando R‘s 
Bereichkommando XI in Rastatt can be found in Record Group 242: Captured German and 
Related Records on Microfilm at the United States National Archives and Records 
Administration (NARA) in College Park, Maryland. 
Surname 
Given 
Name 
Type of 
EWZ 
Record 
NARA 
Sub-
Collection 
Reel 
Number 
Starting 
Frame 
Ending 
Frame 
Ackermann Adalbert E-G Kartei EWZ 57 I3 2036 2038 
Ackermann Albert E-G Kartei EWZ 57 I3 2046 2047 
Ackermann Andreas E-G Kartei EWZ 57 I3 2210 2212 
Ackermann Bernhard E-G Kartei EWZ 57 I3 2404 2406 
Ackermann Erasmus E-G Kartei EWZ 57 I3 2792 2802 
Ackermann Eugen E-G Kartei EWZ 57 I3 2860 2864 
Ackermann Peter E-G Kartei EWZ 57 I4 1386 1396 
Ackermann Vincenz E-G Kartei EWZ 50 I4 1778 1787 
    
UdSSR 
Antrag 
EWZ 57 A3 778 804 
Anton Nikodemus E-G Kartei EWZ 50 I34 1312 1319 
    
UdSSR 
Antrag 
EWZ 57 A13 2340 2368 
Belitzer Johannes E-G Kartei EWZ 50 I34 820 821 
    
UdSSR 
Antrag 
EWZ 57 A42 916 934 
Belitzer Leonhard E-G Kartei EWZ 57 I34 822 824 
Bengert Eugen E-G Kartei EWZ 50 I92 1444 1445 
    
UdSSR 
Antrag 
EWZ 57 A44 696 718 
Benz Johannes E-G Kartei EWZ 57 I93 1974 1982 
Benz Johann E-G Kartei EWZ 50 I93 1988 2000 
    
UdSSR 
Antrag 
EWZ 57 A45 658 672 
Benz Peter E-G Kartei EWZ 57 I93 2278 2285 
Berger Peter E-G Kartei EWZ 56 I98 1620 1621 
    
Rasse 
Kartei 
EWZ 50 A32 426 437 
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UdSSR 
Antrag 
EWZ 57 A49 544 564 
Bockmeier Johann E-G Kartei EWZ 57 I138 2168 2178 
Bockmeier Martin E-G Kartei EWZ 57 I139 2324 2328 
Ehrmanntraut Christian E-G Kartei EWZ 56 K15 430 444 
    
Rasse 
Kartei 
EWZ 57 B28 2252 2256 
Ehrmanntraut Leonhard E-G Kartei EWZ 56 K15 500 511 
    
Rasse 
Kartei 
EWZ 57 B28 2270 2271 
Ehrmanntraut Michael E-G Kartei EWZ 56 K15 514 520 
    
Rasse 
Kartei 
EWZ 50 A32 2272 2273 
    
UdSSR 
Antrag 
EWZ 57 B36 894 910 
Ehrmanntraut Nikolaus E-G Kartei EWZ 56 K15 528 537 
Ehrmanntraut Nikolaus 
Rasse 
Kartei 
EWZ 57 B28 2276 2278 
Ehrmanntraut Pius E-G Kartei EWZ 57 K15 538 548 
Ehrmanntraut Rafael E-G Kartei EWZ 57 K15 552 562 
Ehrmanntraut Theodor E-G Kartei EWZ 56 K15 588 598 
    
Rasse 
Kartei 
EWZ 57 B28 2288 2289 
Eichstätter Emil E-G Kartei EWZ 57 K17 1268 1270 
Feht Johann E-G Kartei EWZ 57 K55 1738 1738 
Feininger Anton E-G Kartei EWZ 57 K56 1748 1757 
Feininger August E-G Kartei EWZ 57 K56 1778 1788 
Feininger Eugen E-G Kartei EWZ 56 K56 1798 1808 
    
Rasse 
Kartei 
EWZ 57 B40 2504 2504 
Feininger Heinrich E-G Kartei EWZ 57 K56 1876 1885 
Feininger Jakob E-G Kartei EWZ 56 K56 1898 1906 
    
Rasse 
Kartei 
EWZ 57 B58 1478 1498 
Feininger Jakob E-G Kartei EWZ 57 K56 1888 1898 
Feininger Josef E-G Kartei EWZ 56 K56 1938 1952 
    
Rasse 
Kartei 
EWZ 57 B40 2512 2513 
Feininger Max E-G Kartei EWZ 57 K56 2050 2060 
Feininger Nikodemus E-G Kartei EWZ 57 K56 2064 2076 
Feininger Nikodemus E-G Kartei EWZ 57 K56 2082 2083 
Feininger Robert E-G Kartei EWZ 57 K56 2126 2136 
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Feininger Thomas E-G Kartei EWZ 50 K56 2162 2163 
Fröhlich Josef 
UdSSR 
Antrag 
EWZ 57 B84 1480 1488 
Fröhlich Josef E-G Kartei EWZ 57 K112 1598 1604 
Fröhlich Nikodemus E-G Kartei EWZ 57 K112 2182 2184 
Fröhlich Matheas E-G Kartei EWZ 50 K112 2420 2429 
    
UdSSR 
Antrag 
EWZ 57 B84 2176 2184 
Fröhlich Matthias E-G Kartei EWZ 57 K112 2430 2893 
Fröhlich Peter E-G Kartei EWZ 50 K112 2894 2896 
    
UdSSR 
Antrag 
EWZ 57 B84 2406 2432 
Gärtner Johann E-G Kartei EWZ 50 K126 1204 1212 
    
UdSSR 
Antrag 
EWZ 57 B91 2878 2904 
Gärtner Josef E-G Kartei EWZ 50 K126 1308 1316 
    
UdSSR 
Antrag 
EWZ 57 B91 2930 2964 
Götzfried Eustachius E-G Kartei EWZ 57 L23 18 20 
Götzfried Nikodemus E-G Kartei EWZ 57 L23 46 54 
Götzfried Theophilia E-G Kartei EWZ 57 L23 72 73 
Hanecker Georg E-G Kartei EWZ 50 L85 1890 1898 
    
UdSSR 
Antrag 
EWZ 57 C47 1988 2016 
Heberle Eugen E-G Kartei EWZ 57 L104 906 907 
Heberle Franz E-G Kartei EWZ 57 L104 912 916 
Heck Eugen E-G Kartei EWZ 50 L105 864 871 
    
UdSSR 
Antrag 
EWZ 57 C56 2298 2314 
Heck Eugen E-G Kartei EWZ 57 L105 872 877 
Heck Franz E-G Kartei EWZ 57 L105 972 980 
Heck Franz E-G Kartei EWZ 50 L105 984 994 
Heck Franz 
UdSSR 
Antrag 
EWZ 57 C56 2500 2502 
Heck Franz E-G Kartei EWZ 57 L105 998 1006 
Heck Ignaz E-G Kartei EWZ 57 L105 1204 1211 
Heck Jakob E-G Kartei EWZ 57 L105 1224 1232 
Heck Johannes E-G Kartei EWZ 57 L105 1258 1265 
Heck Johannes E-G Kartei EWZ 57 L105 1266 1273 
Heck Johannes E-G Kartei EWZ 57 L105 1274 1281 
Heck Johannes E-G Kartei EWZ 57 L105 1282 1290 
Hekk Max E-G Kartei EWZ 57 L105 1720 1727 
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Heck Max E-G Kartei EWZ 50 L105 1684 1686 
    
UdSSR 
Antrag 
EWZ 57 C57 410 412 
Heck Peter E-G Kartei EWZ 57 L105 1794 1802 
Heck Peter E-G Kartei EWZ 50 L105 1810 1812 
Heck Peter 
UdSSR 
Antrag 
EWZ 57 C57 592 604 
Heck Philipp E-G Kartei EWZ 50 L105 1850 1858 
    
UdSSR 
Antrag 
EWZ 57 C57 606 622 
Heck Siegfried E-G Kartei EWZ 57 L105 2014 2022 
Heck Wilhelm E-G Kartei EWZ 57 L105 2102 2110 
Hirsch Georg E-G Kartei EWZ 57 M15 2806 2815 
Hirsch Georg E-G Kartei EWZ 50 M16 454 456 
Hirsch Josef 
UdSSR 
Antrag 
EWZ 50 D8 1454 1470 
Hirsch Stefan 
UdSSR 
Antrag 
EWZ 57 D8 2722 2740 
Hübner Waldemar E-G Kartei EWZ 50 M55 468 470 
Hübner Waldemar 
UdSSR 
Antrag 
EWZ 50 D27 818 830 
Kniel Franz 
UdSSR 
Antrag 
EWZ 57 E21 110 130 
Koffler Christian E-G Kartei EWZ 50 N88 2816 2826 
    
UdSSR 
Antrag 
EWZ 57 E26 1662 1690 
Koffler Peter E-G Kartei EWZ 57 N89 2562 2572 
Kopp Johannes E-G Kartei EWZ 50 N106 1230 1467 
    
UdSSR 
Antrag 
EWZ 57 E32 2262 2290 
Kopp Josef E-G Kartei EWZ 57 N106 1468 1478 
Kowitz Franz E-G Kartei EWZ 50 N125 1192 1202 
    
UdSSR 
Antrag 
EWZ 57 E39 784 818 
Kowitz Peter E-G Kartei EWZ 57 N125 1376 1381 
Kowis Philipp E-G Kartei EWZ 57 N125 1384 1394 
Mayer Gregor E-G Kartei EWZ 50 O140 2304 2314 
    
UdSSR 
Antrag 
EWZ 57 F20 1678 1706 
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Mayer Josef E-G Kartei EWZ 50 O142 2344 2354 
    
UdSSR 
Antrag 
EWZ 57 F21 756 800 
Maier Nikodemus E-G Kartei EWZ 50 O145 2038 2048 
    
UdSSR 
Antrag 
EWZ 57 F22 1228 1258 
Mayer Philipp E-G Kartei EWZ 57 O146 1516 1520 
Mayer Raphael E-G Kartei EWZ 50 O146 1712 1722 
Mayer Raphael 
UdSSR 
Antrag 
EWZ 57 F22 2442 2462 
Meier Raphael E-G Kartei EWZ 57 O146 1742 1726 
Mekler Peter E-G Kartei EWZ 50 P40 1734 1744 
    
UdSSR 
Antrag 
EWZ 57 F44 626 652 
Metz Philipp E-G Kartei EWZ 56 P53 566 574 
    
Rasse 
Kartei 
EWZ 50 F33 2856 2858 
    
UdSSR 
Antrag 
EWZ 57 F50 846 858 
Nuss Christian E-G Kartei EWZ 50 P155 1640 1648 
    
UdSSR 
Antrag 
EWZ 57 G4 1730 1746 
Nuss Jakob E-G Kartei EWZ 50 P155 1946 1956 
    
UdSSR 
Antrag 
EWZ 57 G4 2156 2184 
Nuss Thomas E-G Kartei EWZ 57 P155 2402 2406 
Obenloch Eugen E-G Kartei EWZ 57 P156 1692 1699 
Obenloch Philipp E-G Kartei EWZ 50 P156 1794 1798 
    
UdSSR 
Antrag 
EWZ 57 G5 1092 1114 
Pfoo Eugen E-G Kartei EWZ 57 Q72 2260 2260 
Redler Eduard E-G Kartei EWZ 50 Q147 174 181 
    
UdSSR 
Antrag 
EWZ 57 G58 1198 1224 
Reichert Johannes E-G Kartei EWZ 50 R6 1932 1934 
    
UdSSR 
Antrag 
EWZ 57 G61 1618 1640 
Reinhauer Anton E-G Kartei EWZ 57 R16 2192 2192 
Renner Jakob E-G Kartei EWZ 50 R24 2636 2537 
    
UdSSR 
Antrag 
EWZ 57 G70 80 86 
Scherger Benno E-G Kartei EWZ 50 R129 2708 2712 
Scherger Johannes UdSSR EWZ 57 H31 264 274 
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Antrag 
Scherger Johannes E-G Kartei EWZ 57 R129 2674 2681 
Scherger Josef E-G Kartei EWZ 57 R129 2690 2698 
Schmidt Eduard E-G Kartei EWZ 57 S3 1178 1185 
Schmidt Jakob E-G Kartei EWZ 57 S13 586 594 
Schmidt Johann E-G Kartei EWZ 57 S13 2994 2998 
Schmidt Josef E-G Kartei EWZ 50 S14 1306 1313 
    
UdSSR 
Antrag 
EWZ 57 H46 2318 2336 
Schmidt Matthias E-G Kartei EWZ 57 S17 2106 2116 
Seifert Adolf E-G Kartei EWZ 57 S89 44 45 
Seifert Peter E-G Kartei EWZ 57 S89 1844 1851 
Seelinger Georg E-G Kartei EWZ 56 S94 228 240 
Selinger Georg 
Rasse 
Kartei 
EWZ 57 I32 2712 2713 
Seelinger Gregor E-G Kartei EWZ 57 S94 248 250 
Seelinger Peter E-G Kartei EWZ 57 S94 486 494 
Steif Johann E-G Kartei EWZ 50 T13 258 264 
Stolz Peter 
UdSSR 
Antrag 
EWZ 57 I33 1154 1168 
Thomä Franz E-G Kartei EWZ 50 T75 2556 2556 
    
UdSSR 
Antrag 
EWZ 57 I50 402 428 
Thomä Franz E-G Kartei EWZ 57 T75 2568 2576 
Thomä Jakob E-G Kartei EWZ 50 T75 2684 2691 
    
UdSSR 
Antrag 
EWZ 57 I50 496 514 
Thomä Jakob E-G Kartei EWZ 57 T75 2692 2703 
Thomä Jakob E-G Kartei EWZ 57 T75 2704 2718 
Thomä 
Johann 
a.k.a. 
Raphael 
E-G Kartei EWZ 50 T75 2750 2758 
Thomä   
UdSSR 
Antrag 
EWZ 57 I50 516 548 
Thomä Johannes E-G Kartei EWZ 50 T75 2762 2770 
    
UdSSR 
Antrag 
EWZ 57 I50 550 576 
Thomä Johannes E-G Kartei EWZ 50 T75 2770 2778 
Thomä Johannes 
UdSSR 
Antrag 
EWZ 57 I50 578 594 
Thomä Johannes E-G Kartei EWZ 57 T75 2788 2797 
Thomä Karl E-G Kartei EWZ 57 T75 2860 2868 
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Thomä Leonhard E-G Kartei EWZ 57 T75 2918 2926 
Thomä Max E-G Kartei EWZ 57 T76 32 40 
Thomä Michael E-G Kartei EWZ 57 T76 44 54 
Thomä Michael E-G Kartei EWZ 57 T76 56 64 
Thomä Peter E-G Kartei EWZ 57 T76 122 135 
Thomä Peter E-G Kartei EWZ 57 T76 136 139 
Thomä Peter E-G Kartei EWZ 57 T76 140 147 
Thomä Wilhelm E-G Kartei EWZ 57 T76 316 324 
Weinberger Johann E-G Kartei EWZ 50 U22 450 460 
Weinberger Johann 
UdSSR 
Antrag 
EWZ 57 J2 616 624 
Weinberger Johannes E-G Kartei EWZ 50 U22 462 471 
    
UdSSR 
Antrag 
EWZ 57 J2 628 644 
Vogt Franz E-G Kartei EWZ 57 U89 1206 1216 
Vogt Franz E-G Kartei EWZ 57 U89 1218 1228 
Wollbaum Markus E-G Kartei EWZ 57 U101 2816 2816 
Wollbaum Mattias E-G Kartei EWZ 50 U101 2824 2826 
    
UdSSR 
Antrag 
EWZ 57 J32 1588 1610 
Wollbaum Michael E-G Kartei EWZ 50 U101 2836 2843 
    
UdSSR 
Antrag 
EWZ 57 J32 1612 1642 
Zenther Eduard E-G Kartei   U131 1310 1313 
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Cologne: Böhlau, 1978. 
Eisfeld, Alfred and Victor Herdt, eds. Deportation, Sondersiedlung, Arbeitsarmee: Deutsche 
in der Sowjetunion 1941 bis 1956. Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1996. 
Ericksen, Robert P. Theologians Under Hitler: Gerhard Kittel, Paul Althaus, and Emanuel 
Hirsch. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1985. 
Fitzpatrick, Sheila. Stalin’s Peasants: Resistance and Survival in the Russian Village after 
Collectivization. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994. 
Fleischhauer, Ingeborg. Die Deutschen im Zarenreich: Zwei Jahrhunderte deutsche-russische 
Kulturgemeinschaft. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1986. 
————. Das Dritte Reich und die Deutschen in der Sowjetunion. Stuttgart: Deutsche 
Verlags-Anstalt, 1983. 
————. ―The Nationalities Policy of the Tsars Reconsidered—The Case of the Russian 
Germans.‖ Journal of Modern History 53, no. 1, (1981): D1065-D1090. 
Frank, Hans. Das Diensttagebuch des Deutschen Generalgouverneurs in Polen 1939-1945. 
Edited by Werner Präg and Wolfgang Jacobmeyer. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-
Anstalt, 1975.   
Friedländer, Saul. Nazi Germany and the Jews: The Years of Persecution, 1933-1939. New 
York: Harper Perennial, 1998. 
————. Pius XII and the Third Reich: A Documentation. London: Chatto & Windus, 1966. 
————. The Years of Extermination: Nazi Germany and the Jews, 1939-1945. New York: 
Harper Perennial, 2008. 
Friedman, Philip. ―Ukrainian-Jewish Relations during the Nazi Occupation,‖ YIVO Annual of 
Jewish Social Science 12 (1958): 259-296. 
Furber, David and Wendy Lower. ―Colonialism and Genocide in Nazi-Occupied Poland and 
Ukraine,‖ in Empire, Colony, Genocide: Conquest, Occupation, and Subaltern 
Resistance in World History. Edited by Dirk Moses.  New York: Berghahn Books, 
2008. 
Gatrell, Peter. A Whole Empire Walking: Refugees in Russia during World War I. 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999. 
Gellately, Robert. The Gestapo and German Society: Enforcing Racial Policy 1935-1945. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990. 
Gerlach, Christian. Kalkulierte Morde: Die deutsche Wirtschafts- und Vernichtungspolitik in 
466 
 
Weißrußland 1941 bis 1944. Hamburg, Hamburger Edition, 1999. 
German, A.A. Nemetskaia avtonomiia na Volge: 1918-1941. Saratov: Izdvo Saratovskogo 
universiteta, 1992. 
Gilbert, G.M. The Psychology of Dictatorship: Based on an Examination of the Leaders of 
Nazi Germany. New York: Ronald Press Co., 1950. 
————. Nuremberg Diary. New York: Farrar, Straus, 1947. 
Goldhagen, Daniel J. Hitler’s Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust. 
New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1996. 
Görlich, Frank. ―Volkstumspropaganda und Antisemitismus in der Wochenzeitung ‗Der 
Deutsche in Transnistrien‘ 1942-1944,‖ in Holocaust an der Peripherie: Judenpolitik 
und Judenmord in Rumänien und Transnistrien 1940-1944. Edited by Wolfgang Benz 
and Brigitte Mihok. Berlin: Metropol Verlag, 2009. 
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Raum im besetzten Polen 1940-1944.‖ Archiv für Sozialgeschichte 38 (1998): 191-
214. 
————. ―German Women‘s Recollections of the ‗Ethnic Struggle‘ in Occupied Poland 
During the Second World War,‖ in Home / Front: The Military, War and Gender in 
Twentieth-Century Germany. Edited by Karen Hagemann and Stefanie Schüler-
Springorum. Oxford: Berg, 2002. 
————. ―We Forgot All the Jews and Poles‘: German Women and the ‗Ethnic Struggle‘ in 
Nazi-Occupied Poland.‖ Contemporary European History 10, no. 3 (2001): 447-61. 
————. Women and the Nazi East: Agents and Witnesses of Germanization. New Haven, 
CT: Yale University Press, 2003. 
Herbert, Ulrich. Best: Biographische Studien über Radikalismus, Weltanschauung und 
Vernunft, 1903-1989. Bonn: J.H.W. Dietz, 1996. 
Herf, Jeffrey. The Jewish Enemy: Nazi Propaganda During World War II and the Holocaust. 
467 
 
Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2006. 
Heschel, Susannah. The Aryan Jesus: Christian Theologians and the Bible in Nazi Germany. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008. 
Hidden, John. ―The Weimar Republic and the Problem of Auslandsdeutsche,‖ Journal of 
Contemporary History 12, no. 2 (1977): 273-289. 
Hilberg, Raul. The Destruction of the European Jews. 3rd edition. 3 vols., New Haven, CT: 
Yale University Press, 2003. 
Himka, John-Paul. ―The Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) and the Holocaust,‖ (presented at 
the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies Annual Convention, 
Boston, MA, 2009). 
Hochstetter, Dorothee. Motorisierung und “Volksgemeinschaft”: Das Nationalsozialistische 
Kraftfahrkorps, NSKK, 1931-1945. München: R. Oldenbourg, 2005. 
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